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I, Leah C. Butler Ph.D., hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminal Justice.

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Race and Redemption at a Correctional Turning Point

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Race and Redemption at a Correctional Turning Point

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by

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ABSTRACT

Beginning around 2010, the United States saw a sea change that shifted the focus of correctional policy away from punishment and toward promoting rehabilitation and the successful reentry of prisoners upon returning to society. Two key aspects of this shift have been (1) the call for a pathway by which those who have committed crime can be "redeemed" for their past misdeeds and go on to live a life free of crime and (2) demands to acknowledge and put an end to racial disparities and injustices in the criminal justice system. Although criminal justice public opinion research has done well to examine how animus toward Black people impacts support for punitive policies, research on public opinion of progressive reforms has received decidedly less attention. Likewise, researchers have largely ignored racial attitudes *other than animus* that have long existed but are becoming increasingly apparent in present day America. In this context, the purpose of this dissertation is to measure a diverse set of racial attitudes that capture White Americans' resentment toward Blacks, sympathy toward Blacks, and beliefs about Whiteness and to evaluate the effects of those attitudes on individuals' opinions of wide range of correctional policies.

To do so, the current study involves the analysis of data from a 2019 national survey of 764 White people in the United States conducted by the opt-in Internet panel survey company, YouGov. The survey contained measures of racial resentment, racial sympathy, and White nationalism, as well as measures of demographic characteristics, political affiliations, cultural beliefs, and perceived salience of crime and threat. These measures are used to predict public support for thirteen different correctional orientations, including those that are punitive (e.g., support for the death penalty), progressive (e.g., support for rehabilitation), and race-specific (e.g., belief in the redeemability of Black offenders). Exploratory factor analysis is used to

evaluate the validity of all multi-item measures and to show that racial resentment, racial sympathy, and White nationalism are three distinct constructs. Stepwise logistic and Ordinary Least Squares regression models are estimated to predict support for each of the thirteen policy opinions.

Viewed within the context of prior research, the findings support the claim that public punitiveness is declining and that support for policies that seek to rehabilitate and promote the social inclusion of former offenders is widespread. Importantly, this study shows that correctional policy opinions are inextricably linked to racial beliefs, and that a diverse set of racial attitudes (i.e., not just racial resentment) must be considered in future studies of criminal justice public opinion. These findings have implications for policymakers and practitioners who wish to implement progressive reforms. Further, these findings demonstrate that at a moment when race and justice are at the forefront of the national consciousness, large percentages of White Americans, especially those who are sympathetic to the suffering of Black people, believe that those who have committed crime are deserving of redemption.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The moment that I look back on as setting into motion what would become "the rest of my life" took place in 2011 when I emailed the professor of my Criminology class, Dr. Thomas Vander Ven, to ask if he had any research projects on which I might be able to work with him. Dr. Vander Ven kindly replied and asked me if I'd like to draft a literature review to help him with an encyclopedia entry he was writing. I recently found the paper I wrote for him—four double-spaced pages, stapled together, in a box in my closet—as I was finishing the conclusion to this volume and preparing to move halfway across the country to start my first academic job. In the years that have passed since I wrote that short paper, Dr. Vander Ven became my mentor and my "academic father," and has continued to shape both my personal and professional development. He is one of the many people who I must thank for making this dissertation possible.

While at the 2015 American Society of Criminology Annual Meeting in Washington, DC, Dr. Vander Ven encouraged me to attend the reception for the University of Cincinnati, find *his* academic father, Dr. Francis Cullen, and ask him about the Ph.D. program at UC. And so, the next pivotal moment that led to the culmination of this dissertation was when Dr. Cullen sat down with me at that reception and convinced me that if I wanted to study corrections, I would be stupid not to apply to UC. One year later I was a UC student. At the same UC reception at ASC, this time in New Orleans, Louisiana, Dr. Cullen asked if I would like to be his student. Of course, I said yes, and in that moment one of the most innovative and influential criminologists of all time became my "academic grandfather." Without Dr. Cullen, this dissertation quite literally would not be what it has become, and I would not be the scholar I am today. Dr. Cullen has shown me how much fun it is to conduct research and what an extraordinary privilege it is

that finding answers for the questions we have about the world is an actual "job." I am endlessly grateful for his mentorship.

In addition to Dr. Vander Ven and Dr. Cullen, I want to thank the other members of my dissertation committee—Dr. Ben Feldmeyer and Dr. Paula Smith. In my second year at UC, I took Dr. Feldmeyer's course on race and crime. Prior to taking that class, I believed that race was an important but ultimately "special" topic in criminology. His class taught me that thinking about race is essential to all criminological work, as race—including the racial beliefs held by members of the public—is influential in virtually all aspects of criminology. I am thankful that Dr. Feldmeyer agreed to further my knowledge of this area by contributing his expertise to my dissertation. Dr. Smith also provided invaluable feedback by prompting me to think about the implications of my dissertation beyond policy. Her expertise in the area of corrections and her insights from working directly with prisoners and correctional officers helped me broaden my understanding of the potential implications of my study and how to explain why my findings are important not only for policymakers but also for practitioners in the criminal justice system.

I must also acknowledge the many faculty and staff members at the University of Cincinnati to whom I owe much gratitude. This includes (but is certainly not limited to) the School of Criminal Justice administrative staff—Jean Gary, Erin Cochran, Janice Miller, and Betsy Macke—as well as Dr. Pamela Wilcox, Dr. Michael Benson, Dr. Christopher Sullivan, Dr. J. C. Barnes, and Dr. John Eck. I especially want to thank Dr. Bonnie Fisher for the mentorship she has given me over the three years that I have had the pleasure of working with her. Over those years we've spent countless hours in her office—me typing syntax as fast as I can and Dr. Fisher scribbling ideas and calculations onto any sheet of paper within reach, both of us thinking out loud trying to figure out some complex problem until suddenly one of us would think of

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Part of what makes this dissertation unique is that the data I analyze were collected specifically for this study and are therefore not available anywhere else. Thus, my project would not have been possible without the support of Dr. Velmer Burton of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock who dedicated his research funds to conduct the YouGov survey by which the data were collected. Dr. Burton recognized the scholarly value in the study I set out to complete and trusted that the YouGov survey would make an important contribution to our understanding of correctional policy opinions. I will forever be grateful for the faith he had in me and the support he gave to make this project a reality.

I want to also thank the many friends who have helped me maintain my sanity over the past four years. First, there are my friends from the University of Cincinnati: Clare Strange, my ASC roommate for life, whose mere presence can bring calm in the most chaotic times and who has more wisdom than just about anyone I know. Sultan Altikriti, who, after we submitted our comprehensive exams, asked me "how many jokes did you write in yours?" and whose exuberance and humor made the past four years the most fun times of my life. Diana Sun, who is not only incredibly hardworking, but who also—at the risk of sounding like I'm making a cheesy name pun—is like sunshine; she exudes warmth and kindness. And of course, Paul Adams and Ryan Alunan, Clare and Diana's respective partners, who became honorary members of the graduate program and kept us all from only talking about criminology at parties. I owe gratitude

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Much of this dissertation was written at a Cincinnati coffee shop and taproom called Bean & Barley on Madison Rd. The baristas of Bean & Barley—Sheila, Owen, Chad, Justin, Jason, Matt, Abby, and Tamba—made me countless flat whites and cortados, served the best selection of craft beer in town, listened to me complain about the stresses of graduate school, and over the countless hours I spent there, became my good friends.

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It is impossible to find the words to express how grateful I am for my siblings, David and Sarah—who each told me they read about four pages of this dissertation, but that those pages were *really* good—and my parents, Tammy and Leon Butler. Mom and Dad, I remember you telling me when I was little kid that I could be a great writer one day. Without you I likely would have never believed myself capable of accomplishing what I have done thus far, much less have had the diligence to actually do it. I love you.

Part of the writing of this dissertation was completed during the outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States and around the world. As my husband and I practiced "social distancing" from the rest of society in an effort to do our part in slowing the spread of the virus, the physical distance between the two of us was limited to the confines of our 700-square-foot apartment on the bottom floor of a 100-year-old house in Cincinnati with our two precious but very loud dogs—Arnie and Rudy. And so as much as I must thank you, Nick, for all the support and encouragement that you have shown me since we first started dating, I must also thank you for being the only person in the world I could be stuck in a room with for three months (and counting) and never grow tired of. You are the person with whom I have the most fun, the best conversation, and the strongest sense that everything is going to be OK. Thank you, Nick, for everything.

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Chapter 1

RACIAL ATTITUDES AND CORRECTIONAL POLICY

Around 2010, the United States experienced a historical turning point in correctional policy that reoriented the goals, policies, and practices that had dominated the previous four decades. Beginning in the early 1970s—in part in response to rising crime rates across the country—political rhetoric, public opinion, and public policies turned toward harsher punishment for those who violate the law and ultimately toward the exclusion of those people from society. This era of offender exclusion—marked by tough-on-crime policies such as truth-in-sentencing laws, mandatory minimums, and three-strikes-you're-out laws—resulted in a carceral state in which 2.3 million Americans were behind bars on any given day (Petersilia & Cullen, 2015).

Suddenly, the "sensibility" (Tonry, 2004) of the nation with regard to correctional policy began to change. Shortly after the financial crisis of 2008, policies moved from treating offenders as super-predators whose threat required "total incapacitation" (Simon, 2014, p. 23) to searching for ways to allow for their rehabilitation and redemption (Cullen, Lee, Butler, & Thielo, 2020). This era of offender inclusion is marked by declining (or slowing growth) in prison populations (Petersilia & Cullen, 2015), lower public punitiveness (Enns, 2016; Pickett, 2019), federal reforms such as the First Step Act (Cohen, 2019), and state reforms to reduce prison crowding and expenditures such as those in Georgia, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Alaska, and Mississippi (Cohen, 2017; Warnberg & Olsen, 2019).

In addition to these policy reforms, information on mass incarceration and the disproportionate effect of the get-tough movement on racial minorities has permeated popular culture, with bestselling books such as Michelle Alexander's *The New Jim Crow* (2010), movies such as *13th* (Barish, DuVernay, & Averick, 2016), limited series such as *When They See Us*

(DuVernay, 2019), and many other pieces of popular media. Thus, a call for racial justice has been a key feature of the movement toward offender inclusion.

A series of fatal shootings of unarmed Black men and boys brought the issue of racial injustice back to the surface of American consciousness during the early 2010s. In 2012, 17-year-old Trayvon Martin was walking home one evening and was shot and killed by a citizen on neighborhood watch (Alvarez & Buckley, 2013). Ultimately, the man who shot Martin was found not guilty of second-degree murder and manslaughter; for many, his acquittal symbolized a failure of the criminal justice system to achieve justice for Black crime victims (Alvarez & Buckley, 2013). The case sparked the formation of Black Lives Matter, a grassroots activist movement "whose mission is to build local power and to intervene in violence inflicted on Black communities by the state and vigilantes" ("About Black Lives Matter," n.d.).

Two years later, the shooting of Michael Brown, an 18-year-old Black man, in August 2014 by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri incited continued activist and organization efforts by Black Lives Matter as well as protests and riots in Ferguson and other cities throughout the country ("What We Believe", n.d.). The unrest intensified with the November 24, 2014 announcement that a grand jury would not indict the officer who shot Brown and with the fatal shooting of Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old Black boy, by a police officer in Cleveland, Ohio just two days prior to the grand jury announcement in Brown's case ("Timeline of events," 2019; Izadi & Holley, 2014).

The killings of Brown, Rice, and other Black men by police officers periodically dominated national news coverage and public discourse throughout the next several years. Following the July 2016 shootings of Alton Sterling by a Louisiana police officer and Philandro Castille by a Minnesota police officer, President Barack Obama gave a speech in which he listed

statistics on racial profiling by law enforcement and the disparate impact of incarceration on Black and Hispanic men. In this address, he stated, “This is not just a Black issue. It’s not just an Hispanic issue. This is an American issue that we should all care about, all fair-minded people should be concerned” (White, 2016).

The issue of race became ever more salient with Donald Trump’s presidential campaign beginning in 2015 and his election to the presidency in November 2016. Throughout his campaign, Trump’s statements were reminiscent of the get-tough rhetoric of the era of exclusion. In his campaign announcement speech, Trump said

> When Mexico sends its people…they’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people…we have no protection and we have no competence, we don’t know what’s happening. And it’s got to stop and it’s got to stop fast. (Time Staff, 2015)

Trump later went on to voice opposition to the Black Lives Matter movement (“I think it’s a disgrace what they’re getting away with”; Campbell, 2015), to say that National Football League player Colin Kaepernick should be fired for kneeling during the national anthem as a statement against racial injustice (Flaherty, 2017), to disparage the majority-Black cities of Baltimore (“rodent-infested mess”; McGraw, 2019) and Chicago (“more dangerous than Afghanistan”; Rumore, 2019), and to refer African nations and the majority-Black countries of Haiti and El Salvador as “shithole countries” (Dawsey, 2018; see also McManus, Cullen, Jonson, Burton, & Burton, 2019).

Trump has been criticized not only as being anti-immigrant and anti-Black but also as being sympathetic to White nationalists and neo-Nazis. In August 2017, during a White nationalist and neo-Nazi rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, called the “Unite the Right Rally,” 32-year-old Heather Heyer was killed when a White supremacist intentionally drove his car into a crowd of counter-protestors (Lavoie, 2019). In response to the violence between the rally

attendees and counter-protestors, Trump stated, “I think there’s blame on both sides, and I have no doubt about it...you also had people that were very fine people on both sides” (“Remarks by President Trump,” 2017). The statement was widely criticized as failing to strongly denounce White nationalism and neo-Nazism and even as being favorable to those movements (Lavoie, 2019). Similar criticisms were leveled against Trump when, in response to the removal of confederate statues and monuments, he tweeted “Sad to see the history and culture of our great country being ripped apart” (Donald J. Trump, 2017).

Trump’s supporters, however, were generally not critical of his response to the events in Charlottesville. According to a national poll by NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist Poll (2017), 83% of Trump supporters said they “Mostly disagree” with the “white supremacy movement” (comparable to 86% of adults nationally) (p. 12). However, only 15% of Trump supporters said his response to Charlottesville was “Not strong enough” (compared to 52% of national adults) (p. 10) and 90% of Trump supporters believed “statues honoring leaders of the Confederacy should…remain as a historical symbol” (compared to 62% of national adults) (p. 9).

As race, racism, and White nationalism become increasingly prominent social issues, an important question is how racial attitudes will affect correctional policy preferences among the American public. The growing salience of racial issues and the shift in correctional policy toward inclusionary or “redemptive” policies have unfolded largely in tandem, with the most prominent racial issues in the United States being tied to criminal justice issues (e.g., immigration, officer-involved shootings, hate crimes) and racial justice being a consistent refrain among those calling for criminal justice reform.

Criminal justice public opinion research that considers racial attitudes has largely focused on how one racial attitude—"Resentment over blacks getting ahead unfairly” (i.e., racial

resentment)—predicts support for the punitive policies of the era of exclusion (Kinder & Sanders, 1996, p. 110). Research has yet to tap into (1) the effects of other racial attitudes on (2) support for progressive criminal justice reforms and (3) opinions on race-specific aspects of criminal justice policy. Based on a 2019 national survey, this dissertation addresses this issue. Specifically, the project explores the potential effects of three distinct racial attitudes—racial resentment, racial sympathy, and White nationalism—on a number of punitive, progressive, and race-specific correctional policies and beliefs about offenders.

Focusing on public opinion is important because research in political science and in criminology demonstrates that citizen preferences are related to policy decisions (see Page & Shapiro, 1983; Pickett, 2019). Attitudes can be translated into policy and practice when individuals vote on ballot initiatives and in the elections of executive, legislative, and judicial officials (Kinder, 1998; Picket, 2019), as well as when public officials reference opinion polls to develop their own stance on an issue (Geer, 1996; Igo, 2007). In criminology, public opinion has been shown to predict policy and use of the death penalty (e.g., Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun, 2008), court decisions (e.g., Brace & Boyea, 2008), and incarceration rates and criminal justice expenditures (e.g., Enns, 2016). Thus, the findings of this study have the potential to directly inform policy decisions.

In addition to potentially informing policy decisions, this dissertation attempts to advance the extant literature in three ways. The remainder of this chapter outlines the context for each of these contributions. First, this study tests the previously established effects of racial resentment not only on punitive policies (see Enns, 2016) but also on progressive and race-specific policies—relationships that have been examined rarely in the prior research (for an exception, see Hannan et al., 2019). Thus, the next section of this chapter will describe the

conceptualization of racial resentment as distinct from traditional racism and will detail the empirical findings linking racial resentment to public opinion.

Second, this study moves beyond racial resentment and tests the effects of more recently conceptualized racial attitudes on public opinion. The following section details the new directions in the study of racial attitudes toward distinct measures of Whites' attitudes about Blacks (i.e., racial sympathy; Chudy, 2017) and of Whites' attitudes about Whiteness (i.e., White nationalism). These advances in the study of racial beliefs[1] can reveal the contours of how the American public "feels" about race at a time of heightened awareness to racial issues. The inclusion of these additional racial attitudes also allows for testing the robustness of the effect of racial resentment and can help provide a more nuanced understanding of how racial attitudes predict criminal justice policy preferences.

Third, this study advances the extant research by measuring respondents' views toward a range of correctional policies. Prior studies on the effects of racial attitudes have focused mainly on opinions of punitive policies (e.g., capital punishment). In addition to punitive outcomes, measures are also included assessing progressive beliefs about people who have committed crime (e.g., belief in redeemability), opinions of progressive policies (e.g., expungement), race-specific beliefs about people who have committed crime (e.g., belief in the redeemability of black offenders), and race-specific policy opinions (e.g., whether there is discrimination in the criminal justice system). To provide context for the punitive, progressive, and race-specific measures of the current study, the penultimate section of this chapter will first describe the correctional turning point away from punitive policies and toward offender inclusion and redemption and then explain how racial issues have been a key feature of criminal justice

[1] Note, the terms "racial attitudes" and "racial beliefs" are used interchangeably here as they have been in the extant literature (see, e.g., Kuklinski, Cobb, & Gilens, 1997).

throughout both the eras of exclusion and inclusion. The chapter closes with a brief overview of the research strategy informing this dissertation.

FROM TRADITIONAL TO SYMBOLIC RACISM

The Rise and Decline of Traditional Racism

Traditional racism (also known as biological racism, Jim Crow racism, or blatant racism) is the belief that Blacks are "genetically and socially inferior" to Whites (Unnever, Cullen, & Jonson, 2008, p. 64). The origins of this perspective can be traced to the mid-1500s, when the English encountered West Africans and saw "another sort of men" (Jordan, 1968, p. 4) characterized by black skin, "defective religion," (p. 20) and "savage behavior" (p. 24). The physiological, cultural, and behavioral differences between West Africans and the English corresponded with longstanding theoretical justifications for enslavement in English culture and slavery provided a solution to the need for labor in the New World (Jordan, 1968).

When slavery began, Black inferiority "was simply taken for granted" (Kinder & Sanders, 1996, p. 93). It was not until the start of the abolitionist movement in the early 1800s that slaveholders began to justify slavery with claims that Blacks were immutably "inferior to whites in intelligence and character" (p. 95). American elites (e.g., politicians, social scientists) continued to espouse this belief beyond the end of slavery and into the early 20th century as a "rationale…for postemancipation forms of racial oppression" (e.g., Jim Crow laws) (p. 95).

In the 1920s, however, biological justifications for racial prejudice were "challenged and eventually replaced by liberal environmentalism"—the idea that racial differences were due to situational circumstances rather than genetics (Kinder & Sanders, 1996, p. 95). By the time civil rights activists began their campaign to dismantle legal discrimination in the 1940s, liberal

environmentalism had become the prevailing explanation of racial differences accepted by elites and the general public (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). The later successes of the civil rights movement seemed to actualize the first part of the liberal environmentalist thesis: "Remove the socially created obstacles that stood in their way…and blacks would take their rightful and equal place in society" (p. 95). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 had mandated equal employment opportunity and the integration of public facilities and public education. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibited literacy tests and the 1966 U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections* deemed poll taxes unconstitutional.

Nonetheless, racial inequality in political representation, housing, education, income, and virtually all realms of life continued, as did Blacks' discontentment with these unfair circumstances. Civil unrest broke out in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, California in the summer of 1965, in other cities throughout 1966 and 1967, and across the country in 1968 in response to the assassination of civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. (Myers, 1997).

The unrest became a central concern for the American public. According to a longitudinal analysis of the Gallup poll, in 1967, for the first time, more Americans identified social control as the "most important problem" (MIP) in America than any other issue (Smith, 1980). For those who subscribed to the liberal environmentalist explanation of racial differences and believed that the civil rights movement had eliminated discrimination, rioting against racial injustice was perceived as a demand for unnecessary, unfair advantages (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Obstacles had been removed; Blacks should have had no trouble reaching equality with Whites.

Politicians—including Alabama Governor George Wallace, and U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan—drew upon Americans' concern for social disorder and their growing resentment toward Blacks for not capitalizing on the equal opportunities supposedly

afforded to them by the changes brought about by the civil rights movement. As Kinder and Sanders (1996, p. 105) put it, the message these politicians expressed

> was subtle, rather than blatant: it was that blacks should behave themselves. They should take quiet advantage of the opportunities now provided them. Government had been too generous, had given blacks too much, and blacks, for their part, had accepted these gifts all too readily.

Kinder and Sanders (1996) define this message, and the attitude that embodies it, as racial resentment.

Racial Resentment: "Subtle Prejudice for Modern Times"

Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, political scientists developed several concepts of the new racial attitudes that had begun to prevail over traditional racism, including symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, 2002), modern racism (McConahay, 1982), laissez-faire racism (Bobo, Kluegel, & Smith, 1997), subtle racism (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), and colorblind racism (Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 2000). Each of these concepts captures some form of racial prejudice that is symbolic and subtle rather than blatant and biological. However, these attitudes differ in terms of both conceptual definition and measurement. In criminal justice, one construct—racial resentment—and its measure, developed by Kinder and Sanders (1996), has been dominant in studies of the effect of racial attitudes on beliefs about those who commit crime and about the laws and practices implemented to prevent and address crime.

Recognizing the cultural shift away from traditional racism and toward liberal environmentalism, Kinder and Sanders (1996) were motivated to conceptualize a "subtle prejudice for modern times" (p. 92). In addition to developing a new concept of racism, they were also inclined to address the overlooked role of prejudice in the formation of policy opinions. They criticized political scientists as being reductive, noting that "each study tends to concentrate on a single explanation, ignoring the rest" (p. 40). The result was a field "replete

with misspecified models, biased estimates, and questionable conclusions"—in sum, "an epistemological mess" (p. 40). This single-mindedness was particularly preoccupied with the influence of self-interest on individual opinions, disregarding the potential impact of prejudice and principle. To provide "a pluralistic and empirically grounded approach to understanding public opinion" (p. 43), Kinder and Sanders analyzed data on reliable and valid multi-item measures of the three "primary ingredients of opinion" (p. 47): (1) self- and group-interest, (2) prejudice, and (3) principle (i.e., equality, economic individualism, and limited government). The major contribution of their study was the conceptualization and measurement of the second ingredient as racial resentment and the testing of the effect of their measure on policy opinions.

To measure racial resentment, Kinder and Sanders drew upon the symbolic racism scales developed by Sears, Kinder, and McConahay (Sears & Kinder 1971; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1988). Although racial resentment is similar to symbolic racism, it is distinct in that it more explicitly identifies American values as inextricably linked to racial animus. As Kinder and Sanders (1996) explain, "By failing to mention values at all, it perhaps encourages the interpretation that symbolic racism is really just racism; that values are but a decorative mask" (p. 293). The term "racial resentment" and its measure are not intended to capture biological racism veiled in individualism; rather, "Old-fashioned bigotry and contemporary racial resentment are related, but distinct concepts" (p. 115).

Others have criticized the racial resentment scale as measuring principles, specifically individualism, and wrongfully labeling those principles as racism (see, e.g., Carmines, Sniderman, & Easter, 2011), and so it has become standard practice to include measures of ideology as control variables in studies of racial resentment and public opinion. Enders (2019) found evidence in the 2016 ANES data that the four racial resentment items (Kinder & Sanders,

1996) functioned differently between those with different ideological perspectives. However, differential item functioning (DIF) was generally not found in the 1992 or 2004 ANES data, and Enders (2019) showed that "even after correcting for DIF, the racial resentment scale serves as a strong predictor of attitudes about racial issues" (p. 1).

The original racial resentment scale consisted of six items (listed below). Although some studies continue to administer the six-item scale, two items were eliminated over the course of Kinder and Sanders' research and the resulting four-item scale has been used in most criminal justice research (see, e.g., Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Burton et al., 2020; Feldman & Huddy, 2005; Hannan et al., 2019; Johnson, 2008; Unnever & Cullen 2007a). Items five and six in the list below were excluded because they were not consistently included in the 1986, 1988 and 1992 National Election Study (NES) surveys and therefore could not be used in a longitudinal examination of racial resentment (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). Further, those two items are unique from the others because they "explicitly invoke government, referring to 'welfare' in one case and 'government officials' in the other" and therefore were conflated with the dependent variable (support for race-related policy) that racial resentment was expected to influence (Kinder & Sanders, 1996, p. 118).

The standard racial resentment scale contains the first four items (1–4) of the following six listed (Kinder & Sanders, 1996):

1. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.

2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (Reverse coded.)

3. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough, if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.

4. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (Reverse coded.)

5. Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they need.

6. Government officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black person than from a white person. (Reverse coded.)

In their book, *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*, Kinder and Sanders (1996) analyzed multiple years of cross-sectional data collected by the NES between 1970 and 1992 as well as data collected by the NES panel study from 1990-1992. The NES sample is a probability-based sample of all Americans over the age of 18. Data were collected through face-to-face or phone interviews (depending on the study year) with trained interviewers, using rigorously pretested surveys. The 1986 NES study was particularly focused on Americans' racial attitudes, and Donald Kinder was involved in the development of the survey.

Kinder and Sanders (1996) identified several key findings regarding the validity and reliability of their measure of racial resentment. First, they showed that although the scale items tap into different attitudes about Blacks, "Resentment over blacks getting ahead unfairly is the one theme that runs through *all* six questions" (p. 110, emphasis in original). Thus, they argued, racial resentment is a coherent set of views—a claim bolstered by their finding that each item is modestly correlated with the others (in the 1986 NES data). Second, using the 1990–1992 panel data, they showed that an individual's level of racial resentment is relatively stable over time: "the Pearson's correlation between the 1990 and 1992 [racial resentment] observations is .68," which is greater than the 1990 to 1992 correlation for "views on equality (Pearson's $r = .49$), ideological identification ($r = .49$), or positions on various matters of public policy (Pearson's r's hover around .4)" and nearing the 1990 to 1992 correlation for political party ($r = .79$) (p. 111).

Third, results from the 1988 and 1992 NES studies showed considerable race-of-

interviewer effects. That respondents would alter their expressed resentment in the presence of a Black person suggests that the scale does indeed measure attitudes about race, rather than merely capturing the respondent's values of individualism and hard work, regardless of race. Finally, the analyses revealed that racial resentment is related to other attitudinal measures as expected. Those with the highest racial resentment scores "say whites are much smarter, much harder working, and much less violent" than Blacks (based on measures of stereotype endorsement included on the 1992 NES) (Kinder & Sanders, 1996, p. 114). Again, this finding suggests that racial resentment captures *racial* animus, not just animus toward those who violate core American values. Additionally, the correlation between racial resentment and "opinions on blacks' inborn inferiority" was $r = .12$, indicating that racial resentment is not veiled biological racism. Given the favorable evidence for the validity and reliability of their racial resentment measure, Kinder and Sanders (1996) then turned to the effect of racial resentment on public opinion.

Racial Resentment and Public Opinion

Analyzing the 1986, 1988, and 1992 NES samples, Kinder and Sanders (1996) discovered that racial resentment was a statistically significant predictor of weaker belief that the government should "see to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs," "see to it that white and black children go to the same schools," and "make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks" (pp. 18, 22). Higher racial resentment was also significantly associated with weaker belief that "federal spending on programs that assist blacks be increased," with lower likelihood to be "for preferential hiring and promotion of blacks," and with lower likelihood to support "quotas [for colleges and universities] to admit black students" (pp. 22, 25–26).

Racial resentment also affected opinions on policies that are only implicitly race-related. Albeit weaker than the relationship between racial resentment and the racial policies, the scale was related to lower agreement with "increasing federal support the Food Stamps program" (Kinder & Sanders, 1996, p. 121). Of import to criminologists, the scale was associated with greater likelihood to favor capital punishment for those convicted of murder. The effect of racial resentment on opinions of each policy listed above remained statistically significant after controlling for individualism, leading to the conclusion that "white opposition to racial change appears to be motivated not by commitment to individualism in general, but by resentment directed against blacks in particular" (p. 118).

A multi-disciplinary body of research testing the effects of racial resentment has amassed since the publication of *Divided by Color*, with results showing that racial resentment is a robust predictor of public opinion on a wide range of policies. For example, political scientists have found that racial resentment predicts both voting preferences and legislative behaviors. Analyzing the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) data, Segura and Valenzuela (2010) showed that "Moving from the least to greatest levels of racial resentment reduces the probability of an Obama vote [instead of a McCain vote] by more than 69% among whites" (p. 508). In a study of ANES data from 1988 to 2016, Abramowitz and McCoy (2019) found that "over the past four elections, there has been a dramatic increase in support for Republican presidential candidates among the most racially resentful white working-class workers" (p. 143). Second only to party identification, racial resentment was the strongest predictor of how White voters felt toward the 2016 Republican and Democratic presidential candidates (on a scale of 0 [cool] to 100 [warm]), with more racially resentful Whites feeling more warmly toward Trump relative to Clinton (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019). In addition to voting preferences, racial

resentment increases support for laws that require voters to show government-issued identification at the polls (Wilson & Brewer, 2013; Wilson, Brewer, & Rosenbluth, 2014).

With regard to legislative behaviors, Garcia and Stout (2019) analyzed the relationship between congressional district-level racial resentment (as measured in the 2010, 2012, and 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies [CCES]) and the content "of more than fifty four thousand press releases from almost four hundred U.S. House members in the 114th Congress (2015–2017)" (p. 1). Their results indicated that "Republicans from districts with high levels of racial resentment are more likely to issue press releases that attack President Barack Obama" but no more likely to issue press releases that attack "another prominent Democratic white elected official, Hilary Clinton" (p. 1). This finding lends credence to the claim that aggregate public opinion can influence policymakers' attitudes and decisions.

The salience of racial resentment extends beyond politics to health care and economic policy issues. For example, Henderson and Hillygus (2011) found that whereas views on universal healthcare were stable from 2008 (before the election of Barack Obama) to 2010 (after the election) for those with low racial resentment, those with high levels of racial resentment were "much more likely to oppose the [universal health insurance] proposal in 2010 than in 2008" (p. 956). Thus, the racial implications of an issue can be dynamic, and when an issue becomes more closely associated with race (implicitly or explicitly), the effect of racial resentment may become more pronounced.

Similarly, welfare opposition is influenced by racial resentment and therefore appears to be to be implicitly race-related. With the 1986 NES data, Gilens (1995) showed that Whites who "blame Blacks for racial inequality" (by endorsing items similarly worded to the second, third and fourth items on the racial resentment scale listed above) were more likely to oppose welfare

(p. 1000). The effect was robust to the inclusion of individualism, blaming the poor, and economic self-interest and was the strongest predictor of all covariates (Gilens, 1995). In one of only a handful of studies on the effect of racial resentment on public opinion among Blacks, Kam and Burge (2019) found that racial resentment significantly increased opposition to welfare among both Black and White respondents. Thus, the evidence that racial resentment is a racial attitude in that it is *about* Blacks does not preclude it from being a racial attitude *held by* Blacks.

The relationships between racial resentment and programs such as healthcare and welfare imply that Americans believe those general policies will benefit Blacks, and some researchers have tested whether support for policies differs when the policy explicitly targets Blacks. For example, Rabinowitz and colleagues randomly assigned a sample of college students to be asked whether they "favor or oppose government agencies definitely giving some contracts to" either "women-owned" or "Black-owned" businesses (Rabinowitz, Sears, Sidanius, & Krosnick, 2009, p. 821). If the racial resentment scale captures anti-egalitarianism that is unrelated to racial attitudes, then the scale should similarly affect support for affirmative action for Black-owned businesses and for women-owned businesses. Instead, results indicated that the significance of the effect of racial resentment on support for affirmative action depended on whether the businesses the program targeted were said to be women-owned or Black-owned.

Despite some evidence that racial resentment is a valid measure of racial animus, public opinion researchers continue to debate the validity of the scale, with some research indicating that ideology does affect racial resentment. For example, the New York State Racial Attitudes Survey asked respondents "To what extent do you favor providing college scholarships for…students who score in the top fifteen percent of their school class, even if their school's grades are not in the top fifteen percent nationally?" (Feldman & Huddy, 2005, p. 172).

Respondents were randomly assigned to be asked one of eight different versions of the question, specifying different race/class demographics of students. Among conservatives, higher racial resentment was associated with greater opposition to scholarships for both Black and White students. Thus, the experiment lent some support to claims that the racial resentment scale measured *principle* (i.e., individualism) not prejudice, or at least conflated principle with prejudice (Feldman & Huddy, 2005). It is therefore important to account for the effect of ideology in studies of the effect of racial resentment on race-specific policy opinions.

Relevant to the current study, political scientists have also probed the relationship between racial resentment and support for social control. Recall that in 1967, as race riots erupted across the nation, social control became the most-identified MIP (Smith, 1980). Thus, racially resentful Americans would be expected to more strongly support policies that impose social control, especially if those policies explicitly or implicitly target Blacks. Filindra and Kaplan's (2016) finding that racial resentment increased support for gun control is evidence of this speculation. As further evidence, the 2014 CCES revealed that racial resentment was significantly and positively related to greater support for the privatization of immigration detention centers (Enns & Ramirez, 2018).

Given the association between racial resentment and a perceived need for greater social control, it is unsurprising that racial resentment has dominated research on how racial attitudes impact citizens' preferences for criminal justice policies and their beliefs about offenders. Criminologists have consistently identified large gaps between Blacks and Whites in their levels of support for punitive policies—including sentencing severity (see, e.g., Blumstein & Cohen, 1980; Miller, Rossi, & Simpson, 1986), death penalty support (see, e.g., Bohm, 1991; Cochran & Chamlin, 2006; Combs & Comer, 1982; Unnever & Cullen, 2007b), and the opinion that courts

are not harsh enough (see, e.g., Secret and Johnson, 1989; Cohn, Barkan, & Halteman, 1991)—indicative of a powerful implicit association between race and criminal justice (Enns, 2016).

Three measures of public punitiveness have been frequently used across most criminological public opinion studies: (1) support for capital punishment, (2) support for harsher courts, and (3) support for punishment as the primary goal of prisons (Enns, 2016). As expected, Whites who score high on the racial resentment scale tend to score higher on these three measures of punitiveness than less racially resentful Whites[2] (see, e.g., Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Johnson, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a).

Racial resentment is an especially strong and robust predictor of Whites' support for capital punishment and the gap in the percentage of Whites and the percentage of Blacks who support the death penalty is largely explained by variation in racial resentment between Whites and Blacks (Unnever & Cullen, 2007a). Unnever and Cullen's (2007a) analysis of the 2000 NES post-election data revealed that, controlling for measures of Jim Crow racism, political ideology, egalitarianism, and demographic characteristics, "the symbolic racism measure was the most robust predictor of the strength of support for the death penalty" (p. 1290). Among racist Whites (those who scored higher than the mean score of Black respondents on the symbolic racism scale), "the relationship between egalitarianism and public support for the death penalty was nonsignificant" and the effect of religiosity on death penalty support was significant, but substantially less than the effect of religiosity among non-racists (p. 1291). The diminished effect of egalitarianism and religion among racist Whites relative to non-racists again contradicts the argument that the effect of racial resentment on policy opinions is spurious because the racial resentment scale is confounded by ideology.

[2] Similar scales for measures of symbolic forms of racism have also been found to be associated with punitiveness, including laissez-faire racism (Johnson, 2001).

Unnever and Cullen (2010) later analyzed the 2000 NES pre-and post-election data to test the racial resentment explanation of death penalty support against two competing explanations: (1) the "escalating crime-distrust model" hypothesis that "greater punitiveness occurs among those individuals who *both* distrust the courts and perceive that crime is rising" (p. 114) and (2) the "moral decline model" which posits that punitiveness is driven by a perception that "society is in a state of moral decline" (p. 115). Although the hypotheses of these two competing models were supported when each model was tested individually, the effects of moral decline and of escalating crime-distrust were reduced to nonsignificance when all three models—the third being racial resentment—were included in a single regression analysis. Racial resentment, however, remained significant in the analysis containing all three models, again demonstrating the powerful effect of racial animus on the public's support for the most punitive criminal justice sanction in the United States.

Studies of other samples also have found that racially resentful or prejudiced individuals are more likely to favor the death penalty. These studies include the National African American Election Study (Bobo & Johnson, 2004), the Race, Crime, and Public Opinion Study (Bobo & Johnson, 2004), and national surveys in Great Britain, France, Spain, and Japan (Unnever, Cullen, & Jonson, 2008). Research has also shown racial resentment increases support for capital punishment when controlling for additional competing factors such as perceived criminal justice system bias against Blacks (Bobo & Johnson, 2004). Similarly, Bobo and Johnson (2004) found that racial resentment was associated with greater approval of more severe sentences for possession and distribution of crack cocaine (for which those convicted are mostly Black) than for powdered cocaine (for which those convicted are mostly White).

Research also shows that there is a large Black/White gap in attitudes toward law

enforcement, with Blacks less likely than Whites to view police behaviors as procedurally just (Johnson, Wilson, Maguire, & Lowrey-Kinberg, 2017), more likely to believe that police discriminate against and are racist toward Blacks (Weitzer & Tuch, 1999), and more likely to believe that police misconduct is common (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004; see also Weitzer & Tuch, 2006). Racial resentment may explain these racial differences in attitudes, given that it has been shown to explain the effect of attitudes toward police on voting preferences, leading to the conclusion that "Perceptions of the police appear to act in part as a proxy for racial resentments" (Drakulich, Hagan, Johnson, & Wozniak, 2017, p. 7). However, more research on the effect of racial resentment on attitudes toward policing practices and officers is needed.

Collectively, these studies show that racial resentment affects a wide range of policy opinions, and that these relationships remain when controlling for competing factors such as ideological principles, traditional racism, and demographic characteristics. In her book, *Strangers in their Own Land*, Arlie Russell Hochschild (2016) describes the "deep story" of the predominately White, conservative, religious members of the Tea Party. It is a narrative in which undeserving groups of people—including Blacks—are cutting ahead of Whites in the line in which all Americans must wait to reach the American Dream. The Tea Party members Hochschild interviewed expressed resentment toward the line-cutters. However, they also expressed an irritation with liberals trying to tell them to feel sorry for the line-cutters and a frustrated belief that White Americans in particular were being pushed to the back of the line, their culture and values displaced along with them. Hochschild's research and that of numerous others (see, e.g., Jardina, 2019; Kaufmann, 2019) has shown that racial attitudes extend beyond resentment. Over two decades have passed since the publication of the racial resentment scale in *Divided by Color* (Kinder & Sanders, 1996). It is time to pursue new directions in the study of

racial attitudes.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF RACIAL ATTITUDES

Over the past several decades, the racial demographics of the United States have changed substantially. In 1940, 89.8% of the U.S. population was White, 9.8% of the population was Black, and less than 0.4% of the population was made up of those of any other race ("U.S. Population—1940 to 2010," n.d.). Each decade since then, Whites have comprised a smaller and smaller percentage of the population, reaching an estimated 76.5% in 2018 ("QuickFacts," 2019). The population of Blacks has grown to an estimated 13.4% as of 2018 ("QuickFacts," 2019). The ethnic makeup of the United States also has changed dramatically, with the Hispanic or Latino percentage of the U.S. population growing more than four-fold from 1970 (4.5%) to 2018 (18.3%) ("U.S. Population—1940 to 2010," n.d.; "QuickFacts," 2019). The U.S. Census Bureau projects that non-Hispanic Whites will make up less than half the population by 2045 ("Projected Race and Hispanic Origin," 2017).

Along with these demographic shifts have come significant changes in the political status of minorities in America. The first Black president of the United States, Barack Obama, was elected in 2008 and reelected in 2012. There are more non-White members of the U.S. Congress today than at any time in history (Geiger, Bialik, & Gramlich, 2019), and as of 2015, the total percentage of non-White members of state legislatures (18.1%) was approaching the non-White percentage of the population (23.5%) (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015; "QuickFacts," 2019).

Nonetheless, minorities remain underrepresented in national, state, and local elected offices, and social and economic inequality and segregation between Blacks and Whites persists. Though not by law, public schools remain racially and ethnically segregated (Meatto, 2019). For

the 2016–2017 school year, according to national statistics, the public high school graduation rate for Black students was 11 percentage points lower than that of White students ("The Conditions of Education," 2019). Although the Pew Research Center reports "Dramatic increases in intermarriage for blacks [and] whites" from 1980 to 2015, interracial marriage remains relatively rare, with fewer than 10% of all married people being married to a person outside their race as of 2015 (Livingston & Brown, 2017).

The American public is not blind to the inequality and social distance between Blacks and Whites. Although minorities are more likely than Whites to believe poor race relations and racial inequality exist, many Whites acknowledge that discrimination and lack of opportunity negatively impacts a Black person's ability to succeed (Horowitz, Brown, & Cox, 2019). A substantial portion of Whites also believe that Blacks are treated less fairly than Whites "in dealing with the police" (63%), "by the criminal justice system" (61%), "in hiring, pay and promotions" (44%), "when applying for a loan or mortgage" (38%), "in stores or restaurants" (37%), "when voting in elections" (30%), and "when seeking medical treatment" (26%) (Horowitz et al., 2019). Thus, more than a quarter of Whites believe racial discrimination exists in various arenas of life, but the question of how these Whites *feel* about this unfair treatment remains.

In this regard, Jennifer Chudy, a political scientist, has explored the historical evidence that Whites have, since the time of slavery, actively opposed systems of racial oppression. She has concluded that racial resentment does not fully describe Whites' attitudes toward Blacks, and that research must also measure the degree to which Whites feel sympathy for Blacks' suffering (Chudy, 2017).

Notably, some Whites also believe that being White can negatively impact a person's

chances in life. According to the Pew Research Center, 14% of Whites believe that "when it comes to a person's ability to get ahead in our country these days, being white…hurts a lot/a little" (Horowitz, Brown, & Cox, 2019). It is a fairly new concept that Whites have a racial identity, and that this racial identity can influence their life circumstances and experiences.

Historically, political scientists have generally theorized that Whites "do not, by and large, think about their whiteness—at least not in a way that is politically meaningful" (Jardina, 2019, p. 6). However, scholars such as Ashley Jardina (2019) in her book *White Identity Politics* have drawn attention to evidence that for many Whites, the changing racial demographics of the United States has elicited the emergence of a White racial identity. Beyond identifying with Whiteness and White culture, some Whites with a strong racial identity are politically motivated for the United States to remain a White-majority nation, the belief system underlying the White nationalist movement (Jardina, 2019; Swain, 2002).

Thus, two of the most recent developments in the study of racial attitudes include research that (1) considers new ways of explaining how Whites feel about Blacks (i.e., racial sympathy, or "White distress over Black misfortune") (Chudy, 2017, p. 35) and (2) considers seriously for the first time how Whites feel about Whites (i.e., White nationalism, a strong White identity and desire to maintain the White majority in the United States) (Jardina, 2019; Kaufmann, 2019; Swain, 2002). The following describes the historical context for each of these constructs, the research through which the conceptualization and measurement of each construct unfolded, and the empirical findings of how each construct relates to policy preferences.

Racial Sympathy

Just as the expression of racial animus can be identified throughout U.S. history, evidence of Whites' sympathy for Blacks can be documented as well. As Chudy (2018) notes, "White

Americans have long engaged in efforts to both obstruct *and* promote the political advancement of African Americans" (p. 3). Four key historical moments should be highlighted. First, many Whites advocated for the abolition of slavery and even assisted slaves in escaping the South to freedom in the North. In the 1688 petition, *A Minute Against Slavery*, Quaker leaders urged others among them to cease the use of slaves (Lederer, 2018, p. 2). Other White religious leaders began to oppose slavery throughout the 1700s and 1800s and a broader secular abolitionist movement among Whites eventually took hold (Lederer, 2018).

Second, a nonnegligible number of Whites supported the Civil Rights Movement, participating in acts of civil disobedience and in marches alongside Black activists. An estimated 60,000 Whites participated in the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom on August 28, 1963 ("March on Washington," 2017). White allies who participated in other demonstrations alongside Blacks often faced arrest, beatings, and threats and some were tragically killed for their involvement in the movement, including Viola Liuzzo, Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, James Reeb, and Jonathan Daniels (Freeling, 2015).

Whites' promotion of Blacks' advancement has continued into the 21st century. In the 2008 presidential election, 43% of White voters cast their ballot for Obama over the Republican candidate, a White man, John McCain (Cillizza & Cohen, 2012). In the 2012 election, 39% of White voters supported Obama over another White Republican candidate, Mitt Romney (Cillizza & Cohen, 2012). The intergroup threat hypothesis would predict that Whites would vote for a White candidate over a Black candidate in order to protect their in-group's political power (Blalock, 1967). However, Whites' support for Barack Obama demonstrates that voting across racial lines can occur in large numbers (though such behavior may be affected by in-group racial identity; see Böhm, Funke, & Harth, 2010).

Fourth, Whites have joined Blacks in protesting police brutality and racial inequality in contemporary America. This includes not only joining Black Lives Matter, but also forming new organizations such as White People 4 Black Lives ("Who we are," n.d.). Whites have also actively opposed the White nationalist movement. Recall the tragic death of Heather Heyer, a White woman, who was killed by a White nationalist while attending the counter protest of the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville (Lavoie, 2019).

Again, these examples suggest that Whites' attitudes toward Blacks cannot be solely characterized by the degree to which they are resentful of them. Assisting Black slaves in escaping the South to freedom; facing lasting, even fatal, consequences while marching for Blacks' civil rights; taking to the streets protesting police brutality against Black citizens; and standing face-to-face with a group of torch-carrying White nationalists—all of these actions suggest more than the absence of prejudice. These actions do not imply ambivalence to the suffering of Blacks, they imply discontentment, distress—*sympathy*.

To probe the presence of Whites' sympathy for Blacks, Chudy (2017) conducted a "series of participant observation sessions and qualitative interviews" (p. 36). Chudy (2017) observed White participants in a series of 2013 events organized by the University of Michigan (U-M) College of Literature, Science and the Arts during a "theme semester" on "Understanding Race" (p. 36). As she explains in her dissertation (2017, pp. 36–37):

> These events typically drew white individuals who wanted to think, and often talk, about race and so I attended to listen to how they expressed themselves. I paid close attention to the words they used and the images that they referenced. To complement this research, I also conducted in-depth interviews with white student leaders from the U-M Program on Intergroup Relations…[and] qualitative surveys about race on Amazon's *Mechanical Turk* platform.

From this qualitative research Chudy (2017) concluded that (1) "when sympathetic whites thought about African Americans, they tended to reference salient and actual instances of

discrimination" and (2) "it was rare for whites [to] indicate that they were able to *relate* to the circumstances of blacks" and therefore felt not empathy, but sympathy (p. 39).

Thus, Chudy's next step was to develop a measure of *racial sympathy*. Based on her qualitative findings and drawing on the method used by Schuman and Harding (1963) in *Sympathetic Identification with the Underdog*, she created a series of vignettes that were intended to elicit sympathy toward Blacks. The advantage of the vignette design, Chudy (2017) argues, is that the vignettes "enabled subjects to react directly to specific stimuli rather than to abstract notions of discrimination and inequality" (pp. 39–40).

The racial sympathy index (Chudy, 2017) includes the following four vignettes:

1. Mrs. Lewis, a White woman with young children, posts advertisements for a nanny on community bulletin boards. She receives many inquiries and decides to interview all applicants over the phone. Mrs. Lewis is most impressed with a woman named Laurette, who has relevant experience, is an excellent cook, and comes enthusiastically recommended. Mrs. Lewis invites Laurette over for what she expects will be the final step of the hiring process. When Laurette arrives, Mrs. Lewis is surprised to see that Laurette is Black. After Laurette's visit, which goes very well, Mrs. Lewis thanks her for her time but says that she will not be offered the job. When Laurette asks why, Mrs. Lewis says that she doesn't think that her children would feel comfortable around her. Laurette is upset about Mrs. Lewis' actions.

2. Tim is a White man who owns a hair salon. His business is growing rapidly and so he decides to place an advertisement to hire new stylists. In the advertisement, he writes that interested applicants should come for an interview first thing next Monday. When he arrives at the salon on Monday, he sees a line of seven or eight people waiting outside the door, all of whom appear to be Black. He approaches the line and tells the applicants that he's sorry, but the positions have been filled. The applicants are upset; they feel they have been turned away because of their race.

3. Milford is a mid-sized city in the Northeast. The main bus depot for the city is located in the Whittier section of Milford, a primarily Black neighborhood. Whittier community leaders argue that the concentration of buses produces serious health risks for residents; they point to the high asthma rates in Whittier as evidence of the bus depot's harmful effects. The Milford Department of Transportation officials, who are mostly White, state that Whittier is the best location for the depot because it is centrally located and many Whittier residents take the bus. Furthermore, it would be expensive to relocate the bus depot to a new location. Whittier community leaders are very upset by the Department's inaction.

4. Michael is a young Black man who lives in a midwestern city. One day Michael is crossing the street and jaywalks in front of cars. Some local police officers see Michael jaywalk and stop and question him. Michael argues that he was just jaywalking and is otherwise a law-abiding citizen. The police officers feel that Michael is being uncooperative and so they give him a pat down to see if he is carrying any concealed weapons. Michael is very upset by this treatment.

The index was administered on the 2013 CCES with the goals of demonstrating (1) the validity and reliability of the racial sympathy index (including its discriminant validity from the racial resentment measure) and (2) that racial sympathy influences support for race-specific policies. First, Chudy (2017) used exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to show that the four racial sympathy items loaded onto a separate factor (loadings ranging from .58 to .88) from the four racial resentment items (loadings ranging from .79 to .93) and that the two concepts are negatively, but only moderately correlated (r = -.45). The racial sympathy index also had high internal consistency (Cronbach's α = .74).

Second, the results indicated that racial sympathy was significantly and positively related to support for "government aid to Blacks," "welfare," "subsidies for black businesses," "scholarships for qualified black students," "funding for schools in black neighborhoods," and a racialized policy index[3], even after controlling for racial resentment (Chudy, 2017, p. 71). Racial resentment remained a significant and negative predictor of support for each of these race-related policies, indicating that both concepts are important for understanding public opinion on such policies (Chudy, 2017).

The concept of racial sympathy may provide insight into indications from other research that Whites' sympathy toward Blacks, or lack thereof, contribute to their political ideology.

[3] The racialized policy index was an index of support for "government aid to blacks," "welfare," "subsidies for black businesses," ""scholarships for qualified black students," "funding for schools in black neighborhoods," and "affirmative action" (Chudy, 2017, p. 71).

Among Hochschild's (2016) interviewees, resentment toward Blacks for receiving undeserved benefits is only part of the explanation of White libertarian opposition to government-sponsored efforts toward racial equality. Conservative Whites are frustrated with the liberals telling them who they should feel sympathy for, a feeling Hochschild (2016) refers to as "sympathy fatigue" (p. 146). Their feelings of sympathy have become attenuated, they've "heard stories of oppressed blacks…but at some point…you have to close the borders to human sympathy…you've suffered a great deal yourself, but you aren't complaining about it" (Hochschild, 2016, p. 139). Whereas racially resentful Whites reject the notion that Blacks face discrimination and need special advantages to counter inequality, those lacking racial sympathy may recognize the existence of Blacks' suffering, but do not feel (or choose not to allow themselves to feel) distress over that suffering.

It is in part due to this frustration with the demands to feel sympathy for other racial groups that Whites have recently become conscious of their own "race," and their own racial culture (Hochschild, 2016; Jardina, 2019). With White racial consciousness comes the belief that, like any other racial group, Whites deserve to take pride in their history and protect their group-interests (Jardina, 2019; Kauffman, 2019). Thus, the attitudes that Whites hold about "Whiteness" may be equally important to explaining their policy opinions as the animus or sympathy they feel toward Blacks.

White Nationalism

In his famous commencement address, the author David Foster Wallace (2005) told the following joke: "There are these two young fish swimming along and they happen to meet an older fish swimming the other way, who nods at them and says 'Morning boys. How's the water?'… [and one of the young fish] looks over at the other and goes 'What the hell is water?'"

Wallace (2005) implored the graduates of Kenyon College to see their education as giving them the ability to be aware "of what is so real and essential, so hidden in plain sight all around us," to be like a fish aware of the water in which it swims.

Political scientists have long assumed that Whiteness is to White Americans as water is to a fish, something so omnipresent that it they can live without noticing its existence (Jardina, 2019). However, recent evidence suggests that Whites *do* hold a racial identity, and that their awareness of Whiteness has been brought about by massive ethnic and racial demographic changes through which they were suddenly posed the question "How's the water?" about the racial makeup of the country and their position in it. Beyond simply recognizing White as a racial group, some Whites have responded to the decline of White hegemony by embracing a political orientation toward preserving the Whiteness of the United States—both in terms of racial demographics and cultural norms and values—an orientation known as White nationalism (Kaufmann, 2019; Swain, 2002).

Scholars foresaw the emergence of White nationalism into the mainstream belief system of White Americans in the early 2000s. Swain (2002) conducted interviews with leaders of White nationalist organizations in the United States. She identified "seven conditions [that] threaten to fuel the growth of this new racial consciousness movement" (i.e., White nationalism) (Swain, 2002, p. 1). These conditions were (1) increasing immigration of non-Whites to the United States, (2) economic changes that result in job competition between unskilled workers and immigrants "for a dwindling share of low-paying employment opportunities," (3) "continuing white resentment and hostility over…race-based affirmative action," (4) "high black-on-white violent crime rates," (5) "growing acceptance of multiculturalism with its emphasis on promoting racial and ethnic group pride," (6) "the rising expectations of racial and

ethnic minorities," and (7) increased access to the Internet, "which provides means for like-minded people to consolidate their strength, share ideas, and mobilize their resources for political action" (Swain, 2002, p. 2).

As is the case with many constructs in the social sciences, there is no single, data-based, parsimonious definition of White nationalism that guides research on the movement, its participants, or its underlying beliefs. Swain (2002) referred to White nationalism and White supremacy interchangeably, with neither construct being formally defined. Thus, Gardiner (2005) built upon Swain's (2002) research to provide the following definition:

> White nationalism is a secular political orientation, grounded in an *ideology* of biologically determined racial hierarchy and the presumption of a necessary link between race and nation, and a *praxis* that includes, but is not limited to, pragmatic engagement with electoral and pressure group activity on the model of identity politics. (p. 61, emphasis in original).

Due to the evolving nature of the White nationalist movement, there are two issues with this definition. First, "many white nationalist organizations are intertwined with a religious doctrine supplied by the Christian Identity Church that uses Biblical authority to justify white superiority" (Hughey, 2009, p. 924). Thus, whether White nationalism is entirely secular is up for debate. As will be shown in the next chapter, the measure of White nationalism used in this dissertation includes an item that refers to God's intent for the United States to remain majority-White.

Second, the identity construction of White nationalist organizations and their leaders has changed over time to become more "demure and tame" (Hughey, 2009, p. 925). This new version of White nationalism downplays claims about a biologically rooted racial hierarchy and "attempts to use the discourse of other marginalized peoples to show that they are not 'anti' any race but are rather safeguarding the 'civil rights' of whites" (Hughey, 2009, p. 925). Thus, White nationalism does not necessarily include the belief in Whites' biological superiority and therefore

must be differentiated from White supremacy, the belief in racial stratification and segregation that is justified by a perceived immutable racial hierarchy (Kaufmann, 2019; Taub, 2016).

This change to the identity of White nationalism does not, for the leaders and organizers of the movement, represent a genuine rejection of the belief in White superiority. Rather, shifting the definition and message of White nationalism is impression management (Berbrier, 1999) intended to increase the social acceptability of the movement. Swain (2002) explained, "white nationalism is aggressively seeking a mainstream audience and in going mainstream it has found it necessary to abandon most of the tactics, postures, and regalia of the older racist right, which no longer resonate with contemporary America" (p. 4). As former White nationalist and leader of the Chicago Area Skin Heads, Christian Picciolini, put it, "We recognized back then [in 1989] that we were turning away the average American white racists and that we needed to look and speak more like our neighbors" (Jacobs, 2017). He went on to say, "the idea we had was to blend in, normalize, make the message more palatable." (Jacobs, 2017; see also Diangelo, 2018). The new White nationalist identity appeals to many Americans who might not see themselves as racist and might even reject White nationalism as an organized movement but agree with its political orientations (Diangelo, 2018).

The intent of the current study is not to identify "card-carrying" members of the White nationalist movement. Rather, the goal is to measure the degree to which respondents from a nationally representative sample endorse White nationalist attitudes. Given that the message of White nationalism has recently shifted away from language that invokes biological racism, the measure of White nationalism used in the current study captures how Whites feel about Whiteness, not how they feel about racial minorities (which is measured with the racial resentment and racial sympathy scales).

In his book *Whiteshift*, Kaufmann (2019) provides a detailed account of the history of White majorities in Western nations and how increasing global racial and ethnic diversity has led to the emergence of ethno-traditional nationalism, "the desire to limit change to the ethnic composition of the nation" (p. 515). In this volume, White nationalism is defined by drawing on the aforementioned definition provided by Gardiner (2005) and on the key beliefs Kaufmann (2019) outlines as underlying ethno-traditional nationalism. Thus, White nationalism is understood here as a political orientation characterized by the *ideology* that the United States should remain a White nation in terms of population demographics and mainstream culture, and by a *praxis* that emphasizes, but is not limited to, support for reducing immigration as a means of preserving the White identity of the nation.

The message of White nationalism may appeal to Whites who feel that their racial identity and history is denied the same honor as other racial groups. Hochschild (2016) describes part of the "deep story" of White Tea Party members as feeling that White identity has been devalued with terms such as "'Crazy redneck.' 'White trash.' 'Ignorant Southern Bible-thumper.'" (p. 144). These Whites also feel that they cannot defend their honor because "If a person said he or she was white, as a way of describing themselves in the manner of the Native American or black, they risked being seen as racist soldiers of the Aryan Nation" (Hochschild, 2016, p. 215). Similarly, J. D. Vance's (2016) memoir, *Hillbilly Elegy*, discussed how working-class Whites' feeling that the changing demographics and culture of the United States, particularly after the election of Barack Obama, was like "losing something akin to religion" and that the "tie that bound them to their neighbors…had seemingly vanished" (p. 190).

Unfortunately, because a salient White racial identity has only recently surfaced, and because White nationalist attitudes are only beginning to become mainstream, there is little

public opinion research on how White nationalist attitudes impact policy opinions, let alone a validated measure of White nationalism[4]. However, Jardina (2019) has demonstrated that White identity predicts support for social security, Medicare, and government spending on Whites as well as opposition to affirmative action for Blacks, Hispanics, and minorities. Although White identity is different from White nationalism, those who hold White nationalist attitudes likely have a strong racial identity (Jardina, 2019), so it is reasonable to expect that White nationalism will be similarly related to policy preferences.

Of interest to this dissertation is whether White nationalism and racial sympathy affect preferences toward criminal justice policies and about the people toward whom those policies are aimed. Because research has established that racial resentment is a strong predictor of punitiveness, it is important to consider whether the effect of racial resentment is robust to accounting for the effect of other racial attitudes (and vice-versa). This dissertation will also reveal whether each of the three racial attitudes predicts support for progressive criminal justice policies that have emerged as America experiences a correctional turning point.

A CORRECTIONAL TURNING POINT: MOVING TOWARD OFFENDER REDEMPTION

Offender Exclusion

The focus of public opinion research on punitive practices is not without reason. For roughly four decades, the U.S. criminal justice system was in a state of persistent "tough on crime" rhetoric and policy. The explicit goals of tough on crime policies were to deter crime, incapacitate offenders, and achieve retribution for victims. The implicit goal—and effective

[4] For measures of related forms of nationalism, see Perry and Whitehead (2015) and Bonikowski and Dimaggio (2016)

outcome—was to permanently exclude offenders from society (Garland, 2000). Both political rhetoric and policy reflect this sentiment.

First, around 1970, political elites started to decry the civil unrest of the 1960s and emphasize the need for social order. In 1971, President Richard Nixon proclaimed drugs "public enemy number one" and declared a war on drugs. In a 1982 speech to the Department of Justice, President Ronald Reagan (1982) noted that "crime today is an American epidemic…our criminal justice system has broken down…And many Americans are losing faith in it." Ultimately, claimed Reagan (1982), there was "a new privileged class in America: a class of repeat offenders and career criminals who think they have a right to victimize their fellow citizens with virtual impunity." Democrats used similar rhetoric. During his 1992 presidential campaign, after attending the "execution of Ricky Ray Rector, a mentally impaired black man," Bill Clinton said "I can be nicked on a lot, but no one can say I'm soft on crime" (Mauer, 2016). Then First Lady, Hillary Clinton infamously used the term "super predators" to describe youth offenders in a 1996 speech and would later be criticized for her use of the racially coded term during her 2016 campaign for president (Taylor, 2016).

At the same time—or before by some accounts—that politicians began calling for exclusionary criminal justice policies, public punitiveness also increased—a trend largely explained by the nation's rising crime rate (rather than alternative factors such as the news media over-stating the crime problem) (Enns, 2016). According to FBI official statistics, the homicide rate increased from 5.1 per 100,000 in 1960 to a peak of 10.2 per 100,000 in 1980 and remained within 8 to 10 per 100,000 between 1981 until 1995 (U.S. Department of Justice, 2020). The empirical evidence of a "crime problem" reflected what was felt in the day-to-day lives of Americans, especially in major cities such as New York and Chicago where rates of violence

were highest (Sharkey, 2018). Crime was a salient feature of American society, and its residents were increasingly fearful of being victimized personally (Lane, Rader, Henson, Fisher, & May, 2014).

Whether public punitiveness prompted politicians to support harsher criminal justice policies or vice-versa has been debated (Enns, 2016; Pickett, 2019). Most likely, there is a non-recursive relationship in which political elites affect the opinions of the public *and* politicians decide which policies to support depending on the attitudes of their constituents and the "average" American. Thus, punishment became the hallmark of legislative action, ballot initiatives, and judicial decisions throughout the 1970s and lasting until around 2010 (Pfaff, 2017; Simon, 2006). This punitive agenda included increased capital punishment sentences ("Death Sentences," 2020). California's three-strikes-you're-out law made it possible to sentence some individuals to life in prison after their third offense, even for relatively minor offenses (Pfaff, 2017). Truth-in-sentencing laws and mandatory minimums reduced judges' discretion and increased prosecutors' ability to manipulate charges in order to achieve a specific desired sentence required by law (Pfaff, 2017)

Beyond these policies that increased the likelihood that a person convicted of committing a crime would go to prison and stay incarcerated for longer, there were policies that expanded control-oriented correctional supervision of those living in communities on probation or parole (Cullen, Wright, & Applegate, 1996). From 1980 to 2016, the population of U.S. adults on probation or parole increased 239% ("Probation and Parole Systems," 2018; Phelps, 2016, 2020).

The end of a sentence, whether served fully in prison or completed under community supervision, does not mark the end of a person's punishment. Rather, the collateral consequences of imprisonment were expanded during the era of exclusion. These consequences guaranteed that

a person would be excluded from society even after they had "rejoined" society. Travis (2002) refers the "punishment that is accomplished through the diminution of the rights and privileges of citizenship and legal residency in the United States" as "invisible punishment" (pp. 15–16). The collateral consequences of crime are invisible both because they "operate largely beyond public view," because they "take effect outside of the traditional sentencing framework," and because "they are often added as riders to other, major pieces of legislation, and therefore are given scant attention in the public debate over the main event" (Travis, 2002, p. 16).

Travis (2002) explains that collateral consequences include—but are not limited to—being denied "public housing, welfare benefits, the mobility necessary to access jobs that require driving, child support, parental rights, the ability to obtain an education, and, in the case of deportation, access to the opportunities that brought immigrants to this country" (p. 18). Under these conditions, Simon (2002) argues, "one's debt to society is never paid" (p. 19), effectively excluding offenders "from the supports of modern society" (p. 33; see also Garland, 2000).

All this culminated in a sustained era of mass imprisonment and with population of more than 2.1 million incarcerated people and an additional 4.5 million people under community supervision on December 31, 2016 (Kaeble & Cowhig, 2018). This number does not include all those who were formerly incarcerated and/or formerly under community supervision and continue to be subjected to collateral consequences. The era of exclusion disproportionately targeted Black and Hispanic offenders and, in turn, has disproportionately affected Black and Hispanic families and communities (Alexander, 2010; Clear, 2007; Travis, 2002).

Then, in 2007, the U.S. housing bubble burst, with "the largest single-year drop in U.S. home sales in more than two decades" ("The U.S. Financial Crisis," 2020). And in March 2008, "one of the most iconic institutions on Wall Street," Bear Sterns, collapsed ("The U.S. Financial

Crisis," 2020). The federal budget deficit as a proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP) had increased "from 3.1 percent in 2008 to 9.9 percent in 2009, the highest deficit as a share of the GDP since 1945" ("Federal Budget Deficit," 2009). The U.S. economy was in a recession and political elites on both sides of the aisle were looking for places to make budget cuts. The financial investment in the era of exclusion was (and still is) massive, with state expenditures on corrections increasing from $6.7 billion in 1985 to $42.3 billion in 2005 (The Sentencing Project, 2019). Thus, the financial crisis, among other factors, provided an incentive for political elites to reconsider the era of exclusion and move toward a new era of inclusion.

Offender Inclusion

Criticism of the era of exclusion was an aspect of the professional ideology of criminologists and legal scholars well before the financial crisis. Multitudes of scholarly books have been written to explain the factors that lead to mass incarceration (see, e.g., Garland, 2001; Pfaff, 2017; Simon, 2006). Arguably no critique of the criminal justice system has reached the notoriety and influence of Michelle Alexander's (2010) *The New Jim Crow*. Alexander (2010) contends that just as Jim Crow laws replaced slavery as primary system of racial oppression in the United States, elites in the 1960s began constructing the system of mass incarceration to replace Jim Crow when the eminent demise of legal discrimination became more apparent (see also Wacquant, 2001). She then outlines how the policies of the war on drugs targeted and disproportionately affected Blacks. Others have identified unchecked prosecutorial discretion, overuse and manipulation of the plea-bargaining system, and the general shift toward neoliberalism in American politics as root causes of mass incarceration that must be addressed for reforms to be successful (Gottschalk, 2014; Pfaff, 2017).

Despite these many explanations for how and why the United States became "the most

punitive democracy in the world" (Enns, 2016), the question of what a "successful" criminal justice system would entail has persisted for decades. Scholars have developed distinct models of correctional policy that diverge from harsh punishment and exclusion. First, Canadian researchers—primarily Paul Gendreau, Don Andrews, and James Bonta—developed the Risks-Needs-Responsivity (RNR) model for correctional rehabilitation. The RNR model, posits that rehabilitation efforts should (1) focus on high-risk offenders (R) for recidivism, (2) address criminogenic needs that have been identified by empirical research to foster reoffending (N), and (3) use treatments to that are responsive (R) or capable of reducing these criminogenic needs (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; see also Ziv, 2018).

Although the rehabilitative ideal was a hallmark of correctional policy since the first penitentiaries in the United States were constructed in the 1820s (Rothman, 1971), critiques of treatment as ineffective (see, e.g., Martinson, 1974) resulted in many criminologists and policymakers abandoning the rehabilitative ideal in favor of punishment aimed to deter, incapacitate, and exact retribution (Allen, 1981). The creation of the RNR model, and the generation of empirical evidence that the model was effective in reducing recidivism, rescued the rehabilitative ideal from the "criminological dustbin" (Cullen, 2005). Thus, Cullen (2005) named Gendreau, Andrews, and Bonta as three of "the twelve people who saved rehabilitation" (p. 1).

The RNR model was not adopted without criticism. One main critique was that the RNR model was singularly focused on preventing individuals from reoffending, and therefore ignored the many other life outcomes that individuals may pursue after release from prison, such as a "valued states of affairs" a positive personal identity, and general wellbeing (Ward, 2002, p. 173). Another critique leveled by scholars in this camp was that the RNR model placed such a strong emphasis on accounting for and fixing an individuals' weaknesses that it failed to

capitalize on the individuals' strengths (Ward & Maruna, 2007).

Thus, a second model, the Good Lives Model (GLM) posits that rehabilitation programs should "equip clients with internal and external resources to live a good or better life—a life that is socially acceptable and personally meaningful" (Ward, Yates, & Willis, 2012, p. 95). This is done by fostering primary human goods (i.e., "states of mind, personal characteristics or experiences that are intrinsically beneficial and sought for their own sake") and secondary goods (i.e., skills, behaviors, or strategies that can be instrumental in obtaining primary human goods) (Ward et al., 2012, p. 95).

A third newly proposed model for correctional policy is the rehabilitation and redemption (R&R) model (Cullen, Lee, Butler, & Thielo, 2020). The R&R model proposes that both rehabilitation and redemption are essential goals for the successful reentry and reintegration of those who been incarcerated back into society. Under this model, prisoners would receive rehabilitation treatment in prison, ideally evidence-based treatment that addresses the risks, needs, and responsivity of individuals. Then, when a person leaves prison, they would reenter a society that has embraced their full redemption (Cullen et al., 2020).

Cullen and colleagues (2020) draw upon Maruna's (2001) *Making Good*, where he argues that society must recognize and accept an individuals' efforts to change their behavior and lead a law-abiding life. One way recognizing and accepting an individual as rehabilitated is to formally and publicly give rehabilitated individuals a "clean bill of health" upon release from prison (Maruna, 2011, p. 97). As Maruna (2011) wrote, "reintegration is a 'two-way street' involving not just changes and adjustments on the part of the person returning from prison but also on the part of the community and society welcoming him or her home" (p. 106). To do its part in ensuring reintegration society must provide redemption to those who have earned it,

which "must restore the rights of full citizenship" (p. 326) and "must be marked by a formal ceremony" (p. 327).

The RNR and GLM models were formed and implemented well before the 2008 financial crisis. The era of inclusion is rooted in longstanding rehabilitative and redemptive ideals that never truly disappeared from criminological thought or correctional policy. It is perhaps due to the surmounting evidence of the effectiveness of rehabilitation over the previous three decades (see, e.g., Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Lipsey & Cullen, 2007) that, when the recession began in 2008, political elites turned to rehabilitation as the best alternative approach when they realized punishment had become too costly. Former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Republican Newt Gingrich, and Pat Nolan (a former California State Assembly member *and* former prisoner) wrote the following in a *Washington Post* opinion article (Gingrich & Nolan, 2011):

> There is an urgent need to address the astronomical growth in the prison population, with its huge cost in dollars and lost human potential. We spent $68 billion in 2020 on corrections – 300 percent more than 25 years ago…If our prison policies are failing half of the time, and we know that there are more humane, effective alternatives, it is time to fundamentally rethink how we treat and rehabilitate our prisoners.

That the United States is moving into an era of inclusion—in which components of each of the three models above have been embraced, sometimes as a direct implementation of the model—is evident in political rhetoric and public policy. Just as the get-tough movement received support across political parties, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have embraced policies that aim to rehabilitate and ensure successful reentry into society. For conservatives, criminal justice reforms can please evangelical Christians who make up a considerable portion of their base by allowing for redemption, can appease fiscal conservatives by minimizing government expenditures, and can meet the libertarian goal to limit state power (Cohen, 2017; Gottschalk, 2014). For example, in 2007, Rick Perry (2007), then Governor of Texas said during

his State of the State address "I believe we can take an approach to crime that is both tough and smart…Let's focus more resources on rehabilitating those offenders so we can ultimately spend less money locking them up again" (p. 324).

As another example, the Barna Group (2019) surveyed a nationally representative sample of adults in the United States (N = 1,093) and a supplemental sample of practicing Christians in the United States (N = 572) about their beliefs about crime and opinions of criminal justice policy. The study revealed that 95% and 94% of practicing Christians agree strongly or agree somewhat that "People who have turned their life around after a criminal conviction can benefit a community by using their experience as a lesson to transform their life" (compared to 91% of U.S. adults) and that "Once someone with a criminal history has completed their just punishment, they deserve a second chance to become productive members of the community" (compared to 91% of U.S. adults), respectively (Barna Group, 2019, pp. 15–16).

For progressives, a return to the rehabilitative ideal is necessary given the harms of incarceration (see, e.g., Liebling & Maruna, 2011), is practical given the evidence that rehabilitation is effective (see, e.g., Lipsey & Wilson, 1998; see also Cullen, 2005), and is morally imperative given the disparate impact of the get-tough movement on African Americans and other minorities (Alexander, 2010; Petit & Western, 2004; Western, 2006). For example, former Vice-President Joe Biden's 2020 presidential campaign website states that "Our criminal justice system cannot be just unless we root out the racial, gender, and income-based disparities in our system" and "our criminal justice system must be focused on redemption and rehabilitation." ("Justice," 2020). U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders's 2020 presidential campaign website states in his platform that the U.S. must "guarantee a 'Prisoner's Bill of Rights,' and ensure a just transition for incarcerated individuals upon their release" ("Justice and Safety for

All," 2020).

Policy evidence that the United States has entered an era of inclusion takes on two forms. First, there are efforts to roll back punitive policies and practices. These might include reforming prison downsizing, changing sentencing guidelines, eliminating mandatory minimums, commuting prison sentences, and eliminating or reducing collateral consequences. From 2009 to 2017, thirty-nine states had reduced their prison populations and these reductions ranged from 39% (Alaska) to 1% (Minnesota), with an overall reduction of 7% (Ghandnoosh, 2019). The number of nationwide commutations is difficult to calculate without a centralized data source. Based on news reports, however, hundreds of prisoners have had their sentences commuted by their state's governor in the past several years (Reutter, 2019). After the 2018 election, "outgoing governors in at least 10 states and others who remained in office resolved some outstanding clemency applications by issuing pardons and commutations" (Reutter, 2019). This included the governors of Illinois, Tennessee, Michigan, Maine, Colorado, Washington, California, New York, Arkansas, and Texas (Reutter, 2019).

Other examples of policy reform can be found in numerous other states. In 2018, Florida voters passed a ballot initiative that amended the state constitution to restore voting rights to felons (excluding those convicted of murder and sex offenses)[5] (Lockhart, 2019). Thirty-five states "and over 150 cities and counties have adopted what is widely known as 'ban the box'" which typically restrict employers from asking about criminal history on job applications (but may allow for criminal background checks later in the hiring process) (Avery, 2019; Burton, Cullen, Pickett, Burton, & Thielo, 2020).

The second form of inclusionary policies are those that provide new (or increase the use

[5] The efforts in Florida to restore voting rights to felons have been contentious, with laws preventing some felons from voting being passed and later challenged in court. For a more detailed review see Lockhart (2019).

of existing) measures that promote rehabilitation and redemption. In 2018, the U.S. Congress passed with bipartisan support and President Trump signed into law the First Step Act. The First Step Act (FSA) "requires the Attorney General to develop a risk and needs assessment system to be used by [the Bureau of Prisons] to assess the recidivism risk and criminogenic needs of all federal prisoners and to place prisoners in recidivism reducing programs and productive activities to address their needs and reduce this risk" (" An Overview," 2018). Further, the FSA

> made the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010…retroactive so that currently incarcerated offenders who received longer sentences for possession of crack cocaine than they would have received if sentenced for possession of the same amount of powder cocaine before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act can submit a petition in federal court to have their sentences reduced (" An Overview," 2018).

The FSA also included provisions that address some of the collateral consequences of imprisonment, such as a requirement that inmates be housed "in facilities as close to their primary residence as possible, and to the extent practicable, within 500 driving miles" ("An Overview," 2018; Cohen, 2019).

There are state-level examples of redemption-based policy as well. The use of problem-solving courts (also referred to as specialty courts or problem-oriented courts), which are aimed at providing treatment to offenders with specific needs or offense types (e.g., drug courts, human trafficking courts, veteran's courts) has increased over the past decade, with more than 3,000 in the United States as of 2012 (Marlowe, Hardin, & Fox, 2016). Many of these courts hold ceremonies for successful participants that are similar to the redemption ceremonies that Cullen and colleagues (2020) suggest as an integral part of the R&R model (see, e.g., Adams, n.d.; Arias, 2019; Ferraro, 2019).

Public opinion appears to be turning away from the tough-on-crime doctrine. For example, Ramirez's analysis of Gallup, General Social Survey, Pew Research Center, and other national surveys revealed a general trend of declining public support for punitive policies

including capital punishment and "expenditures for law enforcement," among others (2013, p. 1006). Estimates also suggest that support for rehabilitation and other new reforms is high. A 2013 survey of likely voters in Texas found that in contrast to what might be expected in a "red" (i.e., conservative) state, "more than eight in ten Texans approved of" treatment as an alternative to prison, with "substantial consensus across demographic groups" (Thielo, Cullen, Cohen, & Chouhy, 2013, p. 137). A 2017 national survey of adults in the United States showed that 81.9% of all adults supported rehabilitation ceremonies and 79.4% supported rehabilitation certificates (Butler, Cullen, Burton, Thielo, & Burton, in press; Thielo, 2017).

This evidence is not meant to argue that the system of mass incarceration has been dismantled or that all incentives to maintain it have been eradicated. In *Caught,* Gottschalk (2014) details the ways that economic and political factors suggest the current turning point in criminal justice is the not the end of mass incarceration, but the end of the beginning—the moment that mass incarceration will become entrenched as "the new normal and a key governing institution in the United States" (p. 22) This argument is important, because it highlights how critical it is to understand the nuances of public support for criminal justice reform. Doing so can inform efforts to frame reforms such that the public understands (and supports) the goals of the reform. As Lewis (2017) wrote, summarizing the work of psychologists Kahneman and Tversky on framing, "People [don't] choose between things, they [choose] between descriptions of things" (p. 343).

Given that race and racial attitudes have been consistent predictors of opinions of criminal justice policy (see, e.g., Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Johnson, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a), the way that new progressive policies will differentially or equitably impact racial groups may influence public support. On one hand, racially resentful Whites tend to support

more punitive policies (Bobo & Johnson, 2004) but might respond favorably to progressive polices when those policies are framed as helping poor Whites ensnared in the criminal justice system get a second chance. Whites with a strong racial identity or who believe in ethno-traditional nationalism may respond similarly to such a framing of reforms. Racially sympathetic Whites, on the other hand, may favor efforts toward rehabilitation and redemption that are aimed at eliminating racial disparities in the impact of mass incarceration. This dissertation begins to explore these possibilities by estimating the effects of these three racial attitudes on progressive policy support and beliefs about offenders in general as well as their effects on beliefs about racial disparities in the criminal justice system and beliefs about Black offenders.

RESEARCH STRATEGY

This is a study of how racial attitudes influence a variety of opinions on criminal justice policies. Again, this dissertation advances prior criminal justice public opinion research in two ways. First, whereas prior research has been limited by only considering the effect of racial resentment on policy preferences, this dissertation tests the effect of two more recently conceptualized racial attitudes: racial sympathy and White nationalism. Beyond these measures, the analyses presented will control for a range of measures that have been established as predictors of public opinion through decades of research, including demographic characteristics, political affiliations, cultural beliefs, and salience of crime/threat.

Second, because most criminal justice public opinion research was published during the sustained era of offender exclusion, criminologists have not yet established the predictors of support for progressive criminal justice policies. Further, although there is a large Black-White gap in support for various policies, criminologists have largely disregarded whether opinions differ when measures of policy support and beliefs about offenders specifically refer to Blacks.

Thus, this dissertation predicts public opinion for a range of punitive, progressive, and race-specific policies and measures of beliefs about those who have committed crime.

It is expected that racial resentment and White nationalism will be positively related to support for punitive policies and beliefs about those who have committed crime and negatively related to progressive policy opinions and beliefs about offenders. Racial sympathy is expected to be related to lower levels of punitiveness and higher levels of support for progressive policies and progressive beliefs about offenders. The effects of all three racial attitudes are expected to be larger for the race-specific measures of public beliefs and policy opinions than for the non-race-specific punitive and progressive measures (Chudy, 2017; Kinder & Sanders, 1996).

Given that public opinion has been shown to affect policy decisions (see, e.g., Pickett, 2019), this dissertation has the potential to inform current efforts toward criminal justice reform. The data for this dissertation were collected in a 2019 survey administered to a representative sample of adults residing in the United States. Thus, the conclusions drawn here can be generalized to the American public and highlight how citizens' opinions differ across subsets of the population. The findings of the current project can inform both lawmakers' decisions about which policies to endorse and their decisions about how to frame policies to garner support among their constituents.

CONCLUSION

Beginning in the early 2010s, the shootings of unarmed Black men by law enforcement officers and vigilantes—and in many high-profile cases, the absence of criminal sanctions imposed on the shooters (Allen, Goldberg, & Szekely, 2019)—dominated news media and public discourse. These events and the widely criticized remarks Trump has made about Blacks and Hispanics during his campaign and presidency have ignited debates, protests, and even riots. The

increased salience of race has led scholars outside of criminology to explore racial attitudes beyond racial animus, including racial sympathy and White nationalism.

At the same time, a call for criminal justice reform with an emphasis on racial justice has emerged. The degree to which the public supports criminal justice reforms may differ depending on the degree to which they feel resentment or sympathy toward Blacks and the degree to which they endorse the political orientation of White nationalism. This dissertation advances prior research by testing the effect of these racial attitudes on beliefs about discrimination in the criminal justice system against Blacks and on views toward Black people who have committed crimes. The effects of these racial attitudes, and of a range of other known predictors of policy opinions, are also estimated for numerous punitive and progressive criminal justice policies and attitudes about offenders in general.

Of particular importance given the current context of criminal justice reform discussed above, this dissertation considers whether racial attitudes affect both the belief that those who have committed crimes can be redeemed and support for policies that could facilitate redemption. Thus, race and redemption are central to understanding the nuances of public opinion at the current turning point in correctional policy.

Chapter 2

METHODS

The purpose of this dissertation is to further our understanding of how individuals' attitudes about race impact their preferences for a range of criminal justice policies and their beliefs about people who have committed crime. Prior evidence indicates that racial resentment is a strong and persistent predictor of such preferences and beliefs. This dissertation extends the extant research by measuring racial attitudes more comprehensively by collecting data with novel measures of two other racial attitudes—racial sympathy and White nationalism. To this end, data collected in a 2019 survey conducted by the opt-in Internet panel survey company, YouGov, are analyzed. The following sections will describe the advantages of the opt-in Internet panel survey approach, the sampling and data collection procedures for the 2019 YouGov survey, and the analytical strategy of the current study.

OPT-IN INTERNET PANEL SURVEY APPROACH

Traditional versus Internet Surveys

Opt-in Internet panel survey companies, such as YouGov, administer surveys through the Internet to individuals who have agreed to participate in research studies as part of the company's panel. The use of the Internet for survey research emerged as an alternative to traditional survey methods (e.g., in-person interviews, mail-in questionnaires, phone interviews) that were costly, time-consuming, and plagued by low response rates (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013; Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014). However, one challenge in conducting an Internet survey is establishing that estimates obtained from the sample data are representative of the population from which the sample was selected.

Traditional surveys can use a probability-based sampling method by selecting participants from a sampling frame of all members of the population (e.g., home address listings, telephone number listings) (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013). Some probability-based Internet panels exist—such as CentERpanel, GFK KnowledgePanel, and the American Life Panel (Hays, Liu, & Kapteyn, 2015). However, because respondents are recruited through random digit dialing (RDD) or sampling from address listings, and because respondents may need to be provided with equipment to participate in surveys (e.g., computers, telephone connection, WebTV), probability-based Internet surveys can also be resource-intensive (Hays et al., 2015).

Traditional and Internet probability-based surveys use design-based inference as the theoretical basis for drawing inferences about a population based on the data collected from the sample. Design-based inference assumes that the probability of each case being selected into the sample is known and "Unbiased estimators of population means and proportions can be obtained by weighting selected observations by the reciprocal of their selection probabilities" (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013, p. 312).

However, when cases selected into the sample do not agree to participate in the survey, estimates can be biased due to the nonresponse from those cases (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013). To draw inferences about a population from a survey with a low response rate, "the basis for these inferences must be some sort of model" and so most probability-based surveys "report poststratification weights rather than the design-based [i.e., known probability] weights" (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013, p. 313). Inference made about a population based on this method of accounting for sampling bias is known as *model-based inference*.

Because there is no readily available sampling frame from which to sample participants through the Internet, many Internet surveys use a non-probability sampling method (also known

as convenience sampling). One method of conducting non-probability Internet panel surveys is to administer the survey to a sample drawn from an opt-in panel of participants. With low response rates for probability-based surveys being common, "Some have argued that there is little practical difference between opting out of a probability sample and opting into a nonprobability sample" (Hays, Liu, & Kapteyn, 2015, p. 685; Rivers, 2013). In both cases, model-based inference can be used as the theoretical basis for making inferences about the population from sample data.

Model-based inference typically involves some process of matching and/or weighting cases in order to model the bias created by nonresponse and self-selection (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013). Matching involves using a synthetic sampling frame (SSF) such as a large high-quality dataset from a probability-based sample or population data from the Census. The probability-based dataset includes information on covariates that may influence selection into the non-probability sample (e.g., age, gender, race, socioeconomic status). Cases in the opt-in panel are then matched to a probability-based sample of similar cases, based on the covariates, from the SSF (Mercer, Kreuter, Keeter, & Stuart, 2017). The cases selected into the sample can be weighted by propensity scores that are computed from their values on the covariates, which allows the researcher to assume that the effect of selection bias is ignorable, given the covariates (Mercer et al., 2017). There are various methods of matching and weighting, and multiple methods of combining of the two procedures. As a prelude to a review of the three-stage sampling method specific to YouGov surveys, the following section describes the advantages of the opt-in Internet panel survey approach more generally.

Advantages of Opt-In Internet Panel Surveys

The major advantages of opt-in Internet panel surveys compared to traditional survey

methods are (1) high efficiency at a relatively low cost, (2) evidence of reduced measurement error, and (3) low item non-response. For these reasons, opt-in Internet panel surveys have been widely adopted by political science and public opinion researchers (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013; Baker et al., 2013) and studies using YouGov data have appeared top journals in the social sciences, including *American Journal of Political Science* (Boudreau & MacKenzie, 2014), *American Sociological Review* (Schachter, 2016), *Criminology* (Enns & Ramirez, 2018), *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (Rentfrow et al., 2013), *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* (Roche, Pickett, & Gertz, 2016), and *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Johnston, Hillygus, & Bartles, 2014).

First, opt-in Internet panel surveys can often be less expensive and resource intensive than traditional surveys (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013). Because the questionnaires are administered online, many costs of traditional survey methods (e.g., printing, stamps, phone bills, payment for interviewers) are eliminated. The median completion time can be shorter for Internet surveys than for mail and phone surveys (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014; Baker et al., 2013). Further, when researchers collaborate to collect data on common variables across studies that use the same opt-in Internet panel survey company to draw unique samples, very large sample sizes can be achieved by combining the datasets from those studies (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013).

Importantly, research shows that opt-in Internet panels can produce estimates of population characteristics that are as accurate as mail-in and phone surveys (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014). In one study, Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014) administered an identical survey "fielded at the same time over the Internet (using an opt-in Internet panel), by telephone with live interviews (using a national [RDD] sample of landlines and cellphones), and by mail

(using a national sample of addresses)" (p. 285). YouGov was used as the opt-in Internet panel and findings indicated that the mode of interview did not significantly affect measures of "public opinion, politics, and public health" (p. 286). Further, Internet surveys eliminate interviewer effects (Chang & Krosnick, 2009, 2010; Kiecker & Nelson, 1996) and given that interviewer race impacts racial resentment scores (Kinder & Sanders, 1996), avoiding interviewer effects is especially important for the current study. Similarly, several studies show that computer-led surveys are less likely to evoke socially desirable responses than interviewer-led surveys (see, e.g., Atkeson, Adams, & Alvarez, 2014; Chang & Krosnick, 2010; Simmons & Bobo, 2015).

Finally, opt-in panel surveys often have low item nonresponse than traditional surveys, thereby further reducing measurement error (Johnson et al., 2001; Fricker, Galesic, Tourangeau, & Yan, 2005; Kwak & Radler, 2002; Messer, Edwards, & Dillman, 2012). Low item nonresponse rates for opt-in Internet panel surveys may be in part due to the fact that by choosing to be part of the panel, individuals have already indicated that they are willing to complete surveys and are typically compensated or rewarded for their participation (see, e.g., YouGov, 2017). Given these numerous advantages, the current study analyzes data from an opt-in Internet panel survey conducted by YouGov. YouGov's unique sampling strategy makes it an ideal choice for collecting data about the American public's attitudes about race and opinions of criminal justice policy.

SAMPLING STRATEGY FOR THE CURRENT STUDY

YouGov's Three-Stage Sampling Method

YouGov uses a three-stage sampling method to maximize the generalizability of each study's sample to the population. First, a random sample—the "target sample"—is selected from

persons who fit the study criteria in the synthetic sampling frame (data on a wide range of characteristics from the 2012 American Community Survey). Second, for each case selected into the sample, YouGov selects "one or more *matching* members from [the] pool of [2 million] opt-in respondents" who are "as similar as possible to the selected members of the target sample" using proximity matching (YouGov, 2019, p. 1). The matched sample of YouGov panelists "will have similar properties to a true random sample" of the population (p. 1). The third and final step is weighting the matched cases "to the sampling frame using propensity scores" that are computed from a range of characteristics (p. 4). The use of both sample matching and poststratification weighting is recommended for ensuring the quality of opt-in Internet surveys (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014). Research has shown that YouGov surveys generalize to the U.S. population and may even produce more accurate estimates than surveys that use probability-based sampling methods (Vavrack & Rivers, 2008).

Sample Characteristics

The full weighted sample surveyed by YouGov is similar to the U.S. population on a range of demographic estimates from the U.S. Census (in parentheses): non-Hispanic White 64.1% (60.4%), over the age of 65 26.4% (21.5%), male 48.7% (49.2%), high school diploma or equivalent 91.6% (87.5%), reside in the South 38.2% (38.3%) (QuickFacts, 2019). Because Chudy (2017) defines racial sympathy as "white distress over black misfortune" (p. 35), the current study includes only White respondents (n = 769). Cases with missing data on any single-item measure, or with missing data on all items within a multi-item measure were listwise deleted (n = 5). Given that listwise deletion excludes less than 0.1% of White cases in the sample, multiple imputation of missing values was not necessary. Thus, the final sample includes 764 White adults (18+) residing in the United States. The descriptive statistics for controls and

independent variables are reported in Table 2.1.

DATA COLLECTION

Distribution of the Survey

The co-principal investigators (co-PIs) for the 2019 YouGov survey (Velmer S. Burton and Leah C. Butler) commissioned YouGov to administer the survey to its online panel. The University of Alabama Little Rock (UALR) Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the study protocol. YouGov fielded the survey during June 7–10, 2019. All participants were presented with an information sheet and consent form prior to the start of the survey. A signed consent form was not required by the UALR IRB, as requiring signatures would identify participants whose identity would otherwise be anonymous. YouGov rewarded survey participants with polling points, which can be redeemed for small gifts, such as a UNICEF Donation, gift cards to various stores and restaurants, and Visa Prepaid cards (YouGov, 2017). YouGov then delivered the deidentified survey data and sample weights to the co-PIs. All estimates reported in this dissertation were computed from the weighted data.

Each variable included in the analyses for the current study is described below. Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 report the variable coding and descriptive statistics for the control and independent variables and for the dependent variables, respectively. Exploratory factor analysis results for each multi-item measure are reported in separate tables (along with the survey items, variable coding, descriptive statistics, and Cronbach's alpha of the measure).

Measuring Support for Criminal Justice Policies

Punitive Criminal Justice Opinions. Three measures of punitive policy support are assessed as dependent variables. First, support for the *death penalty* is measured with a single

Table 2.1. Coding and Descriptive Statistics for Controls and Independent Variables

Variable	Item Coding	$\bar{X}$	SD
Age	In years, as of 2019	50.86	17.84
Male	0 = Female, 1 = Male	0.49	0.50
Education	1 = No HS degree, 2 = HS graduate, 3 = Some college, 4 = 2-year college degree, 5 = 4-year college degree, 6 = Postgraduate degree	3.47	1.53
Employed	0 = Not currently working full-time, 1 = Currently working full-time	0.41	0.49
Married	0 = Not married, 1 = Married	0.52	0.50
Southerner	0 = Does not live in the South, 1 = Lives in the South (based on Census regions)	0.38	0.49
Conservatism	1 = Very liberal, 2 = Liberal, 3 = Moderate or not sure, 4 = Conservative, 5 = Very conservative	3.13	1.23
Republicanism	1 = Strong Democrat, 2 = Not very strong Democrat, 3 = Lean Democrat, 4 = Independent or unsure, 5 = Lean Republican, 6 = Not very strong Republican, 7 = Strong Republican	4.13	2.19
Religiosity	Importance of religion: 1 = Not at all important, 2 = Not too important, 3 = Somewhat important, 4 = Very important Church attendance: 1 = Never, 2 = Seldom, 3 = A few times a year, 4 = Once or twice a month, 5 = Once a week, 6 = More than once a week Prayer frequency: 1 = Never, 2 = Seldom, 3 = A few times a month, 4 = Once a week, 5= A few times a week, 6 = Once a day, 7 = Several times a day	-0.11	0.90
Egalitarianism	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	3.32	0.95
Care/harm	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	3.65	0.91
Dangerous world	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	3.49	0.89
Fear of crime	1 = Very unafraid, 2 = Unafraid, 3 = Neither afraid nor unafraid, 4 = Afraid, 5 = Very afraid	2.92	0.99
Racial resentment	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	3.15	1.14
Racial sympathy	1 = I do not feel any sympathy, 2 = A little sympathy, 3 = Some sympathy, 4 = A lot of sympathy, 5 = A great deal of sympathy	3.57	1.82
White nationalism	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	2.28	1.10

Table 2.2. Coding and Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables

Variable	Item Coding	$\bar{X}$	SD
Death penalty	0 = Opposes the death penalty or has no opinion, 1 = Favors the death penalty	0.56	0.50
Harsher courts	0 = Courts are too harsh, about right, or don't know, 1= Courts are not harsh enough	0.42	0.49
Punishment goal	0 = Supports rehabilitation or protecting society as goal of imprisonment or not sure, 1 = Supports punishment as goal of imprisonment	0.17	0.37
Rehabilitation goal	0 = Supports punishment or protecting society as goal of imprisonment or not sure, 1 = Supports rehabilitation as goal of imprisonment	0.42	0.49
Support for rehabilitation	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	3.83	0.72
Belief in redeemability	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	3.92	0.53
Rehabilitation ceremonies	0 = Does not agree with rehabilitation ceremonies, 1= Agrees with rehabilitation ceremonies	0.51	0.50
Rehabilitation certificates	0 = Does not agree with rehabilitation certificates, 1= Agrees with rehabilitation certificates	0.54	0.50
Expungement	0 = Expungement is a bad policy, 1 = Expungement is a good policy	0.51	0.50
Criminal justice discrimination	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	2.99	1.15
Death penalty discrimination	0 = Courts are colorblind or White people are more likely to get the death penalty than African Americans, 1 = African Americans are a little more likely or much more likely to get the death penalty than Whites	0.48	0.50
Black offender redemption	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	4.01	0.68
Black offender condemnation	1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor disagree, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree	2.36	0.85

item, which asked respondents, “Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for a person convicted of murder.” The variable is coded such that 0 = oppose, not sure, 1 = favor. Second, support for *harsher courts* is measured with the question, “In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?” and is coded such that 0 = too harsh, about right, or don’t know, 1 = not harsh enough. The third punitive measure, *punishment goal* captures responses to the question, “What do you think should be the *main emphasis* in most prisons?” where 0 = trying to rehabilitate the individual, protecting society, or not sure, 1 = punishing the offender. These three policy opinions are standard measures of punitiveness (Enns, 2016).

Progressive Criminal Justice Opinions and Beliefs. Six of the dependent variables capture support for progressive criminal justice policy and endorsement of progressive beliefs about offenders. The first three of these variables—*rehabilitation goal*, *support for rehabilitation*, and *belief in redeemability*—capture belief in rehabilitation and redemption generally. The remaining three variables—*rehabilitation ceremonies*, *rehabilitation certificates*, and *expungement*—measure support for specific practices that could facilitate redemption, as proposed by Cullen and colleagues (2020) and Maruna (2001). By examining support for (1) the overarching goals of rehabilitation and redemption as well as (2) the specific practices that could facilitate these goals, this dissertation may inform lawmakers’ decisions about framing both of these aspects of policy.

First, *rehabilitation goal* is an alternative version of the “main emphasis of most prisons” item, coded such that 0 = punishing the individual, protecting society, or not sure, 1 = trying to rehabilitate the individual. Note that this measure is not the inverse of *punishment goal* because “protecting society” and “not sure” are coded as 0 in both measures.

Second, a five-item scale (Thielo, 2017) measured *support for rehabilitation.* Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements about the importance and effectiveness of rehabilitation programs. All five items loaded onto a single factor (see Table 2.3) with high internal consistency (α = .81).

Third, *belief in redeemability* is an eight-item modified version of the ten-item scale developed by O'Sullivan, Holderness, Hong, Bright, and Kemp (2017). The full scale is intended to capture three components of belief in redeemability, the degree to which a respondent sees those who have committed crime as (1) deserving of human capital, (2) as capable of change, and (3) having the agency to "exercise control over his or her life" (O'Sullivan et al., 2017, p. 421). Each item is a statement that reflects these sentiments, and respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a five-point scale (see Table 2.2). However, the EFA results (Table 2.4) indicated that the two items that comprise the third component did not load well onto the same factor as the other items (factor loadings equal to .45 and .46). Given that belief in redeemability is treated only as an outcome variable in the current study, for the sake of parsimoniousness, the two items that capture agency were removed from the scale and a mean scale was computed from the remaining eight items (factor loadings ranging from .56 to .81) The internal consistency of the *belief in redeemability* measure is high (α = .86).

Fourth, support for *rehabilitation ceremonies* is captured with a single item. Because many respondents would likely not be familiar with rehabilitation ceremonies, they were provided with a brief explanation of the policy and with response options that described both an opinion of the policy and a common justification for that opinion. The full item read,

> Some courts hold "rehabilitation ceremonies" for ex-offenders who have done certain things to prove to the community that they have left behind a life of crime—such as

Table 2.3. EFA Results for Support for Rehabilitation Scale (Cronbach's α = .81; $\overline{X}$ = 3.83; SD = 0.72)

Variable	Item	FL	$\overline{X}$	SD
Rehabilitate adults	It is important to try to rehabilitate adults who have committed crimes and are now in the correctional system.	.80	4.09	0.81
Chronic offender	Rehabilitation programs should be available even for offenders who have been involved in a lot of crime in their lives.	.78	3.83	0.99
Expanding programs	I would not support expanding the rehabilitation programs that are now being undertaken in our prisons. (R)	.75	3.61	1.09
Community	It is a good idea to provide treatment for offenders who are supervised by the courts and live in the community.	.74	4.07	0.80
Get off easy	All rehabilitation programs have done is to allow criminals who deserve to be punished to get off easy. (R)	.72	3.59	1.07

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; (R) = reverse coded; KMO = .79; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 1291.59, df = 10, p = .000; total variance explained = 57.80; eigenvalue = 2.89

Table 2.4. EFA Results for Belief in Redeemability Scale (Cronbach's α = .86; $\bar{X}$ = 3.98; SD = 0.62)

Variable	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Regain respect	People who have committed crimes deserve the opportunity to regain the respect of the community.	.81	4.12	0.74
Best life	People who commit a crime still deserve the opportunity to build the best life they can have.	.77	4.16	0.79
Change dramatically	It's possible for someone who commits crime to change dramatically for the better.	.76	4.18	0.80
Law-abiding life	In general, it's possible for people who commit crime to change and lead a law-abiding life.	.74	4.17	0.75
Always a criminal	Once a criminal always a criminal. (R)	.72	3.96	1.00
Rehabilitate	It's not really worth spending time trying to rehabilitate offenders. (R)	.70	4.05	0.97
No obstacle	Having committed a crime should be no obstacle to becoming a valued member of society again.	.68	3.85	0.92
Best efforts	Despite their best efforts, most people who commit crimes just can't manage to go back to living straight. (R)	.56	3.40	1.02

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; (R) = reverse coded; For full scale: KMO = .87; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 2680.91 df = 45, p = .000; total variance explained by one factor = 51.74%; one factor eigenvalue = 4.14

> completing rehabilitation programs and community service activities, taking responsibility and apologizing for their past crimes, and/or staying crime-free for a certain period of time (such as five years). At these public rehabilitation ceremonies, ex-offenders are declared "rehabilitated" and free from all legal penalties and other collateral sanctions of their crimes.
>
> How much would you agree or disagree that rehabilitation ceremonies will help ex-offenders be reintegrated back into their communities and stay out of crime?

Respondents were then asked to indicate their level of agreement on the five-point agreement scale (see Table 2.2).

The fifth progressive measure is *rehabilitation certificates*. Again, respondents were given a brief description of rehabilitation certificates and were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with the use of the policy.

> At some rehabilitation ceremonies, ex-offenders are given "certificates of rehabilitation." These certificates are like letters of recommendation, which state that an ex-offender has been formally "rehabilitated." Ex-offenders can give these certificates to licensing agencies, employers, and state officials to show that they have paid their debt to society for their crimes.
>
> How much would you agree or disagree that "certificates of rehabilitation" will help ex-offenders be reintegrated into their communities and stay out of crime?

The *rehabilitation ceremonies* and *rehabilitation certificates* measures were drawn from a 2017 YouGov survey on public opinion of correctional policy (Thielo, 2017). These measures capture support for two policies that embody the redemption component of the R&R model (Cullen et al., 2020) and may be considered secondary goods under the GLM model (Ward et al., 2012). Thielo (2017) found widespread support for both policies in her national survey, however, it is unknown whether any of the racial attitudes affect support for these redemption-based policies. Thus, the inclusion of *rehabilitation ceremonies* and *rehabilitation certificates* in the current study may guide further theoretical development and practical implementation of both the R&R and GLM models.

Finally, the sixth progressive measure is support for *expungement*. Following the same format as the previous two measures, the full *expungement* item (Thielo, 2017) read,

> There has been some debate recently about expunging criminal records for offenders who have completed their sentences and thus paid for their crime. When a criminal record is expunged, this means that the criminal record is removed or sealed and thus is no longer something that the public, including employers can use. It's like starting over from scratch. We would like to know your opinion on this matter.
>
> Some people argue that *expunging criminal records* is a <u>good policy</u> because it gives criminal offenders the opportunity to wipe their slate clean and get their lives back on track. Other people believe that *expunging criminal records* is a <u>bad policy</u> because public access to criminal records helps keep communities safe.
>
> Which of the following statements is closest to your opinion?

Respondents then selected between two statements and the variable was coded such that 0 = Expunging criminal records is a <u>bad policy</u> because public access to criminal records helps keep communities safe, 1 = Expunging criminal records is a <u>good policy</u> because it gives criminal offenders a chance to get their lives back on track. Expungement is another method of facilitating redemption, and its practice has recently been expanded (Love & Schlussel, 2019). A review of reforms "aimed at reducing barriers faced by people with criminal records" in 2018 found that "The largest number of new laws—28 statutes in 20 states—expanded access to sealing or expungement" (Love & Schlussel, 2019, p. 2). However, expungement differs from rehabilitation ceremonies and certificates because it is effectively *forgetting* the criminal record, but not necessarily *forgiving* (Cullen et al., 2020). Estimating support for expungement may provide insight into the nuances of which of these underlying methods of redemption the public is willing to embrace.

Race-Specific Criminal Justice Opinions and Beliefs. The remaining four dependent variables capture opinions about the presence of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system and beliefs about Black offenders. First, respondents were asked to indicate their level of

agreement with three statements about fair treatment to all racial and ethnic groups by the justice system, by local police, and by federal law enforcement agents (Johnson et al., 2011). Johnson and colleagues (2011) found greater support for the use of racial/ethnic profiling by law enforcement among those who believe there is racial/ethnic bias in the criminal justice system. In the context of the current study's concern with how racial attitudes impact race-related opinions about the criminal justice system, the latter measure is treated as a dependent variable. Thus, c*riminal justice discrimination* is a mean scale composed of three items that loaded onto a single factor (see Table 2.5) with high internal consistency ($\alpha = .91$).

Second, *death penalty discrimination* measures whether respondents believe there is racial disparity in death penalty sentencing. A single item asked,

> One debate is whether capital punishment is given out fairly or discriminates against minorities, especially African Americans who murder a White person. Which of these statements best reflects your views on the death penalty?

The item was then coded as a dichotomous indicator of whether the respondent believes that "African Americans are [a little more likely/a lot more likely] to get the death penalty than Whites" (= 1) versus either of the other options (= 0) (see Table 2.1).

The third race-specific measure, *Black offender redemption*, and the fourth race-specific measure, *Black offender condemnation*, were adapted from the items used in the *belief in redeemability* scale. Select items from the *belief in redeemability* scales (as well as additional items from other redeemability scales) were slightly altered so that rather than referring to "offenders" or "people" or "prisoners" in general, the item specifically referred to "Black offenders," "Black people," or "Black prisoners." These race-specific items appeared on the survey prior to the general items to avoid respondents intentionally answering the items about Black offenders the same way they answered the items about offenders in general. The survey

Table 2.5. EFA Results for Criminal Justice Discrimination Scale (Cronbach's α = .91; $\bar{X}$ = 2.99; SD = 1.15)

Variable	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Unequal treatment by the justice system	The justice system in the United States is fair to all, regardless of racial/ethnic background.	.93	2.86	1.27
Unequal treatment by federal law enforcement	Federal law enforcement agents treat all racial/ethnic groups equally.	.93	2.92	1.26
Unequal treatment by local police	Local police in my community treat all racial/ethnic groups equally.	.89	3.25	1.24

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = .74; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 1536.32, df = 3, p = .000; variance explained = 84.04 %; eigenvalue = 2.52.

was also structured such that several other scale items were asked between the *Black offender redemption* and *Black offender condemnation* items and the *belief in redeemability* and *support for rehabilitation* items. This question-ordering was a deliberate effort to avoid respondents recognizing that the race-specific items and general items were substantively the same.

Exploratory factor analysis was conducted with all items from both scales. As shown in Table 2.6, the items loaded onto two separate factors, as expected. Both factors, *Black offender redemption* and *Black offender condemnation* have high internal consistency ($\alpha = .85$ and .90, respectively). The Pearson's coefficients for the correlation between the each of the four race-specific item with corresponding *belief in redeemability* items ranged from $r = .51$ to .70, indicating that respondents generally did not provide identical responses to the race-specific and respective general items. A paired-samples t-test for each of the four pairs of race-specific and general items was also estimated, and all tests were significant at $p < .05$, indicating significant differences between responses to the items about Black offenders and the corresponding items about offenders in general.

Measuring Racial Attitudes

The effects of three racial attitudes on public opinions of correctional policy and beliefs about people who have committed crime are estimated. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted with all of the *racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism* items. As shown in Table 2.7, the items loaded onto the corresponding scales as expected. The following sections explain the three scales—*racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism*—and provide descriptive statistics.

Racial Resentment. Racial resentment is measured with the standard four-item mean scale developed by Kinder and Sanders (1996). The four items loaded onto a single factor (see

Table 2.6. EFA Results for Black Offender Redemption (Cronbach's α = .85; $\overline{X}$ = 4.01; SD = 0.68) **and Black Offender Condemnation Scales** (Cronbach's α = .90; $\bar{X}$ = 2.36; SD = 0.85)

Variable	Item	F1	F2	$\bar{X}$	SD
Productive lives	Most Black offenders can go on to lead productive lives with help and hard work.	**.78**	-.22	4.08	0.86
Law-abiding life†	In general, it's possible for Black inmates to change and lead a law-abiding life.	**.76**	-.25	4.11	0.87
Get a job	If given a chance, most Black prisoners can learn a trade, get a job, and stay out of crime when they reenter society.	**.74**	-.21	4.09	0.85
Change dramatically†	It's possible for Black inmates to change dramatically for the better.	**.74**	-.22	4.09	0.88
Giving back	Society should look favorably on Black offenders who make an effort to "give something back" to their communities.	**.71**	-.07	4.03	0.87
Young offenders	Even the worst young Black offenders can grow out of criminal behavior.	**.68**	-.20	3.74	0.98
Damaged	Most Black offenders are so damaged that they can never lead productive lives.	-.22	**.81**	2.29	1.05
Lazy	Most Black inmates are too lazy to earn an honest living upon release from prison.	-.22	**.80**	2.25	1.10
Bad upbringing	Unfortunately, most Black prisoners are so damaged by their bad upbringing that they will likely never leave a life in crime.	-.14	**.79**	2.65	1.11
Best efforts†	Despite their best efforts, most Black people who commit crimes just can't manage to go back to living straight.	-.22	**.77**	2.48	1.08
Little hope for change	Most Black offenders really have little hope of changing for the better.	-.14	**.75**	2.31	1.09
Gang members	Many Black inmates are gang members and they will always be violent.	-.19	**.73**	2.72	1.15
Rehabilitation†	It's not really worth spending time to rehabilitate Black offenders.	-.30	**.69**	1.80	1.01

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = .92; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 4774.06, df = 78, p = .000; total variance explained = 60.63%; two factor eigenvalue = 1.95; † indicates an item with a corresponding general item on the belief in redeemability scale.

Table 2.7. EFA Results for Racial Resentment, Racial Sympathy, and White Nationalism Items

Variable	RR	RS	WN
Generations of slavery	**.87**	-.21	.05
Less than deserved	**.83**	-.28	.04
Other minorities	**.79**	-.13	.38
Try harder	**.71**	-.13	.49
Job applicants	-.10	**.83**	-.30
Laurette	-.08	**.81**	-.31
Community leaders	-.23	**.69**	-.06
Michael	-.42	**.64**	-.14
What God meant	.07	-.19	**.90**
Number one	.08	-.16	**.88**
White culture	.38	-.19	**.72**
Immigrants	.52	-.16	**.64**

Notes: RR = Racial resentment factor loadings, RS = Racial sympathy factor loadings, WN = White nationalism factor loadings; KMO = .88; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 =5721.95, df = 66, p = .000; total variance explained = 73.77%; three factor eigenvalue = 1.46

Table 2.8) with high internal consistency (α = .88).

Racial Sympathy. Racial sympathy was measured with Chudy's (2017) four vignettes. Following each of the vignette, respondents were asked "How much sympathy do you feel for [person/group]" on a five-point scale (see Table 2.1). As expected, the items loaded onto a single factor (see Table 2.9) with a comparable Cronbach's alpha (α = .80) level to that found in Chudy's (2017) study (α = .74).

White Nationalism. *White nationalism* is measured with a four-item scale. The items were developed for use in this dissertation and were written to reflect the major sentiments that comprise white nationalism as a political orientation, as described by Kauffman (2019). Each item is a statement that values White culture and/or emphasizes the importance of the United States remaining a White-majority nation. The items loaded onto a single factor (see Table 2.10) with high internal consistency (α = .87).

Control Variables

Demographics. Five of the YouGov core profile items are controlled for as demographic measures. All YouGov panelists answer the core profile items when they join the panel and are asked to update their data periodically (every 12-27 months, depending on the item). YouGov then provides data for these items as part of the deidentified dataset delivered to the researcher when the survey is complete (YouGov, n.d.). Although this method limits the researchers' flexibility in measuring these characteristics, it also frees space on the survey to devote to items that are of particular interest to the study at hand. Each of these five measures, *age*, *male*, *education*, *employed*, *married*, and *southerner* are standard measures controlled for in public opinion research (see, e.g., Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013).

YouGov reports the birth year for each respondent, and so *age* is measured as the

Table 2.8. EFA Results for Racial Resentment Scale (Cronbach's α = .88; $\bar{X}$ = 3.15; SD = 1.14)

Variable	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Other minorities	Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.	.89	3.37	1.30
Generations of slavery	Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. (R)	.87	3.17	1.46
Less than deserved	Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. (R)	.85	3.12	1.30
Try harder	It is really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as Whites.	.85	2.94	1.24

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; (R) = reverse coded; KMO = .76; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 1854.19, df = 6, p = .000; total variance explained = 74.42%; eigenvalue = 2.98.

Table 2.9. EFA Results for Racial Sympathy Scale (Cronbach's α = .80; $\bar{X}$ = 3.57; SD = 1.02)

Variable	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Job applicants	Tim is a White man who owns a hair salon. His business is growing rapidly and so he decides to place an advertisement to hire new stylists. In the advertisement, he writes that interested applicants should come for an interview first thing next Monday. When he arrives at the salon on Monday, he sees a line of seven or eight people waiting outside the door, all of whom appear to be Black. He approaches the line and tells the applicants that he's sorry, but the positions have been filled. The applicants are upset; they feel they have been turned away because of their race.	.88	3.99	1.21
Laurette	Mrs. Lewis, a White woman with young children, posts advertisements for a nanny on community bulletin boards. She receives many inquiries and decides to interview all applicants over the phone. Mrs. Lewis is most impressed with a woman named Laurette, who has relevant experience, is an excellent cook, and comes enthusiastically recommended. Mrs. Lewis invites Laurette over for what she expects will be the final step of the hiring process. When Laurette arrives, Mrs. Lewis is surprised to see that Laurette is Black. After Laurette's visit, which goes very well, Mrs. Lewis thanks her for her time but says that she will not be offered the job. When Laurette asks why, Mrs. Lewis says that she doesn't think that her children would feel comfortable around her. Laurette is upset about Mrs. Lewis' actions.	.85	4.04	1.17
Michael	Michael is a young Black man who lives in a midwestern city. One day Michael is crossing the street and jaywalks in front of cars. Some local police officers see Michael jaywalk and stop and question him. Michael argues that he was just jaywalking and is otherwise a law-abiding citizen. The police officers feel that Michael is being uncooperative and so they give him a pat down to see if he is carrying any concealed weapons. Michael is very upset by this treatment.	.77	3.31	1.45
Community leaders	Milford is a mid-sized city in the Northeast. The main bus depot for the city is located in the Whittier section of Milford, a primarily Black neighborhood. Whittier community leaders argue that the concentration of buses produces serious health risks for residents; they point to the high asthma rates in Whittier as evidence of the bus depot's harmful effects. The Milford Department of Transportation officials, who are mostly White, state that Whittier is the best location for the depot because it is centrally located and many Whittier residents take the bus. Furthermore, it would be expensive to relocate the bus depot to a new location. Whittier community leaders are very upset by the Department's inaction.	.68	2.95	1.30

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = .71; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 1188.53, df = 6, p = .000; total variance explained = 63.29%; eigenvalue = 2.53

Table 2.10. EFA Results for White Nationalism Scale (Cronbach's α = .87; $\bar{X}$ = 2.28; SD = 1.10)

Variable	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Number one	Although everyone is welcome in the country, America must remain mostly a White nation to remain #1 in the world.	.88	1.95	1.15
What God meant	We need to reduce immigration to keep the U.S. a mostly White nation—which is what God meant it to be.	.88	1.90	1.16
White culture	Although people won't admit it, White people and their culture are what made America great in the first place.	.85	2.51	1.32
Immigrants	The immigrants now invading our country—and their liberal supporters—want to turn America into a third-world country where White people are a tiny minority.	.81	2.74	1.53

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = .80; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 1634.69, df = 6, p = .000; total variance explained = 73.22%; eigenvalue = 2.93.

respondent's age in years as of January 1, 2019. The core profile item for sex includes only male and female as options, therefore *male* is a dichotomous measure coded such that 0 = female, 1 = male. To measure *education*, YouGov asked panelists to report the "highest level of education [they] have completed" on a six-point scale, coded such that higher values indicate higher levels of education (YouGov, n.d., p. 2).

Panelists are also asked to report their current employment status. Nine different options are provided, including working full time now, working part time now, temporarily laid off, unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, taking care of home or family, student, and other. *Employed* is a dichotomous measure of whether a respondent indicated that they are working full time now (= 1) or any of the other options (= 0). Similarly, although the YouGov core profile item for marital status includes six options (married, living with spouse; separated; divorced; widowed; single, never married; and domestic partnership), *married* is a dichotomous measure which indicates whether the respondent is married (= 1) or any of the other options (= 0). Finally, the current study controls for region of residence. State of residence is measured in the YouGov core profile and states were recoded into the four Census regions. *Southerner* is a dichotomous indicator of whether a respondent resides in the South (= 1) or in any other state (= 0). States in the South include Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.

Political Affiliations. Two additional core profile items, political ideology and party identity, are controlled for as measures of political affiliations. *Conservatism* is a single-item measure of the degree to which a respondent identifies as liberal or conservative on a five-point scale (see Table 2.1). *Republicanism* is a single-item measure of how strongly identifies as a

Democrat or a Republican on a seven-point scale (See Table 2.1). Both political ideology and party identification are standard control measures in public opinion research (see, e.g., Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013).

Cultural Beliefs. Three cultural beliefs are controlled for. First, research has linked religious affiliation and religiosity to support for the death penalty (see, e.g., Grasmick, Bursik, & Blackwell, 2012). However, more recent surveys have shown that Christians generally support rehabilitation and redemption (Barna Group, 2019) and Cullen and colleagues (2020) note that redemption is an important religious principle. Thus, this study may provide insight into whether religiosity differentially impacts support for punitive, progressive, and race-specific policies. To measure *religiosity*, standardized values (z-scores) were computed for three items (church attendance frequency, prayer frequency, and importance of religion) and *religiosity* is computed as the mean of the standardized versions of the three items. All three items loaded onto a single factor (see Table 2.11) and the alpha level ($\alpha = .87$) indicates this is a reliable measure of religiosity.

Egalitarianism is a six-item mean scale that was adapted from Feldman and Huddy's (2005) scale. As previously noted, one critique of the *racial resentment* scale (Kinder & Sanders, 1996) is that it is confounded by individualism as a general attitude (i.e., not directed toward Blacks specifically). To account for this potential confounding, egalitarianism has been used as a measure of the inverse of individualism (Feldman & Huddy, 2005). All items loaded onto a single factor (see Table 2.12) and the measure has high internal consistency ($\alpha = .87$).

The third cultural belief is a measure of the *care/harm foundation* (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) that Haidt (2012) identified as one of the primary moral foundations that humans hold. The *care/harm foundation* measures the degree to which a person is concerned "about

Table 2.11. EFA Results for Religiosity Scale (Cronbach's α = .87; $\bar{X}$ = -.108; SD = .90)

Variable	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Importance of religion	How important is religion in your life? (z-score)	.92	-0.14	1.03
Frequency of prayer	People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of attending religious services, how often do you pray? (z-score)	.90	-0.10	1.02
Church attendance	Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? (z-score)	.86	-0.10	1.00

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = .72; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 1149.50, df = 3, p = .000; variance explained: 79.79%; eigenvalue = 2.39

Table 2.12. EFA Results for Egalitarianism Scale (Cronbach's α = .86; $\bar{X}$ = 3.32; SD = 0.95)

Variable	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Fewer problems	If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have fewer problems.	.82	3.49	1.19
Equal chance	One of the biggest problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance.	.81	3.34	1.29
Gone too far	We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. (R)	.81	3.15	1.39
Worry less	This country would be better off if we worried less about whether everyone is equal. (R)	.79	2.97	1.31
Succeed	Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.	.72	3.75	1.07
Chance in life	It is okay if some people have more of a chance in life than others. (R)	.65	3.24	1.14

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; (R) = reverse coded; KMO = .83; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 2204.00, df = 15, p = .000; variance explained = 59.42%; eigenvalue = 3.57

caring, nurturing, and protecting vulnerable individuals from harm" (Graham et al., 2009, p. 1031). Given that the *racial sympathy* scale describes Blacks' misfortune, it is likely those who heavily value ensuring care and preventing harm to others would score more highly on the *racial sympathy* scale than those who place less weight on this moral foundation. Thus, controlling for *care/harm foundation* may account for some of the variation explained by *racial sympathy* if Chudy's (2017) scale captures sympathy in general, rather than sympathy toward Blacks, in particular. If the effect of *racial sympathy* on policy opinions is significant when controlling for *care/harm foundation*, it would lend credence to the argument that *racial sympathy* is inherently a racial attitude. All items from the Graham et al. (2009) scale loaded onto a single factor (see Table 2.13). However, the factor loadings are modest (ranging from .63 to .67) and the Cronbach's alpha indicates only moderate internal consistency ($\alpha = .54$).

Salience of Crime/Threat. The remaining two control variables are measures of the degree to which crime and the threat of violence are salient features of an individual's worldview. It stands to reason that opinions about crime policy and beliefs about offenders will differ between individuals for whom crime is a prominent concern and those for whom it is not (Costelloe, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2009). First, *dangerous worldview* captures the degree to which respondents perceive the world as a dangerous and threatening place. This concept is similar to the "moral decline" model, which Unnever and Cullen (2010) found to be an inferior explanation of support for capital punishment relative to the "racial animus" model. The four-item mean scale for *dangerous worldview* was adapted from a scale developed by Altemeyer (1988; see also Stroebe, Leander, & Kruglanski, 2017). As shown in Table 2.14, the four items loaded onto a single factor with high internal consistency ($\alpha = .80$).

Fear of crime has been shown to predict support for capital punishment, (Keil & Vito,

Table 2.13. EFA Results for Care/Harm Moral Foundation Scale (Cronbach's α = .54; $\overline{X}$ = 3.65; SD = 0.71)

Variable	Item	FL	$\overline{X}$	SD
Compassion	Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.	.67	3.97	0.86
Outrage	If I saw a mother slapping her child, I would be outraged.	.66	3.46	1.12
Government	The government must first and foremost protect all people from harm.	.65	3.92	1.03
Never right to kill	It can never be right to kill a human being.	.63	3.25	1.30

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = .67; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 211.19, df = 6, p = .000; total variance explained = 42.64 %; eigenvalue = 1.71

Table 2.14 EFA Results for Belief in a Dangerous World Scale (Cronbach's α = .80; $\bar{X}$ = 3.49; SD = 0.87)

Variable	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Unpredictable	The world we live in is basically a dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent and moral people's values and way of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people.	.84	3.44	1.12
No morals	It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else.	.80	3.52	1.09
Dangerous people	There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all.	.77	3.77	1.07
Chaos	Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All signs are pointing to it.	.74	3.20	1.13

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = .79; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity $\chi^2 = 882.60$, df = 6, p = .000; total variance explained = 61.98%; eigenvalue = 2.48

1991) and handgun ownership (Holbert, Shah, & Kwak, 2004). A five-item mean scale measuring *fear of crime* is controlled for. Respondents were asked, "How afraid or unafraid are you that someone will try to commit the following crimes against you or a member of your household in the next five years?" and separately indicated their fear of robbery, murder, theft, burglary, and rape on a five-point scale (see Table 2.1). As shown in Table 2.15, the items loaded onto a single factor and the measure has high internal consistency ($\alpha = .80$).

ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Stepwise regression is used to estimate the effects of the covariates, *racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism* on each of the measures of policy opinions and beliefs about offenders. For the binary outcome measures (i.e., *death penalty*, *punishment goal*, *harsher courts*, *rehabilitation ceremonies*, *rehabilitation certificates*, *expungement*, *rehabilitation goal*, *racial disparity in the death penalty*), logistic regression models are estimated. For the continuous outcome measures (i.e., *belief in redeemability*, *support for rehabilitation*, *criminal justice discrimination*, *Black offender redemption*, *Black offender condemnation*), ordinary least squares regression models are estimated.

The same stepwise procedure is followed for all outcome variables. The first model includes only the covariates (i.e., demographics, political affiliations, cultural beliefs, salience of crime/threat). The second model includes all of the covariates along with *racial resentment*. The third model includes all of the covariates along with *racial sympathy*. The fourth model includes all of the covariates along with *white nationalism*. The fifth and final model includes all of the covariates, *racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism*. Thus, the marginal effects of the three racial attitudes are estimated individually and simultaneously, allowing for conclusions to be drawn regarding the added variance explained by each of the three constructs

Table 2.15. EFA Results for Fear of Crime Scale (Cronbach's α = .90; $\bar{X}$ = 2.92; SD = 0.99)

Variable	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Robbery	Rob or mug you on the street.	.90	2.97	1.14
Murder	Murder you.	.87	2.70	1.19
Theft	Steal money or property from you.	.85	3.15	1.09
Burglary	Break into your house.	.85	3.13	1.13
Rape	Rape or sexually assault you.	.79	2.67	1.28

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = .84; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 2577.85, df = 10, p = .000; total variance explained = 72.68 %; eigenvalue = 3.63

as well as the robustness of the effects of each racial attitude once the others are included in the model.

The variance inflation factors (VIF) and tolerance values were assessed for all independent and control variables to test for multicollinearity. The largest VIF was 2.92 and the smallest tolerance value was .34, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem (O'Brien, 2007). Additional alternate versions of each full model are estimated to test the sensitivity of the estimated effects to alterations made to the model. These alternate versions involved consolidating multiple theoretically similar variables into single measures. First, *right political leaning* ($\overline{X}$ = 0.00; SD = 0.87; α = .85) is the mean of the standardized (z-score) versions of three variables, *Republicanism*, *conservatism*, and *egalitarianism* (egalitarianism was first reverse coded so that higher values indicate lower egalitarianism). Second, *crime salience* ($\overline{X}$= 3.20; SD = 0.78; α = 0.56) is the mean of two variables, *dangerous world* and *fear of crime*. Three alternate versions of the full model are evaluated: (1) *Republicanism*, *conservatism*, and *egalitarianism* removed and *right political leaning* added to the full model, (2) *dangerous world* and *fear of crime* removed and *crime salience* added to the full model, and (3) *Republicanism*, *conservatism*, *egalitarianism*, *dangerous world*, and *fear of crime* removed and *right political leaning* and *fear of crime* added to the full model. Any differences between these alternative models and the full models in terms of the direction and/or significance of a variable's effect will be reported along with the main results.

CONCLUSION

The current study analyzes data that were collected with a relatively new, but nonetheless empirically validated method of surveying representative samples of the population: the opt-in Internet panel approach. The panel from which data for this dissertation were collected and the

sample matching and weighting used by the company that administered the survey, YouGov, has been shown to produce valid and reliable estimates of public opinion, political affiliations, criminal justice attitudes, and other constructs (e.g., Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013; Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014; Simmons & Bobo, 2015). For this dissertation, data from 764 White adults residing in the United States are analyzed. Measures of opinions of punitive, progressive, and race-specific criminal justice policies and beliefs about offenders are measured, as well as three racial attitudes: *racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism*. The next chapter will report the results of the stepwise regression models used to estimate the effects of these three racial attitudes on the measures of support for different criminal justice policies and beliefs about offenders. Ultimately, the current study will provide insight to the nuances of public opinion that may inform which policies lawmakers endorse and how they frame those policies as corrections in the United States continues to move toward an era of offender inclusion.

Chapter 3

RESULTS

The current study tests the effects of three distinct racial attitudes—racial resentment, racial sympathy, and White nationalism—on thirteen measures of public opinion of criminal justice policy and beliefs about those who have committed crime. A key contribution of this study is that it tests the effects of these racial attitudes not only on punitive policy opinions (which have been the focus of prior research) but also on progressive policy opinions and beliefs about offenders (which have been proposed or implemented during the emerging era of inclusion in criminal justice) and race-specific policy opinions and beliefs about offenders (which are expected to be the most strongly influenced by racial attitudes). Thus, the results will be organized into three sections: (1) punitive beliefs and policy opinions, (2) progressive beliefs and policy opinions, and (3) race-specific beliefs and policy opinions.

Within each category of punitive, progressive, and race-specific beliefs and policy opinions, the level of support for or belief in each measure (i.e., univariate descriptive results) are reviewed first. Then, the stepwise regression results for each dependent variable within the category are described. The purpose of presenting the models stepwise is to answer the questions of whether the effect of each racial attitude is robust to the inclusion of the other racial attitudes and of how much additional variation is explained by each racial attitude beyond the variance explained by covariates. However, any interpretation of the differences in effects of the covariates across models should be taken with caution because the final step model (Model 5 in each multivariate results table) is the fully specified model.

In each section, results are also reported for the alternative models that are estimated to check the sensitivity of the results to consolidating theoretically similar covariates into the

summary measures *right political leaning* (the standardized mean of *Republicanism*, *conservatism*, and *egalitarianism*) and *crime salience* (the mean of *dangerous world* and *fear of crime*). The purpose of these sensitivity checks is to identify substantive changes to the results produced by altering the variables included in the model. Thus, differences between the full model and the alternative models will be reported in terms of (1) changes in whether a variable's coefficient is significant at $p \leq .05$, but not whether the level of significance differs (e.g., from $p \leq .05$ to $p \leq .01$), and (2) changes in the direction of significant coefficients from positive to negative or vice-versa.

PUNITIVE BELIEFS AND POLICY OPINIONS

Assessing Indicators of Public Punitiveness

One contribution of the current study is that it provides new estimates of public punitiveness on three indicators that have been estimated in numerous previous studies (Enns, 2016): (1) support for the death penalty, (2) the opinion that courts are not harsh enough, and (3) support for punishment as the primary goal of prisons. Table 3.1 shows the levels of support for each of these three policies. More than half (56.4%) of White Americans favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. 42.4% believe that courts are not harsh enough, and 16.6% endorse punishment as the primary goal of prisons (as opposed to protecting society, rehabilitation, or "not sure").

These results suggest that public punitiveness generally remains lower than the levels observed during the era of exclusion and continues to trend downward. In fact, the estimates provided in Table 3.1 are considerably lower than the most recent estimates for the same variables provided by other national surveys. According to the General Social Survey, between

Table 3.1. Assessing Indicators of Public Punitiveness

Response	Death Penalty	Harsher Courts	Punishment Goal
0 (%)	43.65%	57.59%	83.41%
1 (%)	56.35%	42.41%	16.59%

Notes: Death penalty: 0 = Oppose, 1 = Favor; Harsher courts: 0 = Too harsh/don't know, 1 = Not harsh enough; Punishment goal: 0 = Rehabilitation/protecting society/don't know, 1 = Punishment

1972 and 2018, White support for capital punishment peaked at 78.5% in 1994. With the exception of small (less than two percentage points) year-to-year increases, the percentage of Whites who favor the death penalty has steadily declined each year since 1994, reaching 64.9% in 2018. Likewise, the percentage of Whites who believe courts do not deal with criminals harshly enough has generally declined over the same time period, from 85.7% in 1994 to 56.9% in 2018 (GSS Data Explorer, 2020). Up-to-date estimates of Whites' endorsement of punishment as the main goal of prisons are not as readily available as estimates of the other punitive measures, but in a 2017 national YouGov survey of adults in the United States, Thielo found that 17.2% of Americans believe punishment should be the main emphasis of prisons. Thus, the estimates provided in Table 3.1 suggest a decline in punitiveness in recent years on all three indicators.

Predicting Support for the Death Penalty

Beginning with support for the death penalty, Table 3.2 presents the stepwise logistic regression results. With regard to the covariates, Whites who are older, more conservative, or who more strongly believe that the world is a dangerous, chaotic place, are significantly more likely to favor the death penalty than those who are younger, more liberal, or who less strongly hold the dangerous worldview, respectively. Those who are employed full-time, who are more religious, or who more strongly ascribe to the care/harm moral foundation are significantly less likely to favor the death penalty than their respective counterparts who are not employed full-time, who are less religious, or who less strongly value the care/harm moral foundation.

Also shown in Table 3.2, racial resentment and racial sympathy both have a significant and positive effect on support for the death penalty both with and without including the other racial attitudes (see Models 2, 3, and 5), whereas the effect of White nationalism is

Table 3.2. Logistic Regression of Support for the Death Penalty

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR
Demographics										
Age	0.018 (0.005)***	1.018	0.013 (0.006)*	1.013	0.018 (0.005)***	1.018	0.019 (0.006)***	1.020	0.015 (0.006)*	1.015
Male	0.118 (0.190)	1.126	0.126 (0.195)	1.135	0.122 (0.190)	1.129	0.053 (0.193)	1.054	0.072 (0.198)	1.074
Education	-0.110 (0.062)	0.896	-0.055 (0.064)	0.947	-0.115 (0.062)	0.891	-0.082 (0.063)	0.921	-0.041 (0.065)	0.960
Employed Full-Time	-0.081 (0.040)*	0.922	-0.088 (0.041)*	0.916	-0.081 (0.040)*	0.922	-0.078 (0.040)	0.925	-0.087 (0.041)*	0.917
Married	0.103 (0.187)	1.108	0.156 (0.192)	1.169	0.087 (0.188)	1.090	0.053 (0.190)	1.054	0.066 (0.196)	1.068
Southerner	0.262 (0.188)	1.300	0.269 (0.192)	1.309	0.268 (0.188)	1.308	0.290 (0.190)	1.337	0.311 (0.194)	1.365
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	0.439 (0.117)***	1.552	0.356 (0.119)**	1.427	0.459 (0.119)***	1.582	0.439 (0.118)***	1.551	0.407 (0.124)***	1.502
Republicanism	0.165 (0.058)**	1.179	0.126 (0.060)*	1.135	0.160 (0.058)**	1.174	0.124 (0.060)*	1.132	0.071 (0.062)	1.074
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	-0.204 (0.121)	0.816	-0.221 (0.124)	0.802	-0.214 (0.122)	0.808	-0.225 (0.123)	0.798	-0.266 (0.127)*	0.767
Egalitarianism	-0.261 (0.134)	0.770	0.117 (0.154)	1.124	-0.306 (0.142)*	0.736	-0.082 (0.145)	0.921	0.167 (0.164)	1.181
Care/Harm Foundation	-0.680 (0.158)***	0.507	-0.621 (0.161)***	0.537	-0.723 (0.164)***	0.485	-0.691 (0.160)***	0.501	-0.748 (0.171)***	0.473
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	0.504 (0.127)***	1.656	0.367 (0.134)**	1.444	0.512 (0.128)***	1.669	0.424 (0.130)***	1.528	0.302 (0.137)*	1.352
Fear of Crime	0.197 (0.100)*	1.218	0.214 (0.104)*	1.239	0.208 (0.101)*	1.231	0.103 (0.106)	1.109	0.153 (0.109)	1.165
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			0.716 (0.131)***	2.046					0.716 (0.135)***	2.047
Racial Sympathy					0.108 (0.109)	1.115			0.292 (0.117)*	1.339
White Nationalism							0.396 (0.114)***	1.485	0.393 (0.120)***	1.481
Cox & Snell R-square	.300		.328		.301		.311		.341	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

nonsignificant both before (Model 4) and after controlling for the other racial attitudes (Model 5). The odds ratio for the effect of racial resentment (Model 5) indicates that with each unit increase on the racial resentment scale, the likelihood that the respondent favors the death penalty approximately doubles. This result supports the same general finding (that racial resentment increases support for capital punishment) across numerous other studies (e.g., Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a, 2010; Unnever, Cullen, & Jonson, 2008).

That more racially sympathetic Whites are also more likely to support capital punishment is contrary to the expectations. Because racial sympathy measures "White distress over Black misfortune" (Chudy, 2017, p. 35) and because a death sentence could reasonably be considered a "misfortune," racially sympathetic Whites would be expected to oppose its use. Nonetheless, this finding further supports the notion that racial sympathy and racial resentment are distinct constructs and therefore may impact some measures in the same, rather than opposite, directions. The unanticipated positive relationship between *racial sympathy* and *death penalty* will be discussed further in the following chapter, as a similar relationship is found between *racial sympathy* and *punishment goal*. The Cox and Snell R^2 for the full model of capital punishment (Model 5) is .341. Adding the three racial attitudes to the model increases the model fit (Cox and Snell R^2) by .041 beyond the model fit of the covariates alone (Model 1).

Predicting the Opinion that Courts are Not Harsh Enough

Two covariates are significant predictors of the opinion that courts are not harsh enough—*age* and *dangerous world* (Table 3.3). Mirroring the effects of these covariates on support for the death penalty, older individuals and those who more strongly believe that the world is a dangerous, chaotic place are more likely to believe that the courts do not deal harshly enough with criminals than are those who are younger and those who believe less strongly

Table 3.3. Logistic Regression of Harsher Courts

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR
Demographics										
Age	0.018 (0.005)***	1.018	0.014 (0.005)**	1.015	0.018 (0.005)***	1.018	0.018 (0.005)***	1.018	0.014 (0.005)**	1.015
Male	-0.155 (0.179)	0.857	-0.165 (0.181)	0.848	-0.162 (0.179)	0.851	-0.163 (0.180)	0.850	-0.165 (0.182)	0.847
Education	-0.043 (0.058)	0.958	0.004 (0.060)	1.004	-0.037 (0.058)	0.963	-0.040 (0.059)	0.961	0.006 (0.060)	1.006
Employed Full-Time	-0.055 (0.038)	0.946	-0.056 (0.038)	0.946	-0.054 (0.038)	0.947	-0.055 (0.038)	0.946	-0.055 (0.038)	0.946
Married	0.136 (0.174)	1.145	0.164 (0.177)	1.178	0.161 (0.175)	1.174	0.130 (0.175)	1.139	0.183 (0.178)	1.200
Southerner	-0.084 (0.173)	0.919	-0.085 (0.175)	0.918	-0.091 (0.173)	0.913	-0.082 (0.173)	0.922	-0.091 (0.175)	0.913
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	0.183 (0.108)	1.200	0.106 (0.111)	1.111	0.156 (0.110)	1.169	0.180 (0.109)	1.197	0.091 (0.112)	1.095
Republicanism	0.076 (0.055)	1.079	0.054 (0.056)	1.055	0.082 (0.055)	1.086	0.071 (0.056)	1.074	0.061 (0.057)	1.063
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	-0.093 (0.110)	0.911	-0.104 (0.112)	0.901	-0.081 (0.110)	0.923	-0.094 (0.110)	0.910	-0.095 (0.112)	0.910
Egalitarianism	-0.286 (0.126)*	0.751	-0.019 (0.141)	0.981	-0.231 (0.132)	0.794	-0.268 (0.133)*	0.765	0.002 (0.148)	1.002
Care/Harm Foundation	-0.215 (0.139)	0.807	-0.166 (0.141)	0.847	-0.161 (0.143)	0.851	-0.215 (0.139)	0.806	-0.130 (0.146)	0.878
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	0.683 (0.123)***	1.979	0.584 (0.127)***	1.793	0.676 (0.124)***	1.965	0.674 (0.125)***	1.961	0.586 (0.128)***	1.796
Fear of Crime	0.132 (0.094)	1.141	0.126 (0.095)	1.135	0.119 (0.095)	1.127	0.121 (0.097)	1.128	0.125 (0.099)	1.133
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			0.521 (0.119)***	1.684					0.511 (0.121)***	1.666
Racial Sympathy					-0.146 (0.099)	0.864			-0.098 (0.103)	0.907
White Nationalism							0.044 (0.101)	1.045	-0.024 (0.105)	0.976
Cox & Snell R-square	.198		.218		.200		.198		.219	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

ascribe to the dangerous worldview, respectively. The effects of the remaining covariates are nonsignificant.

The only racial attitude that is significantly related to *harsher courts* is *racial resentment*, with more racially resentful Whites being more likely to believe that the courts are not harsh enough. Further, as shown in Models 2 and 5, the effect of racial resentment is robust to the inclusion of the other two racial attitudes. The Cox and Snell R^2 increases from .198 in Model 1 to .218 in Model 2 where racial resentment is added to the model (a .02 improvement in model fit). Adding both *racial sympathy* and *White nationalism* in Model 5 increases the Cox and Snell R^2 by only .001. That the effects of *racial sympathy* (Models 3 and 5) and *White nationalism* (Models 4 and 5) on *harsher courts* are nonsignificant predictors of *harsher courts* both with and without the other racial attitudes included in the model suggests that the three racial attitudes are not equally relevant for all measures of public opinion. This trend and its implications for future public opinion research will be further evaluated in the following chapter.

Predicting Support for Punishment as the Primary Goal of Prisons

The results of the stepwise logistic regression model predicting *punishment goal*, presented in Table 3.4, show that only one of the covariates, *employed full-time*, is a significant predictor of the opinion that punishment should be the primary goal of prisons. Surprisingly, *racial resentment* is also nonsignificant, both before and after including *racial sympathy* and *White nationalism* in the model (Models 2 and 5, respectively). Just as *racial sympathy* is positively related to *death penalty*, it is also positively related to *punishment goal*, as is *White nationalism*. However, the Cox and Snell R^2 for the model of *punishment goal* is relatively low at .074. The poor model fit for *punishment goal* suggests that omitted factors may influence variation in this indicator of punitiveness.

Table 3.4. Logistic Regression of Punishment Goal

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR
Demographics										
Age	-0.012 (0.006)	0.988	-0.014 (0.006)*	0.987	-0.012 (0.006)	0.989	-0.012 (0.006)	0.988	-0.012 (0.007)	0.988
Male	0.382 (0.220)	1.465	0.383 (0.220)	1.467	0.395 (0.221)	1.484	0.329 (0.221)	1.389	0.340 (0.222)	1.405
Education	-0.054 (0.071)	0.948	-0.037 (0.073)	0.964	-0.059 (0.072)	0.943	-0.043 (0.072)	0.958	-0.029 (0.073)	0.972
Employed Full-Time	-0.111 (0.047)*	0.895	-0.112 (0.047)*	0.894	-0.114 (0.047)*	0.893	-0.113 (0.047)*	0.893	-0.118 (0.048)*	0.889
Married	0.064 (0.218)	1.066	0.071 (0.218)	1.074	0.025 (0.220)	1.025	0.030 (0.220)	1.031	-0.028 (0.223)	0.972
Southerner	0.128 (0.210)	1.137	0.127 (0.210)	1.135	0.135 (0.210)	1.145	0.154 (0.211)	1.167	0.166 (0.212)	1.180
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	0.000 (0.131)	1.000	-0.027 (0.132)	0.973	0.038 (0.134)	1.039	-0.006 (0.130)	0.994	0.021 (0.134)	1.021
Republicanism	0.143 (0.070)*	1.153	0.135 (0.070)	1.145	0.134 (0.070)	1.144	0.118 (0.070)	1.125	0.092 (0.071)	1.097
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	0.047 (0.133)	1.048	0.048 (0.133)	1.049	0.030 (0.133)	1.030	0.043 (0.133)	1.044	0.014 (0.134)	1.014
Egalitarianism	-0.155 (0.156)	0.856	-0.061 (0.173)	0.941	-0.227 (0.163)	0.797	-0.051 (0.164)	0.950	-0.040 (0.182)	0.960
Care/Harm Foundation	-0.125 (0.165)	0.882	-0.107 (0.166)	0.898	-0.191 (0.170)	0.826	-0.137 (0.166)	0.872	-0.220 (0.173)	0.803
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	0.241 (0.147)	1.273	0.201 (0.151)	1.223	0.253 (0.147)	1.287	0.175 (0.152)	1.191	0.141 (0.155)	1.151
Fear of Crime	0.123 (0.114)	1.131	0.121 (0.114)	1.129	0.138 (0.114)	1.148	0.052 (0.119)	1.054	0.062 (0.119)	1.064
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			0.179 (0.148)	1.196					0.189 (0.151)	1.208
Racial Sympathy					0.193 (0.126)	1.213			0.281 (0.130)*	1.325
White Nationalism							0.261 (0.120)*	1.299	0.307 (0.124)*	1.359
Cox & Snell R-square	.061		.062		.064		.066		.074	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

Sensitivity Checks for Models of Punitive Measures

The results of the alternative models generally do not differ from the results reported in Tables 3.2 through 3.4, with a few exceptions. In Model 5 in Table 3.2 (predicting *death penalty*), *religiosity* is significant ($p \leq .05$), but is nonsignificant in the alternative model with *crime salience* added. In Model 5 in Table 3.3 (predicting *harsher courts*), *conservatism*, *Republicanism*, and *egalitarianism* are all nonsignificant, but *right political leaning* is significant ($p \leq .05$) in the alternative model with *crime salience* added. In Model 5 in Table 3.4 (predicting *punishment goal*), *age* is nonsignificant. In the alternative model with *right political leaning* and *crime salience* added to the model, *age* is significant ($p \leq .05$).

The substantive results with regard to the effects of *racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism* do not differ between the full models and the alternative models. The model fit statistics for the full models of *death penalty* (Cox and Snell $R^2 = .341$), *harsher courts* (Cox and Snell $R^2 = .219$), and *punishment goal* (Cox and Snell $R^2 = 0.74$) are only slightly better than for the best fitting alternative models (Cox and Snell $R^2 = .340$, .218, and .073, respectively). Although a more parsimonious model is desirable, this goal must be balanced against the meaningful insights added by estimating the effects of *Republicanism*, *conservatism*, *egalitarianism*, *dangerous world*, and *fear of crime* separately. The implications of consolidating these measures are discussed further with the models of progressive beliefs and policy opinions to which we now turn.

PROGRESSIVE BELIEFS AND POLICY OPINIONS

Assessing Indicators of Public Progressiveness

Table 3.5 shows the percent of White respondents who support rehabilitation as the

Table 3.5. Assessing Indicators of Public Progressiveness

Response	Rehabilitation Goal	Rehabilitation Ceremonies	Rehabilitation Certificates	Expungement
0 (%)	58.31%	48.71%	45.98%	48.94%
1 (%)	41.69%	51.29%	54.02%	51.06%

Notes: Rehabilitation Goal (0 = Punishment/protecting society/don't know, 1 = Rehabilitation); Rehabilitation Ceremonies, Rehabilitation Certificates (0 = Strongly disagree/disagree/neither agree nor disagree, 1 = Agree/strongly agree); Expungement (0 = Expungement is a bad policy, 1 = Expungement is a good policy).

primary emphasis of prisons (*rehabilitation goal*), *rehabilitation ceremonies*, *rehabilitation certificates*, and *expungement*. A substantial percentage of White Americans indicate that rehabilitation should be the primary goal of prisons (41.7%). In fact, rehabilitation was the most common response to the main emphasis of prisons question. A majority of Whites support holding "rehabilitation ceremonies"—that is, official ceremonies where ex-offenders who have completed treatment programs are formally declared "rehabilitated" (51.3%). A majority also support providing ex-offenders with "certificates of rehabilitation" that these individuals can provide as evidence of their rehabilitation (e.g., to employers, landlords) (54.0%). Finally, just over half of Whites support providing opportunities to "wipe the slate clean" for some people who have committed crime by expunging criminal records (51.1%).

Tables 3.6 and 3.7 list the percent of White respondents who agree with each of the items in the *support for rehabilitation* and *belief in redeemability* scales, respectively. First, with regard to rehabilitation, large majorities of Whites (67.7–80.1%) agree with the items that support providing treatment to people who have committed crime. By contrast, only a small percentage of respondents do not support expanding rehabilitation programs (15.2%) or agree that rehabilitation lets offenders off easy (13.1%). Second, support for offender redeemability is extensive. Thus, nearly seven in ten White respondents agree that "Having committed aa crime should be no obstacle to becoming a valued member of society again" (69.2%). Even larger percentages of Whites (82.4–85.5%) endorsed the other items that express the sentiment that those who have committed crime can be redeemed and can go on to live a life free of crime. Alternatively, very few support the items that reflect the belief that offenders cannot change (6.3–17.8%). These findings bolster the previously made claim that a new era is emerging in U.S. correctional policy which emphasizes the need for rehabilitation and redemption of the

Table 3.6. Assessing Support for Rehabilitation

Item	% Strongly Disagree	% Disagree	% Neither Agree nor Disagree	% Agree	% Strongly Agree	**Total % Agree**
It is important to try to rehabilitate adults who have committed crimes and are now in the correctional system.	0.93%	1.93%	17.07%	47.56%	32.52%	**80.08%**
Rehabilitation programs should be available even for offenders who have been involved in a lot of crime in their lives.	2.28%	7.73%	22.29%	40.81%	26.88%	**67.69%**
I would not support expanding the rehabilitation programs that are now being undertaken in our prisons. (R)	24.97%	31.67%	29.13%	11.34%	3.90%	**15.24%**
It is a good idea to provide treatment for offenders who are supervised by the courts and live in the community.	0.96%	1.70%	17.44%	49.34%	30.56%	**79.90%**
All rehabilitation programs have done is to allow criminals who deserve to be punished to get off easy. (R)	22.29%	32.20%	32.45%	8.32%	4.74%	**13.06%**

Notes: R = Reverse coded; Total Agree indicates the number and percentage of respondents who selected agree or strongly agree, combined.

Table 3.7. Assessing Belief in Redeemability

Item	% Strongly Disagree	% Disagree	% Neither Agree nor Disagree	% Agree	% Strongly Agree	**Total % Agree**
People who have committed crimes deserve the opportunity to regain the respect of the community.	0.52%	0.86%	16.21%	50.46%	31.95%	**82.41%**
People who commit a crime still deserve the opportunity to build the best life they can have.	1.22%	1.33%	13.30%	48.68%	35.48%	**84.16%**
It's possible for someone who commits crime to change dramatically for the better.	1.07%	1.95%	12.70%	46.74%	37.55%	**84.29%**
In general, it's possible for people who commit crime to change and lead a law-abiding life.	0.60%	1.79%	12.09%	51.22%	34.30%	**85.52%**
Once a criminal always a criminal. (R)	34.36%	38.12%	19.09%	5.68%	2.75%	**8.43%**
It's not really worth spending time trying to rehabilitate offenders. (R)	38.49%	37.59%	17.58%	3.74%	2.60%	**6.34%**
Having committed a crime should be no obstacle to becoming a valued member of society again.	1.33%	7.35%	22.16%	44.15%	25.00%	**69.15%**
Despite their best efforts, most people who commit crimes just can't manage to go back to living straight. (R)	15.20%	30.66%	36.38%	13.94%	3.81%	**17.75%**

Notes: R = Reverse coded; Total Agree indicates the number and percentage of respondents who selected agree or strongly agree, combined.

formerly incarcerated—an era of inclusion.

Predicting Support for Rehabilitation as the Primary Goal of Prisons

The stepwise logistic results for the model predicting support for rehabilitation as the primary goal of prisons are listed in Table 3.8. Only one of the covariates, *egalitarianism*, is significantly related to *rehabilitation goal*. Those who more strongly believe in equal rights and access to opportunities are more likely to endorse rehabilitation as the primary goal of prisons.

Both *racial resentment* and *racial sympathy* are significantly related to *rehabilitation goal* in the expected directions. More racially resentful Whites are less likely to have selected rehabilitation (Models 2 and 5) and more racially sympathetic Whites are more likely to have selected rehabilitation as the primary goal of prisons (Models 3 and 5). The effects of both variables are robust to the inclusion of the other in the model, as well as to the inclusion of White nationalism in the model (Model 5). Although *White nationalism* is significantly and negatively related to *rehabilitation goal* when *racial resentment* and *racial sympathy* are not included in the model (Model 4), it is reduced to nonsignificance in the full model (Model 5). The Cox and Snell R^2 indicates that adding the three racial attitudes to the model improves the model from 2.00 in the model with the covariates only (Model 1) to 2.19 (Model 5). However, effect of the racial attitudes and covariates on respondents' opinions of rehabilitation can also be assessed by examining the model predicting the Likert-type scale of *support for rehabilitation*.

Predicting Support for Rehabilitation

Table 3.9 presents the results of the stepwise OLS regression model predicting *support for rehabilitation.* Two of the measures of cultural beliefs are related to greater support for rehabilitation, *egalitarianism* and *care/harm moral foundation*. These effects are robust to the

Table 3.8. Logistic Regression of Rehabilitation Goal

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR
Demographics										
Age	-0.007 (0.005)	0.993	-0.004 (0.005)	0.996	-0.006 (0.005)	0.994	-0.007 (0.005)	0.993	-0.005 (0.005)	0.995
Male	0.229 (0.180)	1.257	0.227 (0.181)	1.255	0.246 (0.181)	1.279	0.275 (0.182)	1.316	0.274 (0.184)	1.315
Education	0.068 (0.058)	1.070	0.038 (0.059)	1.039	0.057 (0.059)	1.058	0.051 (0.059)	1.052	0.023 (0.060)	1.024
Employed Full-Time	0.063 (0.037)	1.065	0.064 (0.037)	1.066	0.061 (0.037)	1.063	0.061 (0.037)	1.063	0.061 (0.037)	1.063
Married	-0.182 (0.175)	0.834	-0.201 (0.177)	0.818	-0.227 (0.177)	0.797	-0.155 (0.177)	0.856	-0.213 (0.179)	0.808
Southerner	-0.067 (0.175)	0.935	-0.062 (0.176)	0.940	-0.045 (0.176)	0.956	-0.076 (0.176)	0.927	-0.055 (0.177)	0.947
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	-0.294 (0.109)**	0.745	-0.245 (0.111)*	0.783	-0.243 (0.110)*	0.784	-0.287 (0.110)**	0.750	-0.209 (0.113)	0.811
Republicanism	0.000 (0.056)	1.000	0.020 (0.057)	1.020	-0.011 (0.056)	0.989	0.029 (0.058)	1.030	0.027 (0.059)	1.028
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	0.039 (0.111)	1.040	0.044 (0.112)	1.045	0.014 (0.112)	1.014	0.049 (0.112)	1.051	0.031 (0.113)	1.031
Egalitarianism	0.641 (0.129)***	1.899	0.471 (0.143)***	1.601	0.530 (0.135)***	1.699	0.526 (0.137)***	1.692	0.341 (0.150)*	1.406
Care/Harm Foundation	0.121 (0.143)	1.128	0.081 (0.144)	1.085	0.009 (0.148)	1.009	0.122 (0.144)	1.130	0.006 (0.150)	1.006
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	-0.286 (0.117)*	0.751	-0.213 (0.121)	0.808	-0.266 (0.118)*	0.766	-0.230 (0.119)	0.795	-0.173 (0.123)	0.842
Fear of Crime	-0.121 (0.095)	0.886	-0.119 (0.095)	0.888	-0.097 (0.095)	0.908	-0.061 (0.098)	0.941	-0.060 (0.099)	0.942
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			-0.331 (0.119)**	0.719					-0.269 (0.121)*	0.764
Racial Sympathy					0.312 (0.106)**	1.366			0.238 (0.110)*	1.269
White Nationalism							-0.270 (0.108)*	0.764	-0.183 (0.111)	0.833
Cox & Snell R-square	.201		.209		.210		.207		.219	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

Table 3.9. OLS Regression of Support for Rehabilitation

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta
Demographics										
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.026	0.002 (0.001)	0.053	0.001 (0.001)	0.032	0.001 (0.001)	0.020	0.002 (0.001)	0.043
Male	0.006 (0.046)	0.004	0.006 (0.045)	0.004	0.010 (0.045)	0.007	0.046 (0.044)	0.032	0.043 (0.043)	0.030
Education	0.028 (0.015)	0.059	0.016 (0.015)	0.034	0.023 (0.015)	0.048	0.014 (0.014)	0.030	0.005 (0.014)	0.011
Employed Full-Time	0.004 (0.009)	0.012	0.004 (0.009)	0.013	0.002 (0.009)	0.008	0.003 (0.009)	0.010	0.002 (0.009)	0.008
Married	-0.026 (0.045)	-0.018	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.023	-0.049 (0.044)	-0.034	-0.004 (0.043)	-0.003	-0.026 (0.042)	-0.018
Southerner	0.013 (0.044)	0.009	0.015 (0.044)	0.010	0.022 (0.043)	0.015	0.007 (0.042)	0.005	0.015 (0.042)	0.010
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	0.000 (0.028)	0.001	0.020 (0.028)	0.033	0.026 (0.028)	0.044	0.013 (0.027)	0.022	0.040 (0.027)	0.068
Republicanism	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.037	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.016	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.056	0.010 (0.014)	0.029	0.007 (0.014)	0.022
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	-0.010 (0.028)	-0.012	-0.007 (0.028)	-0.009	-0.023 (0.028)	-0.028	-0.007 (0.027)	-0.009	-0.014 (0.027)	-0.018
Egalitarianism	0.320 (0.032)***	0.422	0.254 (0.036)***	0.335	0.264 (0.033)***	0.348	0.228 (0.033)***	0.301	0.161 (0.035)***	0.213
Care/Harm Foundation	0.163 (0.036)***	0.159	0.146 (0.035)***	0.143	0.114 (0.036)**	0.112	0.166 (0.034)***	0.163	0.124 (0.035)***	0.121
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	-0.102 (0.029)***	-0.122	-0.074 (0.030)*	-0.089	-0.089 (0.029)**	-0.107	-0.056 (0.029)*	-0.068	-0.036 (0.029)	-0.044
Fear of Crime	-0.098 (0.024)***	-0.135	-0.096 (0.024)***	-0.132	-0.088 (0.024)***	-0.121	-0.047 (0.024)*	-0.064	-0.046 (0.023)	-0.063
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			-0.127 (0.03)***	-0.201					-0.085 (0.029)**	-0.135
Racial Sympathy					0.144 (0.026)***	0.203			0.091 (0.025)***	0.128
White Nationalism							-0.224 (0.026)***	-0.342	-0.193 (0.026)***	-0.295
Adjusted R-square	.357		.372		.383		.416		.433	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

inclusion of the three racial attitudes in the model. All three of the racial attitudes have a significant effect on *support for rehabilitation*. Whites who are more resentful of Blacks or who more strongly express White nationalist attitude score significantly lower on the *support for rehabilitation* scale than those who are less resentful of Blacks and those who agree less strongly with White nationalism. As expected, more racially sympathetic Whites tend to support rehabilitation more strongly. The full model (Model 5) explains a substantial percent (43.3%) of variance in *support for rehabilitation*. Further, adding the three racial attitudes to the model (Model 5) explains an additional 7.6% of the variance in *support for rehabilitation* compared to the model with only the covariates (Model 1).

Predicting Belief in Redeemability

Unlike the models discussed up to this point, in which only a couple of covariates were significant in the full models, several covariates are significant in the model predicting *belief in redeemability*. The results, reported in Table 3.10, reveal that Whites who are male, more conservative, and more strongly identify as Republican, tend to believe more strongly that people who have committed crime can be redeemed relative to those who are female, more liberal and more strongly identify as Democrat, respectively. The positive relationship between *Republicanism* and *conservatism* and *belief in redeemability* demonstrates that beliefs underlying the era of inclusion are not limited to liberals and receive strong support from many right-leaning White Americans. *Egalitarianism* and *care/harm foundation* are also positively and significantly related to *belief in redeemability*.

Racial sympathy and *White nationalism* each significantly predict *belief in redeemability* in the expected direction. Whites who feel greater sympathy for Blacks more strongly believe that people who have committed crime or who have been incarcerated can go on to live a life

Table 3.10. OLS Regression of Belief in Redeemability

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta
Demographics										
Age	0.002 (0.001)	0.065	0.002 (0.001)	0.063	0.002 (0.001)	0.070	0.002 (0.001)	0.058	0.001 (0.001)	0.050
Male	0.072 (0.038)	0.068	0.072 (0.038)	0.068	0.075 (0.038)*	0.071	0.107 (0.036)*	0.101	0.107 (0.036)**	0.101
Education	0.013 (0.012)	0.039	0.014 (0.012)	0.040	0.010 (0.012)	0.030	0.002 (0.012)	0.005	0.004 (0.012)	0.012
Employed Full-Time	0.001 (0.008)	0.005	0.001 (0.008)	0.005	0.000 (0.008)	0.002	0.001 (0.007)	0.003	0.000 (0.007)	0.000
Married	-0.048 (0.037)	-0.045	-0.048 (0.037)	-0.045	-0.062 (0.037)	-0.059	-0.029 (0.035)	-0.027	-0.036 (0.035)	-0.034
Southerner	-0.014 (0.037)	-0.013	-0.014 (0.037)	-0.013	-0.008 (0.036)	-0.008	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.018	-0.016 (0.035)	-0.015
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	0.040 (0.023)	0.092	0.039 (0.024)	0.090	0.056 (0.023)*	0.129	0.051 (0.022)*	0.117	0.053 (0.022)*	0.123
Republicanism	0.009 (0.012)	0.039	0.009 (0.012)	0.037	0.005 (0.012)	0.023	0.028 (0.011)	0.118	0.023 (0.012)*	0.096
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	0.016 (0.023)	0.027	0.016 (0.023)	0.027	0.008 (0.023)	0.013	0.018 (0.022)	0.031	0.012 (0.022)	0.021
Egalitarianism	0.178 (0.027)***	0.320	0.181 (0.030)***	0.326	0.143 (0.028)***	0.257	0.098 (0.027)***	0.177	0.102 (0.029)***	0.184
Care/Harm Foundation	0.139 (0.029)***	0.185	0.140 (0.030)***	0.186	0.109 (0.030)***	0.145	0.142 (0.028)***	0.189	0.130 (0.029)***	0.173
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	-0.014 (0.024)	-0.023	-0.015 (0.025)	-0.025	-0.006 (0.024)	-0.010	0.025 (0.023)	0.042	0.019 (0.024)	0.032
Fear of Crime	-0.129 (0.020)***	-0.241	-0.129 (0.020)***	-0.242	-0.122 (0.020)***	-0.229	-0.084 (0.019)***	-0.157	-0.083 (0.019)***	-0.155
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			0.006 (0.025)	0.013					0.041 (0.024)	0.088
Racial Sympathy					0.090 (0.021)***	0.173			0.053 (0.021)*	0.102
White Nationalism							-0.195 (0.021)***	-0.406	-0.187 (0.022)***	-0.388
Adjusted R-square	.187		.186		.205		.270		.276	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

free of crime than do Whites who feel little to no sympathy for Blacks. Whites who more strongly align with the political orientation of *white nationalism* tend to disagree more strongly with the belief in redeemability of those who have committed crime. Adding *racial sympathy* and *White nationalism* to the model, along with *racial resentment*, increases the variance explained by the model from .187 in Model 1 (with only the covariates) to .276 (Model 5). Thus, these two racial attitudes are highly relevant to understanding the degree to which individuals believe in the redeemability of people who have committed crime.

Predicting Support for Rehabilitation Ceremonies

As shown in Table 3.11, those who are younger, male, or unmarried are more likely to support rehabilitation ceremonies than are their respective older, female, or married counterparts. Only one of the racial attitudes has an effect reaching statistical significance, *racial sympathy*. As expected, *racial sympathy* is positively related to the progressive opinion, with more racially sympathetic Whites being more likely to support holding ceremonies in which people who have committed crimes are declared "rehabilitated" and free from all legal penalties and other collateral sanctions of their crimes. Looking at Models 1, 2, and 4 the effects of *egalitarianism* and *care/harm foundation* are significant. However, adding *racial sympathy* to the model (Model 3), reduces the effects of those two cultural beliefs to nonsignificance. This finding demonstrates that the effect of *racial sympathy* on *rehabilitation ceremonies* is robust to the inclusion of non-racial measures of values that are similar to racial sympathy—equal treatment of individuals and protecting individuals from harm. The finding that *racial sympathy* reduces the effects of *egalitarianism* and *care/harm foundation* to nonsignificance and remains significant itself supports the claim that *racial sympathy* specifically measures distress over Black suffering, rather than simply measuring distress over suffering in general.

Table 3.11. Logistic Regression of Rehabilitation Ceremonies

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR
Demographics										
Age	-0.015 (0.005)***	0.985	-0.014 (0.005)**	0.986	-0.015 (0.005)**	0.985	-0.015 (0.005)***	0.985	-0.014 (0.005)**	0.986
Male	0.348 (0.169)*	1.416	0.350 (0.170)*	1.419	0.369 (0.171)*	1.447	0.342 (0.170)*	1.408	0.348 (0.172)*	1.416
Education	0.078 (0.054)	1.081	0.060 (0.055)	1.062	0.066 (0.055)	1.068	0.080 (0.055)	1.083	0.059 (0.056)	1.061
Employed Full-Time	0.001 (0.035)	1.001	0.001 (0.035)	1.001	-0.002 (0.035)	0.998	0.001 (0.035)	1.001	-0.002 (0.035)	0.998
Married	-0.273 (0.164)	0.761	-0.285 (0.164)	0.752	-0.332 (0.166)*	0.717	-0.276 (0.164)	0.759	-0.358 (0.167)*	0.699
Southerner	0.060 (0.163)	1.062	0.064 (0.163)	1.066	0.083 (0.164)	1.086	0.061 (0.163)	1.063	0.091 (0.165)	1.095
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	-0.210 (0.104)*	0.811	-0.179 (0.105)	0.836	-0.146 (0.106)	0.864	-0.212 (0.104)*	0.809	-0.128 (0.108)	0.880
Republicanism	0.047 (0.053)	1.048	0.059 (0.053)	1.060	0.032 (0.054)	1.033	0.044 (0.054)	1.045	0.027 (0.055)	1.028
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	0.124 (0.104)	1.132	0.127 (0.104)	1.135	0.093 (0.105)	1.097	0.123 (0.104)	1.131	0.091 (0.106)	1.096
Egalitarianism	0.381 (0.120)***	1.464	0.277 (0.132)*	1.319	0.245 (0.126)	1.277	0.393 (0.126)**	1.482	0.212 (0.139)	1.237
Care/Harm Foundation	0.303 (0.131)*	1.354	0.278 (0.132)*	1.321	0.179 (0.136)	1.196	0.303 (0.131)*	1.354	0.155 (0.137)	1.168
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	-0.087 (0.109)	0.917	-0.042 (0.112)	0.959	-0.058 (0.111)	0.943	-0.094 (0.111)	0.911	-0.049 (0.115)	0.952
Fear of Crime	0.018 (0.088)	1.019	0.022 (0.089)	1.022	0.048 (0.090)	1.049	0.011 (0.091)	1.011	0.017 (0.093)	1.017
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			-0.206 (0.110)	0.814					-0.165 (0.113)	0.848
Racial Sympathy					0.370 (0.097)***	1.448			0.384 (0.101)***	1.468
White Nationalism							0.032 (0.098)	1.032	0.144 (0.104)	1.155
Cox & Snell R-square	.111		.115		.128		.111		.132	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

Predicting Support for Rehabilitation Certificates

As shown in Table 3.11, Whites who score higher on the *racial sympathy* scale are also more likely to support giving certificates to persons who have completed rehabilitation programs that formally acknowledge that the person has been rehabilitated. Higher scores on the *religiosity* scale and on the *egalitarianism* scale were also significantly related to greater likelihood to support rehabilitation certificates. However, the model may be a poor fit, with the Cox and Snell R^2 for Model 5 being only .085. This suggests that some important factors have been overlooked in estimating rehabilitation certificates.

Predicting Support for Expungement

The final progressive measure modeled is *expungement*. As shown in Table 3.13, those who are younger, not employed full-time and more liberal are more likely to believe that expungement is a good policy than are those who are older, employed full-time, and more conservative, respectively. *Expungement* was the only progressive measure for which the effect of *racial sympathy* is nonsignificant. Only one racial attitude, *racial resentment*, appears to predict support for expungement, with Whites who more strongly resent Blacks for getting ahead unfairly being more likely to oppose expungement than Whites who score lower on the *racial resentment* scale.

Sensitivity Checks for Models of Progressive Measures

The alternative models with *right political leaning* and *crime salience* were also assessed for each of the full models predicting the progressive measures. As with the punitive measures, these alterations generally did not result in many substantive changes to the results, except in a

Table 3.12. Logistic Regression of Rehabilitation Certificates

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR
Demographics										
Age	-0.005 (0.005)	0.995	-0.005 (0.005)	0.995	-0.005 (0.005)	0.995	-0.005 (0.005)	0.995	-0.005 (0.005)	0.995
Male	0.110 (0.165)	1.116	0.110 (0.165)	1.116	0.122 (0.167)	1.130	0.096 (0.166)	1.101	0.097 (0.168)	1.102
Education	0.080 (0.053)	1.083	0.082 (0.054)	1.085	0.071 (0.054)	1.073	0.085 (0.054)	1.089	0.084 (0.055)	1.087
Employed Full-Time	0.004 (0.034)	1.004	0.004 (0.034)	1.004	0.002 (0.034)	1.002	0.004 (0.034)	1.004	0.002 (0.034)	1.002
Married	-0.086 (0.161)	0.917	-0.085 (0.161)	0.918	-0.131 (0.163)	0.877	-0.094 (0.161)	0.910	-0.149 (0.163)	0.861
Southerner	-0.084 (0.159)	0.920	-0.084 (0.159)	0.919	-0.069 (0.160)	0.933	-0.081 (0.159)	0.922	-0.064 (0.161)	0.938
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	-0.031 (0.102)	0.969	-0.034 (0.103)	0.966	0.021 (0.104)	1.021	-0.036 (0.102)	0.965	0.011 (0.106)	1.011
Republicanism	-0.014 (0.052)	0.986	-0.015 (0.052)	0.985	-0.027 (0.053)	0.973	-0.022 (0.053)	0.978	-0.046 (0.054)	0.955
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	0.354 (0.103)***	1.424	0.354 (0.103)***	1.424	0.332 (0.104)***	1.394	0.353 (0.103)***	1.423	0.327 (0.104)**	1.386
Egalitarianism	0.474 (0.119)***	1.606	0.485 (0.132)***	1.624	0.368 (0.124)**	1.445	0.505 (0.125)***	1.657	0.442 (0.138)***	1.555
Care/Harm Foundation	0.154 (0.128)	1.167	0.157 (0.129)	1.170	0.058 (0.133)	1.060	0.154 (0.128)	1.167	0.052 (0.134)	1.053
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	-0.027 (0.107)	0.973	-0.031 (0.109)	0.969	-0.002 (0.108)	0.998	-0.043 (0.109)	0.958	-0.040 (0.112)	0.961
Fear of Crime	-0.027 (0.087)	0.974	-0.027 (0.087)	0.973	-0.005 (0.088)	0.995	-0.045 (0.090)	0.956	-0.039 (0.091)	0.961
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			0.021 (0.110)	1.021					0.054 (0.113)	1.056
Racial Sympathy					0.284 (0.095)**	1.328			0.326 (0.099)***	1.385
White Nationalism							0.078 (0.097)	1.081	0.152 (0.101)	1.165
Cox & Snell R-square	.071		.071		.082		.071		.085	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

Table 3.13. Logistic Regression of Expungement

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR
Demographics										
Age	-0.014 (0.005)**	0.986	-0.011 (0.005)*	0.989	-0.014 (0.005)*	0.987	-0.014 (0.005)**	0.987	-0.011 (0.005)*	0.989
Male	0.172 (0.169)	1.188	0.177 (0.170)	1.194	0.177 (0.169)	1.193	0.150 (0.170)	1.162	0.148 (0.171)	1.160
Education	-0.029 (0.055)	0.971	-0.055 (0.056)	0.947	-0.034 (0.055)	0.966	-0.021 (0.055)	0.979	-0.050 (0.056)	0.951
Employed Full-Time	-0.075 (0.034)*	0.927	-0.076 (0.034)*	0.927	-0.077 (0.034)*	0.926	-0.075 (0.034)*	0.928	-0.077 (0.035)*	0.926
Married	-0.265 (0.164)	0.768	-0.281 (0.165)	0.755	-0.287 (0.165)	0.751	-0.279 (0.164)	0.757	-0.326 (0.167)	0.722
Southerner	-0.152 (0.163)	0.859	-0.149 (0.163)	0.862	-0.143 (0.163)	0.867	-0.147 (0.163)	0.863	-0.134 (0.164)	0.875
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	-0.323 (0.104)**	0.724	-0.283 (0.106)**	0.753	-0.299 (0.106)**	0.741	-0.332 (0.105)**	0.718	-0.271 (0.108)*	0.763
Republicanism	-0.018 (0.052)	0.982	-0.003 (0.053)	0.997	-0.023 (0.053)	0.977	-0.030 (0.053)	0.971	-0.027 (0.055)	0.973
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	0.165 (0.104)	1.18	0.172 (0.105)	1.188	0.153 (0.105)	1.166	0.164 (0.104)	1.178	0.158 (0.105)	1.171
Egalitarianism	0.252 (0.120)*	1.287	0.112 (0.133)	1.119	0.199 (0.125)	1.221	0.303 (0.126)*	1.354	0.131 (0.139)	1.140
Care/Harm Foundation	0.047 (0.131)	1.049	0.010 (0.132)	1.010	-0.001 (0.135)	0.999	0.046 (0.131)	1.047	-0.044 (0.137)	0.957
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	0.001 (0.109)	1.001	0.063 (0.112)	1.065	0.012 (0.109)	1.012	-0.025 (0.110)	0.975	0.036 (0.114)	1.037
Fear of Crime	-0.078 (0.088)	0.925	-0.075 (0.089)	0.928	-0.068 (0.089)	0.934	-0.108 (0.092)	0.897	-0.111 (0.093)	0.895
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			-0.277 (0.111)*	0.758					-0.281 (0.113)*	0.755
Racial Sympathy					0.138 (0.095)	1.148			0.150 (0.099)	1.162
White Nationalism							0.128 (0.099)	1.136	0.195 (0.103)	1.215
Cox & Snell R-square	.114		.122		.117		.116		.127	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

few instances. First, in Model 5 in Table 3.9, the effects of *fear of crime* and *dangerous world* on *support for rehabilitation* are nonsignificant. However, in the alternative model with *right political leaning*, *fear of crime* is significant ($p \leq .05$). Also, in the model with both *right political leaning* and *crime salience*, the summary measure that replaced *fear of crime* and *dangerous world* (i.e., *crime salience*) is significant ($p \leq .05$).

In Model 5 in Table 3.10, *age* is nonsignificant, but in the alternative model with *crime salience* and *right political leaning* added, *age* is significant ($p \leq .05$). Also, in Model 5 in Table 3.10, *racial resentment* is nonsignificant, but in the alternative model with *crime salience* added, *racial resentment* is significant ($p \leq .05$). Thus, conclusions drawn about the effect of *racial resentment* on *belief in redeemability* should take the findings of the alternative model into account. In Model 5 in Table 3.13, *married* is nonsignificant, but in the alternative model with *crime salience* added, *married* is significant ($p \leq .05$). Finally, in Model 5 in Table 3.13, *White nationalism* is nonsignificant. In the alternative models with *crime salience* added and with both *crime salience* and *right political leaning* added, *White nationalism* is significant ($p \leq .05$). It is important to note that there are not any variables that are significant in the original full model that are nonsignificant in the alternative models. As with the models of the punitive measures, the full models of the progressive measures did not differ greatly in terms of model fit when compared to the best-fitting alternative model (i.e., less than .01 difference in the adjusted R^2 or Cox and Snell R^2).

RACE-SPECIFIC BELIEFS AND POLICY OPINIONS

Assessing Race-Specific Beliefs and Policy Opinions

Kinder and Sanders (1996) and Chudy (2017) both argue that their measures—*racial resentment* and *racial sympathy*, respectively—will more strongly impact public opinion on policies that are explicitly related to race (e.g., affirmative action) than policies that are only implicitly related to race (e.g., welfare). Thus, a key contribution of the current study is that it tests the effects of these measures—as well as *White nationalism*—on race-specific beliefs about people who have committed crime and race-specific criminal justice policy opinions. Before discussing the multivariate models predicting the race-specific dependent variables, Table 3.14 presents the levels of respondents' opinions about whether the criminal justice system treats racial and ethnic groups unequally (*criminal justice discrimination*) and their opinions about whether Blacks are more likely than Whites to be sentenced to death (*death penalty discrimination*). As shown in Table 3.14, less than half of respondents agree or strongly agree with the statements that the criminal justice system (35.3%), the local police (47.1%), and federal law enforcement (36.4%) treat all people the same regardless of race or ethnicity. An even larger percent of White Americans, 47.7%, believe that Blacks are more likely than Whites to receive the death penalty.

Table 3.15 shows the percentage of respondents who selected each level of agreement (from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree") for each item on the scale measuring the degree to which respondents believe Black offenders can be redeemed and go on to live law-abiding lives (*Black offender redemption*). The results indicate that a large majority of Whites believe that Black offenders can be redeemed, with between 64.2–80.2% agreeing or strongly agreeing with each item on the scale. Likewise, a small percentage of respondents (6.0–25.4%) agree or

Table 3.14. Assessing Belief in Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System and the Death Penalty

Criminal Justice Discrimination Item	% Strongly Disagree	% Disagree	% Neither Agree nor Disagree	% Agree	% Strongly Agree	**Total % Agree**
The justice system in the United States is fair to all, regardless of racial/ethnic background.	17.05%	25.62%	22.08%	24.34%	10.91%	**35.25%**
Federal law enforcement agents treat all racial/ethnic groups equally.	10.27%	18.60%	24.03%	29.44%	17.65%	**47.09%**
Local police in my community treat all racial/ethnic groups equally.	15.88%	23.85%	23.90%	24.68%	11.69%	**36.37%**

Death Penalty Discrimination Item	% Courts are colorblind or white people are more likely to get the death penalty than African Americans	% African Americans are a little more likely or much more likely to get the death penalty than whites
One debate is whether capital punishment is given out fairly or discriminates against minorities, especially African Americans who murder a White person. Which of these statements best reflects your views on the death penalty?	52.35%	47.65%

Note: Total Agree indicates the number and percentage of respondents who selected agree or strongly agree, combined.

Table 3.15. Assessing Belief in Black Offender Redemption

Item	% Strongly Disagree	% Disagree	% Neither Agree nor Disagree	% Agree	% Strongly Agree	**Total % Agree**
Most Black offenders can go on to lead productive lives with help and hard work.	1.10%	2.68%	19.10%	41.48%	35.64%	**77.12%**
In general, it's possible for Black inmates to change and lead a law-abiding life.	1.29%	3.45%	15.37%	43.42%	36.47%	**79.89%**
If given a chance, most Black prisoners can learn a trade, get a job, and stay out of crime when they reenter society.	0.76%	4.19%	14.86%	46.04%	34.15%	**80.19%**
It's possible for Black inmates to change dramatically for the better.	1.89%	2.82%	15.16%	44.69%	35.44%	**80.13%**
Society should look favorably on Black offenders who make an effort to "give something back" to their communities.	2.15%	2.73%	18.06%	45.22%	31.84%	**77.06%**
Even the worst young Black offenders can grow out of criminal behavior.	2.70%	7.65%	25.47%	41.62%	22.56%	**64.18%**

Note: Total Agree indicates the number and percentage of respondents who selected agree or strongly agree, combined.

Table 3.16. Assessing Belief in Black Offender Condemnation

Item	% Strongly Disagree	% Disagree	% Neither Agree nor Disagree	% Agree	% Strongly Agree	**Total % Agree**
Most Black offenders are so damaged that they can never lead productive lives.	26.40%	33.72%	27.98%	8.84%	3.06%	**11.90%**
Most Black inmates are too lazy to earn an honest living upon release from prison.	30.48%	29.82%	28.40%	7.01%	4.30%	**11.31%**
Unfortunately, most Black prisoners are so damaged by their bad upbringing that they will likely never leave a life in crime.	17.02%	29.06%	30.88%	17.92%	5.13%	**23.05%**
Despite their best efforts, most Black people who commit crimes just can't manage to go back to living straight.	20.68%	31.80%	30.12%	13.78%	3.63%	**17.41%**
Most Black offenders really have little hope of changing for the better.	27.25%	32.54%	25.89%	10.84%	3.48%	**14.32%**
Many Black inmates are gang members and they will always be violent.	17.74%	24.08%	32.76%	19.28%	6.14%	**25.42%**
It's not really worth spending time to rehabilitate Black offenders.	50.11%	29.22%	14.66%	2.72%	3.30%	**6.02%**

Note: Total Agree indicates the number and percentage of respondents who selected agree or strongly agree, combined.

strongly agree with each of the items expressing that Black offenders cannot change and are condemned to a life of crime (Table 3.16). Note the percentage of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the items indicating belief in the redeemability of Black offenders is close to the percentage of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the items on the non-racially-specific *belief in redeemability* scale (Table 3.7). The virtually identical levels of belief in redeemability of offenders in general and of Black offenders in particular suggests that either beliefs about offenders are not affected by the race of the offender or that Whites tend to think of offenders as Black even when race is not specified. Although respondents may have intentionally provided the same responses to the similar *belief in redeemability* and *Black offender redemption* items, not all of the items on the *Black offender redemption* and *Black offender condemnation* scales were drawn from the *belief in redeemability* scale.

The implications of the descriptive findings provided in Tables 3.14 through 3.16 will be further discussed in the final chapter. These results generally show that a large percentage of Whites believe that the criminal justice system discriminates against Blacks and that a majority of Whites believe that Black people who have been involved in the criminal justice system can change and lead productive lives. However, sizable minorities of Whites disagree with these sentiments, and racial attitudes—*racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism*—may explain variation among Whites in the race-specific dependent variables.

Predicting Perceived Unfair Treatment of Minorities in the Criminal Justice System

In the full model predicting *criminal justice discrimination*, (Model 5 in Table 3.17), the coefficients for the effects of *age*, *conservatism*, *egalitarianism*, and *care/harm foundation* are each statistically significant. Thus, Whites who are older, more liberal, more egalitarian, and who more strongly ascribe to the care/harm moral foundation tend to more strongly believe that the

Table 3.17. OLS Regression of Criminal Justice Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta
Demographics										
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.018	0.005 (0.002)*	0.074	0.001 (0.002)	0.020	0.001 (0.002)	0.014	0.004 (0.002)*	0.068
Male	-0.124 (0.069)	-0.054	-0.122 (0.065)	-0.053	-0.121 (0.068)	-0.053	-0.083 (0.068)	-0.036	-0.089 (0.064)	-0.039
Education	0.060 (0.022)**	0.080	0.022 (0.021)	0.029	0.057 (0.022)**	0.076	0.046 (0.022)*	0.062	0.013 (0.021)	0.017
Employed Full-Time	0.016 (0.014)	0.034	0.017 (0.013)	0.035	0.016 (0.014)	0.033	0.016 (0.014)	0.033	0.016 (0.013)	0.034
Married	-0.105 (0.067)	-0.046	-0.128 (0.063)*	-0.056	-0.119 (0.067)	-0.052	-0.082 (0.065)	-0.036	-0.109 (0.062)	-0.047
Southerner	-0.069 (0.066)	-0.029	-0.062 (0.062)	-0.026	-0.063 (0.066)	-0.027	-0.075 (0.065)	-0.032	-0.067 (0.061)	-0.028
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	-0.160 (0.042)***	-0.171	-0.096 (0.040)*	-0.102	-0.144 (0.042)***	-0.154	-0.147 (0.041)***	-0.157	-0.089 (0.040)*	-0.095
Republicanism	-0.047 (0.022)*	-0.090	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.046	-0.051 (0.022)*	-0.097	-0.025 (0.021)	-0.047	-0.007 (0.021)	-0.014
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	-0.050 (0.042)	-0.039	-0.041 (0.040)	-0.032	-0.058 (0.042)	-0.045	-0.047 (0.041)	-0.037	-0.040 (0.039)	-0.031
Egalitarianism	0.521 (0.048)***	0.431	0.300 (0.051)***	0.248	0.486 (0.051)***	0.402	0.428 (0.050)***	0.354	0.238 (0.052)***	0.197
Care/Harm Foundation	-0.105 (0.053)*	-0.064	-0.161 (0.05)***	-0.099	-0.135 (0.055)*	-0.083	-0.102 (0.052)	-0.062	-0.155 (0.051)**	-0.095
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	-0.041 (0.044)	-0.031	0.051 (0.042)	0.038	-0.034 (0.044)	-0.025	0.005 (0.044)	0.004	0.083 (0.042)	0.062
Fear of Crime	-0.078 (0.036)*	-0.067	-0.069 (0.034)*	-0.060	-0.071 (0.036)*	-0.062	-0.025 (0.036)	-0.022	-0.027 (0.034)	-0.023
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			-0.426 (0.043)***	-0.424					-0.400 (0.043)***	-0.398
Racial Sympathy					0.089 (0.039)*	0.079			0.000 (0.037)	0.000
White Nationalism							-0.228 (0.039)***	-0.219	-0.185 (0.038)***	-0.177
Adjusted R-square	.436		.501		.439		.459		.515	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

criminal justice system, federal law enforcement, and local law enforcement treat racial and ethnic groups unequally. Prior to including the racial attitudes in the model (Model 1), the covariates explain 43.6% of the variance in *criminal justice discrimination*. Adding *racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism* increases the variance explained to 51.5%. Thus, racial attitudes are highly relevant to understanding variation in this race-specific indicator of public opinions. Although *racial sympathy* is significant in the model without the other two racial attitudes (Model 3), its effect is reduced to nonsignificance in the full model (Model 5). With statistically significant effects and relatively large standardized coefficients in the full model, *racial resentment* (Beta = -0.398) and *White nationalism* (Beta = -0.177) are the most strongly related predictors of *criminal justice discrimination*.

Predicting Perceived Racial Disparity against Blacks in the Death Penalty

Table 3.18 presents the stepwise logistic regression results for the model predicting *death penalty discrimination*. The results indicate that Whites who are more highly educated, less conservative, and more egalitarian, are more likely to believe that there is discrimination against Blacks in death penalty sentencing than are Whites who are less educated, more conservative, and less egalitarian. These effects are robust to the inclusion of the three racial attitudes (Model 5). As with *criminal justice discrimination*, the effect of *racial sympathy* is significant prior to the inclusion of the other two racial attitudes (Model 3) but is nonsignificant when *racial resentment* and *White nationalism* are added in Model 5. Also mirroring the findings regarding *criminal justice discrimination*, the effect of *racial resentment* on *death penalty discrimination* is significant and fairly large, with each unit increase on the *racial resentment* scale decreasing the odds of belief that Blacks are more likely to be sentenced to death than Whites by a factor of 0.350. The full model improves upon the model fit of the covariates alone (Cox and Snell R^2)

Table 3.18. Logistic Regression of Death Penalty Discrimination

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR	*B* (SE)	OR
Demographics										
Age	0.002 (0.006)	1.002	0.011 (0.006)	1.011	0.002 (0.006)	1.002	0.001 (0.006)	1.001	0.010 (0.006)	1.010
Male	0.212 (0.204)	1.236	0.234 (0.214)	1.264	0.229 (0.205)	1.257	0.260 (0.207)	1.297	0.275 (0.217)	1.316
Education	0.337 (0.068)***	1.401	0.268 (0.071)***	1.307	0.331 (0.069)***	1.392	0.319 (0.069)***	1.376	0.257 (0.072)***	1.293
Employed Full-Time	0.075 (0.043)	1.078	0.082 (0.046)	1.085	0.074 (0.043)	1.076	0.073 (0.043)	1.076	0.081 (0.046)	1.084
Married	-0.015 (0.203)	0.985	-0.061 (0.214)	0.941	-0.054 (0.205)	0.947	0.028 (0.205)	1.029	-0.058 (0.217)	0.944
Southerner	-0.104 (0.200)	0.901	-0.129 (0.209)	0.879	-0.095 (0.200)	0.909	-0.123 (0.201)	0.884	-0.138 (0.21)	0.871
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	-0.215 (0.124)***	0.807	-0.047 (0.129)	0.954	-0.165 (0.126)***	0.848	-0.201 (0.126)***	0.818	-0.013 (0.132)***	0.987
Republicanism	-0.301 (0.062)	0.740	-0.269 (0.065)	0.764	-0.314 (0.062)	0.730	-0.275 (0.063)	0.759	-0.264 (0.067)	0.768
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	-0.012 (0.127)	0.988	-0.007 (0.134)	0.993	-0.043 (0.128)	0.958	-0.002 (0.128)	0.998	-0.022 (0.135)	0.979
Egalitarianism	0.900 (0.150)***	2.459	0.457 (0.167)**	1.579	0.802 (0.155)***	2.229	0.778 (0.158)***	2.178	0.363 (0.175)*	1.438
Care/Harm Foundation	0.247 (0.164)	1.280	0.161 (0.172)	1.174	0.131 (0.171)	1.140	0.237 (0.166)	1.268	0.095 (0.179)	1.100
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	-0.540 (0.141)***	0.583	-0.319 (0.154)**	0.727	-0.523 (0.142)***	0.593	-0.476 (0.144)***	0.621	-0.277 (0.158)	0.758
Fear of Crime	-0.023 (0.107)	0.977	-0.045 (0.114)	0.956	0.010 (0.109)	1.010	0.046 (0.112)	1.047	0.007 (0.119)	1.007
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			-1.084 (0.151)***	0.338					-1.049 (0.153)***	0.350
Racial Sympathy					0.285 (0.117)*	1.329			0.155 (0.124)	1.168
White Nationalism							-0.276 (0.116)*	0.759	-0.143 (0.124)	0.867
Cox & Snell R-square	.384		.430		.389		.389		.433	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

from .384 for Model 1 to .433 for Model 5.

Predicting Belief in Black Offender Redemption

The results for the models of race-specific measures related to policy (*criminal justice discrimination* and *death penalty discrimination*) differ from the results of the race-specific measures of beliefs about Black offenders. Beginning with *Black offender redemption*—the degree to which respondents believe Black offenders are able to change and live law-abiding, productive lives—Table 3.19 shows that the effect of *racial resentment* is significant prior to including the other racial attitudes in the model (Model 2) but is nonsignificant when *racial sympathy* and *White nationalism* are added to the model. In fact, the magnitude of the standardized coefficient for *racial resentment* is reduced approximately by half when *racial sympathy* and *White nationalism* are accounted for (Model 2 Beta = -0.125 compared to Model 5 Beta = -0.059).

Controlling for all covariates (Model 5), *racial sympathy* and *White nationalism* significantly influence *Black offender redemption*. As expected, those who are more sympathetic toward Blacks' suffering more strongly believe Black offenders can be redeemed than those who are less sympathetic toward Blacks' suffering. Those who more strongly agree with the White nationalist attitudes have a weaker belief in the redeemability of Black offenders than those who more weakly endorse White nationalist attitudes. The results also show that those who are male, more religious, more egalitarian or who more strongly value caring for others tend to more strongly believe in the redeemability of Black offenders than those who are female, less religious, less egalitarian, or who less strongly value caring for others, respectively. The full model explains 24.6% of the variance in *Black offender redemption*, an increase of 7.6 percentage points beyond the variance explained by the covariates alone (Model 1).

Table 3.19. OLS Regression of Black Offender Redemption

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta
Demographics										
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.026	0.000 (0.001)	-0.010	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.018	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.030	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.015
Male	0.086 (0.049)	0.063	0.086 (0.049)	0.063	0.091 (0.048)	0.067	0.112 (0.048)*	0.082	0.110 (0.047)*	0.080
Education	0.034 (0.016)*	0.077	0.028 (0.016)	0.062	0.028 (0.015)	0.063	0.026 (0.016)	0.057	0.020 (0.015)	0.044
Employed Full-Time	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.005	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.004	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.010	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.006	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.010
Married	-0.078 (0.047)	-0.057	-0.082 (0.047)	-0.060	-0.106 (0.046)*	-0.078	-0.063 (0.047)	-0.046	-0.093 (0.046)*	-0.068
Southerner	-0.096 (0.047)*	-0.068	-0.095 (0.047)*	-0.067	-0.084 (0.046)	-0.060	-0.100 (0.046)*	-0.071	-0.088 (0.045)	-0.063
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	0.015 (0.030)	0.027	0.026 (0.030)	0.047	0.046 (0.029)	0.083	0.023 (0.029)	0.041	0.053 (0.029)	0.095
Republicanism	0.008 (0.015)	0.026	0.012 (0.015)	0.039	0.000 (0.015)	0.001	0.022 (0.015)	0.072	0.014 (0.015)	0.045
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	0.104 (0.030)***	0.138	0.106 (0.030)***	0.140	0.088 (0.029)**	0.117	0.106 (0.030)***	0.140	0.093 (0.029)***	0.123
Egalitarianism	0.237 (0.035)***	0.330	0.198 (0.038)***	0.276	0.168 (0.035)***	0.234	0.177 (0.036)***	0.247	0.117 (0.039)**	0.162
Care/Harm Foundation	0.182 (0.038)***	0.188	0.173 (0.038)***	0.178	0.122 (0.038)***	0.126	0.185 (0.037)***	0.191	0.129 (0.038)***	0.133
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	-0.026 (0.031)	-0.033	-0.010 (0.032)	-0.013	-0.011 (0.031)	-0.014	0.003 (0.031)	0.004	0.016 (0.031)	0.020
Fear of Crime	-0.085 (0.026)***	-0.124	-0.084 (0.026)***	-0.122	-0.073 (0.025)**	-0.106	-0.051 (0.026)*	-0.075	-0.049 (0.025)	-0.072
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			-0.075 (0.032)*	-0.125					-0.035 (0.032)	-0.059
Racial Sympathy					0.178 (0.027)***	0.265			0.150 (0.028)***	0.223
White Nationalism							-0.147 (0.028)***	-0.237	-0.108 (0.028)***	-0.173
Adjusted R-square	.188		.193		.232		.216		.246	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

Predicting Belief in Black Offender Condemnation

The stepwise logistic regression results for *Black offender condemnation*, shown in Table 3.20, partly mirror those for *Black offender redemption*. The effect of *racial resentment* is nonsignificant both before and after including *racial sympathy* and *White nationalism* in the model, with the standardized coefficient being reduced approximately by half (Model 1 Beta = 0.096, Model 5 Beta = 0.005). The effects of *racial sympathy* and *White nationalism*, however, are significant both before and after including the other racial attitudes in the model. The effect of *White nationalism* is notably large (Beta = 0.515). Three covariates are also significant predictors of *Black offender condemnation* with *married*, *dangerous world*, and *fear of crime* having positive effects and *conservativism* having a negative effect. Taken together, the covariates and racial attitudes explain nearly half (47.2%) of the variance in *Black offender condemnation* (Model 5), a 14.9 percentage point increase in the adjusted R^2 compared to the covariates-only model (Model 1). Given that adding *White nationalism* alone (Model 4) increases the adjusted R^2 by 14.6 percentage points beyond the variance explained by the covariates-only (Model 1), *White nationalism* is an especially salient predictor of this race-specific belief about people who have committed crime.

Sensitivity Checks for Models of Race-Specific Measures

The effects of two variables in the alternative models differ in significance from the full model of *Black offender redemption* (Model 5 in Table 3.19). First, *Age* is nonsignificant in the full model of *Black offender redemption* but is significant ($p \leq .05$) in the alternative model with *right political leaning* added to the model. Second, *Southerner* is nonsignificant in the full model of *Black offender redemption* but is significant ($p \leq 05$) in the alternative models with *right political leaning* added, with *crime salience* added, and with both *right political leaning* and

Table 3.20. OLS Regression of Black Offender Condemnation

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
Variables	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta	*b* (SE)	Beta
Demographics										
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.048	0.002 (0.002)	0.035	0.002 (0.002)	0.042	0.003 (0.001)	0.056	0.003 (0.001)	0.053
Male	0.117 (0.056)*	0.069	0.116 (0.055)*	0.068	0.112 (0.055)*	0.066	0.043 (0.050)	0.025	0.044 (0.049)	0.026
Education	-0.041 (0.018)*	-0.074	-0.035 (0.018)	-0.062	-0.036 (0.018)*	-0.064	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.030	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.026
Employed Full-Time	-0.000 (0.011)	0.000	0.000 (0.011)	0.000	0.001 (0.011)	0.004	0.001 (0.010)	0.004	0.002 (0.010)	0.005
Married	0.163 (0.054)**	0.096	0.167 (0.054)**	0.098	0.188 (0.053)***	0.111	0.121 (0.048)*	0.071	0.135 (0.048)**	0.079
Southerner	-0.079 (0.054)	-0.045	-0.080 (0.053)	-0.046	-0.089 (0.053)	-0.051	-0.068 (0.047)	-0.039	-0.073 (0.047)	-0.042
Political Affiliations										
Conservatism	-0.047 (0.034)	-0.067	-0.057 (0.034)	-0.083	-0.075 (0.034)*	-0.108	-0.070 (0.030)*	-0.101	-0.082 (0.031)**	-0.118
Republicanism	0.019 (0.017)	0.050	0.015 (0.018)	0.040	0.026 (0.017)	0.068	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.055	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.043
Cultural Beliefs										
Religiosity	0.005 (0.034)	0.005	0.003 (0.034)	0.004	0.019 (0.034)	0.020	0.001 (0.030)	0.001	0.007 (0.030)	0.007
Egalitarianism	-0.268 (0.039)***	-0.299	-0.231 (0.044)***	-0.258	-0.205 (0.040)***	-0.229	-0.098 (0.037)**	-0.110	-0.075 (0.040)	-0.084
Care/Harm Foundation	0.031 (0.043)	0.026	0.040 (0.043)	0.033	0.085 (0.044)*	0.071	0.025 (0.038)	0.020	0.049 (0.039)	0.041
Salience of Crime/Threat										
Dangerous World	0.248 (0.036)***	0.253	0.232 (0.037)***	0.237	0.234 (0.035)***	0.239	0.164 (0.032)***	0.167	0.160 (0.033)***	0.164
Fear of Crime	0.186 (0.029)***	0.217	0.184 (0.029)***	0.215	0.174 (0.029)***	0.203	0.090 (0.027)***	0.105	0.089 (0.027)***	0.104
Racial Attitudes										
Racial Resentment			0.071 (0.037)	0.096					0.004 (0.033)	0.005
Racial Sympathy					-0.161 (0.031)***	-0.193			-0.071 (0.029)*	-0.085
White Nationalism							0.415 (0.029)***	0.537	0.398 (0.030)***	0.515
Adjusted R-square	.323		.325		.345		.469		.472	

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

crime salience added. Aside from these two instances, there are no other differences between the full models of the race-specific attitudes and the alternative models of the race-specific attitudes.

Although the significance of the effects do not differ, the alternative models of *death penalty discrimination* with *crime salience* added (Cox and Snell R^2 = .432) and with both *right political leaning* and *crime salience* added (Cox and Snell R^2 = .428) both improve upon the model fit of the full model (Model 5 in Table 3.18; Cox and Snell R^2 = .389). The other alternative models neither improve upon nor substantially decrease the model fit of the respective full models for *criminal justice discrimination*, *Black offender redemption*, or *Black offender condemnation*.

CONCLUSION

Table 3.21 summarizes the effects of each of the three racial attitudes on each dependent variable. The coefficients and significance levels reported are for the full models (Model 5 in each multivariate regression table) As expected higher scores on the racial resentment scale correspond with greater support for punitive policies and lower likelihood to believe there is discrimination in the criminal justice system or in death penalty sentencing. As further evidence that racial resentment is a salient predictor of public opinion beyond punitiveness, racial resentment is significantly and negatively related to the opinion that rehabilitation should be the primary goal of prisons, support for rehabilitation, and support for expungement.

Racial sympathy also predicts public opinion on the progressive policies in the expected direction. Racial sympathy is significantly related to greater support for rehabilitation as the primary goal of prisons, support for rehabilitation generally, belief in redeemability, and support for rehabilitation ceremonies and rehabilitation certificates. The only progressive measure that racial sympathy does not predict is support for expungement. Higher scores on the racial

Table 3.21. Summary of Racial Resentment, Racial Sympathy, and White Nationalism Effects across Full Models

Dependent Variable	Racial Resentment Coefficient (SE)	Racial Sympathy Coefficient (SE)	White Nationalism Coefficient (SE)
Punitive Measures			
Death Penalty	0.716 (0.135)***	0.292 (0.117)*	0.393 (0.120)***
Harsher Courts	0.511 (0.121)***	-0.098 (0.103)	-0.024 (0.105)
Punishment Goal	0.189 (0.151)	0.281 (0.130)*	0.307 (0.124)*
Progressive Measures			
Rehabilitation Goal	-0.269 (0.121)*	0.238 (0.110)*	-0.183 (0.111)
Support for Rehabilitation	-0.085 (0.029)**	0.091 (0.025)***	-0.193 (0.026)***
Belief in Redeemability	0.041 (0.024)	0.053 (0.021)*	-0.187 (0.022)***
Rehabilitation Ceremonies	-0.165 (0.113)	0.384 (0.101)***	0.144 (0.104)
Rehabilitation Certificates	0.054 (0.113)	0.326 (0.099)***	0.152 (0.101)
Expungement	-0.281 (0.113)*	0.150 (0.099)	0.195 (0.103)
Race-Specific Measures			
Criminal Justice Discrimination	-0.400 (0.043)***	0.000 (0.037)	-0.185 (0.038)***
Death Penalty Discrimination	-1.049 (0.153)***	0.155 (0.124)	-0.143 (0.124)
Black Offender Redemption	-0.035 (0.032)	0.150 (0.028)***	-0.108 (0.028)***
Black Offender Condemnation	0.004 (0.033)	-0.071 (0.029)*	0.398 (0.030)***

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (two-tailed).

sympathy scale also predict greater belief in the redeemability of Black offenders and less belief in the condemnation of Black offenders. Surprisingly, racial sympathy is positively related to two of the punitive measures—support for the death penalty and support for punishment as the primary goal of prisons.

The effects of White nationalism are consistent with expectations. Those who more strongly endorse White nationalist attitudes are more likely to support the death penalty and to support punishment as the primary goal of prisons. Although White nationalism does not predict opinions on the specific progressive policies (i.e., rehabilitation ceremonies, rehabilitation certificates, and expungement), it does predict the more global progressive measures—less support for rehabilitation and lower belief in redeemability. Similarly, White nationalism predicts weaker belief that there is racial discrimination in the criminal justice system more generally but does not predict the opinion that there is racial discrimination in death penalty sentencing specifically. Finally, White nationalism is related to weaker belief in the redeemability of Black offenders and greater belief in the condemnation to Black offenders in the expected directions.

These findings provide new insights into the nuances of public opinion of correctional policy and beliefs about people who have committed crime. Because the data analyzed here can be generalized to Whites in the general population of the United States, the estimated levels of aggregate opinion on the punitive, progressive, and race-specific dependent variables can be compared to previous national estimates from datasets that have included the same measures. Thus, the claim that public beliefs and policy opinions are shifting away from offender exclusion and toward inclusion can be evaluated. The multivariate findings further inform our understanding of how political affiliations, cultural beliefs, crime salience, and other racial

attitudes affect support for correctional policies or beliefs about people who have committed crime. Ultimately, the current study shows that considering racial attitudes—including those beyond racial resentment—is an imperative for the future of research on criminal justice public opinion.

Chapter 4

DISCUSSION:
RACE AND REDEMPTION

As U.S correctional policy is shifting away from seeking to exclude from society those who have committed crime, the time is ripe to assess public support for punitive policies that reigned in the past era of exclusion and for progressive policies proposed and implemented during the emerging era of inclusion. Given that racial justice has been a chief concern during this latter period, it is also imperative for criminologists to consider how the public may respond to race-specific aspects of criminal justice. Thus, the goal of this dissertation was to contribute new understanding of Americans' sentiments at this pivotal moment in corrections by evaluating a broad range of their punitive, progressive, and race-specific beliefs and policy opinions.

Because prior research has consistently shown that racial resentment (Kinder & Sanders, 1996) is a strong and robust predictor of views about the criminal justice system, the primary pursuit of the current analysis was to test the effect of racial attitudes on the degree of support for the range of policies under study. This dissertation extends prior research by testing the effects not only of racial resentment (which has been the focus of most criminological public opinion research) but also of two racial beliefs that have not yet been introduced into this line of inquiry—racial sympathy and White nationalism.

With these goals in mind, this chapter discusses each of the contributions of the findings presented in the preceding chapter. First, the estimates of the levels of support for each of the punitive, progressive, and race-specific policies are reviewed. Viewed within the context of previous studies of criminal justice public opinion, these estimates demonstrate that public punitiveness is declining, that progressive beliefs are widespread and apply to both offenders in

general and Black offenders in particular, and that acknowledgment of systemic racial discrimination is common. Second, the sources of public opinion outside of racial beliefs are considered. Namely, trends in the effects of political affiliations, cultural beliefs, salience of crime/threat, and demographic characteristics across different measures of correctional orientations are discussed. Third and finally, the major findings regarding the effects of racial resentment, racial sympathy, and White nationalism are reviewed. Ultimately, the results support the claims that U.S. public opinion is moving toward offender redemption and that any future efforts to explain individual differences in views toward correctional policies should take into account a diverse set of racial attitudes.

PUBLIC OPINION AT A CORRECTIONAL TURNING POINT

This dissertation provides contemporary evidence on White Americans' beliefs about offenders and levels of support for correctional policies. The results reveal that public endorsement of punitive policies—the death penalty, harsher courts, and punishment as the main emphasis of prisons—is lower than estimates from recent years and much lower than the levels at the height of the era of exclusion. The results also show high support for policies that seek to rehabilitate those who have committed crime and facilitate their social reintegration. Large majorities of White Americans believe that a person with a criminal past is redeemable. Notably, most White Americans also believe in the redeemability of Black offenders and reject the notion that Black offenders are condemned to a life of crime. The following sections place the findings of the current study in the context of prior research to show that the United States is moving into an era of inclusion.

From Exclusion to Inclusion

Given the sampling and weighting procedures used by YouGov, the data collected for this dissertation can be generalized to the U.S. population. Because the current study focuses on White Americans, the estimated levels of public punitiveness provided in Chapter 3 can be compared to estimates for White Americans provided by the General Social Survey. The GSS has shown that the percentage of Whites who support the death penalty has steadily declined from 79% in 1994 to 65% in 2018 (GSS Data Explorer, 2020). The percentage of Whites who believed that courts should deal more harshly with criminals fell over the same time period, from 86% in 1994 to 57% in 2018 (GSS Data Explorer, 2020). The results of the current study suggest that these numbers continued to drop from 2018 to 2019. As shown in this dissertation, 56.4% of Whites supported the death penalty and 42.4% of Whites believed that courts are not harsh enough. As further evidence of declining emphasis on what Clear and Frost (2014) called "the punitive imperative," the results of the current study show that just 16.6% of Whites endorse punishment as the main emphasis of prisons (see also Clear, 1994).

The estimates of public opinion of progressive criminal justice policies demonstrate that Whites' support for rehabilitation and reentry initiatives is widespread. This includes 41.7% of Whites supporting rehabilitation as the primary goal of prisons, between 54.5% and 86.9% agreeing or strongly agreeing with each of the *support for rehabilitation* items[6], and 51.3% and 54.0% agreeing that rehabilitation ceremonies and rehabilitation certificates will help ex-offenders be reintegrated into their communities and stay out of crime, respectively. Additionally, just over half (51.1%) of Whites agree that expungement is a good policy. These results are generally in line with findings of high levels of support for these initiatives among

[6] These numbers include those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with the reverse coded items that expressed opposition to rehabilitation.

Whites in a 2017 YouGov survey (Thielo, 2017)[7]. The widespread support for these policies of inclusion correspond with high levels of belief in the redeemability of people who have committed crime.

Belief in Redeemability

The special focus of this dissertation is on the degree to which White Americans believe in the redeemability of those who have committed crime. Cullen and colleagues (2020) define redemption as "a pathway to legal forgiveness in which offenders regain their status as a full citizen" (p. 320). As the first core principle of their theory of Rehabilitation and Redemption, Cullen et al. (2020) argue that redemption "should be justified as a conscious choice that we, as a society, should make because it genuinely represents our embrace of hope and human dignity" (p. 18). Thus, evaluating whether the public genuinely believes that people can change and are deserving of full social inclusion is a crucial first step in establishing correctional policies that grant true redemption. Redemption is unique from the four main goals of corrections—deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation (Kifer, Hemmens, & Stohr, 2003)—because unlike these other goals, redemption inherently requires public buy-in. In other words, redemption necessitates action not only from the state (by granting legal forgiveness in the form of full citizenship) but also from members of the communities to which people return upon release from prison (by granting social acceptance).

Drawing upon attribution theory from social psychology, Maruna and King (2009) argue that the degree to which the public believes in offenders' redeemability is indicative of whether they view human behavior as "fixed versus malleable" (Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998, p.

[7] Direct comparisons between the estimates derived from the current study and those from Thielo's (2017) data are not made here because the two studies used different response sets (i.e., Thielo [2017] did not include "Neither Agree nor Disagree" as a response option).

22). Thus, they ask whether individuals "believe that 'once a criminal, always a criminal' or do they believe that even the most persistent offenders can redeem themselves and turn their lives around" (Maruna & King, 2009, p. 9). Maruna and King (2009) hypothesize that those who more strongly believe in redeemability will be less punitive. They find strong support for this hypothesis, with their four-item belief in redeemability scale being significantly related to lower scores on their eight-item punitiveness scale.

Further research has been consistent with Maruna and King's (2009) finding that belief in redeemability decreases punitiveness (Burton et al., 2020; Moss, Lee, Berman, & Rung, 2019; Rade, Desmarais, & Burnette, 2018; Reich, 2017, Sloas & Atkin-Plunk, 2018). Recently, Burton and colleagues (2020) revisited the effect that the "once a criminal, always a criminal" belief has on policy opinions. Based on evidence from a 2017 YouGov survey, Burton et al. (2020) reveal that belief in redeemability also increases support for rehabilitation, reinstating felon voting rights, "ban the box" initiatives, and expungement of criminal records. Additionally, research has shown that those who more strongly believe that offenders can turn their lives around are more likely to support other progressive policies, such as restorative justice (Moss et al., 2019), parole (Dodd, 2018), public housing for released inmates (Ouelette, Applegate, & Vuk, 2017), expanding job opportunities for the formerly incarcerated (Ouelette et al., 2017), and hiring ex-felons (Reich, 2017).

This dissertation contributes to this line of inquiry not by evaluating the effect of belief in redeemability on policy opinions, but by providing updated estimates of how strongly the public believes in redeemability of offenders in general and by revealing the first ever estimates of belief in redeemability of Black offenders. The evidence that White Americans believe offenders can be redeemed is strong. Between 82.4% and 85.5% endorsed each of the positively worded

items on the *belief in redeemability* scale. With regard to the reverse-coded *belief in redeemability* items, most rejected the notion that offenders cannot be redeemed. Just 6.3% agree or strongly agree that "It's not really worth spending time trying to rehabilitate offenders," 17.8% agree or strongly agree that "Despite their best efforts, most people who commit crimes just can't manage to go back to living straight," and 8.4% agree or strongly agree that "once a criminal, always a criminal."

Black Offender Redeemability and Condemnation

Given that racial beliefs are known to have a profound impact on policy opinions, an important direction for criminal justice public opinion research is to measure Whites' beliefs about Black people who have committed crime. Previous research on perceptions of Black offenders have largely focused on negative stereotypes of Black people as being aggressive (Johnson, 2008; Johnson & Kuhns, 2009) and inherently criminal—what Russell (1998, 2002) refers to as the "criminalblackman" image (see also Barkan & Cohn, 2005; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997, 2005). Although these stereotypes are real and consequential, they only reflect one side of Whites' views of Black offenders. Because research has been limited to exploring the effects of these negative stereotypes, it is unknown whether some Whites may hold more positive or progressive beliefs about Black people who have committed crime. Because the special focus of this dissertation is on redemption, it includes, for the first time, measures of the degree to which Whites believe that Black offenders can change and lead productive, crime-free lives.

As shown in Chapter 3, belief in the redeemability of Black offenders is high and condemnation of Black offenders is relatively low. Between 64.2% and 80.2% agree or strongly agree with each of the *Black offender redemption* items and between 6.0% and 25.4% agree or strongly agree with the *Black offender condemnation* items. For example, more than seven in ten

(77.1%) Whites believe that "Society should look favorably on Black offenders who make an effort to 'give something back' to their communities." More than eight in ten (80.1%) believe that "It's possible for Black inmates to change dramatically for the better." Conversely, only about one in sixteen (6.0%) believe that "It's not really worth spending time to rehabilitate Black offenders."

These findings do not necessarily refute the evidence from prior research that some Whites stereotype Blacks as inherently criminal or aggressive (see, e.g., Johnson, 2008; Johnson & Kuhns, 2009). For example, a substantial minority agree or strongly agree that "Many Black inmates are gang members and they will always be violent." (25.4%) and that "Unfortunately, most Black prisoners are so damaged by their bad upbringing that they will likely never leave a life in crime" (23.1%). Nonetheless, it is possible that least some Whites who view Black people as dangerous predators may also believe that Black people who have committed crime are capable of changing and deserving of acceptance back into society. Future research should probe the potential comorbidity of positive and negative attitudes toward Black people who have committed crime. By developing a better understanding the nuances of how individuals view Black offenders, researchers may, in turn, inform how beliefs about Black offenders affect public support for correctional policies in general. In hypothesizing that racial beliefs (e.g., racial resentment) influence policy opinions, the assumption is that the relationship exists because the policy opinions either explicitly or implicitly target minorities. The measures of *Black offender redemption* and *Black offender condemnation* presented here—both of which have high internal consistency and factor loadings—open the door for researchers to explore the mechanisms by which racial beliefs impact policy opinions.

SOURCES OF PUBLIC POLICY OPINIONS

Although the primary focus of this dissertation is on the effects of racial attitudes on correctional orientations, a secondary contribution is the insight it provides into other sources of those orientations. The following sections summarize the effects of political affiliations, cultural beliefs, salience of crime/threat, and demographic characteristics across the full models of the correctional policies assessed in Chapter 3.

Political Affiliations

A wealth of public opinion research demonstrates that political affiliations predict opinions on a range of criminal justice issues, including, but not limited to, punitiveness (Johnson, 2008), support for capital punishment (Unnever & Cullen, 2007b), perceptions of whether Blacks are treated unfairly by police (Gabbidon & Higgins, 2009), feeling that racial profiling by police is justified (Reitzel & Piquero, 2006), and justification of racial profiling by airport security (Gabbidon, Penn, Jordan, & Higgins, 2009). Thus, political affiliations are important to control for in studies of criminal justice policy opinions. Table 4.1 summarizes the effects of *Republicanism* and *conservatism* across the full models of the punitive, progressive, and race-specific measures of correctional orientations.

Republicanism is a 7-point scale of party identification (1 = Strong Democrat, 7 = Strong Republican), and *conservatism* is a 5-point scale of political ideology (1 = Very Liberal, 5 = Very Conservative). With the exception of its positive effect on favoring the death penalty for persons convicted of murder, party identification does not significantly impact policy opinions. However, conservatism does affect several of the dependent variables, with some notable

Table 4.1. Summary of Political Affiliation Effects across Full Models

Dependent Variable	Conservatism	Republicanism
Punitive Measures		
Death Penalty	+	+
Harsher Courts	ns	ns
Punishment Goal	ns	ns
Progressive Measures		
Rehabilitation Goal	–	ns
Support for Rehabilitation	ns	ns
Belief in Redeemability	+	ns
Rehabilitation Ceremonies	–	ns
Rehabilitation Certificates	ns	ns
Expungement	–	ns
Race-Specific Measures		
Criminal Justice Discrimination	–	ns
Death Penalty Discrimination	–	ns
Black Offender Redemption	ns	ns
Black Offender Condemnation	–	ns

+ (positive effect, $p \leq .05$), – (negative effect, $p \leq .05$), ns (nonsignificant effect, $p \geq .05$)

findings that align with prior research. In the full model of *death* penalty, those who are more conservative are more likely to favor the death penalty (see also Unnever & Cullen, 2007b) and in the full model of *criminal justice discrimination*, those who are more conservative are less likely to believe that racial and ethnic minorities are treated unequally by the criminal justice system (see also Gabbidon & Higgins, 2009). As expected given Gabbidon and Higgins's (2009) finding that conservatives are less likely to perceive unfair treatment of Blacks by police, those who are more conservative are significantly less likely to believe there is *death penalty discrimination* (i.e., that Blacks are more likely to receive the death penalty than Whites).

Supportive of previous evidence that progressive criminal justice reforms has bipartisan endorsement, *conservatism* increases belief in redeemability and decreases *Black offender condemnation*. However, more conservative Whites are less likely than more liberal Whites to approve of the specific policies that may facilitate redemption—*support for rehabilitation, rehabilitation ceremonies* and *expungement*. Nonetheless, conservatives' lower likelihood to agree with progressive policies relative to liberals does not refute the claim that such policies are supported by a substantial percentage of White conservatives. Among conservatives[8] Whites, between 60.3% and 78.2% of agree with each of the positively worded *support for rehabilitation* items, only 17.1% and 20.7% agree with the reverse-coded *support for rehabilitation* items, 41.4% agree with rehabilitation ceremonies, 49.0% agree with rehabilitation certificates, and 35.9% agree with expungement[9].

Cultural Beliefs

The full models of correctional policy opinions that are estimated in Chapter 3 also

[8] Those who identify as conservative or very conservative.
[9] These numbers include those who either agree or strongly agree with the item.

include measures of cultural beliefs that have been shown to predict public opinion in previous research. These cultural beliefs include *religiosity*, *egalitarianism*, and *care/harm foundation*.

Religiosity is a standardized mean scale composed of three items—importance of religion, frequency of prayer, and church attendance. Table 4.2 summarizes the effects of *religiosity* across the full models of all dependent variables. With the exception of its positive effect on believing that rehabilitation certificates will help ex-offenders be reintegrated into their communities and more strongly believing in the redeemability of Black offenders, *religiosity* generally does not affect correctional orientations when all other independent variables and controls are accounted for.

The *care/harm foundation* measures how strongly the respondent agrees with the moral foundation of taking care of and preventing harm to others (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Thus, the *care/harm foundation* is expected to be negatively related to punitive policies of the era of exclusion and positively related to progressive policies of the era of inclusion. Although the *care/harm foundation* did not influence several of the dependent variables, it is significantly related to five of the dependent variables in the expected directions. As shown in Table 4.2, those who more strongly value protecting others from harm are less likely to support the death penalty, more strongly support rehabilitation, more strongly believe in redeemability (both of offenders in general and Black offenders, in particular), and are more likely to support rehabilitation ceremonies.

The most consistently salient cultural belief across models is *egalitarianism*, with each effect of *egalitarianism* in the expected direction (see Table 4.2). Relative to less egalitarian Whites, those who are more egalitarian are less likely to believe that courts are not harsh enough and less strongly believe that Black offenders are condemned to a life of crime. *Egalitarianism*

Table 4.2. Summary of Cultural Beliefs Effects across Full Models

Dependent Variable	Religiosity	Egalitarianism	Care/Harm Foundation
Punitive Measures			
Death Penalty	ns	ns	–
Harsher Courts	ns	–	ns
Punishment Goal	ns	ns	ns
Progressive Measures			
Rehabilitation Goal	ns	+	ns
Support for Rehabilitation	ns	+	+
Belief in Redeemability	ns	+	+
Rehabilitation Ceremonies	ns	+	+
Rehabilitation Certificates	+	+	ns
Expungement	ns	+	ns
Race-Specific Measures			
Criminal Justice Discrimination	ns	+	ns
Death Penalty Discrimination	ns	+	ns
Black Offender Redemption	+	+	+
Black Offender Condemnation	ns	–	ns

+ (positive effect, $p \leq .05$), – (negative effect, $p \leq .05$), ns (nonsignificant effect, $p \geq .05$)

increases support for all of the progressive policies and increases belief in redeemability of offenders in general and Black offenders in particular. These findings suggest that *egalitarianism* should be a standard control variable in studies of correctional policy opinions. *Egalitarianism* is distinct from the *care/harm foundation* because it is the belief that all individuals must be afforded equal rights and opportunities (Feldman & Huddy, 2005). Thus, *egalitarianism* does not necessarily require taking care of others, but rather insists that the resources for taking care of others are distributed equally. If people who have committed crime are viewed as a group who have been denied equal rights and opportunities (i.e., the basic function of imprisonment), it follows logically that more egalitarian individuals may oppose punishment and favor treatment because they believe doing so promotes the restoration of equal rights for that targeted group.

Salience of Crime/Threat

Simon (2007) argues that as the public became more concerned with the suffering of crime victims and more distrusting of courts to serve justice, it became increasingly punitive and less amenable to rehabilitation as the focus of imprisonment. Unnever and Cullen (2010) refer to this theory as the escalating crime-distrust model, and they test this model against the effect of racial resentment and racial stereotyping (i.e., the racial animus model) and against Tyler and Boeckmann's (1997) argument that support for punitive legislation "arose from a general uneasiness about the 'social cohesion of the world'" (i.e., the moral decline model) (p. 104). Unnever and Cullen (2010) find that the racial animus model best explains punitiveness and support for the death penalty when tested against the escalating crime-distrust model and the moral decline model. Still, including measures that capture perceptions of crime, victimization experiences, and beliefs about the decline of society is standard in criminal justice public opinion research (see, e.g., Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Dodd, 2018; Johnson, 2006; Johnson, 2008;

Leverentz, 2011; Maruna & King, 2009; Sloas & Atkin-Plunk, 2018; Weitzer & Tuch, 2004). Thus, the current study includes two measures of salience of crime/threat—*dangerous world* and *fear of crime*. The effects of these scales across the full models of policy opinions are summarized in Table 4.3.

Dangerous world captures the degree to which the respondent perceives the world as dangerous and chaotic. Building from the moral decline model argument that the perceived dissolution of social cohesiveness will result in stronger leanings toward punishment, *dangerous world* is expected to increase support for punitive policies and decrease support for progressive policies. The results are consistent with this expectation. *Dangerous world* is positively related to support for the death penalty, belief that courts do not deal harshly enough with criminals, and *Black offender condemnation*. More strongly viewing the world is a dangerous place is negatively related to support for rehabilitation and belief that there is discrimination in death penalty sentencing.

Fear of crime is a mean scale that captures how fearful the respondent is of being a victim of robbery, murder, theft, burglary, or rape. Based on the escalating crime-distrust model, those who are more fearful of being victims of crime would be expected to be more punitive and less progressive in their policy opinions. As expected, greater fear of crime is associated with lower scores on the scales of *support for rehabilitation*, *belief in redeemability*, and *Black offender redeemability* and with higher scores on the *Black offender condemnation* scale. The significant relationships between *fear of crime* and the *Black offender redemption* and *Black offender condemnation* scales begs the question of whether variation in fear of crime may differentially impact policy opinions when those policies are explicitly or implicitly framed as targeting different racial groups of offenders; this is yet another avenue for future research using

Table 4.3. Summary of Crime Salience/Threat Effects across Full Models

Dependent Variable	Dangerous World	Fear of Crime
Punitive Measures		
Death Penalty	+	ns
Harsher Courts	+	ns
Punishment Goal	ns	ns
Progressive Measures		
Rehabilitation Goal	ns	ns
Support for Rehabilitation	–	–
Belief in Redeemability	ns	–
Rehabilitation Ceremonies	ns	ns
Rehabilitation Certificates	ns	ns
Expungement	ns	ns
Race-Specific Measures		
Criminal Justice Discrimination	ns	ns
Death Penalty Discrimination	–	ns
Black Offender Redemption	ns	–
Black Offender Condemnation	+	+

+ (positive effect, $p \leq .05$), – (negative effect, $p \leq .05$), ns (nonsignificant effect, $p \geq .05$)

the *Black offender* scales.

Demographics

The most notable trend with regard to the demographic characteristics is that when all other independent and control variables are taken into account, an individual's age, gender, education level, employment status, marital status, and region of residence are generally nonsignificant in predicting their opinion on correctional policies. A handful of exceptions are shown in Table 4.4. Older Whites are more likely than younger Whites to support the death penalty and harsher courts, to support rehabilitation ceremonies and expungement, and to believe there is discrimination in the criminal justice system. White men are more likely than White women to support rehabilitation ceremonies and to believe in the redeemability of Black offenders. More educated Whites are more likely than less educated Whites to agree that there is discrimination against Blacks in death penalty sentencing. Those who are employed full-time are less likely than those who are not employed full time to favor the death penalty, to endorse punishment as the main emphasis of prisons, and to agree that expungement is a good policy. Finally, compared to unmarried Whites, married Whites are less likely to support rehabilitation ceremonies, less strongly believe in the redeemability of black offenders, and more strongly believe that Black offenders are condemned to a life of crime. Although many of these demographic characteristics are nonsignificant, prior research has identified these characteristics as important controls in studies of public opinion (see, e.g., Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013) and thus without these controls the models would be misspecified.

RACIAL ATTITUDES AND CORRECTIONAL POLICY

Racial resentment has been shown to be a robust predictor of a range of attitudes about

Table 4.4. Summary of Demographics Effects across Full Models

Dependent Variable	Age	Male	Education	Employed Full-Time	Married	Southerner
Punitive Measures						
Death Penalty	+	ns	ns	–	ns	ns
Harsher Courts	+	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Punishment Goal	ns	ns	ns	–	ns	ns
Progressive Measures						
Rehabilitation Goal	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Support for Rehabilitation	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Belief in Redeemability	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Rehabilitation Ceremonies	–	+	ns	ns	–	ns
Rehabilitation Certificates	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Expungement	–	ns	ns	–	ns	ns
Race-Specific Measures						
Criminal Justice Discrimination	+	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Death Penalty Discrimination	ns	ns	+	ns	ns	ns
Black Offender Redemption	ns	+	ns	ns	–	ns
Black Offender Condemnation	ns	ns	ns	ns	+	ns

+ (positive effect, $p \leq .05$), – (negative effect, $p \leq .05$), ns (nonsignificant effect, $p \geq .05$)

the criminal justice system—including support for the death penalty, harsher courts, punishment as the goal of prisons (see, e.g., Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Johnson, 2008; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a), and beliefs about misconduct and discrimination by police against Blacks (see, e.g., Weitzer & Tuch, 1999, 2004, 2006). It is therefore not unreasonable for researchers to have continued to evaluate the effect of racial resentment on public attitudes over the two decades since Kinder and Sanders (1996) published their scale. However, because criminologists have limited their perspective on racial attitudes almost exclusively to animus toward Blacks, they have ignored both positive beliefs about Black people and beliefs about White people and Whiteness.

This study introduces two racial attitudes that have thus far been overlooked in criminal justice public opinion research—racial sympathy and White nationalism—and tests the effects of these attitudes on policy opinions. Racial sympathy is defined as "White distress over Black misfortune" (Chudy, 2017, p. 35). Recall that racial sympathy is not merely the absence of animus. Racial sympathy and racial resentment are not two ends of the same spectrum, they are two distinct constructs.

White nationalism is defined here as a political orientation characterized by the *ideology* that the United States should remain a White nation in terms of population demographics and mainstream culture, and by a *praxis* that emphasizes, but is not limited to, support for reducing immigration as a means of preserving the White identity of the nation. As explained in Chapter 1, the *White nationalism* scale is not intended to measure whether a person identifies as a White nationalist, but rather measures how strongly a person agrees or disagrees with the ideas underlying the contemporary messaging of White nationalism (see Kaufmann, 2019; Swain, 2002). *White nationalism* measures Whites' attitudes about Whiteness is therefore distinct from

racial resentment and *racial sympathy*, which measure separate aspects of Whites' beliefs about Blacks.

An advance made by this dissertation is to provide empirical evidence that *racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism* are three separate constructs. As shown in Table 2.7, exploratory factor analysis indicates that *racial resentment*, *racial sympathy*, and *White nationalism* are three racial attitudes whose constituent items load onto the respective scales as expected with high factor loadings (ranging from .64 to .90) and high reliability (α = .88, .80, and .87, respectively). The finding that the *racial resentment* and *racial sympathy* items load onto separate factors is also evidenced in Chudy's (2017) research and across two surveys conducted using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Hannan et al., 2019), but the finding that *White nationalism* is separate from the other racial attitudes is a unique contribution of the current study.

This volume demonstrates also that each construct has important effects on correctional policy opinions. To summarize the effects of each racial attitude across all of the full models, Table 4.5 presents the direction and significance for each scale in each full model. Several conclusions can be drawn with regard to each of the racial attitudes.

Racial Resentment: A Robust but Incomplete Explanation of Policy Opinions

Racial resentment is a strong predictor of numerous policy opinions and is generally robust to the inclusion of the other racial attitudes. *Racial resentment* is shown to increase support for the death penalty and harsher courts. Compared to Whites who score lower on the *racial resentment* scale, more racially resentful Whites are less likely to endorse rehabilitation as the main emphasis of imprisonment, they less strongly support rehabilitation generally, and they are more likely to believe expungement is a good policy. As previously explained, criminologists

Table 4.5. Summary of Racial Resentment, Racial Sympathy, and White Nationalism Effects across Full Models

Dependent Variable	Racial Resentment	Racial Sympathy	White Nationalism
Punitive Measures			
Death Penalty	+	+	+
Harsher Courts	+	ns	ns
Punishment Goal	ns	+	+
Progressive Measures			
Rehabilitation Goal	–	+	ns
Support for Rehabilitation	–	+	–
Belief in Redeemability	ns	+	–
Rehabilitation Ceremonies	ns	+	ns
Rehabilitation Certificates	ns	+	ns
Expungement	–	ns	ns
Race-Specific Measures			
Criminal Justice Discrimination	–	ns	–
Death Penalty Discrimination	–	ns	ns
Black Offender Redemption	ns	+	–
Black Offender Condemnation	ns	–	–

+ (positive effect, $p \leq .05$), – (negative effect, $p \leq .05$), ns (nonsignificant effect, $p \geq .05$)

have largely been concerned with assessing public support for punitive measures. The finding that *racial resentment* increases punitiveness is in line with prior research (see, e.g., Bobo & Johnson, 2004; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a, 2007b), but to show that racially resentful Whites are more likely also to oppose progressive criminal justice policies is a new contribution to the extant literature.

As expected given prior research (see, e.g., Gabbidon & Higgins, 2009), *racial resentment* also affected beliefs about racial discrimination. More racially resentful Whites tend to less strongly believe that racial and ethnic groups are treated unequally by the criminal justice system, by local police, and by federal law enforcement than do less racially resentful Whites. Racial resentment also significantly decreases the likelihood of believing that Blacks are more likely to be sentenced to death than are Whites. Notably, when *racial sympathy* and *White nationalism* are taken into account, *racial resentment* does not significantly impact how strongly a person believes that Black offenders are redeemable, nor does it predict how strongly an individual believes that Black offenders are condemned to a life of crime.

Another key finding with regard to *racial resentment* is that its effect is nonsignificant in nearly half of the models. Researchers must further probe mechanism by which *racial resentment* affects policy opinions and question whether it is the most salient form of racial animus today. The concept of racial resentment and its measure were developed more than two decades ago (Kinder & Sanders, 1996) in response to changes in how racial animus was expressed in the United States. Traditional biological racism had become socially unacceptable by the time of the Civil Rights movement, and in the wake of the goals achieved by the Civil Rights movement, many Whites believed that racial inequality had been eliminated (Kinder &

Sanders, 1996). It is questionable whether the belief that Blacks are given unfair and unneeded advantages is the dominant form of racial animus today.

The data show that many Whites still hold this view. More than a third (34.8%) agree that "It is really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as Whites" and more than half (51.4%) agree that "Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors." More than four in ten Whites (40.8%) and 46.7% disagree that "Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve" (40.8%) and that "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class" (46.7%). But some Whites still believe in biological racism as well, with the percent of Whites who believe Blacks are less intelligent than Whites hovering between 24% and 27% between since 2004 (Krysan & Moberg, 2016). Just as biological racism has become less salient than racial resentment, the changing racial dynamics in the United States over the past 20 years may have likely produced other racial beliefs that provide a more complete picture of how Americans think and feel about race. Researchers must work to identify, measure, and test the effects of racial attitudes outside of resentment that have been overlooked.

White Nationalism: A Parallel to Racial Resentment that We Can No Longer Ignore

White nationalism may be one racial attitude that maybe just as salient in present day as racial resentment. The effects of *White nationalism* tend to parallel the effects of *racial resentment*. The more strongly a White person ascribes to the ideas underlying the White nationalist political orientation, the more likely they are to support the death penalty and harsher courts. *White nationalism* also decreases *support for rehabilitation*, *belief in redeemability*, and

belief that there is *criminal justice discrimination*. It is not, however, related to opinions on *harsher courts*, *rehabilitation goal*, *rehabilitation ceremonies*, *rehabilitation certificates*, *expungement*, and *death penalty discrimination*.

Given that both *racial resentment* and *White nationalism* are only significant predictors of six of the thirteen dependent variables and tend to impact the dependent variables in the same direction, the critique that the two measures "explain away" the effects of each other may be raised. This argument can be refuted both conceptually and empirically. As explained above, *white nationalism* as it is conceptualized and measured here does not necessarily involve animus toward Blacks. Removing racial animus from the messaging of the White nationalist movement has been an explicit goal of leaders of the movement to appeal to Whites who would reject blatant racist messaging (see, e.g., Diangelo, 2018; Swain, 2002). To reflect contemporary White nationalist messaging, the items in the scale center on beliefs about the White people and the White identify of the United States.

The divergence between *racial resentment* and *White nationalism* is apparent in the exploratory factor analysis results that have already been reviewed. As further evidence, *White nationalism* and *racial resentment* are only moderately correlated ($r = .57$) and the tolerance and VIF values assessed for all models indicate that there is not multicollinearity between these two scales. Finally, there is only one stepwise regression model (*Black offender redemption*, Table 3.19) in which the effect of *racial resentment* is significant when included in the model without *White nationalism* (Model 2) and is reduced to nonsignificance when *White nationalism* is added to the model (Model 5). There are only two models (*rehabilitation goal*, Table 3.8; *death penalty discrimination*, Table 3.18) in which the effect of *White nationalism* is significant when included

in the model without *racial resentment* (Model 4) and is reduced to non-significance when *racial resentment* is added to the model (Model 5).

All this is to say that the differing effects of *racial resentment* and *White nationalism* across models likely indicates that these two racial attitudes tap into real nuances in how Whites' beliefs about Blacks and beliefs about Whiteness affect their support for correctional policies. Future research should seek to parse out these nuances and better inform our understanding of the measures that best capture White Americans' racial attitudes.

Racial Sympathy: A Key Ingredient of Public Opinion in the Era of Inclusion

One of the main conclusions of this study is that *racial sympathy* predicts a wide range of policy opinions, in both expected and unexpected directions. *Racial sympathy* was anticipated to be negatively related to the punitive measures. However, the results indicate that greater racial sympathy is associated with higher likelihood to support capital punishment and higher likelihood to endorse punishment as the primary goal of prisons. One explanation for this may be that asking about the death penalty and about how harshly courts should treat criminals invokes a victim-oriented response. Those who feel sympathy toward Blacks may support punishment if they think of Black people as the victims for whom "criminals" are being punished. This is only speculation and should be considered in future studies. The finding that *racial sympathy*, *racial resentment*, and *White nationalism* are all positively related to the punitive measures further indicates that these three attitudes do not exist upon the same spectrum. If *racial sympathy* is merely the opposite of *racial resentment* and *White nationalism*, the scales would affect policy opinions in opposite directions.

Racial sympathy is particularly salient with regard to explaining support for progressive policies. Whites who more strongly feel distress over Black suffering are more likely to support

rehabilitation as the main emphasis of prisons, more strongly support rehabilitation generally, and are more likely to agree that rehabilitation ceremonies and rehabilitation certificates will aid in reintegrating offenders back into society. Greater racial sympathy also predicts stronger belief in the redeemability of Black offenders and weaker belief in the condemnation of Black offenders. The only progressive measure to which *racial sympathy* is not significantly related is expungement, a result that makes sense if sympathy promotes forgiveness and if expungement is a mechanism of *forgetting* rather than forgiving.

Ultimately, these findings suggest that accounting for *racial sympathy* will be of particular importance for researchers who begin to analyze public opinion of policies of inclusion. A potential avenue for such research would be to use experimental vignette designs. For example, surveys could include vignettes that describe a crime with the offender and victim characteristics (e.g., race, gender, education level, type of crime, criminal/victimization history) varied for different respondents. Respondents could then be asked to indicate whether they believe the offender is redeemable or whether they would approve of a specific sanction or treatment response (such as the death penalty, rehabilitation ceremonies, or expungement) for the offender described in the vignette. Given that *racial sympathy* is positively related to both punitive and progressive policy opinions, an experimental vignette design could reveal for whom racially sympathetic individuals favor treatment and for whom they favor punishment. This type of design could also further our understanding the nuances of how *racial resentment* and *White nationalism* shape attitudes about punishment, rehabilitation, and redemption.

CONCLUSION

The research presented in this volume has implications for the future of correctional policy and for future criminological research. The following sections describe how the findings

outlined above inform the how the public may respond to the implementation of policies of inclusion and how criminologists can move forward to better understand how individuals think and feel about race, crime, and justice.

Policy Implications

One key finding of this dissertation is that White Americans are turning away from punitive correctional policies that seek to permanently exclude the formerly incarcerated from society and toward progressive policies of inclusion. The public is largely supportive of rehabilitation and is open to policies that move beyond treatment and provide to those who have committed crime a pathway to full citizenship and social inclusion. Policymakers who wish to reform correctional policy in their jurisdiction should take the public's approval of rehabilitation and redemption into account when deciding which reforms they will choose to endorse. This research also shows that racially sympathetic Whites are more likely to believe in redeemability of offenders in general and of Black offenders in particular. Policymakers and criminal justice officials (e.g., prison wardens) may therefore be able to leverage the sympathy that their constituents or practitioners (e.g., corrections officers) feel about the suffering of Black people at the hands of the criminal justice system in order to evoke support for redemption-based policies and practices. The findings of this dissertation suggest that there are fertile grounds for large-scale changes to the criminal justice system that have been proposed by lawmakers and activists alike.

Criminological Implications

Two implications for the future of the criminological enterprise merit attention. First, racial beliefs are integral to our understanding of how the public thinks about crime, "criminals," and criminal justice. Any model of public opinion on correctional policy (and likely on criminal

justice policy more broadly) is misspecified if it does not include a diverse set of racial attitudes. This claim is not entirely novel. Given the numerous studies on the effect of racial resentment on opinions about crime and justice, criminologists apparently understand that racial beliefs matter. However, the findings discussed above demonstrate that racial resentment alone does not comprehensively capture the diversity of racial beliefs, nor does it adequately explain policy opinions. Given that the current study was limited to White respondents, researchers should study the measurement and effects of racial resentment, racial sympathy, and White nationalism among non-Whites. It would be particularly interesting to examine the attitudes of Blacks who score low on the *racial sympathy* scale and of all non-Whites who score high on the *White nationalism* scale. And of course, criminologists should aim to conceptualize other racial attitudes outside of those considered here.

Second, criminologists who are interested in public opinion must move beyond studies that seek to explain punitive attitudes. The present moment may be pivotal in moving away from punishment-oriented crime policy and toward policies that emphasize treatment and that ensure the successful reentry of the formerly incarcerated back into society by allowing for true redemption. Rehabilitation and Redemption are not the absence of punishment, and public support for these goals is not the absence of public punitiveness. We cannot explain the degree to which the public believes in the redeemability of people who have committed crime in general, or of Black people who have committed crime, in particular, by asking about the three standard "punitiveness" indicators. As progressive reforms are proposed and implemented, it is the responsibility of public opinion researchers to assess public support for those reforms.

Final Thoughts

As of the writing of this dissertation, the issue of systemic racism in criminal justice has again burst to the surface of the public consciousness in the United States. On May 25, 2020, in the process of arresting 46-year-old George Floyd under suspicion of using a counterfeit $20 bill at a convenience store, three police officers pinned Floyd to the ground. One of the officers knelt on Floyd's neck for eight minutes and 46 seconds, ignored Floyd pleading for him to stop, and "did not remove his knee even after Mr. Floyd lost consciousness, and for a full minute after paramedics arrived at the scene" (Hill et al., 2020). George Floyd was pronounced dead later at the hospital, and all four officers were fired the next day (Hill et al., 2020). As of June 12, 2020, the officer who knelt on Floyd's neck, causing him to die, has been charged with second-degree murder and manslaughter. The other three officers have been charged with aiding and abetting the murder (Barker, Eligon, Oppel, & Furber, 2020).

For any person paying attention to the protests around the country that have erupted in response to Floyd's death (and the killings of Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, and countless others by police and White vigilantes), it should be apparent that an absence of racial resentment does not adequately explain the current movement (see, e.g., Godfrey, 2020). Images of racial sympathy are everywhere. The protesters across the country and around the globe include thousands of White people, and they are risking personal injury and arrest—not to mention infection by a deadly virus—to denounce the suffering of Black people (Kindy, Jacobs, & Farenthold, 2020). These risks demonstrate something distinct from the absence of prejudice. As scholar and Civil Rights Leader Angela Davis said, "it is not enough to be non-racist, we must be antiracist." (quoted in "Being Antiracist, n.d."; see also Kendi, 2019). Racial sympathy can be thought of as one component of anti-racism.

Once again, people in the United States are thinking and talking about what it means to be Black and what it means to be White in America, with systemic racism in criminal justice being a primary concern. At the same time, the country is facing the coronavirus pandemic; on May 28, 2020, "the number of people in the United States who have died from COVID-19 surpassed 100,000" ("United States Coronavirus," 2020). In efforts to prevent the spread of the virus in correctional institutions, prisons and jails have begun releasing inmates early and enacting policies to reduce the intake of new inmates ("Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic," 2020). Thus, as of this writing, the pandemic and the protests against racial injustice rage on and the effects of both are yet to be known. The outcome of the 2020 election will also likely influence the future of the criminal justice system and efforts toward reforms. As policy makers and criminal justice officials consider how to move forward in this new era, evidence indicates that they will take public opinion into account (Enns, 2016; Pickett, 2019).

The findings of this dissertation show that White Americans largely endorse policies that seek to rehabilitate, redeem, and ensure the social inclusion of people who have committed crime. Of great significance, given the outpouring of racial sympathy at the present moment, is the finding that those who are sympathetic to the suffering of Black people are generally more likely to support progressive reforms and to believe that Black people who have committed crime deserve redemption and the rights of full citizenship. The United States may be at the most consequential turning point in correctional policy since the late 1970s. The data presented here support decades of research demonstrating that racial beliefs are a fulcrum on which public opinion on correctional policy pivots. Understanding the dynamics of racial resentment, racial sympathy, and White nationalism is crucial to determining how the U.S. correctional system, and

the American public more broadly, can move forward to end racial injustice and mass incarceration.

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