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I, Heejin Lee, hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminal Justice.

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Millennials as the Future of Corrections: A Generational Analysis of Public Policy Opinions

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Millennials as the Future of Corrections:
A Generational Analysis of Public Policy Opinions

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ABSTRACT

Recently, the concept of "generation" has received considerable commentary in academic and popular circles. Millennials—ages 24 to 39 on Election Day 2020—have gained particular attention due to the generation's size (more than 75 million), spending power (about $1.3 trillion per year), and growing political influence. Accordingly, a host of studies from disciplines such as business, education, political science, and psychology have investigated the nature and possible distinctiveness of Millennials' beliefs and behaviors. Only limited research, however, has been undertaken exploring the possible effects of generational membership on crime and criminal justice issues. This dissertation seeks to help close this void in the literature.

This omission in the research is consequential considering the impact that Millennials' public opinion might have on the future of the U.S. criminal justice system. Notably, American corrections is in the midst of a historic policy turning point from offender exclusion to offender inclusion. For four decades, the United States was enmeshed in a punitive era during which offenders were removed and/or ostracized from society through exclusionary policies (e.g., mass incarceration, punitive laws, expansion of debilitating collateral sanctions). Beginning around 2010, however, a paradigmatic shift occurred marked by a halt in the growth of prison populations and the spread of inclusionary policies (e.g., prisoner reentry programs, criminal record expungement).

In this context, one way to prognosticate if the current changes are likely to continue into the future is to examine Millennials' views on corrections. If this large generation is supportive of offender inclusion, then its members are likely to be political force favoring progressive policies and reforms as they proceed across their life course. Based on a 2017 opt-in internet

i

panel survey conducted by YouGov ($N = 1,000$), this dissertation assesses the nature of Millennials' correctional policy opinions and compares these to the views of other generations.

The levels of support for 13 correctional policies are reported, and generational differences are estimated through multivariate analyses. Three correctional themes are explored: (1) public support for punitiveness (the death penalty, court harshness, and punishment as the goal of prisons); (2) offender rehabilitation, reentry, and reintegration (restoration of civil rights, fair-chance hiring, reducing collateral sanctions, expungement of criminal records, general attitudes toward expungement, having the FBI review criminal records); and (3) offender redemption (formal redemption rituals, redeemability). As a result, this study presents the most comprehensive assessment of what Millennials think about American corrections.

The main findings of this dissertation are twofold. First, as a generation in and of themselves, Millennials are only modestly punitive but clearly supportive of progressive policies. Millennials favor a rehabilitative correctional orientation, believe in offender redeemability, and prefer policies that reduce exclusion and increase inclusion. Second, generational differences in public support for correctional policies are limited. Regardless of generation, the respondents tend to embrace inclusionary policies. Thus, in the future, Millennials will likely seek to transform the current correctional turning point into a lengthy era of progressive reform—a project that will be similarly endorsed by Americans of all generations.

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As the saying goes, "It takes a village to raise a child"—and I have learned that the same wise saying applies to the process of writing a doctoral dissertation. This dissertation project was undertaken between June 2019, when my son Daniel turned 7 months old, and July 2020, when he was 20 months old. Being a novice to both parenthood and dissertation-writing, I would not have been able to finish this project without the support from the people in my "village." Thus, I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge their encouragement and guidance that meant the world to me while completing the current study.

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My dissertation would not have been possible without the support from other members of my dissertation committee: Dr. J. C. Barnes, Dr. Edward Latessa, and Dr. Cheryl Lero Jonson

iv

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 1

GENERATIONS AND CORRECTIONAL POLICIES

The concept of "generation" refers to a group of people born over a 15- to 20-year span, and its use offers one way to classify and investigate age cohorts (Doherty, Kiley, Tyson, & Jameson, 2015). According to Karl Mannheim (1928/1970), those who belong to the same generation share "a common social location in the social and historical process" and develop "a tendency pointing towards certain definite modes of behavior, feeling, and thought" (p. 381). Born at a similar time and influenced by common historical events and popular culture, individuals in a given generation are expected to share analogous characteristics and attitudes across various social domains. Although the labels and age cutoffs used to distinguish generations vary among scholars, one widely accepted distinction by Pew Research Center classifies individuals into the following generations: Greatest (birthyear: –1927), Silent (1928– 1945), Baby Boomers (1946–1964), Generation X (1965–1980), Millennials (1981–1996), and Generation Z (1997–) (Dimock, 2019; Doherty et al., 2015).

There is a growing interest in generations, especially in Millennials who are aged between 23 and 38 as of 2019 (24 and 39 on Election Day 2020). The focus on Millennials is well-timed because they comprise the majority of youngest adults today. Totaling nearly 80 million individuals and spending $1.3 trillion annually, Millennials are the largest living generation and "the largest generation in world history" (Marous, 2016, para. 1; see also Frey, 2018; United States Census Bureau, 2015). Also referred to as Generation Y, Generation Me, Generation Why, Echo Boomers, and Generation Next, Millennials are known to hold characteristics that differentiate them from other generations (Lancaster & Stillman, 2002; Macky, Gardner, & Forsyth, 2008; Reeves & Oh, 2008; Twenge, 2006).

To be specific, Millennials are distinct from non-Millennial generations in terms of their composition and the external influences to which they have been exposed. Regarding composition, Millennials are racially and ethnically more diverse than previous generations (Levitz, 2019; United States Census Bureau, 2015). It also is alleged that Baby Boomers raised them in a way that nurtures a higher sense of self-esteem and entitlement (DeChane, 2014; Stein, 2013; Twenge, 2006). With regard to external influences, the worldviews of Millennials were potentially affected by historical events such as the release of the World Wide Web (1991), 9/11 attack (2001), Iraq War (2003), the Great Recession (2007), the election of the first African American President (2008), and a series of mass school shootings (Bae & Mowbray, 2019; Bialik & Fry, 2019; Deane, Duggan, & Morin, 2016; Frey, 2018; Jenkins, 2017; "Major events," 2016). Because they have experienced this unique set of events, it is possible that Millennials will share unique personal, social, and political/policy differences that merit investigation.

In fact, Millennials have been a popular research topic in other disciplines such as business, political science, psychology, and sociology (Milkman, 2017; Reeves, 2007; Sanders, 2019; Teagle, Mueller, & Lockshin, 2010; Twenge & Campbell, 2008). However, research is lacking on this generation's perspectives on crime- and criminal justice-related issues (but see, e.g., Anderson, Lytle, & Schwadel, 2017). A salient topic of interest is what opinions Millennials hold regarding the future of corrections. This issue is particularly significant because the United States is at a "correctional turning point" in which "get tough" policies that have resulted in mass incarceration are being called into question and reforms are being proposed (Cullen, Lee, Butler, & Thielo, 2020).

In this context, the current project proposes to undertake a generational analysis to address the following two research questions: (1) Do Millennials differ from older cohorts in

2

their support for correctional policies? (2) If so, how are they different? At issue is whether Millennials embrace less punitive and more progressive policies compared to other generations. Notably, this study provides the first attempt to apply a generational analysis on a range of correctional policies in crime and criminal justice literature. In so doing—by paying attention to generations, especially Millennials—it is possible to predict what policies the public will support in the time ahead—that is, we can gain insight into the *future* of corrections. This prognostication is the purpose of this dissertation.

Chapter 1 sets a context for this analysis. The discussion is divided into four sections. The first section reviews how the concept of generation has been defined and developed focusing on the seminal contributions of Karl Mannheim (1928/1970) and of William Strauss and Neil Howe (1991). These works set the context for contemporary analyses using distinct generational categories. The second section examines how studies have divided the United States' living population into six generations. Each generation falls into a separate age category with an upper and lower boundary. They are hypothesized to be distinguished by a set of characteristics. Given the focus of this dissertation, special consideration is given to the experiences that shape Millennials' history and what previous research has found regarding the characteristics of this generation. The third section summarizes the findings published in a variety of disciplines— ranging from political science, business, psychology, to education—to see if differences exist between Millennials and other age cohorts. Drawing from a host of generational research from other fields, this section speculates why we would—or would not—expect Millennial generation's attitudes toward corrections to differ from other generations.

Finally, the fourth section discusses the implication of studying Millennials' support for correctional policies. The opinions of Millennials matter because the United States is in the

midst of a historic correctional turning point, in which the future of crime-related policies is being determined. As a large generation who will live for decades, Millennials promise to play an integral role in shaping the nation's correctional future. Will they endorse punitive or progressive policies? Will they form a policy consensus with other generations or differ in ways that prove consequential? The research strategy for undertaking the data analysis to address these and related questions will be demarcated in this section.

What Is a Generation? Two Classic Contributions

The term generation is defined as "a group of individuals born and living contemporaneously" ("Generation," n.d.). The etymological origin of generation stems from the Latin generāre, which means "to bring into being." The attention given to generations is hardly new. For example, Socrates (469–399 B.C.) is said to remark on misbehaving youths:

> The children now love luxury; they have bad manners, contempt for authority; they show disrespect for elders and love chatter in place of exercise. Children are now tyrants, not the servants of their households. They no longer rise when elders enter the room. They contradict their parents, chatter before company, gobble up dainties at the table, cross their legs, and tyrannize their teachers.

Do younger generations differ from older generations? The notion of generation straddles the disciplines of sociology, history, and social psychology wherein it serves as a popular topic of discussion (Pilcher, 1994). Of note, there are two dominant works that contributed to the conceptual development of generation: Karl Mannheim's theory of generations and William Strauss and Neil Howe's generation theory (DeChane, 2014). In this section, these perspectives will be introduced to explain why generations might exhibit unique patterns of group personalities, behaviors, and attitudes.

Mannheim's Theory of Generations

In 1928, the German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) published an essay titled *The Problem of Generations*. Considered as "the seminal theoretical treatment of generations as a sociological phenomenon" (Pilcher, 1994, p. 481), this paper was highly acclaimed by subsequent generational studies for systematically advancing the concept of generation (see, e.g., Bengtson, Furlong, & Laufer, 1974; Milkman, 2017; Ryder, 1965; Schuman & Scott, 1989; Simirenko, 1966). In Mannheim's work, generations are theorized as agencies of social change that pass down accumulated cultural heritage across the ebb and flow of history (Pilcher, 1994).

Three Focal Concepts. Three theoretical concepts are central to Mannheim's theory: generation location, generation as actuality, and generation unit. First, generational location refers to the socio-historical location, determined by the biological rhythm of birth and death, that individuals of the same generation share in common. According to Mannheim (1928/1970), due to a similar generational location, generational cohorts experience "the same event and data, etc." and these experiences formulate "a similarly 'stratified' consciousness" (p. 176). Second, generation as actuality means that individuals of the same age are united as actual generation "in so far as they participate in the characteristic social and intellectual currents of their society and period, and in so far as they have an active or passive experience of the interactions of forces, which made up the new situation" (Mannheim, 1928/1970, p. 183). For example, argues Mannheim, no one would assert that young people of China and Germany about 1800 are of the same generation. Third, within the same actual generation, individuals may still experience the same concrete historical problems in different ways and constitute separate generation units. Various generation units ultimately polarize into dominant and opposed units, where dominant

units have a stronger influence on the historical process and opposed units still exert countering forces (Simirenko, 1966).

Forces Shaping Generations. Mannheim argues that social and cultural forces shape the way generations manifest themselves. For one, the effect of biological factors is "reflected through the medium of social and cultural forces" (Mannheim, 1928/1970, p. 192). For another, however, not every generation necessarily develops a distinctive consciousness. Rather, the potential that a generation is likely to develop "collective impulses and formative principles original to itself" depends on "the tempo of social change" (Mannheim, 1928/1970, p. 189). In this way, generations can adapt swiftly in response to major social events. Therefore, to the extent that generations derive from social rather than biological necessity, his theory proposes the overriding influence of social factors over biological factors (Pilcher, 1994).

Equally importantly, Mannheim emphasizes the critical role of experiences during late adolescence and early adulthood (between ages 17 and 25) in shaping lasting perspectives throughout the rest of life. He observes that the inventory of experience absorbed in early youth according to a person's location in the socio-historical structure becomes "the historically oldest stratum of consciousness," which stabilizes as the natural view of the world (Mannheim, 1928/1970, p. 179). Later experiences then receive their meanings from early impressions formulated in youth, an idea that has been extended or empirically tested by later scholars (Fine & Eisenberg, 2002; Jacobson, 2016; Jennings, 1987; Marwell, Aiken, & Demerath, 1987; Pilcher, 1994; Schuman & Scott, 1989; Whittier, 1997; but see Barnes, 1972; Holsti & Rosenau, 1980; Weil, 1987).

For example, using a probability sample of 1,410 Americans, Schuman and Scott (1989) show that individuals tend to rate events and changes in their youth as more important. They

assert that this critical period ranges from late adolescence to early adulthood because of (1) low salience of events that occurred prior to intellectual maturity, (2) openness to events and influences from outside the home and neighborhood, (3) the importance of the first political and social events on shaping later views. They further coin a term "generational imprinting," which describes how "differences in generational perspectives on the 'same' event can be seen to be a consequences of varying locations in historical time" (Schuman & Scott, 1989, p. 378).

Strauss and Howe's Generational Theory

If Mannheim refined the sociological concept of generation, William Strauss and Neil Howe are credited with defining the generation categories that are now used in virtually all contemporary analyses, including this dissertation. In *Generations: The History of America's Future, 1584–2069* (Strauss & Howe, 1991), they break American history into five repeating cycles comprising of 18 generations. Relevant to the current project are six living generations: G.I. (birth years: 1901–1924), Silent (1925–1942), Boom (1943–1960), Thirteenth (1961–1981), and Millennial (1982–2003).

Defining Generation. Strauss and Howe define generation as "a cohort-group whose length approximates the span of a phase of life and whose boundaries are fixed by peer personality" (p. 60). Their position concurs with Mannheim's (1928/1970) that a generation is originally shaped by its "age location" or the "age-determined participation in epochal events that occur during its lifecycle" (p. 32). However, their definition of generation includes two other elements that are not highlighted in Mannheim's framework: the length of a generational cohort-group and its peer personality.

First, the Strauss-Howe generational theory contends that the length of a generation closely matches that of the life phase—a stage of life determined by a major social role and

7

spans about 22 years (e.g., youth, adulthood, midlife, elderhood). Depending on what major role

a person assumes, each age group is differently affected by a decisive social event. For example,

Strauss and Howe (1991) propose that every society recognizes "a discrete coming-of-age

moment," "a midlife transition," and "an age of declining physiological potential" (p. 61).

Across life stages, the central role of an individual changes in this sequence: dependence (youth:

ages 0 to 21), activity (rising adulthood: ages 22 to 43), leadership (ages 44 to 65), and

stewardship (ages 66 to 87). Second, Strauss and Howe (1991) theorize that individuals in the

same generation share a "peer personality," which is "a generational persona recognized and

determined by (1) common age location; (2) common beliefs and behaviors; and (3) perceived

membership in a common generation" (p. 64). They posit that peer personality, once developed,

"expresses itself throughout a generation's lifecycle trajectory" as "a set of collective behavioral

traits and attitudes" (p. 32).

     Generational Cycles. Strauss and Howe (1991) also depart from Mannheim in proposing

that generations, in terms of their unique peer personalities, come in cycles. They observe that

such repeating patterns are produced by an interaction between the generation and the history.

Central to the generation-history interaction are "social moments," brief eras when "people

perceive that historic events are altering their social environment" (p. 430). Based on a review of

American history since pre-Colonial period, they find that social moments alternate between

"secular crises," a moment when society reorders social institutions, and "spiritual awakenings,"

a moment when society changes individual values and private behavior (p. 430). Such critical

events arrive every 40–45 years (two phases of life), during which recurring patterns of

generations correspond with recurring types of social moments (awakening, inner-driven, crisis,

outer-driven). That is, the lineup of living generations ordered by the phase of life ("generational constellation") appears the same on every secular crisis or spiritual awakening.

Generations and Genealogy. Another distinction of Strauss and Howe's work is that they relate generations to family genealogy. They do so in order to emphasize the nurturing influence of the parenting generation on succeeding generation. As they note, "a generation's parents (or children) are distributed over the two preceding (or two succeeding) generations," and a generation's early birth cohorts are likely to have an earlier parent generation than late birth cohorts (Strauss & Howe, 1991, p. 62). In addition, they observe that "between any two parenting generations, the one in midlife naturally exercises a greater cultural and institutional influence than the one in rising adulthood" (p. 63). The nurturing style is also influenced by the societal mood because the adult control needs to increase during the crisis era and not much so during the awakening era. Taken altogether, it is assumed that peer personality of the midlife parental generation, in combination with the shifting mood of the constellation era, affects childhood nurture, which in turn shapes peer personality of the youths.

Personality Patterns. As for recurring personality patterns, Strauss and Howe (1991) propose that there are four types of generations grouped by peer personalities that have followed each other in a fixed order: Idealists, Reactives, Civics, and Adaptives. First, Idealists are raised by Civic (and Adaptive) parents whose nurturing style tends to be relaxing. Coming of age during an awakening era, most Idealists are attracted to spiritual self-discovery, and they have a narrow distinction between acceptable sex roles. In midlife, Idealist parents nurture (Reactive and) Civic children in a tightening manner, the one opposite to what they were subject to, and feel a growing pessimism about worldly affairs. Idealists enter elderhood during a crisis era, preoccupied with moral principles. Second, Reactives are raised by Adaptive (and Idealist)

parents in an under-protected nurturing style. They reach adulthood during an inner-driven era, displaying the strongest desire for early independence and adventure and being the most risk-prone among generations. Midlife Reactives raise (Civic and) Adaptive children in an over-protected manner, the opposite to the manner in which they were brought up, and at this phase of life, they tire from early bingeing and slow down. Reactives become elders during an outer-driven era and they typically live least comfortably relative to younger generations.

Third, Civics are parented by Idealists (and Reactives) in a tightening nurturing style. Becoming adults during a crisis era, most Civics are attracted to teamwork and widen the distinction between acceptable sex roles. In midlife, Civic parents nurture (Adaptive and) Idealist children in a relaxing style, in contrast to how they were treated. Midlife Civics also feel a growing optimism about worldly affairs. Elder Civics go through an awakening era and are preoccupied with secular achievement. Last, Adaptive generation is reared by Reactive (and Civic) parents in an over-protected manner. Adaptive adults mature during an outer-driven era, display the weakest desire for early independence and adventure, and are the most risk-averse. Reaching midlife, Adaptives nurture (Idealist and) Reactive children in an under-protected style, contrary to how they were nurtured. Adaptives in midlife also break from earlier conformity and speed up. Entering elderhood during an inner-driven era, old Adaptives typically live most comfortably relative to younger generations.

Defining American Generations. According to Strauss and Howe (1991), there are six generations currently in existence in the United States: G.I. (birth years: 1901–1924, personality type: Civic), Silent (1925–1942, Adaptive), Boom (1943–1960, Idealist), Thirteenth (1961–1981, Reactive), and Millennial (1982–2003, Civic) (p. 428). Again, although the specific labels may differ in other studies (see, e.g., Dimock, 2019), Strauss-Howe's typology has implications in the

10

conceptual development of generation for more clearly refining the generational length and characteristics.

Why Are Generations Expected to Be Distinct?

The two main works in generational framework suggest that generations might have different behavioral traits and attitudes toward various social issues because of shared experiences determined by their life cycle and age location in the history, worldviews substantially affected by historical events during emerging adulthood, dominant nurturing styles favored by parental generations, and different role expectations based on life stages. Importantly, applying the concept of "generational imprinting" to the current study, it is plausible that Millennials, aged 23 to 38, might have gone through the key period where they developed social and political outlooks that will continuously influence their positions on social issues. Thus, the section that follows discusses how studies since the 1990s have employed different age boundaries to define generations following Strauss and Howe's work, the nature of the commonly known characteristics of living generations, and how Millennials can be compared to non-Millennials.

Generations in America: Age Categories and Social Experiences

Age Boundaries

Since the publication of Strauss and Howe's (1991) work, generation studies have diverged with regard to how they demarcate the age boundaries of generations and label each generation group. Except for Baby Boomers whose name and age boundary reflect a substantial rise in birth rates (baby boom) after the World War II (Colby & Ortman, 2014; Hogan, Perez, & Bell, 2008), there is no standard to define generational cut-offs. Defining generational

boundaries is not a science, but they are not demarcated arbitrarily (Dimock, 2019; Twenge, 2017). Scholars have relied on historical events or social changes to differentiate between generations. For example, Pew Research Center (2019) set the year 1996 as "a meaningful cutoff between Millennials and Gen Z" based on "key political, economic and social factors that define the Millennial generation's formative years" (para. 8). Twenge (2017) uses the year 1995 as the first year to define iGen because the Internet was born in that year. Nevertheless, it is difficult to adjudicate which typology is the most accurate or reliable although these typologies generally include similar birth cohorts with several years' differences.

Among others, in 2006, Thomas C. Reeves and Eunjung Oh conducted a literature review on generational differences in the workforce commissioned by the U.S. Department of Labor and UPS and developed a table in which they compared various labels and chronological schemes reported in different sources (Reeves, 2007; Reeves & Oh, 2008). Table 1.1 below builds from Reeves and Oh's table and includes more recent studies that appeared following their review. As seen in Table 1.1, post-2010 studies seem to manifest a consensus on the labels of Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials as these names are widely used among the public and in popular culture. As for the youngest generation cohort, Generation Z is currently the most popular name although the trend might change in the future and give this generation a more unique title as they grow older (see, e.g., Twenge, 2017). For analytic purposes, this study will take generational labels and boundaries that are currently used by Pew Research Center considering their active engagement in studying generational differences since the 1990s—and the Millennial generation since the early 2000s—as attested by around 300 publications including more than 170 reports (see, e.g., Dimock, 2019; Pew Research Center, 2007, 2015b, 2018a; Taylor & Keeter, 2010).

Table 1.1. *Generational Categories Used in Prior Literature (Oldest to Newest)*

Source	Labels				
Strauss & Howe (1991)[†]	G.I. Generation 1901–1924	Silent Generation 1925–1942	Boom Generation 1943–1960	13th Generation 1961–1981	Millennial Generation 1982–	-
Tapscott (1998)[†]	-	-	Baby Boom Generation 1946–1964	Generation X 1965–1975	Digital generation 1976–2000	-
Zemke, Raines, & Filipczak (2000)[†]	-	Veterans 1922–1943	Baby Boomers 1943–1960	Gen-Xers 1960–1980	Nexters 1980–1999	-
Lancaster & Stillman (2002)[†]	-	Traditionalists 1900–1945	Baby Boomers 1946–1964	Generation Xers 1965–1980	Millennial generation; Echo Boomers; Generation Y; Baby Busters; Generation Next 1981–1999	-
Martin & Tulgan (2002)[†]	-	Silent Generation 1925–1942	Baby Boomers 1946–1964	Generation X 1965–1977	Millennials 1978–2000	-
Oblinger & Oblinger (2005)[†]	-	Matures 1900–1946	Baby Boomers 1946–1964	Generation X 1965–1982	Net Generation 1982–1991	
Twenge (2006)	-	-	Baby Boomers 1943–1960	Generation X 1961–1981	Millennials 1982–1999	-
Reeves & Oh (2008)[†]	-	Mature Generation 1924–1945	Boom Generation 1946–1964	Generation X 1965–1980	Millennial Generation 1981–2000	Generation Z 2001–
Tapscott (2008)[†]	-		Baby Boomers 1946–1964	Generation X 1965–1976	Net Generation 1977–1997	Generation Next 1998–

Table 1.1. *Generational Categories Used in Prior Literature (Oldest to Newest) (Continued)*

Source	Labels					
Deloitte Millennial Survey (since 2010)	-	-	-	-	Millennial 1983–1994	Gen Z 1995–1999
Pew Research Center (e.g., Dimock, 2019)	Greatest –1927	Silent 1928–1945	Baby Boomer 1946–1964	Generation X 1965–1980	Millennial 1981–1996	Generation Z 1997–2012
Twenge, Carter, & Campbell (2015)	Greatest 1900–1924	Silent 1925–1945	Boomers 1946–1964	GenX 1965–1981	Millennials 1982–1999	
Grubb (2016)			Baby Boomer 1946–1964	Generation Xer 1965–1980	Millennial 1981–1997	Generation Z 1998–
Anderson et al. (2017)	Lost and Greatest –1925	Silent 1925–1944	Baby Boom 1945–1965	Generation X 1966–		
Twenge (2017)	-	-	Boomers 1946–1964	Gen X 1965–1979	Millennial 1980–1994	iGen 1995–2012
Fisher (2018)	Greatest 1910–1927	Silent 1928–1945	Baby Boomer 1946–1964	Generation X 1965–1980	Millennial 1981–	

[†] These sources are originally adopted from Reeves and Oh (2008).

Characteristics of Generations: Beyond Millennials

In 2018, Pew Research Center established a cutoff between Millennials and the next generation (Dimock, 2019). In doing so, they clarified the age boundaries of current living generations: The Greatest (born before 1928), the Silent (born between 1928–1945), Baby Boomers (born between 1946–1964), Generation X (born between 1965–1980), Millennials (born between 1981–1996), and Generation Z (born between 1997–2012). Note that Pew Research Center has not yet set a chronological endpoint for Generation Z and tentatively uses the birthyear 2012 for analyses (Dimock, 2019). In this section, the characteristics of generations that come either before or after Millennials will be discussed to contextualize how the Millennial generation might be distinguished from other generation groups.

Greatest (Those Born Before 1928). The name Greatest generation was popularized by Tom Brokaw's book *The Greatest Generation* (1998). Accoladed as "the greatest generation" by Brokaw and as those who "saved the world" by Ronald Reagan, this generation fought and won World War II (1939–1945) despite the challenge of being raised during the deprivation of the Great Depression (1923–1933) (Taylor & Keeter, 2010; Pew Research Center, 2015b). Individuals in the Greatest generation are the children of the "Lost generation" (those who grew up or came of age during World War I) and the parents of the "Baby Boomers" (Kagan, 2019). They are described as heroic and patriotic (Strauss & Howe, 1991). Their memories of the Great Depression and World War II led them to have a stronger faith in the government activism and support for Democratic Party (Fisher, 2018).

Now that most of the Greatest generation have retired and consist of only 2% of the U.S. population, this generation is not much of a focus in research because of a small sample size

(Pew Research Center, 2015b, 2019). In analyses, it is often grouped with the succeeding Silent generation (Taylor & Keeter, 2010).

Silent (Those Born Between 1928 and 1945). Those born between 1928 and 1945 are referred to as the Silent generation, and this label represents their conformist and civic personalities (Taylor & Keeter, 2010). The two major historical events that impacted the Greatest generation—the Great Depression and World War II—also had a great influence on the Silent. For this reason, some studies group the Greatest and the Silent into a single generational category (see, e.g., Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005; Tolbize, 2008). The majority of the Silent generation are the parents of the Generation X. Members of this generation are depicted as having the following characteristics: (1) conservative, averse to risk, making decisions based on what worked in the past (Kersten, 2002; Niemiec, 2000; Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005); (2) liking formality and social order, disciplined, having respect for authority, displaying command-and-control leadership reminiscent of military operations (Kersten, 2002; Tolbize, 2008; Zemke et el., 2000); (3) loyal workers who have a sense of obligation and believe in paying their duties (Jenkins, 2019; Niemiec, 2000; Tolbize, 2008); (4) committed to teamwork and having a high regard for developing communication skills (Jenkins, 2019); (5) the most affluent generation owing to the tendency to save and observe fiscal restraint (Jenkins, 2019; Niemiec, 2000); (6) uncomfortable with ambiguity, change, and conflict (Zemke et al., 2000).

Baby Boomers (Those Born Between 1946 and 1964). The Baby Boom generation (or Baby Boomers) has "a demography-driven name" drawn from "the great spike in fertility that began in 1946, right after the end of World War II, and ended almost as abruptly in 1964, around the time the birth control pill went on the market" (Taylor & Keeter, 2010, p. 4). During this period, extra 17 million babies were born compared to previous generations (O'Bannon, 2001).

16

Because of this population bulge, Baby Boomers are also metaphorized as the pig in the python (Callanan & Greenhaus, 2008; Marston, 2011). The Baby Boom generation was once believed to have the largest impact on the U.S. society because of its enormous size (roughly 78 million) and the historical turmoil during its coming-of-age period (Tolbize, 2008). During their formative years, Baby Boomers were shaped by a series of political events including the civil rights movement, Kennedy and King assassinations (1963 and 1968), Vietnam War (1955–1975), and Watergate scandal (1972) (Tolbize, 2008). In addition, they witnessed and partook in liberal or radical social changes such as the first landing on the moon (1969), Woodstock, and the freewheeling of the 1960s (Schuman & Scott, 1989; Strauss & Howe, 1991).

Commonly cited characteristics of Baby Boomers include: (1) liberal (Niemiec, 2000); (2) lacking trust against authority figures (Jenkins, 2019; Tolbize, 2008); (3) having a sense of financial security and optimism owing to growing up in an era of prosperity and experiencing rapidly expanding economic circumstances (Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005; Yang & Guy, 2006); (4) spendthrift yet having to work longer as their retirement savings were decimated because of the fall of the dot.com marketplace (Jenkins, 2019; Niemiec, 2000); (5) feeling entitled and that they are a special generation (Jenkins, 2019; Niemiec, 2000; Yang & Guy, 2006); (6) workaholic, competitive, and equating work with self-worth and personal fulfillment, liking teamwork and collaboration, more process-oriented than result-oriented (Jenkins, 2019; Kersten, 2002; Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005; Yang & Guy, 2006; Zemke et al., 2000); (7) favoring a top-down approach but also flexible corporate culture (e.g., casual dress codes and flexible schedules) (Kersten, 2002); (8) good at relationships and conflict-avoidant (Kersten, 2002; Zemke et el., 2000).

Generation X (Those Born between 1965 and 1980). Generation X (or Gen Xers) refers to those who came of age at the end of the 20ᵗʰ century and the label became popular with the publication of Douglas Coupland's book *Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture* in 1991 (Taylor & Keeter, 2010; Tolbize, 2008). The first name affixed to this generation was the Baby Bust, which derives from its small population size (roughly 65 million) relative to the preceding Baby Boom generation (around 75 million) (Taylor & Keeter, 2010; Tolbize, 2008).

While growing up, Generation X were shaped by a period of "financial, familial, and societal insecurity" (Tolbize, 2008, p. 3). Financially, they experienced the 1980s flat economy characterized by a stagnant job market, corporate downsizing, and limited income mobility (Niemiec, 2000; Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005; Tolbize, 2008; Yang & Guy, 2006). Indeed, Gen Xers are the first individuals who were predicted to earn less than their parents (Tolbize, 2008). In addition, Generation X were brought up as "latchkey kids" in homes where both parents worked or in single-parent households because of high divorce rates (Bova & Kroth, 2001; Karp, Fuller, & Sirias, 2002; Kersten, 2002; Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005). Even socially, this generation went through a rapidly changing era with the development of technology and the decline of American global power—as exemplified by the release of Microsoft Windows 1.0 (1985) and the Iran hostage crisis (1979–1981) (Tolbize, 2008; Tulgan, 1997; Yang & Guy, 2006).

Influenced by the economic recession and worldwide competition, members of Generation X tend to be skeptical of society's organizations and institutions (Kersten, 2002; Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005). Having seen many of their Baby Boomer parents laid off regardless of how much they gave up for their careers, Gen Xers are highly individualistic workers who are not overly loyal to their employers (Adams, 2000; Bova & Kroth, 2001).

Instead, they aspire a balance between work and life and have strong loyalty toward family and friends (Jenkins, 2017; Karp et al., 2002; Niemiec, 2000). Growing up as latchkey kids affixed them independent and autonomous personalities (Jenkins, 2017; Zemke et al., 2000). Due to insecure employment, they are adaptable to change, prefer flexible schedules, and value continuing skill development (Bova & Kroth, 2001; Jenkins, 2019; Joyner, 2000; Zemke et al., 2000). Because of what Kersten (2002) calls a culture of instant results (e.g., remote controls, the internet), Gen Xers are also depicted as technologically savvy, result-oriented, and preferring to receive instant feedback (Crampton & Hodge, 2006; Niemiec, 2000; O'Bannon, 2001; Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005; Tolbize, 2008; Zemke et al., 2000).

Generation Z (Those Born Between 1997 and 2012). Generation Z is a name of a birth cohort that succeeds Millennials or Generation Y. Other names of this group include iGen (Twenge, 2017) or Post-Millennials (Kilgore, 2018). However, according to Google Trends, Generation Z is most widely accepted in people's searches for information (Dimock, 2019) as well as in literature (see, e.g., Barr, 2019; Bote, 2019; Levin, 2019; Loehr, 2017; Törőcsik, Szűcs, & Kehl, 2014; Zhitomirsky-Geffet & Blau, 2016). Gen Zers are affected by a series of school shootings such as the ones at Sandy Hook Elementary School (Newtown, CT) in 2012 and Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (Parkland, FL) in 2018. They also witnessed the election of President Donald Trump and the protests and controversy this has sparked.

Regarding known characteristics of Generation Z, the most important contrast between them and previous generations is that Gen Zers more often interact with one another digitally. For them, the use of smartphone and apps has been a fact of life since birth (Sulleyman, 2017; Twenge, 2017). In other words, they have never known a world without the internet. Generation Z are more concerned about safety—both physical and emotional—and make less risky choices

19

such as engaging in sexual activities (Twenge, 2017). They also grow up slowly, meaning that it takes them longer to relinquish parental supervision and support and to embrace the responsibilities of adulthood (Bote, 2019; Twenge, 2017).

Studies also find that this generation is more likely to report poor mental health such as anxiety and depression—especially female Gen Zers—and to seek help (American Psychological Association [APA], 2018; Geiger & Davis, 2019; Wasserman, 2019). For example, a report by APA (2018) reveals that about 91% of Gen Zers between ages 18 and 21 "experienced at least one physical or emotional symptom due to stress in the past month compared to 74% of adults overall" (p. 4). In particular, Gen Zers are stressed about mass shootings and the possibility of a school shooting at their school, the separation and deportation of immigrant and migrant families, and widespread sexual harassment and assault reports in the news (APA, 2018).

As for politics, a strong majority of this group (about two thirds of those ages between 18 and 29) favor stricter gun laws such as a ban on assault weapons ("Harvard IOP Youth Poll," 2019). Regardless of political affiliation, this generation is known to shift toward the left. However, despite a well-publicized image of Generation Z leading political and social activism such as the March for Our Lives (Lopez, 2018; Mejia, 2018; Murdock & Boboltz, 2018) and the climate change movement (Campion, 2019; Engelfried, 2020), Generation Z is the least likely to vote (APA, 2018). They are also characterized as irreligious (Twenge, 2017) and particularly resentful toward Baby Boomers for not taking action on pressing social issues and for generalizing younger generations as Peter Pans, who refuse to grow up and want to remain perpetual adolescents (Bote, 2019).

Who Are the Millennials?

    Name. Millennials include those who were born between 1981 and 1996. The name Millennial first appeared in Strauss and Howe's (1991) *Generations: The History of America's Future, 1584 to 2069*. The name was originated because this age group was "the first generation to come of age in the new millennium" (Taylor & Keeter, 2010, p. 4). As demonstrated in Table 1.1, this generation has other names such as Digital Generation (Tapscott, 1998); Nexters (Zemke et al., 2000); Echo Boomers, Generation Y, Baby Busters (Lancaster & Stillman, 2002); Net Generation (Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005; Tapscott, 2008); and Generation Me (Twenge, 2006). However, as attested by Google Trend, both scholarly and public interests most often have used the title Millennial.

    Demographics. Millennials are more racially and ethnically diverse than previous generations (Bialik & Fry, 2019; Frey, 2018; Jones, Cox, & Banchoff, 2012). According to a report by William Frey (2018), the racial makeup of Millennials, whom he defined as those born between 1981 and 1997, includes 55.8% Whites and nearly 30% new minorities (Hispanics, Asians, and two or more races). In comparison, the proportion of young adults who were White was 63% in 2000 and 78% in 1980. With the influx of immigration—especially from Latin America and Asia—and the aging of the White population, the Millennial generation is considered "a bridge between a whiter, older America and the more multihued country of the future" (Frey, 2018, p. 41).

    Major Historical Events. Millennials went through several historical, economic, social events, and notable experiences include the September 11 terrorist attacks, the internet explosion, and the 2008 economic recession. First, the Millennial generation was ages 5 to 20 when they witnessed a series of attacks by the Islamic terrorist al-Queda on the morning of Tuesday,

September 11 in 2001. The vivid image of two hijacked airplanes crashing into the North and South towers of the World Trade Center in Manhattan, NY, is imprinted in this generation's collective memories. Following the attacks, President George W. Bush announced the War on Terror and began the Afghanistan War in 2001 and the Iraq War in 2003. In other words, Millennials were raised during an era of global terror threats (Jenkins, 2019).

Second, this generation group was also shaped by the unprecedented revolution in technology, one of which was the dissemination of personal computers and the internet (Frey, 2018; Jenkins, 2019; Niemiec, 2000). They literally grew up in tandem with the development of personal computers, cell phones, and the internet. For example, IBM's first personal computer was introduced in 1981, the same year when the first birth cohort of Millennials was born. The first iPhone was released in 2007, when Millennials were ages between 11 and 26. Social media emerged and gained popularity in the 2000s and 2010s, as evidenced by the launch of Facebook (2004), Twitter (2006), Instagram (2010), and Snapchat (2011). That is, for most Millennials, such devices and online connectivity were not readily available when they were born. It was also common for the Millennial generation to take computer lessons at school, meaning that a new technology was something that they had to learn or adapt to. In this sense, Millennials are referred to as "digital explorers," which contrast with Generation Z being called true "digital natives," because they were surrounded by the swamp of information on the internet since birth.

Third, another major event that profoundly affected Millennials was the economic recession in 2008, which was followed by a housing market crash in subsequent years. The age of Millennials spanned from 12 to 27 when they witnessed these economic crises. The entry into careers by Millennials—especially its older members—was set back by the recession (Taylor & Keeter, 2010). Because of economic hardships, this generation is more likely to delay marriage,

buying a house, or having a child, all of which are deemed traditional signs of adulthood (Bialik & Fry, 2019; Frey, 2018). In addition, they often return home to live with parents after college and struggle to pay off student loans (Drake, 2014). For this reason, the Millennial generation obtained nicknames such as twixters or perma-children (Stein, 2013). If they secure employment, Millennials are more likely to switch jobs than other generations, a reason why Gallup called them the "job-hopping generation" (Adkins, 2016; but see Fry, 2017a). Millennials are also better educated compared to previous generations, and one explanation is that they are pressured to pursue higher education degrees because of a high competition on the job market (Bialik & Fry, 2019; Frey, 2018; Jenkins, 2019).

Other notable events in the history of Millennials might include the 2008 election of President Obama, the first African American President in the U.S. history, and a series of mass school shootings. Regarding the former, Millennials were an electorate group that provided the strongest support for Obama (Jones et al., 2012; Pew Research Center, 2014; Taylor & Keeter, 2010). On the latter, this generation was shaped by the threats of mass school shootings such as Columbine High School massacre (1999) and Virginia Tech shooting (2007).

Attributes. Millennials are regarded as the first global-centric generation because of the rapid growth in the internet and an increase in global terrorism (Jenkins, 2019). Keeping up with the development of technology makes them tech-savvy and resilient in navigating change (Frey, 2018; Jenkins, 2019). In terms of their composition, as previously discussed, the Millennial generation includes more diverse origins of race, ethnicity, and nationality. Thus, members of this generation are likely to hold more global attitudes than older generations—such as speaking a language other than English at home or having interracial marriages—and to appreciate diversity and inclusion (Frey, 2018; Jenkins, 2019).

Raised mostly by younger Baby Boomers and older Gen Xers, Millennials were parented to have higher levels of self-esteem and entitlement (DeChane, 2014; Stein, 2013; Twenge, 2006). For example, Millennials were born into a culture that was favorable to children (e.g., pro-kid television shows and movies, children's magazine, proliferation of toys). Such a culture also treated each individual as unique and special since birth. At school, Millennial students received education to boost self-esteem. In this view, they allegedly benefited from inflated grades and trophies while being sheltered from failures. Another oft-cited characteristic of Millennials is that they tend to be idealistic and optimistic about the future, in part because they were influenced by Boomer parents of similar personalities and because they experienced economic prosperity during early childhood (Frey, 2018; Kersten, 2002; Niemiec, 2000; Pew Research Center, 2007; Strauss & Howe, 1991; Twenge, 2006).

In the workplace, Millennials are known to be team-centric or collaborative because much of their lives were programmed with sports, music, and recreational activities while growing up (Jenkins, 2019; Kersten, 2002). In addition, this generation modeled their parents' (mostly Baby Boomers') willingness to work hard and focus on achievement (Howe & Strauss, 2000; Jenkins, 2019). Kersten (2002) points out that being optimistic and collaborative are two characteristics that distinguish Millennials and Gen Xers. Yet, similar to Gen Xers, Millennials also prefer a work/life balance (Kersten, 2002). A study by Lancaster and Stillman (2002) shows that Millennials make 74% of their families' leisure decisions. Regarding religion, the Millennial generation is less religious than other generations although there is variation among racial groups (Alper, 2015; Diamant & Mohamed, 2018; Taylor & Keeter, 2010). In politics, members of this generation are most likely to self-identify as liberals and indeed were among the strongest supporters of Obama in 2008 (Taylor & Keeter, 2010).

Thus, these considerations suggest that, compared to other generations, Millennials have had different social experiences and have different attributes (for a summary, see Table 1.2). Furthermore, some literature argues that differences might exist between old Millennials and young Millennials because of the timing when they were affected by major historical events in their courses of lives (Agnello-Dean, 2017; Neal, 2017; Singal, 2017). For example, Singal (2017) uses the birthyear 1989 to demarcate old Millennials and young Millennials. This divide is because the older subgroup (those who were born between 1989) were young adults when two epochal events—the financial collapse of 2008 and the rise of smartphones—occurred, whereas the younger subgroup (those born in 1989 or later) were mostly early adolescents. Neal (2017) discusses nine differences between older Millennials and younger Millennials such as the level of parental supervision in childhood, streaming, online dating, and even travel restrictions. Thus, it is plausible that there might be intra-generation variation among Millennials with regard to their perspectives on social issues.

Are Millennials Different?

Generational analysis examines "the variations within, as well as between, age groups" and explores "the social and psychological implications of such distinctions for the continuity of current social structure" (Bengtson et al., 1974, p. 2). The following sections will review what generational differences or the Millennial impacts have been found in other disciplines such as political science, business, psychology, and education. The methodology and findings from this line of research are expected to inform the current project in examining whether Millennials are distinct in their attitudes toward correctional policies and, if so, how.

Table 1.2. *Characteristics of Generations*

	Greatest	Silent	Boomers	Gen Xers	Gen Zers	Millennials
Experiences	Great Depression, World War II	Great Depression, World War II	Vietnam War, Woodstock, economic prosperity	Economic recession in the 1980s, latchkey kids, declining American power, Gulf War, fall of the Berlin Wall /end of Cold War, computer revolution, advent of MTV	School shootings, election of Donald Trump, social media, being in an "always on" technological environment	9/11 attack, war on terror, election of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the 2008 economic crisis, internet explosion, gay marriage
Attributes	heroic, patriotic, having a strong faith in the government activism, Democrat	conformist, civic, conservative, risk-aversive, liking formality, having respect for authority, loyal, having a tendency to save, disliking change	liberal, distrust against authority, optimistic, entitled, feeling special, workaholic, process-oriented, conflict-avoidant	skeptical, work/life balance, independent, self-reliant, adaptive, flexible, tech-savvy, result-oriented	tech-savvy, having online interaction, safety-concerned, growing up slowly, left-leaning, resentful toward Baby Boomers	tech-savvy, growing up slowly, optimistic, idealistic, hardworking, collaborative, achievement-oriented, work/life balance, less religious, liberal

26

Political Science

As mentioned previously, Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, DC, has actively provided information on generational differences on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends—with a focus on Millennials (for a compilation of reports, see "Millennials," n.d.). A typical methodology used by Pew Research Center is a telephone interview conducted with a national sample of U.S. adults ("Our Survey Methodology," n.d.). Pew Research Center creates a random digit sample of both landline (approximately 25%) and cellphone numbers (75%) in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia. To account for sampling error, the sample is then weighted using population parameters (e.g., gender, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, population density, region) drawn from probability samples (e.g., American Community Survey) and the Decennial Census.

To date, Pew Research Center has published on topics including (1) political party affiliation, (2) voting participation, (3) views on national identity and the typical American, (4) patriotism and service in the army, (5) attitudes toward social institutions and social trust, (6) environmental and energy issues, and (7) views on a range of social issues such as same-sex marriage, interracial marriage, marijuana legalization, immigration reform, and an activist government.

First, in terms of political party affiliation, it is well documented that Millennials are more Democratic than older generations (Kiley & Dimock, 2014; Maniam & Smith, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2014). For example, in a 2016 survey, Pew Research Center reported that 27% of Millennials identified themselves as liberal Democrats or Democratic-leaning independents compared to 21% of Gen Xers, 17% of Baby Boomers, and 15% of Silents. In contrast, 36% of Silents and 31% of Boomers identified themselves as conservative Republicans or Republican

leaners, whereas 23% of Gen Xers and 17% of Millennials belonged to Republican groups (Maniam & Smith, 2017). Moreover, the same study observed a growing generational gap in American politics. That is, during the past two decades, the share of liberal Democrats has risen among Millennials and Gen Xers, whereas the share of conservative Republicans has risen among Boomers and Silents (Maniam & Smith, 2017).

Second, Millennials are increasingly casting votes in elections. During the 2016 presidential election, the three youngest generations (Gen Zers, Millennials, and Gen Xers) outvoted Boomers and older generations for the first time by casting 69.6 million votes versus 67.9 million votes (Fry, 2017b). And the same pattern continued in the 2018 midterm elections where the three younger generations cast 62.2 million votes, compared with 60.1 million votes cast by older generations (Cilluffo & Fry, 2019). Notably, Millennial turnout almost doubled from 2014 to 2018. According to Fry (2017b), "the ascendance of the Millennial vote is noteworthy because Millennials are more likely to be self-described independents, but they also are more Democratic than older generations in their political preferences" (para. 6).

Third, regarding their outlooks on national identity, Millennials take a far more inclusive view of national identity than older generations (Stokes, 2017). When asked about important factors to determine national identity, a smaller proportion (21%) of 18- to 34-years-old Americans say birthplace is very important to nationality compared to 31% of 35- to 49-years-olds and 40% of those ages 50 and older. Americans ages 18 to 34 are also less likely to believe in the importance of sharing national customs and traditions to national identity than those ages 50 and older (28% vs. 55%). In addition, only 18% of younger Americans (ages between 18 and 34) link national identity to being Christian whereas more than a half (65%) of older American (ages 50 and older) consider that being Christian is very important to be a true national.

Pertinent to their views of the typical American, Millennials are more likely to hold negative views with more than a half (63%) describing the typical American as lazy (Smith, 2015).

Fourth, Millennials are much less inclined to identify themselves as patriotic. Pew Research Center (2014) demonstrates that about a half (49%) of Millennials say the phrase "a patriotic person" applies to them well, which is substantially lower than Gen Xers (64%), Boomers (75%) and Silents (81%). This finding is consistent with less volunteerism among Millennials to serve in the army (Pew Research Center, 2014).

Fifth, Millennials generally hold more positive attitudes toward key social institutions (Fingerhut, 2016), an evidence that might be related to their high levels of optimism. Fingerhut (2016) analyzes generational ratings of various social institutions between 2010 and 2015. The findings indicate that Millennials have more positive views than their elders about most social institutions such as banks, large corporations, labor unions, and small businesses, but not churches and news media. Compared to previous generations, Millennials are less likely to say religious organizations have a positive impact on the country, consistent with other evidence supporting their decreased levels of religiosity (also see Drake, 2014; Pew Research Center, 2014). Millennials' evaluations of the national news media are on par with older generations. In contrast to positive perspectives on social institutions, Millennials have relatively lower levels of social trust than older generations (Pew Research Center, 2014). In a 2014 survey, 19% of Millennials reported that "most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people," significantly less than 31% of Gen Xers, 37% of Silents, and 40% of Boomers.

Sixth, as for environmentalism, Millennial and Gen Z Republicans take a more active stance than their elders in the GOP on environmental and energy issues (Funk & Hefferon, 2019). About a third (34%) of younger Republicans attribute climate change to human activity,

more than twice the share of older Republicans (14%). Compared to older generations, younger Republicans are more likely to report that they see effects of global climate change in the communities (47% vs. 32%), criticize that federal government is doing little to protect air quality (55% vs. 34%) or water quality (57% vs. 45%), and support the development of alternative energy (78% vs. 53%) and policies aimed at reducing the effects of global climate change (40% vs. 29%). In contrast, they provide less support for the use of fossil fuel energy (54% vs. 76%).

Seventh, Millennials are more liberal and open than their elders in their views on a range of social issues such as same-sex marriage, interracial marriage, marijuana legalization, immigration reform, and an activist government (Pew Research Center, 2014). Notably, however, on some social issues—including abortion and gun control—Millennials take positions that are not much different from those of other generations (Pew Research Center, 2014). For example, slightly less than a half of Millennials (48%) favored the protection of gun rights over gun control, which was a similar pattern in other generations (51% of Silents, 48% of Gen Xers, and 44% of Boomers).

According to Pew Research Center's 2014 survey, about a half of Millennials (51%) reported they supported gay rights, followed by Gen Xers (37%), Boomers (33%), and Silents (31%). In a similar vein, Millennials were the strongest supporters of same-sex marriage in 2014, with 7 in 10 (68%) favoring allowing gays and lesbians to marry. Millennials' support was greater than that of Gen Xers (55%), Boomers (48%), and Silents (38%), and it has substantially increased from 44% in 2004. For undocumented illegal immigrants, only among Millennials did a majority (55%) of the generation agree that such immigrants should be allowed to apply for citizenship if they met certain requirements, which can be compared to Gen Xers (46%), Boomers (39%), and Silents (41%). On another note, in a 2013 survey, more than a half

(53%) of Millennials supported a bigger government that provides more services compared to 43% of Gen Xers, 32% of Boomers, and 22% of Silents. Other evidence of Millennials' openness is their support for interracial marriage. Half of Millennials (50%) endorse marriage between people of different colors as a positive social trend compared to 38% of Gen Xers, 33% of Boomers, and 19% of Silents.

Regarding the marijuana legalization, Millennials are more supportive of this policy than previous generations, although support is trending upward irrespective of generational membership (Geiger, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2014). In 2016, the legalization of marijuana was supported by 71% of Millennials, followed by 57% of Gen Xers, 56% of Boomers, and 33% of Silents. Daniller (2019) reports similar generational differences in views of marijuana legalization. In 2019, except for Silents (35%), a majority of Millennials, Gen Xers, and Boomers endorsed legalizing marijuana use (76%, 65%, and 63% respectively).

Within generations, views of marijuana legalization are further split based on party coalitions (Daniller, 2019). Millennial Republicans are as supportive of legalization as Millennial Democrats (71% vs. 78%). However, partisan divides are clearer for older generations: Gen Xers (55% Republicans vs. 76% Democrats), Boomers (49% Republicans vs. 81% Democrats), and Silents (21% Republicans vs. 53% Democrats).

In sum, the findings from Pew Research Center's research clearly demonstrate that Millennials hold more progressive views of various social issues than older generations. However, differences exist in views between White and non-White Millennials on some social issues but not others. Thus, White and non-White Millennials hold almost identical views regarding gay rights, same-sex marriage, and immigration. By contrast, racial differences appear within generations over the legalization of marijuana and the role of government. For example,

White Millennials (73%) were more supportive of legalization of marijuana than non-White counterparts (63%). Regarding activist government, only 39% of White Millennials preferred a bigger government whereas 71% of non-White Millennials favored it.

Other than the work by Pew Research Center, the Institute of Politics at Harvard Kennedy School has contributed to the understanding of Millennial generation by conducting a national poll of youths (ages 18 to 29) biannually since 2000. The most recent survey of this project (Harvard Public Opinion Project), drawing from 3,022 individuals born between 1990 and 2001, presents several key findings: (1) About a half (48%) of Millennial students reported they experienced anxiety regardless of political affiliation. (2) A majority of Millennials doubt that Baby Boomers, especially elected officials, care about them. And (3) Millennials are increasingly concerned about the moral direction of the nation (from 52% in 2015 to 61% in 2019) ("Spring 2019 Harvard IOP Youth Poll," 2019).

Business

There is another line of literature in business that examines generational differences or characteristics of the Millennial generation. To contextualize, Millennials emerge as the largest force in both labor and consumer segments, constituting over 80 million people and spending an estimated $600 billion each year (Costin, 2019; Eastman & Liu, 2012; Nichols, Raska, & Flint, 2015). Due to a higher level of labor participation and an increased wage of Millennial women, households headed by Millennials earn more than older Americans at the same age (Fry, 2018). In part because older cohorts of Millennials were affected by the 2008 economic recession (when they were ages 12 to 27), Millennials are more likely to live in their parents' home than to live with a spouse or partner compared to older generations at the same age (Fry, 2016). And such trend continues even after job market has improved (Fry, 2015).

A body of research in this area can be classified into two groups: studies that focus on management (Millennials as potential workers) and studies that are relevant to marketing (Millennials as potential consumers). The first group examines topics such as (1) vocational interests, (2) work values, (3) organizational commitment, (4) job satisfaction, (5) work-life balance, (6) preference for teamwork and attitudes toward unions, and (7) leadership preferences and behaviors. The second group explores topics covering (1) wine consumption, (2) status consumption, (3) sport consumption, (4) shopping preferences and brand loyalty, (5) online sales, and (6) explanations of consumer behavior. Studies in management are grounded on more sound methodology employing meta-analyses (e.g., Bubany & Hansen, 2011; Costanza, Badger, Fraser, Severt, & Gade, 2012; Jin & Rounds, 2012) or nation-level surveys (e.g., Beutell & Wittig-Berman, 2008; Twenge, Campbell, Hoffman, & Lance, 2010; Wray-Lake, Syvertsen, Briddell, Osgood, & Flanagan, 2011; but see Graybill, 2014; Kaiser, 2005; Smola & Sutton, 2002). However, studies in marketing often have issues with generalizability of their findings because they mostly relied on convenient sampling (e.g., Atkin & Thach, 2012; Eastman & Liu, 2012; Grotts & Johnson, 2012; Qenani-Petrela, Wolf, & Zuckerman, 2007; Yim, 2015).

Generational Research on Management. In management, as speculated by Lyons and Kuron (2014), "the generations in today's workplace differ in aspects of their personalities, work values and attitudes, leadership and teamwork preferences, leader behaviors, and career experiences" (p. S149). First, to examine the trend of vocational interests among U.S. college students, Bubany and Hansen (2011) performed a cross-temporal meta-analysis of 18 studies conducted between 1976 and 2004 ($N = 33,520$). The findings indicate generational differences for both sexes. From older to younger cohorts, females demonstrated increasing interests in an enterprising (i.e., influencing others) career whereas males showed decreasing interests in

33

realistic (i.e., mechanical or outdoor activities) and investigative (i.e., problem-solving or research activities) career. Increases in social (i.e., helping others) career interests were observed for both men and women, suggesting greater interests among younger generations in careers that demonstrate extroversion and social influence (Lyons & Kuron, 2014).

Second, numerous studies analyze whether generations have different priorities in their work values (e.g., Cogin, 2012; Jin & Rounds, 2012; Smola & Sutton, 2002; Twenge, Campbell et al., 2010; Wray et al., 2011). Work values refer to "generalized beliefs about the relative desirability of various aspects of work (e.g., pay, autonomy and working conditions) and work-oriented outcomes (e.g., prestige, accomplishment and fulfillment)" (Lyons & Kuron, 2014, p. S144) or "the outcomes people desire and feel they should attain through work" (Twenge, Campbell et al., 2010, p. 1121). According to a conventional typology proposed by Ros and her colleagues (1999), there are four types of work values: intrinsic (e.g., cognitive outcomes such as autonomy, interest, growth, and creativity in work), extrinsic (e.g., instrumental outcomes such as work conditions and benefits, job security, and income), social (e.g., affective outcomes such as relations with associates), and prestige (e.g., authority, influence, power).

Overall, studies suggest that younger generations focus less on intrinsic and social values and place greater focus on leisure values than older cohorts (Cogin, 2012; Smola & Sutton, 2002; Twenge, Campbell et al., 2010; Wray-Lake et al., 2011). Two studies analyzed nationally representative random samples of U.S. high school seniors drawn from the Monitoring the Future project (Twenge, Campbell et al., 2010; Wray-Lake et al., 2011). Twenge, Campbell et al. (2010) found that when comparing seniors in high school (i.e., age is held constant) between 1976 and 2006, leisure values were prioritized by younger generations, scoring highest by Millennials, followed by Gen Xers, and Boomers. On the contrary, Millennials were less

interested in intrinsic and social values compared to older generations whereas no significant differences were found between Gen Xers and Boomers.

A study by Wray-Lake and her colleagues (2011) reported similar findings: More recent generations gradually reported higher leisure values between 1976 and 2005 and placed less emphasis on the importance of work, job security, and intrinsic rewards of work (see also "The Deloitte Global Millennial Survey," 2019). The authors applied a different statistical technique (generalized linear logit models) to the same data set used by Twenge, Campbell et al. (2010) to investigate trends in the importance of work (work centrality), job stability, leisure, extrinsic and intrinsic values while controlling for gender, race, parents' education, and adolescents' college aspirations.

For extrinsic values, the trend was curvilinear in both studies indicating that Generation X consider them most important among generations. Across generations, extrinsic and materialistic values increased between 1975 and 1990 and plateaued until 2005, whereas leisure values trended upward linearly between 1976 and 2005 (Wray-Lake et al., 2011). The two studies also found that generations did not differ in the importance attributed to altruistic values.

In tandem with an increase in leisure values, intrinsic values such as work centrality and pride in craftsmanship are losing appeal among younger generations (Cogin, 2012; Smola & Sutton, 2002). Smola and Sutton (2002) compared data collected on a sample of students who enrolled in MBA programs at a university in the Southeastern United States and their referred acquaintances in 1999 ($N = 335$) to data from a 1974 study (Cherrington, Condie, & England, 1979). Because of low response rates, their generational analysis only included Baby Boomers and Gen Xers. The study's findings support a rise in leisure values and a decline in work centrality and work ethic. To be specific, Gen Xers were less likely to exhibit loyalty to the

company and consider work as central to their lives compared to Boomers. Gen Xers were also less likely than Boomers to believe in the moral importance of work (e.g., "A good indication of a man's worth is how well he does his job"). Nevertheless, they showed a stronger desire for quick promotion. There were no significant differences between Boomers and Gen Xers in the pride in craftmanship.

Cogin (2012) conducted a survey of personnel at the American, Australian, Chinese, Singaporean, and German offices of a large multinational company ($N = 407$) and compared their findings to data collected in 1999 by Smola and Sutton (2002). This study reported that the most important work value for Silents and Boomers was hard work, while for Millennials it was leisure. Also, a significant generational decline existed for pride in craftmanship. In contrast to Smola and Sutton (2002), the generations did not differ significantly on the moral importance of work as well as the independence and desirability of work outcomes.

Younger generations might also prefer extrinsic values over intrinsic or prestige values. Using data collected over a 30-year-period from clients (working adults) of a vocational assessment clinic ($N = 1,689$), Hansen and Leuty (2012) compared work values of three generations (Silent, Baby Boom, Generation X). They observed that Gen Xers considered comfort (e.g., compensation, security, working conditions) more important and autonomy and status (e.g., advancement, recognition, authority) less important than did Silents and Boomers. By contrast, these generations did not differ much on achievement, altruism, or safety values. Overall, however, the study revealed few generational differences in work values among the constructs being analyzed (only one out of six work value dimensions).

Two issues have been debated in work value studies: whether work values, similar to personality traits, change across the life course and whether differences among birth cohorts

reflect true generational effects. Regarding the first issue, a meta-analysis by Jin and Rounds (2012) investigates stability and change in work values across the life span. This study indicates that work values are mostly persistent over time (see also Cogin, 2012). That is, changes in work values were not statistically significant, but social values decreased for both Boomers and Gen Xers. Notably, generations differ to the extent to which work values remain stable across the life course. Baby Boomers showed greater rank-order stability in work values across time compared to Generation X (i.e., their work values were more stable than those of Gen Xers).

Importantly, pertinent to the second issue, Parry and Urwin (2011) raise methodological problems (e.g., disentangling generational effects from age and period effects) inherent in generational studies and claim that evidence is at best mixed on generational differences in work values. Twenge, Campbell et al. (2010) similarly argue that "the limited research on generational differences in work values has often relied on nonempirical data (anecdotes, interviews) or problematic methods (cross-sectional studies, which cannot separate the effects of age and generation). Thus many of the recruiting techniques used recently for GenMe [Millennials] are on shaky empirical ground" (p. 1122). A later review by Lyons and Kuron (2014), however, posits that recent cross-sectional studies provide "more consistent evidence" supportive of generational differences citing that "significant differences were observed on slightly over half (52.5%) of the items included in the U.S. cross-sectional studies," compared to 70% of the items employed in international studies (p. S145).

Third, younger generations are less committed to stay in the organization. According to Allen and Meyer (1990), there are three types of organizational commitment: affective (i.e., emotional attachment, "want to stay"), continuance (i.e., perceived costs, "need to stay"), and normative commitment (i.e., an obligation to remain, "ought to stay"). A meta-analysis of

37

Costanza and his colleagues (2012) casts doubt on the notion that there exist systematic, substantive generational differences in organizational commitment based on weak to modest effect sizes. They argue that even the few observed significant differences might be attributable to alternative explanations, not generations.

Comparably, significant differences in organizational commitment across generations are noted in research conducted in other nations. According to these studies, more recent generations show less overall commitment in European countries (D'Amato & Hertzfeldt, 2008), less affective commitment in Australia (Brunetto, Farr-Wharton, & Shacklock, 2012; Solnet & Kralj, 2011), New Zealand (Cennamo & Gardner, 2008) and the Netherlands (Lub, Bijvank, Bal, Blomme, & Schalk, 2012) as well as less continuance commitment in Australia (Ferres, Travaglione, & Firns, 2003) and in the Netherlands (Lub et al., 2012).

However, most studies on work values have been criticized with an issue of generalizability because research on this topic mostly includes one organization, industry, or profession (for a review, see Lyons & Kuron, 2014). For example, Kaiser (2005) compared organizational values and commitment of the four generations employed at one community college and argued that Millennials and Traditionalists showed a lower organizational commitment than Boomers and Gen Xers. In short, evidence on generational differences in work values is mixed.

Fourth, research generally shows that younger generations express weaker job satisfaction than their elders. Costanza and colleagues' (2012) meta-analysis reports a significant decline in job satisfaction across generations, although the effect was small (corrected Cohen's ds ranged from .02 to .25). In addition, seven out of 10 studies reviewed by Lyons and Kuron (2014) support significant generational differences in job satisfaction. Specifically, four

studies found significant linear downward trends in job satisfaction among younger generations (Benson & Brown, 2011; Beutell & Wittig-Berman, 2008; Maier, 2011; Solnet & Kralj, 2011). Two studies indicated curvilinear trends where job satisfaction was low among Matures and Boomers and higher among younger generations (Clark, Oswald, & Warr, 1996; Kowske, Rasch, & Wiley, 2010). One study using data drawn from Turkish hospitality workers observed that Gen Y workers rated greater job satisfaction than Gen X counterparts (Inelmen, Zeytinoglu, & Uygur, 2012).

Other evidence, however, disputes the notion of generational differences in job satisfaction (Cennamo & Gardner, 2008; Westerman & Yamamura, 2007). Furthermore, except for a few studies (Beutell & Wittig-Berman, 2008; Kowske et al., 2010; Westerman & Yamamura, 2007), most of the extant research was conducted in other countries including the United Kingdom (Clark et al., 1996), Australia (Benson & Brown, 2011; Solnet & Kralj, 2011), New Zealand (Cennamo & Gardner, 2008), Turkey (Inelmen et al., 2012). In this sense, more evidence—especially in the U.S. setting—might be needed to draw a more definitive conclusion.

Fifth, regardless of which data and methodologies are employed, the findings are fairly robust that younger generations place greater emphasis on the importance of and the need for work–life balance (Gursoy, Chi, & Karadag, 2013; Sullivan, Forret, Carraher, & Mainiero, 2009; Twenge, Campbell et al., 2010; Wray-Lake et al., 2011). For example, in a study using a nationally representative sample of U.S. workers collected in 1997, Beutell and Wittig-Berman (2008) report that Baby Boomers were more likely to have higher scores on "work interfering with family" (WIF) and "family interfering with work" (FIW) and lower scores on "work-family synergy" (WFS) than preceding and following generations (Matures and Generation X). Other reviews also find that Millennials prioritize their personal lives, families, and hobbies over the

desire for control, recognition, or responsibility through managerial leadership positions (Lyons & Kuron, 2014; Mosley, 2005; Twenge, 2010).

Sixth, contrary to a relatively well-established belief about younger generations' stronger individualism, there is little evidence to support the idea that younger generations prefer less teamwork (Lyons & Kuron, 2014). There are few studies though that compared Boomers and Gen Xers, indicating that Gen Xers have a greater preference for working alone than Boomers (Sirias, Karp, & Brotherton, 2007; Yrle, Hartman, & Payne, 2005). Also related to individualism, Smith and Duxbury's (2019) mixed method study indicates that younger generations (Gen Xers and Millennials) are less likely to hold pro-union perceptions and attitudes compared to Baby Boomers (Smith & Duxbury, 2019).

Seventh, regarding Millennials' leadership preferences and behaviors, this generation is found to prefer leaders who provide a working environment conducive to individual fulfillment and career management rather than organizational success (Gentry, Griggs, Deal, Mondore, & Cox, 2011; Sessa, Kabacoff, Deal, & Brown, 2007). However, younger generations still prefer leadership characterized by interpersonal dependability, support, and trust (Arsenault, 2004; Sessa et al., 2007). Using a mixed methods methodology, Dulin's (2008) study also reports that, although Millennials are high-tech, they still want relationships that are "high touch" and prefer leaders who can act like mentors. In this sense, Millennials are individualistic but also desire caring leader–subordinate relationships.

Generational Research on Marketing. In the area of marketing, generational differences have been examined with regard to consumer preferences and behaviors. First, studies assess what factors influence the selection choice of wine across different generations (Atkin & Thach, 2012; Teagle et al., 2010; Qenani-Petrela et al., 2007). Millennials are one of the driving forces

for an increase in wine consumption, taking up 42% of all wine sales in the United States in 2015 (Tang, Yslas, & Stickles, 2019). Using a nationwide survey of 409 U.S. wine consumers, Atkin and Thach (2012) observe that Millennials are more concerned with making a mistake in wine choice than older wine consumers (but see Teagle et al., 2010). Compared to older generations, Millennials have less wine knowledge and are willing to spend less money on a bottle of wine. In order to minimize risk of a bad purchase decision, Millennials have information searching patterns and consideration factors that are distinguished from older generations when making a wine selection. That is, Millennials prefer to gather information from friends/family and from reading shelf talkers whereas elders rely more on store personnel, wine stewards, and the bottle label. Regarding external cues other than brand, Millennials most often rely on alcohol content, label imagery, and medals won, whereas their elders rely on country of origin, vintage, region, and state (Atkin & Thach, 2012).

In another study by Qenani-Petrela and colleagues (2007) that administered a survey using a random sample collected in San Luis Obispo County in California ($N = 447$), Millennial wine consumers focus more on wine that is good for a date, inexpensive, and decorated with a creative label compared to Baby Boomer counterparts. Baby Boomer consumers are more prone to wine with premium quality and health benefits (Qenani-Petrela et al., 2007). This study also reports that Millennials have more experiences in wine tasting in foreign countries (e.g., Italy, Australia) and are more likely to perceive Italian wine to be of higher quality and more expensive than Baby Boomers. There were no significant differences across generations in the number of wine bottles purchased per month, but Baby Boomers spent the largest sum of money on wine monthly (over $75), followed by Generation X ($66) and Millennials ($41) (Qenani-Petrela et al., 2007).

Second, younger generations are more likely to engage in status consumption, which is defined as "the motivational process by which individuals strive to improve their social standing through the conspicuous consumption of consumer products that confer or symbolize status both for the individual and surrounding significant others" (Eastman, Goldsmith, & Flynn, 1999, p. 41). Using a convenient email sample of 220 adults living in the southeast United States, Eastman and Liu (2012) found that status consumption was most prevalent among Millennials, followed by Gen Xers and Baby Boomers, although the difference was only significant between Millennials and Baby Boomers.

Third, in his doctoral dissertation, Yim (2015) contributes to an understanding of the needs and desires of Millennial sport fans. He conducted focus-group interviews ($n = 18$) and a survey ($n = 300$) and identified five traits of Millennial sport consumption: (1) community-driven, (2) emotional, (3) peer pressure-influenced, (4) fan engagement, (5) technology. In addition, he employed an internet survey using Amazon Mechanical Turk ($n = 603$). His analysis revealed generational differences for four sport-consumption behaviors (event attendance, TV watching, team-related online activity participation, and team-related social media activity). However, this study was limited by not showing the direction of generational difference in each sport consumption behavior because of the nature of multi-group Confirmatory Factor Analysis invariance tests. Put differently, the analyses estimated whether there was a moderation effect of generation by comparing model fits of measurement models from two subsamples of respective generations (e.g., Baby Boomers and Generation X for online activity participation). The significant difference in model fits (configural model and fitted model) supports a significant moderating effect of generational membership. These results, however, do not probe "how" generations differ on sport consumption behaviors.

42

Fourth, generational differences exist in shopping preferences and brand loyalty.

Drawing from an internet survey of customers of two international retail companies ($N = 2,068$),

Ordun (2015) examined whether there are generational differences in the following factors that

affect apparel-buying behavior: trend ("popular or identified as cool by social media"), loyalty

("psychological or mental attachment to a brand"), prestige ("respect and reputation"), brand

("well-known or recognized name"), fit ("suitability of the product"), quality ("excellence of

standard, fulfillment of expectations"), advertisement ("news and commercials of the brand"),

variety ("quantity by colors, shapes and categories"), service ("knowledge, expertise, enthusiasm

of the staff"), price ("fairness of payment"), recommendation ("suggested by the others"),

ambiance ("atmosphere and organization of the store"), and availability ("quantity and scope—

coverage—of the stores") (p. 53). Generations were not affected differently by price,

recommendation, ambiance, and availability. By contrast, when buying apparel, Millennial

customers considered trend as more important than other generations, whereas brand loyalty and

quality were important to Gen Xers and Baby Boomers. In other words, this study suggests that

Millennials are less loyal to brand than older generations.

Fifth, regarding Millennials' online consumption, Moore (2012) demonstrates the usage

of interactive media across generations by applying a decision tree analysis (a data mining

approach) to a national sample ($N = 3,289$) from the Kantar Retail IQ. Not surprisingly,

Millennials show a significantly higher usage of interactive media compared to previous

generations (Generation X, Baby Boom generation) across 14 applications. Millennial

consumers more actively engage in social networking using their mobile devices or internet tools

in order to connect with retailers and brands. They are also more adept at using interactive

media for utilitarian and entertainment purposes (e.g., download coupons, game or entertainment

apps). However, contrary to common expectations, Millennials make less online purchases than Gen Xers or Baby Boomers. Last, compared to elders, Millennial consumers more often engage in masking behaviors (i.e., a strategy to hide or cover up an embarrassing product to avoid social scrutiny) when purchasing sensitive health-related products (Nichols et al., 2015).

Psychology

Works by Twenge and Colleagues. In the area of psychology, the contribution of Jean Twenge and her colleagues is noteworthy because they have extensively examined generational differences in a variety of psychological traits ranging from anxiety, neuroticism, externality in locus of control, agentic self-evaluations, depression, concern for others, civic orientation, to individualism manifested as parents' choices for children's names (see, e.g., Twenge, 1997a, 1997b, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2006, 2017; Twenge, Abebe, & Campbell, 2010; Twenge & Campbell, 2001, 2008; Twenge, Campbell, & Freeman, 2012; Twenge, Campbell, & Gentile, 2012; Twenge & Foster, 2010; Twenge & Im, 2007; Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008; Twenge, Zhang, & Im, 2004).

Twenge's initial interests in generations stemmed back before she pursued graduate degrees at the University of Chicago and the University of Michigan (Twenge, 2006). Theoretically, Twenge succeeded Norman Ryder's (1965) cohort perspective, a variant of Mannheim's social forces perspective (Lyons & Kuron, 2014). Being a demographer, Ryder (1965) originally put forth a cohort perspective as "a demographic approach to the study of social change" (p. 843). He contends that the use of cohort as a temporal unit and longitudinal data would improve the understanding of social change. The cohort is, argues Ryder (1965), "a structural category with the same kind of analytic utility as a variable like social class" and a surrogate index for "the common experiences of many persons in each category" (p. 847). In

other words, he suggests the comparison of birth cohorts as a way to study social change. According to Ryder (1965), a birth cohort refers to "those persons born in the same time interval and aging together" (p. 844) whereas a generation means "those within a broad (characteristically unspecified) age span during a particular epoch, and implicitly those with common characteristics because of common experiences" (p. 853). Importantly, a cohort perspective is inherently a macro-level (or "macroanalytic") perspective that posits demographic transformation experienced by a cohort has "no meaning at the individual level of analysis" because its composition is modified by societal-level changes (p. 845).

Subsequent scholars compared the perspectives of Mannheim and Ryder with regard to the ability to disentangle the effects of age, cohort, and period (Gilleard, 2004; Laufer & Bengtson, 1974; Lyons & Kuron, 2014). That is, in Mannheim's framework, generation is a combination of biological, social, and historical processes that exerts an inseparable "gestalt" effect. The cohort perspective contends that generation is a demographic cohort who "experience the same event within the same time interval" (Ryder, 1965, p. 845). In this approach, generation becomes an "observable group of people" with "concrete boundaries corresponding to a set of birth years" (Lyons & Kuron, 2014, p. S141) and their commonalities can be measured by mean scores on attitudinal and behavioral variables. In short, research based on a cohort perspective—such as that of Twenge—seeks to parcel out the "separate" effects of age, period, and cohort.

Studies adopting Ryder's (1965) "cohort" perspective in psychology maintain that "the strength of various personality traits should differ across generations given the different socio-cultural landscapes individuals experience during their formative years" (Lyons & Kuron, 2014, p. S143; see also Schuman & Scott, 1989). In a similar vein, Twenge and her colleagues

repeatedly make a point that a birth cohort is "a proxy for the larger sociocultural environment" (Twenge, 2000a, p. 1008; Twenge, 2001a, p. 736) or "an indicator of historical and cultural change" (Twenge & Campbell, 2001, p. 322). Drawing from prior literature regarding the sources of personality characteristics, Twenge (2000a, 2001a) reports that genetic influences explain about 40% to 50% of the variance (not variation, per Twenge's terminology) whereas family or individual environment influences explain about 5% to 10% of the variance. She maintains that broader social dynamics might partially account for the remainder of variance.

In terms of methodology, Twenge developed an innovative technique called cross-temporal meta-analysis (CTMA), which was first applied to her initial works in the late 1990s (Twenge, 1997a, 1997b) as well as to her 2000 doctoral dissertation at the University of Michigan (Twenge, 2000b). Unlike a traditional meta-analysis, this technique does not compute an effect size for each study but examines the correlation between the weighted sample mean (for each sample size) and the year of data collection. By comparing similar-aged individuals at one time point to similar-aged individuals at another time point, this approach has the advantage of estimating birth cohort effects while controlling for age effects simultaneously; technically, any observable differences might be due to both age and period effects, but studies using CTMAs maintain that age effects are more plausible explanations than period effects (e.g., Twenge et al., 2008).

Generational Research on Psychological Traits. A host of scholarship has found generational increases on some personality traits (e.g., Gentile, Twenge, & Campbell, 2010; Klerman & Weissman, 1989; Lewinsohn, Rohde, Seeley, & Fischer, 1993; Reynolds, Stewart, MacDonald, & Sischo, 2006; Robins & Regier, 1991; Roberts & Helson, 1997; Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010; Swindle, Heller, Pescosolido, & Kikuzawa, 2000; Woodruff & Birren, 1972)

and generational decreases on others (e.g., Kim, 2011; Konrath, O'Brien, & Hsing, 2011; Twenge & Im, 2007; Wells & Twenge, 2005). As for generational increases, younger generations exhibit higher levels of (1) anxiety and neuroticism, (2) extroversion, (3) narcissism, (4) self-esteem, (5) externality in locus of control, (6) positive self-views and agentic self-evaluations, and (7) depression compared to their elders.

First, successive generations are likely to rate higher scores on anxiety (Twenge, 2000a) and neuroticism (Roberts & Helson, 1997; Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010; Twenge, 2000a). For example, Twenge (2000a) conducted two CTMAs to test the trend of anxiety across birth cohorts. She analyzed 170 samples of college students collected between 1952 and 1993 in Study 1 ($n = 40,192$) and 99 samples of children collected between 1954 and 1981 in Study 2 ($n = 12,056$). The purpose of using both college and children samples is to account for selection bias. Findings from the two analyses support the linear increase in anxiety over decades. In both adult (college students) and child samples, their levels of anxiety increased by "almost a full standard deviation" (Twenge, 2000a, p. 1007). Of note, birth cohort explained between 16% and 21% of the variance in personality, which was considerably larger than what was accounted for by family environment in previous studies (Twenge, 2000a). Regarding possible explanations for the increase in anxiety reported by younger cohorts, Twenge (2000a) observed that higher anxiety scores were correlated with low social connectedness (e.g., percentage of people living alone, women's age at first marriage) and high overall threat indices (e.g., crime rates, AIDS, worry about nuclear war), but not economic conditions (e.g., unemployment rate, percentage of children in poverty)—even among socioeconomically diverse samples.

Second, younger generations are found to be more extroverted than older counterparts. Twenge (2001a) explored whether American college students' levels of extraversion have

changed between the late 1960s and the early 1990s by applying a CMTA to 59 studies that employed the Eysenck Personality Inventory and the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire ($N = 16,846$ college students). As a result, strong positive correlations between extraversion scores and year of data collection supported the increase in extraversion over time. Similar to studies on anxiety, birth cohort explained between 14% and 19% of the variance in extraversion.

Third, the level of narcissism has increased over the generations (Roberts & Helson, 1997; Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010; Twenge & Foster, 2010; Twenge et al., 2008). Using a CTMA of 85 samples of American college students who completed the Narcissistic Personality Inventory between 1979 and 2006 ($N = 16,475$), Twenge et al. (2008) observed that college students in 2006 reported increased levels of narcissism, which is defined as "a positive and inflated view of the self, especially on agentic traits (e.g., power, importance, physical attractiveness)," by 0.33 standard deviation compared to college students in 1982 (p. 876). This study also noted that generation was a stronger predictor of narcissism than gender. The generational increase in narcissism was consistently supported by other studies relying on different research designs (e.g., comparison of two cross-sectional samples, a longitudinal panel design) or psychological instruments (e.g., California Psychological Inventory, Narcissistic Personality Inventory) (Roberts & Helson, 1997; Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010; Twenge & Foster, 2010). Additionally, another relevant trend to support inflated narcissism among younger cohorts might be that American parents have given less common and more unique names to their children between 1880 and 2007—particularly after 1950 and with more substantial changes occurring since 1983 (Twenge, Abebe et al., 2010).

Fourth, more recent generations have higher levels of self-esteem (Gentile et al., 2010; Twenge & Campbell, 2001). Twenge and Campbell (2001) employed CTMAs using 199

samples of elementary- through college-age students on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE; $n = 65,965$) and 156 samples on the Coopersmith Self-Esteem Inventory (SEI; $n = 39,353$). Their findings indicated that college students' self-esteem as measured by the RSE increased substantially between 1968 and 1994—propelled by the culture's emphasis on self-esteem. They also analyzed elementary and middle school students' self-esteem using scores on the SEI. Children showed a curvilinear developmental pattern in their self-esteem, which decreased from 1965 to 1979 and increased from 1980 to 1993. Twenge and Campbell (2001) explained that children's self-esteem scores generally correlated with negative social statistics (e.g., divorce rates, unemployment) but, after 1980, were also influenced by "the culture of self-worth" (p. 339). Pertinent to the magnitude of cohort effect, birth cohort explained about 7% to 23% of the variance in college students' self-esteem and about 40% of the variance in elementary school students' self-esteem, which were larger than the effect of individual family environment in prior research.

A later study by Gentile and her colleagues (2010) seeks to update the findings from Twenge and Campbell (2001) by applying the CTMA technique to three data sets of American middle school ($k = 22$, $n = 10,119$), high school ($k = 28$, $n = 16,669$), and college students ($k = 214$, $n = 50,734$) using the RSE between 1988 and 2008. They observed that self-esteem has trended upward among all three student samples and the rise in middle students' self-esteem was more substantial than in high school or college students. Comparing their results to those of Twenge and Campbell (2001), Gentile et al. (2010) summed that greater increases in self-esteem occurred from the 1960s to the 1980s and smaller increases continued from the 1980s to the 2000s. Furthermore, other telling evidence to support high self-esteem among younger generations comes from a supplemental survey collected from 154 university students in Gentile

et al. (2010). In this study, 18% of the participants scored a 40 on the RSE, which represented "perfect" self-esteem," and about a half (51%) scored 35 or over.

Fifth, younger age cohorts increasingly report greater externality in locus of control (Twenge et al., 2004). Regarded as a cognitive orientation rather than as a personality trait, externality in locus of control refers to a belief that one's life is controlled by outside forces (e.g., luck, powerful others) rather than by one's own efforts (Twenge et al., 2004). To examine the trend in locus of control across birth cohorts, Twenge and her colleagues (2004) conducted CMTAs of 97 samples of college students (n = 18,310) using the Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale and 41 samples of children (n = 6,554) using the Children's Nowicki-Strickland Internal-External Control Scale. They found that locus of control scores became more external in both college student and child samples between 1960 and 2002 and the increasing trend was observed for children as early as 9 years old. To place this finding in perspective, the average college student in 2002 had a more external locus of control than 80% of college students in the early 1960s. Similar to studies on anxiety, extroversion, and self-esteem, birth cohort explains about 14% of the variance in locus of control.

Sixth, there are generational increases in positive self-views and agentic self-evaluations (Reynolds et al., 2006; Twenge & Campbell, 2008; Twenge et al., 2012). On the one hand, with regard to positive self-views, Twenge and Campbell (2008) analyzed two national-level cross-sectional samples of U.S. high-school students collected in 1975 and in 2006 drawing from the Monitoring the Future study. They compared 13 items relevant to self-views and reported that high school students in 2006 were more confident about their future performances as important adult roles (e.g., spouses, parents, and workers) than their counterparts in 1975. The 2006 high school students also scored higher levels of self-satisfaction (e.g., "Satisfied with yourself"), self-

50

liking (e.g., "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself"), and self-rated intelligence (e.g., "How intelligent do you think you are compared with others your age?") but lower levels of self-competence (e.g., "I am able to do things as well as most other people") than students in the 1970s.

On the other hand, pertaining to agentic self-evaluations, Twenge and her colleagues (2012) explored whether younger generations evaluate themselves more positively on attributes such as academic ability, drive to achieve, leadership ability, public speaking ability, self-confidence, and writing ability. They performed a time-lag study (not a meta-analysis because the data were from one source) that surveyed same-age respondents at different time points using a nationally representative sample of 4-year college or university students as a part of the American Freshman Project collected between 1966 and 2009 ($N = 6,451,524$). Their findings revealed that college students in younger generations held more positive self-views on attributes such as academic ability, drive to achieve, leadership ability, public speaking ability, self-confidence, and writing ability compared to their counterparts in previous generations—regardless of actual increases in their skills or efforts.

Of note, the change patterns were similar to the trend of self-esteem observed in previous studies (Gentile et al., 2010; Twenge & Campbell, 2001)—with greater increases occurring between the 1960s and 1980s and smaller increases between the 1980s and 2000s. From this, Twenge et al. (2012) concluded that "the largest change in positive self-views occurred between Baby Boomers (in college 1960s–1970s) and Gen Xers (1980s–1990s), but that Millennials/Gen Me (2000s–2010s) have continued the upward trend in seeing themselves as above average" (p. 420). On the contrary, self-evaluations of emotional health, physical health, and spirituality decreased whereas self-evaluations of understanding others and cooperativeness did not change.

51

Similar to the findings reported by Twenge et al. (2012) on positive self-evaluations among younger generations, other studies also noted that Millennials are more confident in their parenting abilities (Livingston, 2018) or overly ambitious of their educational and occupational plans (Reynolds et al., 2006).

Seventh, research in medicine and psychology has indicated that recent birth cohorts are more likely to suffer from depression and poor psychological health than previous cohorts (Klerman & Weissman, 1989; Lewinsohn et al., 1993; Robins & Regier, 1991; Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010; Swindle et al., 2000; but see Twenge & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2002). Klerman and Weissman's (1989) extensive review of previous studies found that, among younger cohorts, the rates of depression were more prevalent and the ages of onset became younger although such results were not found with certain racial or ethnic populations (e.g., Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico, Mexico-Americans in Los Angeles, Koreans in Seoul and rural areas). Importantly, according to Klerman and Weissman (1989), the temporal change in the prevalence of depression and the age of onset did not seem to be confounded by alternative explanations (e.g., differential mortality and institutionalization, selective migration, changing diagnostic criteria, changes in attitudes of mental health professionals, changes in societal attitudes, general reporting bias, recall and memory). However, published in 1989, this study examined birth cohorts born between the early 1900s and mid-1960s and did not provide insights on later cohorts.

Lewinsohn and his colleagues (1993) also provided support for cohort effects on depression as well as other psychological problems. This study applied survival analyses to a total of four samples (three adults and one adolescent samples) that consist of 2,032 adults (Ns = 571, 472, and 989) and 1,710 adolescents. As a result, significant birth cohort effects were

observed across all four samples. More recent birth cohorts reported a greater proportion of depression, an earlier age of onset, and a higher risk of relapse (but only for the late-onset group). Among adult samples but not for an adolescent sample, other mental disorders than depression were more prevalent among younger birth cohorts (see also Robins & Regier, 1991). Such cohort effects remained significant after controlling for mood state at the time of the interview, social desirability response bias, labeling tendency, and time interval between the depression episode and the diagnostic interview. According to Lewinsohn and colleagues (1993), possible explanations for increasing rates of psychological problems among younger generations include "increasing fear of destruction caused by overpopulation, pollution, and nuclear war; increasing urbanization; greater geographic mobility; rapid changes in living arrangements; increased number of mothers entering the labor force; and increased social anomie" (p. 110).

Similar trends were documented in yet other studies. Using the 1956 and 1976 Americans View Their Mental Health surveys (Ns = 2,460 and 2,264) and the 1996 General Social Survey (N = 1,444), Swindle and his colleagues (2000) reported that an increasing number of Americans experienced an impending nervous breakdown between 1957 and 1996. To illustrate, the adjusted prevalence rates were 17.0% in 1957, 19.6% in 1976, and 24.3% in 1996 when demographic characteristics were held constant. In addition, using a sample of 588 undergraduate students and 147 graduate students, Stewart and Bernhardt (2010) demonstrated that the 2004–2008 undergraduates reported poorer psychological health compared to pre-1987 undergraduates, whereas they exhibited higher narcissism than pre-1990 undergraduates.

With regard to generational decreases, more recent generations show lower levels of (1) creativity, (2) self-assuredness, achievement, and impulse control, (3) need for social approval,

(4) empathetic concern and perspective taking, and (5) feelings of sexual guilt. First, recent younger children are less capable of creative thinking than their counterparts in previous generations (Kim, 2011). Using six cross-sectional data sets that employed the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking measure collected between 1966 and 2008 ($N = 272,599$ kindergarten through 12th grade students and adults), Kim (2011) reported that the decrease in six indices of creative thinking (i.e., fluency, originality, creative strengths, elaboration, abstractness of titles, resistance to premature closure) were shown across all ages, with most substantial changes occurring in kindergartners through third-graders. To be specific, fluency scores trended downward between 1966 and 2008 despite a small uptick between 1974 and 1990. Originality scores increased from 1966 to 1974 but decreased from 1990 to 1998 and plateaued until 2008. Creative strengths scores and elaboration scores decreased linearly between 1990 and 2008 and between 1984 and 2008 respectively. Abstractness of titles scores and resistance to premature closure scores increased until 1998 but dropped between 1998 and 2008.

Second, there is evidence that younger generations might feel less self-assuredness and less motivation to achieve and that they are less capable of impulse control (Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010). In Stewart and Bernhardt's (2010) study, the 2004–08 undergraduate students scored significantly lower than pre-1987 undergraduate students on achievement assets (i.e., achievement via conformity, achievement via independence, conceptual fluency, insightfulness) and impulse control (i.e., self-control, good impression, social conformity, responsibility, work orientation) and somewhat lower on ascendancy and self-assuredness (i.e., dominance, social presence, sociability, self-acceptance, capacity for status).

Third, the need for social approval, which refers to "a desire to conform, a concern with others' opinions, and an urge to be socially acceptable," is declining among more recent

generations (Twenge & Im, 2007, p. 173). Drawing from 203 samples of college students

responding to the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (n = 36,004) and 38 samples of

children responding to the Children's Social Desirability Questionnaire (n = 4,741) between

1958 and 2001, Twenge and Im (2007) observed that the need for social approval followed a

curvilinear trend with the turning around 1980. In other words, the need for social approval has

decreased from 1958 to 1980 and leveled off between 1980 and 2001. Additionally, the decrease

in the need for social approval was correlated with positive social statistics such as a low divorce

rate, low crime rate, and low unemployment rate.

Fourth, youths in younger generations are less likely to have empathetic concern and take

perspectives of others compared to their counterparts in older generations (Konrath et al., 2011).

Konrath and her colleagues (2011) conducted a CTMA of American college students who

completed at least one of the four subscales (empathetic concern, perspective taking, fantasy, and

personal distress) of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) between 1979 and 2009 (k = 72, N

= 13,737). Their results suggested that the most drastic decreases occurred with empathetic

concern (e.g., "I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me"),

followed by perspective taking (e.g., "I sometimes try to understand my friends better by

imagining how things look from their perspective"). Empathetic concern scores and perspective

taking scores decreased by 0.65 standard deviations (a medium to large effect size) and by 0.44

standard deviations (a small to medium effect size) from 1979 to 2009. According to Konrath et

al. (2011), these findings represent "a 48% decrease" in empathetic concern and "a 34%

decrease" in perspective taking (p. 186). For both traits, notably, the declines became more

pronounced after the 2000s. Scores on fantasy and personal distress did not change significantly.

Fifth, the feelings of sexual guilt are less perceived by more recent generations than by older generations (Wells & Twenge, 2005). Wells and Twenge (2005) employed a CTMA of 530 samples collected between 1943 and 1999 ($N = 269,649$) and analyzed young people's sexual guilt as well as their sexual activity, average age at first intercourse, and attitudes toward premarital sex. Sexual guilt, as measured by scores on the Mosher Forced Choice Sexual Guilt Inventory and the Revised Mosher Sexual Guilt Inventory, decreased among younger people during about five decades. The findings also indicated that the prevalence of young people who were sexually active increased over time and that younger generations became sexually active at an earlier age. For example, the average age at first intercourse was 18 (males) or 19 (females) for youths before 1970 whereas it was 15 for both sexes among youths in the late 1990s. In addition, young people in successive generations more strongly approved of premarital sex compared to previous generations (i.e., 73% of women and 79% of men in the 1980s compared to 12% and 40% in the late 1950s). Perhaps not surprisingly, these changes in young people's sexual behavior and attitudes were more substantial among females. However, there was not a significant change in the average number of sexual partners.

Criticisms. As reviewed above, distinctions among generations on psychological traits have been supported by empirical studies that relied on various sampling approaches (e.g., nationally representative samples, subject pool samples of college students). However, there is another line of research that casts doubt on the notion of generational differences or criticizes the CTMA technique on both theoretical and methodological grounds (e.g., Costanza, Darrow, Yost, & Severt, 2017; Rudolph, Costanza, Wright, & Zacher, 2019; Rudolph & Zacher, 2017; Terracciano, 2010; Trzesniewski & Donnellan, 2010). Criticisms leveled at generational research in psychology—particularly at the CTMA technique—center on issues of (1) sampling

error, (2) ecological correlation, (3) inconsistent findings from studies using non-CTMA approach, (4) inseparability of cohort-period effects, (5) bias in CTMA estimates from true population parameters.

First, there is a concern with the potential sampling error of CTMA. Trzesniewski and Donnellan (2010) posited that there might be a concern with the generalizability of findings because the constituent samples of CTMAs were mostly nonprobability samples (e.g., college students). To account for this possibility, they used nationally representative samples of high-school seniors collected for the Monitoring the Future project between 1976 and 2006 ($N =$ 477,380) and observed generational differences for only 9 out of 31 constructs. Drawing from these results, they argued that more recent generations were not significantly different from older generations in terms of egotism, self-enhancement, individualism, self-esteem, locus of control, hopelessness, happiness, life satisfaction, loneliness, antisocial behavior, time spent working or watching television, political activity, the importance of religion, and the importance of social status. There existed a few generational changes, however. Younger generations expressed higher educational expectations but fewer concerns about social problems. They were also more cynical of institutions and distrusting of others than older generations. Similarly, Terracciano (2010) made a point that the findings from Twenge's CTMAs may not be generalized beyond specific age groups (e.g., children, college students) or may be confounded by period effects.

Second, scholars bring into question that the CTMA studies made inferences about individuals based on ecological correlations (e.g., Rudolph et al., 2019; Trzesniewski & Donnellan, 2010). As mentioned previously, CTMAs calculate ecological correlations by using summary statistics (e.g., sample means). Trzesniewski and Donnellan (2010) argued, however, the interpretations from the results thus may not be applicable to individual-level associations

between psychological trait and time of measurement (e.g., an individual's score on anxiety in 2000)—a problem known as ecological fallacy. A major issue at hand is that correlations based on aggregated scores can be larger or smaller (i.e., bias in the opposite direction) than correlations based on individual scores (see also Donnellan, Trzesniewski, & Robins, 2009; Trzesniewski, Donnellan, & Robins, 2008).

According to Trzesniewski and Donnellan (2010), another issue pertains to how Twenge and her colleagues translated their findings drawn from sample means into individual-level effects using Cohen's *d* coefficients. In Twenge's works, the effect size was computed by estimating predicted average scores of a given trait for the first and last time points based on the regression equation and dividing the difference between the two predicted average scores by the average standard deviation. Yet, because individual-level and aggregated data are often not available at the same time, there is no way to check "whether the signs of the individual and ecological correlations are in the same direction" and how much they differ (p. 62).

Third, the findings from CTMAs were contradicted by those from studies using non-CTMA methods. For example, Terracciano, McCrae, and Costa (2006) employed Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) to assess the trends in ten personality traits measured by the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey (GZTS) instrument drawing from the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging (BLSA) data between 1958 and 2002 ($N = 2,359$). In their study, the birth year significantly predicted mean differences in 7 out of 10 GZTS instruments. However, except for personal relations (7.6%) and ascendance (2.6%) scales, these effects explained less than 1% of the variance. Notably, there was little evidence on increases in neuroticism or extraversion over time. Contrary to research on neuroticism (e.g., Twenge, 2000a), emotional stability, which has been negatively related to neuroticism, was higher among younger generations. And objectivity,

which is a scale strongly related to neuroticism, did not show generational difference. Pertinent to extraversion, an increase in ascendance was reported similar to previous literature (e.g., Twenge, 2001a) but the effect size was much smaller. Moreover, there was no significant change in sociability, a trait most strongly related to extraversion.

Using the same BLSA data set, Terracciano, McCrae, Brant, and Costa (2005) also conducted HLM to explore personality changes measured by the Revised NEO Personality Inventory between 1989 and 2004 ($N = 1,944$). In this study, generational increases in neuroticism and extraversion were not significant in contrast to Twenge's (2000a, 2001a) work. In addition, a small decline in depression among children was observed. This finding was opposite to several studies discussed previously (e.g., Klerman & Weissman, 1989) but consistent with a CTMA of Twenge and Nolen-Hoeksema (2002) that found decreases in depression scores among girls, but not among boys.

In light of these results, Terracciano and colleagues contended that the profiles of younger generations popularized by Twenge's findings (e.g., neurotic, anxious, extrovert) might need to be reconsidered (see also Costa et al., 1986; Löckenhoff et al., 2008; Mroczek & Spiro, 2003). In addition, Costanza and colleagues (2017) found that the application of three most common analytical methods in generation research (i.e., cross-sectional ANOVA, CTMA, cross-classified HLM) yielded different results when performed to the same data. Therefore, the identification of generational differences might be affected by which analytical method is used. Nevertheless, it should be noted that some generational differences were more clearly manifested across studies regardless of methodology. For example, the decline in trust was consistently evidenced in studies using different samples and analytic methods (Robinson & Jackson, 2001; Terracciano et al., 2006; Trzesniewski & Donnellan, 2010). In a study by Terracciano and

colleagues (2006), personal relations, a scale related to social trust, recorded the largest decrease. To place this finding in perspective, those born around 1950 (and tested in 2000) scored about 0.25 standard deviations lower than those born around 1930 (and tested in 1980).

Fourth, as discussed by Rudolph and his colleagues (2019), the validity of CTMA research is undermined by the inseparability of cohort-period effects. According to Rudolph et al. (2019), the study of generations is inherently troubled with proper estimation of Age-Period-Cohort (APC) effects because each of these three factors is entirely determined by the other two. As for CTMA studies, they argued, "the separation of period and cohort effects is an intractable problem *even in the population*" [emphasis in original]. In fact, Twenge and colleagues tried to address this concern by treating period effects as minimal or at least smaller than cohort effects (i.e., when controlling for age, the remaining unexplained variance in a trait would be accounted for by cohort effects if period effects are negligible). Rudolph et al. (2019) posited that such a logical assumption might be flawed because ample evidence indicates that there are potent period effects on traits and behaviors (for a review, see Rudolph et al., 2019).

Last, in CTMA, cohort effects are represented by mean-level changes in a given trait of birth cohorts across time. However, critics point out that this statistical assumption of CTMA might not hold upon further analysis (Rudolph et al., 2019). In this regard, Rudolph and colleagues (2019) used Monte Carlo simulations to test whether CTMA estimates were biased from true population parameters. As a result, CTMA estimates closely approximated population parameters under some conditions. Under two conditions, however, CTMA estimates were substantially biased. For one, when the variability in the population and the simulated period-cohort effect were both small, CTMA estimates were higher than the actual population parameter—by up to eight times. For another, when the variability in the population and the

simulated period-cohort effect were both large, CTMA estimates were lower than the actual population parameter. Thus, CTMA estimates approximate true population parameters only when the population variability is moderate. Indeed, Rudolph et al.'s (2019) Monte Carlo simulations attested that CTMA offered biased estimates of known population parameters except for a relatively narrow range of cases.

Education

Generational research in the area of education is largely exploratory and speculative. Compared to other disciplines discussed previously, fewer empirical studies exist. Studies that do exist in education tend to focus on medical or nursing students and are often based on small sample sizes and poor sampling methods (e.g., Nicholas, 2008; Sandfort & Haworth, 2002). By contrast, a large volume of literature consists of essays that describe the characteristics of students from different generations (e.g., Borges, Manuel, Elam, & Jones, 2006; Murray, 1997; Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005; Smith, 2005) or discuss challenges of and strategies for educating younger generations (e.g., Eckleberry-Hunt & Tucciarone, 2011; Mangold, 2007; Pardue & Morgan, 2008).

Characteristics of Millennial Students. Entering college beginning around the 2000s, Millennials have higher educational expectations and are more educated than previous generations (Bialik & Fry, 2019; Frey, 2018; Jenkins, 2019; Rudolph & Zacher, 2017). In this context, several studies describe the personality and behavior of Millennial college students that are different from those of older generations (e.g., DiLullo, McGee, & Kriebel, 2001; Howe & Strauss, 2003; Pardue & Morgan, 2008). Note that there is an overlap with the findings from other disciplines because prior studies were mostly conducted with samples of high school or college students and because these studies were reviewed in educational literature.

In *Millennials Go to College: Strategies for a New Generation on Campus*, Howe and Strauss (2003) summarized seven characteristics of Millennial students: (1) special (i.e., they feel important), (2) sheltered (i.e., they were sheltered from harms while brought up as evidenced by "baby on board" signs and child safety rules), (3) confident (i.e., they believe in themselves and expect good news), (4) team-oriented (i.e., they like to cooperate), (5) conventional (i.e., they accept and follow social rules), (6) pressured (i.e., they feel pressured to perform), and (7) achieving (i.e., they expect high achievements such as grades and social status).

Similar to Twenge and colleagues, Howe and Strauss (2003) heavily emphasize the influence of protective parenting practices (e.g., helicopter parents) and early childhood experiences (e.g., school shootings) on the formation of Millennial characteristics (see also Lancaster, 2004; Mangold, 2007; Monaco & Martin, 2007; Nicholas, 2008). For example, they speculated that Millennials feel special and confident owing to their close relationships with their parents (e.g., greater roles they play in family decision-making processes). Because Millennials were raised with stronger enforcement of rules and regulations, they argued, this generation has become more respectful of norms and demands of more secure environment.

Other scholars have offered similar speculations that Millennial students are optimistic, goal-oriented, ambitious, and collaborative (Borges et al., 2006; DiLullo et al., 2001; Pardue & Morgan, 2008; Sandfort & Haworth, 2002; Wesner & Miller, 2008). For example, Sandfort and Haworth (2002) conducted qualitative interviews with a focus group of 72 high school students drawn from nine schools with purposive sampling. Their findings showed that students in the Millennial generation are optimistic but pragmatic, consider higher education as an important factor for financial stability and personal fulfillment, feel pressured by high parental expectations on education and career, and are spiritual but less religious.

Concerns With Millennial Students. Although Millennial students' high academic optimism and aspirations might be regarded as positive assets, there is a concern that students in this generation are "less knowledgeable and academically skilled" than they would hope to become (Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010, p. 580; see also Bauerlein, 2008; Pardue & Morgan, 2008). Scholars claim that Millennials studied in educational environments with lax academic standards and grade inflations, which resulted in less studying time (DeBard, 2004; Schneider & Stevenson, 1999). Notably, Astin and his colleagues (2002) examined annual surveys of national samples of college freshmen collected from about 700 schools between 1966 and 2001 (N = 350,000 to 400,000) as a part of the Cooperative Institutional Research Program. Their analyses showed that, compared to freshmen entering college during the late 1960s, the 1997–2001 freshman students were more likely to receive inflated grades in high schools, which might have led to their possessing increased optimism about academic prospects and aspiring to post-graduate degrees. In the late 1960s, for example, those who received "C" grades outnumbered those who earned "A" grades (20.7% to 17.7%). In 2001, there were seven times as many students who received "A" as students who received "C" (44.1% to 6.3%). In this study, more recent college students were clearly less academically engaged despite their higher grades than their older counterparts (see also Dumais, 2009). A decreasing proportion of freshmen spent six or more hours on studying or doing homework over generations, whereas a greater proportion of successive generations reported being frequently bored in class.

In a similar vein, Millennial students are depicted as impatient, unprepared for independence, and deficient in time management and critical thinking skills (Borges et al., 2006; Monaco & Martin, 2007; for a review, see DiLullo et al., 2001). Millennials as children were occupied with regimented extracurricular activities and had limited free time to themselves, and

these experiences have been speculated to stifle the development of independence, time management, and critical thinking skills (Monaco & Martin, 2007). In a comparison between Millennial and Generation X medical students at one medical school ($N = 809$), Borges and her colleagues reported that Millennial students scored less on self-reliance than Gen Xers. Several studies also contend that professionalism might be decreasing among physicians and nurses among younger generations (Eckleberry-Hunt & Tucciarone, 2011; Smith, 2005; but see Johnston, 2006).

Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that Millennial students are less literate than older generations (National Endowment for the Arts, 2004, 2007). In a report titled *To Read or Not to Read: A Question of National Consequence*, National Endowment for the Arts (2007) examined various sources of data (e.g., self-report on individual behavioral patterns, national test scores) and concluded that reading was generally declining among Americans. In particular, Millennial college students read a smaller number of pages per day in school and for homework, were less engaged in voluntary reading (e.g., fiction, poetry, and drama), and showed poorer reading skills than their counterparts from 10 or 20 years ago.

Relatedly, Millennial students were also found to have weak media literacy (DiLullo et al., 2001; Hargittai, Fullerton, Menchen-Trevino, & Thomas, 2010; Weiler, 2004), which is defined as "the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, and effectively communicate in a variety of forms including print and nonprint texts" (Considine, Horton, & Moorman, 2009, p. 472). This finding might be counterintuitive considering this generation's well-documented tech-savviness. The issue is that, although the internet use among Millennial students for searching academic information is almost universal regardless of certain background factors such as year of study or academic aptitude (Selwyn, 2008), they are mostly not equipped with skills to critically analyze

information and determine the validity (Considine et al., 2009; DiLullo et al., 2001; Hargittai et al., 2010). According to DiLullo and her colleagues (2001), "the predilection for Millennial students is to make big gains quickly and with minimal effort" in part because they have been exposed to a swarm of unexamined internet resources such as Wikipedia and YouTube (p. 218). Other scholars have similarly argued that Millennial students care less about the accuracy of the information than the time and ease of obtaining material (Weiler, 2004) or brands of search engine (Hargittai et al., 2010).

 Learning Styles of Millennial Students. Educators recommend several strategies to teach and work with Millennial students. Studies indicate that, as learners, Millennial students are known to (1) be multitaskers, (2) prefer to learn via interactive media, (3) like teamwork, and (4) anticipate immediate feedback (Borges et al., 2006; DiLullo et al., 2001; Mangold, 2007; Pardue & Morgan, 2008; Wesner & Miller, 2008).

 First, as Millennials' use of technology outpaces that of older generations (Vogel, 2019), students from this generation are able to multitask when they are studying or in class using different technological devices such as laptop and cell phone (DiLullo et al., 2001; Eckleberry-Hunt & Tucciarone, 2011; Mangold, 2007; Murray, 2004; Nicholas, 2008; Pardue & Morgan, 2008). Although this ability might have the benefit of increasing productivity, scholars propose that multitasking behavior might impede learning by restructuring neural pathways in brains (DiLullo et al., 2001; Murray, 2004), decreasing attention span and critical thinking abilities (Nicholas, 2008), and distracting other classmates (Eckleberry-Hunt & Tucciarone, 2011). Importantly, by examining brain activity, Foerde and her colleagues (2006) provided evidence that the knowledge acquired in multitask situations were less flexibly applied in new situations.

Second, Millennial students are active learners who prefer learning through the use of interactive media (DiLullo et al., 2001; Monaco & Martin, 2007; Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005; Prensky, 2001; Sandars & Morrison, 2007; Weiler, 2004). They are visual learners (Weiler, 2004) and like instructional strategies that incorporate interactions through the web and social media (e.g., personal learning network) instead of traditional lecture formats (DiLullo et al., 2001; Eckleberry-Hunt & Tucciarone, 2011; Mangold, 2007; Nicholas, 2008). They also enjoy the process of "doing rather than knowing" (Mangold, 2007, p. 22). To Millennials, observed Mangold (2007), "being able to search and manipulate information to generate knowledge is more important than the attainment of knowledge" (p. 22). Similarly, Millennials prefer learning to be "creative, interactive, and fun" (Eckleberry-Hunt & Tucciarone, 2011, p. 458), and they are accustomed to learning from trial and error such as when they are playing video games (Mangold, 2007).

Third, Millennial students like to work in collaboration (Eckleberry-Hunt & Tucciarone, 2011; Mangold, 2007; Monaco & Martin, 2007; Nicholas, 2008). Using a survey of private college students on their learning styles and preferences ($N = 102$), Nicholas (2008) reported that Millennial students were used to socializing and collaborating with others through technology (e.g., text messaging, instant messaging, blogging, and video gaming). Monaco and Martin (2007) also posited that, since Millennials are "a collaborative and social generation that has a focus on understanding and building their knowledge through various forms of medium to discover the answers," educators should "provide an arena for engagement and discovery" and "be a content expert and mentor" (p. 46).

Last, Millennial students have less tolerance for delays and want quick response (Borges et al., 2006; DiLullo et al., 2001; Mangold, 2007; Pardue & Morgan, 2008; Wesner & Miller,

2008). Millennials experienced "a wide range of teaching methods given the rapid advancement of learning theories in the end of the 20th century, particularly given trends of serving needs of specialized populations and individualized instruction" and are possibly "the most tested generation" (DiLullo et al., 2001, p. 218). With this background, students from this generation are accustomed to receiving feedback on their performance (Borges et al., 2006). Growing up with immediate access to vast amounts of information, Millennials are less patient in waiting on feedback. In addition, Millennials prefer to build close relationships with authority figures as they did with their parents, so they require open communication and feedback that is only swift but also involves a "personal touch" (Mangold, 2007, p. 23) and "personal attention" (Eckleberry-Hunt & Tucciarone, 2011, p. 460).

Generations and Studying Correctional Policy

Implications for Millennial Support for Correctional Policies

Explanations for Why Millennials Might be Different. Based on a review of generational research in other disciplines, it is plausible that Millennials might differ from other generations in their support for correctional policy issues. Edmunds and Turner (2002) posit that social and political change is motivated by the characteristics of a generation (e.g., size, demographic makeup) and generation-specific trauma (e.g., warfare, economic recession). If so, it can be theorized that generational changes in public support for correctional policies are attributable to two sources: a composition effect and a contextual effect.

Regarding the composition effect, Millennials have demographic characteristics that might be related to more inclusionary attitudes toward correctional populations: (1) diverse composition, (2) higher educational attainment, (3) decreased religiosity, and (4) increasing

numbers of Independents and Democrats. First, the racial and ethnic composition of the

Millennial generation has become more diverse compared to older generations. Millennials are

comprised of a higher proportion of minorities and immigrants. In other words, there are

decreases in the proportion of Whites, a group showing more punitive attitudes on criminal

justice policies (e.g., death penalty) (Barkan & Cohn, 2010; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a, 2007b).

Moreover, considering that diversity of social networks is associated with increased tolerance

and trust toward marginalized out-groups (Couture & Penn, 2003; Mutz, 2002; Schwadel &

Garneau, 2017), Millennials might be more open to reintegrating ex-prisoners.

Second, Millennials are more educated than previous generations. According to previous

studies, higher educational attainment was the primary factor that promoted greater political

tolerance over time in the United States (Davis, 1975; Loftus, 2001; Schwadel & Garneau, 2014,

2017; Stouffer, 1955). Because education develops "more sophisticated styles of reasoning,"

thereby increasing political tolerance (Bobo & Licari, 1989, p. 306), Millennials might be more

likely to question the ramifications of punitive policies and endorse rehabilitative ideas.

Third, Millennials are less affiliated with religion than members of older generations

(Hout & Fischer, 2002; Schwadel, 2010). Similar to higher educational attainment, increased

religious nonaffiliation was significantly correlated with political tolerance (Bobo & Licari,

1989; Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982; Treas, 2002). On

the contrary, research on public support for death penalty indicates that religiosity was associated

with higher levels of punitiveness (Bjarnaso & Welch, 2004; Unnever & Cullen, 2006). Thus,

due to decreased religiosity, Millennials on aggregate might be less punitive toward criminals.

Last, Millennials are more left-leaning than previous generations as evidenced by

increasing numbers of Independents and Democrats (Fry, 2017b; Maniam & Smith, 2017; Taylor

& Keeter, 2010). A host of previous studies support that political affiliation is a strong predictor of death penalty attitudes (Applegate, Cullen, & Fisher, 2002; Barkan & Cohn, 1994; Britt, 1998; Pew Research Center, 2015a; Ramirez, 2013; Toch & Maguire, 2014). With that, a decreasing number of conservatives among Millennials might signal less punitiveness of this generation, which is the harbinger of support for nonpunitive alternatives to deal with offenders.

As opposed to the composition effect, the contextual effect derives from "differences in socialization and cultural exposure across birth cohorts" (Schwadel & Garneau, 2017, p. 765). With regard to the contextual effect on Millennials' attitudes on correctional policies, two factors can be noted: (1) liberal political and social environment and (2) decline in crime rates. First, members of Millennial generation were brought up in a political and social environment where the values of liberalism (e.g., civil rights, free markets) are increasingly protected. Studies found a cultural shift toward liberalism in the United States, indicating that Americans have become more liberal across birth cohorts (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Firebaugh, 1992; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988; Inglehart, 1990). At the same time, a larger segment of Americans have also become more tolerant of controversial political views over time (Davis, 1975; Schafer & Shaw, 2009; Schwadel & Garneau, 2014, 2017). Thus, Millennials were raised in "contexts of relatively widespread political tolerance" (Schwadel & Garneau, 2017, p. 752). Growing up during the presidency of Barack Obama in their formative years might have also affected Millennials' viewpoints on social issues.

Second, Millennials grew up in a less crime-ridden society as crime rates have declined since the early 1990s (Gramlich, 2019). Decreased crime rates were associated with weaker public support for death penalty, an indicator of American punitiveness (Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003; Enns, 2014, 2016; Ramirez, 2013; Soss, Langbein, & Metelko, 2003; but see

69

Kleck & Jackson, 2017). At the same time, then, Millennials might be more supportive of rehabilitation and reentry ideals.

All in all, drawing from prior research on generational differences in other fields and correlates of public support for death penalty, it can be argued that Millennials might be more likely to support rehabilitative and inclusionary correctional policies than older generations. There is evidence that public punitiveness affects criminal justice policies and their outcomes (Enns, 2014, 2016; Jennings, Farrall, Gray, & Hay, 2017; Nicholson-Crotty, Peterson, & Ramirez, 2009; for a review, see Pickett, 2019). And public support for the death penalty, a measure of punitiveness, is correlated with sex (Applegate et al., 2002; Cochran & Sanders, 2009; Erskine, 1970; Smith, 1984), race (Barkan & Cohn, 1994, 2010; Britt, 1998; Unnever & Cullen, 2006, 2007a, 2007b), religion (Bjarnaso & Welch, 2004), political affiliation (Pew Research Center, 2015a; Ramirez, 2013; Toch & Maguire, 2014), and violent crime rates (Anderson et al., 2017). According to Messner, Baumer, and Rosenfeld (2006), higher levels of support for the death penalty consistently were found "among white, older persons, men, wealthier individuals, conservatives, religious fundamentalists, married persons, and those who reside in less populated areas" (pp. 365–366). With that, the general profile of Millennials is becoming distant from some of these characteristics (i.e., less White, more liberal, areligious). Then, what implications do these findings have for a future trend in criminal justice policies?

Generational Research in Criminology. Compared to scholars in other disciplines, criminologists have paid relatively scant attention to studying potential generational effects. However, beginning around the late 2010s, research emerged that used the hierarchical age-period-cohort (HAPC) models to estimate the effects of age, period, and birth cohort

simultaneously on criminal justice issues (Anderson et al., 2017; Gray, Grasso, Farrall, Jennings, & Hay, 2019; Schwadel & Ellison, 2017; Shi, Lu, & Pickett, 2020).

Before reviewing each study, the statistical technique commonly employed in these studies merits attention: the HAPC models. The logic of this approach is that, by fitting a cross-classified random-effects model to repeated cross-sectional data, it is possible to estimate the effect of each cohort (averaged across periods and controlling for age) and the effect of each period (averaged across cohorts and controlling for age) (Schwadel & Ellison, 2017; Yang & Land, 2013). Initially developed by Yang and Land (2006), the HAPC models involve two steps. First, model specification tests are conducted that compare model fit statistics of partial models against the full fixed-effects APC model to determine whether age, period, and cohort effects are meaningful. Second, the HAPC models assume the hierarchical structure of repeated cross-sectional data where each respondent is nested in a period by cohort cell (Yang & Land, 2013). To be specific, individuals are modeled as the level-1 unit of analysis and age as a fixed effects individual-level variable; periods and cohorts are modeled as cross-classified level-2 units of analysis. Level-2 heterogeneity, if not accounted for, may result in underestimated standard errors and increase the risk of Type I error (Hox & Kreft, 1994). In this regard, the advantage of HAPC approach is to control for level-2 heterogeneity and result in valid statistical inference. Subsequent studies tested that a couple of assumptions should be met for the HAPC models to provide reliable results: (1) there exist period effects; (2) the associations between period, cohort, and outcome variables are not perfectly linear (Reither et al., 2015; but see Reither, Hauser, & Yang, 2009).

Applying the HAPC models, recent studies in criminology examined the APC effects on (1) death penalty attitudes (Anderson et al., 2017), (2) crime salience (Shi et al., 2020), (3)

marijuana legalization (Schwadel & Ellison, 2017), and (4) worry about crime and perceptions of antisocial behavior (Gray et al., 2019).

First, Anderson and her colleagues (2017) explore changes in death penalty attitudes over time and across birth cohorts using data from the General Social Survey between 1974 and 2014 ($N = 41,474$). Of note, Anderson and colleagues tested the influence of age, period, and cohort by employing three different types of statistical analyses (plotting time trends, fixed-effects APC binary logistic models, HAPC models) to strengthen the robustness of their findings. Across three methods, cohort effects were weaker than age and period effects, indicating that age and period were stronger predictors of changes in views on the death penalty than generation. To be more specific, those born in the 1930s and 1950s cohorts provided slightly lower levels of support for the death penalty (cohort effect). Support for the death penalty increased among those born in the 1960s and 1970s and decreased among those born after the 1980s. However, the differences were not substantial (less than .02 in estimated probability support). Notably, among more recent birth cohorts (younger Generation X and older Millennials), gender and racial differences in support for the death penalty became larger because the support among females and Blacks in younger generations declined substantially. In addition, youngest and oldest individuals supported the death penalty least, whereas middle-aged adults were most punitive (age effect). Support for the death penalty grew stronger between the mid-1980s and late 1990s (period effect).

Second, a recent study by Shi and her colleagues (2020) conducted HAPC models using 414 repeated cross-sectional surveys from the Most Important Problem (MIP) data ($N = 422,504$) collected between 1960 and 2014 to analyze the APC effects on the public salience of crime (i.e., identifying crime as a pressing social problem). The key takeaway from this research was that

period effects were greater than either age effects or cohort effects (i.e., the amount of variation

explained by age or cohort was smaller than that of period effects). Indeed, crime salience for all

generation groups increased steeply in the late 1980s, peaked in the mid-1990s, and declined

thereafter (period effect). However, cohort effect was smaller but did exist. The pre-1910 birth

cohorts (Lost and Greatest generations) and post-1970 cohorts (Generations X and Y) were most

likely to consider crime as the country's MIP (cohort effect). Across time, elder individuals

(those in their 50s and 60s) mostly reported the highest crime salience. However, since the late

1990s, the trend has changed, and younger individuals (those ages 18 to 29) became most salient

to crime (age effect).

Third, Schwadel and Ellison (2017) examined the shift in public support for marijuana

legalization between 1973 and 2014 using the General Social Survey data ($N = 26,307$). A

similar pattern was observed that was found in Shi et al. (2020), suggesting that the large

increase in support for marijuana legalization over time was predominantly due to period effects.

Support for marijuana legalization rose in the late 1970s, declined in the early 1980s, remained

low in the 1980s, and increased considerably from 1990 to 2014 (period effect). Notably, in

2014, an estimated probability of support reached over .5 whereas it was less than .2 in the early

1990s. However, age and cohort effects were also significant. Baby Boomers (the 1945 through

1964 cohorts) were relatively more supportive of marijuana legalization than other generations

(cohort effect). To be specific, an average estimated probability of support was .28 versus .22

for the remaining cohorts. That Baby Boomers provided stronger support for marijuana

legalization than Millennials is inconsistent with Pew Research Center's (2014) finding that the

support was most prevalent among Millennials. There was also a significant negative age effect.

73

The estimated probability of support for marijuana legalization decreased from .32 to .10 across the life course when individual correlates were controlled.

Fourth, Gray and her colleagues (2019) focus on the APC effects on fear of crime (robbery, burglary, car theft) and perceptions of antisocial behavior (vandalism, teenagers hanging around, noisy neighbors) by employing generalized additive models (GAMs) to repeated cross-sectional data from the British Crime Survey between 1982 and 2010. Similar to Anderson et al. (2017), they also used a three-step method to verify the estimates, including regression analysis, Wald tests, and GAMs. As a result, this study supported robust cohort effects and relatively weaker period effects. Pertinent to the cohort effect, the eldest generation (born between 1910 and 1924; equivalent of Silents) were least worried about crime (burglary, robbery, and car theft) compared to other generations, whereas those born after the 1940s (equivalent of Baby Boomers) and during the 1980s (equivalent of Millennials) were most salient to crime. With regard to the period effect, the year of interview was significantly associated with worry about burglary, robbery, and car theft but the odds ratios were modest. It also had small effects on the perceptions of teenagers and vandalism. As for the age effect, the youngest age category (ages 16 and 34) showed greater levels of concern about three forms of antisocial behavior (teenagers hanging around, vandalism, noisy neighbors) than older age categories. With these findings, Gray and colleagues (2019) conclude that "the political generation who came of age during an era where criminal justice was intensely focused on 'antisocial behaviour' later exhibited the lowest tolerance for low-level public order offences" (p. 449).

In summary, in these studies, Millennials were reported as (1) less favorable to death penalty than Generation X, but not as much as Silents and Baby Boomers, (2) very much likely

to identify crime as a serious social issue that the country attends to, (3) less supportive of marijuana legalization than Baby Boomers (but see Pew Research Center, 2014), and (4) more fearful of crime than other generation (however, this finding was drawn from British samples and may not be generalizable to American population).

Correctional Turning Point

The Millennial generation's attitudes toward correctional policies are worth exploring not only because this group will constitute a larger segment of society by gradually replacing older cohorts but also because American corrections is in the midst of a historic policy transformation. Starting around 2010, the United States has witnessed a shift in correctional policy that may imply fundamental changes in public views of criminals and criminal justice system. This transition ended four decades of a punitive era in corrections and embarked on a new era that gives more serious consideration to offender rehabilitation and redemption. Scholars refer to this period as a "correctional turning point" (Butler, Cullen, Burton, Thielo, & Burton, 2020; Cullen et al., 2020; Petersilia & Cullen, 2015).

Exclusion of Offenders: Punitive Era (1970–2010). From the early 1970s until 2010, correctional rhetoric and policy in the United States were increasingly guided by "the punishment imperative" (Clear & Frost, 2014) or "the culture of control" (Garland, 2001). Politicians espoused exclusionary, punitive correctional policies (Cullen & Jonson, 2017; Pfaff, 2017; Tonry, 2019). In prisons and jails, deterrence- or incapacitation-based correctional programs (e.g., boot camps, scared straight programs) were popular that tried to get tough with offenders and juvenile delinquents. In the mid-1990s, California and other states implemented three-strikes-and-you're-out laws—or two-strikes laws in some states—that mandated a life sentence without parole for those with two or more prior convictions of serious crimes.

Nationally, a war on drugs gained momentum and gave harsh penalties for drug offenses. At the same time, truth-in-sentencing laws and mandatory minimum sentencing laws were passed that reduced judicial discretion to consider extralegal factors in sentencing and increased the length of prison sentences. In academia, skepticism about rehabilitation was prevalent. Propelled by Robert Martinson's (1974) famous argument that nothing works in prison rehabilitation programs, scholars criticized the idea of rehabilitation as ineffective and overly lenient (for a review, see Cullen & Gilbert, 1982). During this era, public attitudes also grew punitive steadily (Enns, 2014, 2016; Pickett, 2019). In academic and popular writings, offenders were often portrayed as wicked, risky individuals or super-predators who were beyond redemption (e.g., DiIulio, 1995; Simon, 2014; Wilson, 1975).

The results of such punitive and exclusionary policies include mass incarceration and collateral consequences. First, America is met with unprecedented incarceration rates that are distinguished from other developed countries (Wagner & Sawyer, 2018). Indeed, between the 1950s and 1960s, the size of prison population had remained pretty stable, fluctuating around 200,000 (Cullen, 2018). In this context, Blumstein and Cohen (1973) even wrote "A Theory of the Stability of Punishment." However, their observations proved wrong when the size of prison population began to grow exponentially starting in the early 1970s. As of 2020, it is estimated that approximately 2.3 million people are locked up behind bars (Sawyer & Wagner, 2020).

Second, after prisoners serve their time, they face collateral consequences—"sanctions, restrictions, or disqualifications that stem from a person's criminal history" (United States Commission on Civil Rights [USCCR], 2019, p. 9). Lasting indefinitely, these consequences create social and economic barriers for ex-prisoners returning to society by denying rights and restricting opportunities (ABA, 2018; Jacobs, 2015; USCCR, 2019). Collateral consequences

adversely affect "adoptions, housing, welfare, immigration, employment, professional licensure, property rights, mobility, and other opportunities" (ABA, 2018, p. 4). Statistics show that there are over 46,000 collateral consequences at the state and federal levels (Malcolm & Seibler, 2017). As a result, they collectively increase the likelihood of recidivism by making it more difficult for individuals with convictions to reintegrate into society (Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002; Uggen, Manza, & Thompson, 2006; for a review, see USCCR, 2019). To place this problem in perspective, about 19 million Americans have felony records that are eternally available on the internet and 77 million or a third of Americans have any type of criminal record (Umez & Pirius, 2019). Moreover, collateral consequences disproportionately impact minority and economically disadvantaged populations (ABA, 2018; USCCR, 2019).

   Correctional Turning Point: A New Era (2010–). Reflecting the seriousness of the problem, scholars have written a shelfful of books on the mass incarceration era (see, e.g., Alexander, 2010; Enns, 2016; Mears & Cochran, 2014; Petersilia, 2003; Travis, 2000). However, beginning around 2010, incarceration rates suddenly stopped growing and started trending downward—a historic change predicted by nobody. In other words, American corrections has experienced a remarkable policy turning point (Aviram, 2015; Petersilia & Cullen, 2015; Pickett, 2016; Simon, 2014). Scholars call this event a turning point because the changes are occurring in multiple contexts (Butler et al., 2020; Petersilia & Cullen, 2015). To be specific, states have implemented ban-the-box regulations that prohibit employers from asking about a person's criminal history on a job application (for a review, see Avery, 2019). Criminal justice reform is gaining support from politicians and the public as evidenced by the fact that the First Step Act was signed into law under the Trump administration in December 2018 (Cohen, 2019; "First Step Act," n.d.; Grawert & Lau, 2019). At the passage of this bill,

President Trump even announced: "Redemption is at the heart of the America idea" (Strong, 2018). In culture, books, documentaries, and films are being released that criticize mass incarceration and collateral consequences (see, e.g., Hornaday, 2016; "Our 2019 Picks," 2019). These changes show evidence of a fundamental transition in thinking about offenders. Importantly, this new era has been endorsed across officials with divergent political ideologies and across Red and Blue states. For example, in Oklahoma, one of the most conservative states, a Republican governor recently released 527 prison inmates by commuting their sentences (Bellware, 2019).

Why are these changes occurring? Despite widespread concerns that the prison population would continue to grow unendingly, it stopped. Even though there are a shelfful of books on mass incarceration, none predicted such change. Neither did any of these works explain why four-decades of mass imprisonment and get-tough policies suddenly ended (for exceptions, see Aviram, 2015; Petersilia & Cullen, 2015). Yet there are a couple of plausible explanations. First, maintaining prisons and jails is expensive. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, it costs about 81 billion dollars per year to operate prisons, jails, parole, and probation (Wagner & Rabuy, 2017). In 2009, because of the Great Recession, government revenue was shrinking and balancing budgets was a pressing challenge (Aviram, 2015; Gottschalk, 2010, 2011). Thus, a number of state governors realized that it was not economically feasible to continue to build new prisons to house a growing inmate population. They were thus propelled to explore other options, which included community alternatives to incarceration and downsizing institutional populations. Second, public punitiveness was declining, in part due to decreasing crime rates. The public is increasingly favoring rehabilitation and alternatives to incarceration—even in Red States (Arkin, 2019; Bellware,

2019; Sundt, Cullen, Thielo, & Jonson, 2015; Thielo, Cullen, Cohen, & Chouhy, 2016; Pickett, 2016). Relatedly, the perception of law breakers has changed. Once, offenders were portrayed as super predators who posed a high threat to public safety and whose criminality was persistent. Now, policymakers classify criminals based on risk assessment, and they argue low-risk offenders do not belong to prison (Obama, 2017; Simon, 2014). Third, there was a growing awareness of racial injustice among the public—an awareness spurred by the release of popular trade books and widely watched documentaries. In this context, increasing efforts are being made to be inclusive rather than exclusive of ex-offenders. Such efforts to reduce barriers include prisoner reentry programs, ban-the-box regulations, therapeutic-justice specialty courts, and statutes facilitating criminal record expungement and reducing collateral consequences (Butler et al., 2020; Cullen et al., 2020; Jonson & Cullen, 2015; Love, Gaines, & Osborne., 2018; Love & Schlussel, 2019; Mears & Cochran, 2014; Thielo, Cullen, Burton, Moon, & Burton, 2019).

  Specific Policies Chosen for This Study. Numerous signs indicate that Millennials are in the midst of an important correctional turning point. However, one might ask whether this is a change that will endure for the next couple of decades or a temporary thing that could turn around quickly. Put more simply, will this trend continue? In this context, one way to prognosticate about the future of American corrections is to apply a generational framework and examine younger generations' public policy opinions. In particular, this study focuses on public attitudes on the following policy themes because these policies might be "a high priority and a voting issue for citizens" (Pickett, 2016, p. 133): (1) rehabilitation, (2) reentry, (3) reintegration, (4) redemption, and (5) punitiveness.

First, rehabilitation means "a planned correctional intervention that targets for change internal and/or social criminogenic factors with the goal of reducing recidivism and, where possible, of improving other aspects of an offender's life" (Cullen & Jonson, 2011, p. 295). According to Cullen and Gendreau (2000), correctional rehabilitation includes any intervention that meets the following: "(1) the intervention is planned or explicitly undertaken, not a chance or unwitting occurrence; (2) the intervention targets for change some aspect about the offender that is thought to cause the offender's criminality, such as his or her attitudes, cognitive processes, personality or mental health, social relationships to others, educational and vocational skills, and employment; and (3) the intervention is intended to make the offender less likely to break the law in the future—that is, it reduces recidivism" (p. 112).

Second, reentry refers to "the process of leaving prison and returning to society" (Travis, 2000, p. xxi). Programs that facilitate prisoner reentry include psychosocial support, education, vocational training, education, substance abuse treatment, medical and mental health services, and housing (Jonson & Cullen, 2015). Third, reintegration efforts can encompass the restoration of civil rights (e.g., voting, jury), fair-chance hiring (e.g., ban-the-box laws), reducing collateral consequences (e.g., giving offenders information, regular review of existing collateral sanctions of convictions), and the expungement of criminal records (e.g., automatic expungement for juvenile records, restricted access, ban on internet release) (USCCR, 2019). Fourth, the practice of redemption provides offenders with the opportunity to shed the stigma of "the other" to earn their place back into society. Redemptive ideals can be expanded by formal redemption rituals and rehabilitation ceremonies (Cullen et al., 2020). Fifth, public punitiveness can be gauged by their support for court harshness and the death penalty (Tyler & Weber, 1982).

Research Strategy

In the prior literature, generational research has been employed across disciplines relying on several different statistical techniques that range from cross-sectional ANOVA (in business and education) to CTMAs (in psychology) to HAPC models (in sociology and criminology). In order to assess generational differences in correctional ideology and in specific policy issues, this dissertation project will use multivariate multiple regressions because the nature of the data does not permit the application of CTMA or HAPC analysis. However, since the main goal of this study is to analyze across-generation "trends" in public attitudes on correctional policies rather than dissecting separate contributions of age, period, and cohort, the results from single-level regression models will be able to provide meaningful information. Furthermore, the use of the current data set is justified because it contains the most extensive correctional policy measures.

In addition to the main analyses, this study will examine whether there is intra-generation variation in support for correctional policies by conducting a subgroup analysis of Millennials. It is plausible that older Millennials might have significantly different attitudes on a certain policy issue from younger Millennials. Several theorists focus on generation units (i.e., subgroups of a generation) as an important theoretical construct (e.g., Mannheim, 1928/1970). Laufer and Bengtson (1974) even argue that the generational unit might be a more appropriate focus for generational research rather than broader generation.

Nevertheless, a potential limitation of this study is that it does not control for the effects of age, period, and cohort simultaneously. In other words, changes across generations, if they exist, may as well stem from the effects of age or period. For example, even if younger generations are more liberal on correctional policies than older generations at the time of survey, they might become more conservative as they age. It is also possible that attitudes observed in

81

this study might be "the result of specific temporal events" whose effects are transient and will be prevailed by the effects of other events (Anderson et al., 2017, p. 854). Additionally, by its design, this study inherently conflates cohort and age effects by leaving age out of the statistical models (Schwadel & Ellison, 2017).

However, three methodological considerations justify the use of cross-sectional data in this dissertation. First, the research design of this study is pertinent to its research question. The focal question of the current study is: "Are Millennials different in their support for correctional policies? If so, *how* are they different?" In other words, this dissertation explores what correctional policies are favored by Millennials to a greater (or lesser) extent compared to other generations. Thus, an analysis of the sources of generational differences (e.g., disentanglement of age, period, cohort effects) is not the focus of this study. Drawing from prior literature, the current study discusses compositional and contextual influences as possible explanations. Yet future studies might probe "*why* generations are different" by profiting from appropriate research designs. Second, as noted previously, the data set used in this study provides extensive measures on public attitudes toward correctional policies that are not available in any existing longitudinal data set. In this context, the current data set has a unique value because it has detailed measures of progressive and exclusionary correctional policies. Third, according to Lyons and Kuron (2014), a cross-sectional study can provide a "current snapshot of generational differences" and "a fossil record" or data that can be used in subsequent meta-analyses and reviews (p. S153).

In addition to these methodological justifications, this study draws upon theoretical justifications made in prior research. Regarding concerns for a potential age effect, studies show that political perspectives fixated during people's formative years tend to persist throughout the life course (e.g., Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Peterson, Smith, & Hibbing, 2020), resulting in

lasting social change by cohort replacement (Alwin & McCammon, 2007). As for concerns for a potential period effect, this study uses the assumption made by Twenge and colleagues that generational effects are stronger than period effects (e.g., Twenge et al., 2012). On the whole, however, the aim of this study is to examine how Millennial generation views correctional issues—whether due to age, period, or cohort effects. Thus, the focus is to unearth whether this group of Americans have a distinguished set of beliefs and attitudes that will indicate what they support now and likely in the future. Unpacking sources of the variation (e.g., age, period) awaits future research.

Conclusion

Do individuals of the same generation share similar attitudes regarding how to deal with correctional populations? In particular, are Millennials distinct from other generations in their public opinion on correctional policies? To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand how the concept of generation has been theoretically refined and whether research across disciplines empirically shows the existence of generational effects. Several works have contributed to the development of a theory of generations to date. As discussed, two classic contributions often cited in subsequent research and popular writings are Mannheim's (1928/1970) theory of generations and Strauss and Howe's (1991) generational theory. A later work by Ryder (1965) further expanded Mannheim's (1928/1970) framework. Note that these scholars worked in different disciplines: Mannheim was a sociologist; Strauss and Howe were historians; and Ryder was a demographer. Thus, the study of generation has been advanced in many other fields over time. These generational theories converge, however, on two points: (1) Differences in beliefs and behaviors across generations derive from different socialization processes and historical influences; (2) Generations are agencies of social change.

83

Grouped as those born between 1981 and 1996 by Pew Research Center (2019), Millennials are more racially and ethnically diverse than previous generations. While growing up, they witnessed 9/11 terrorist attacks, the internet explosion, the 2008 economic recession, and the 2008 election of Barack Obama. Generational differences have been documented by a host of studies across disciplines, including political science, business, psychology, and education. Of note, several findings might be relevant to the topic of this dissertation. For example, political science research indicates that, compared to older generations, Millennials are more Democratic and hold more liberal attitudes on social issues such as interracial marriage and immigration reform (see, e.g., Maniam & Smith, 2017).

Drawing from a review of previous research, there are several compositional (e.g., changes in racial/ethnic makeup, educational attainment, political and religious affiliations) and contextual factors (e.g., changes in society's political tolerance, crime rates) that might result in the "Millennial effect" on public support for correctional policies. The examination of Millennials' beliefs in correctional ideologies as shown by their policy preferences is particularly important because they are the "agency of social change" in the history of American corrections. Now that American corrections is transitioning from four decades of a punitive era into a more inclusionary period, the study of Millennials will be able to tell whether this change is likely to persist or not in the foreseeable future.

Chapter 2

METHODS

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore generational differences in public support for correctional policies—with a focus on Millennial generation. Previous studies suggest that Millennials might be distinguished from previous generations in several respects, including political preferences, work values and attitudes, psychological traits, and learning styles. Nevertheless, generational research on criminal justice issues is at a burgeoning stage. To contribute to this growing line of research, this dissertation analyzes a national-level opt-in internet panel survey collected by YouGov in 2017, using multivariate multiple regressions. In this chapter, the methodology of the current study will be discussed that includes the sampling and data collection procedures, the construction of measures, and the analytical strategy.

Data Collection

Opt-in Internet Panel Survey Approach

Challenges of Traditional Surveys. Opt-in internet panel survey approach has developed in tandem with challenges faced by traditional surveys (e.g., mail, face-to-face interviews, landline phone surveys) to secure high-quality data (Stern, Bilgen, & Dillman, 2014; for a review, see Thielo, 2017). Two issues are relevant: (1) falling response rates and (2) low coverage bias. First, response rates of traditional surveys have decreased due to the difficulties involved in contacting cell-phone users (e.g., technologies that screen and block incoming calls) and in-person interviewees (e.g., the proliferation of gated communities) as well as citizens' reluctance to respond to telephone and mailed surveys (Atkeson, Adams, & Alvarez, 2014; Brick & Williams, 2013). Second, this potential for low coverage bias increases that some members of

85

the population are excluded in a sampling frame (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2014). There is a growing concern with the coverage of traditional phone surveys that use random digit dialing (RDD) because landline phone use is in decline.

As an alternative, a "dual-frame" approach adds cellphone numbers to landline sampling frames (Dillman et al., 2014). However, it is more costly and takes more effort to sample and survey cellphone users than landline phone users because of a greater proportion of notworking or ineligible numbers and because of a greater number of attempts made to reach individuals (Link, Battaglia, Frankel, Osborn, & Mokdad, 2007; Link, Daily, Shuttles, Bourquin, & Yancey, 2009). In-person surveys are even more expensive and time-consuming than phone surveys (Aquilino, 1991; Holbrook, Green, & Krosnick, 2003; Szolnoki & Hoffman, 2013), and they are less desirable for a geographically expansive sample. Thus, traditional surveys are becoming less viable options for researchers with limited funds.

In this context, as a way to obtain "large, diverse, and high-quality samples" (Thielo, 2017, p. 19), an increasing number of researchers advocate the use of opt-in internet panel surveys (Baker et al., 2010, 2013; Callegaro et al., 2014). In opt-in internet panel surveys, an online panel consists of individuals who volunteer or "opt-in" to participate in surveys, usually in exchange for rewards (e.g., raffle entries, points that can be redeemed for gift cards or money) (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014; Smith, Roster, Golden, & Albaum, 2016). Drawing from this pool, a randomly selected sample of online panelists receive invitations to participate in surveys if they meet researcher-determined specifications (Callegaro et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2016).

Advantages of Online Opt-In Panel Surveys. This approach has three advantages: (1) efficiency and cost, (2) accuracy of responses, and (3) less concern for item nonresponse error (Thielo, 2017). First, compared to traditional survey methods, it takes less time to administer

online surveys and collect responses (e.g., Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014; Baker et al., 2010). The costs can also be saved from not employing interviewers or mailing materials (Dillman et al., 2014). In addition, this methods provides relatively efficient and inexpensive access to potential respondents because online panelists can be recruited through online advertisement and emails (Couper, 2000).

Second, scholars argue that survey responses in online surveys might be more accurate because respondents are able to view survey questions and response options in full on computer screens (Chang & Krosnick, 2009, 2010). Respondents are also less likely to "satisfice" (i.e., tendency to choose response options with minimal effort rather than giving deliberate thought, including straightening or speeding) and be influenced by "recency effects" (i.e., tendency to favor the last response option read by an interviewer) and "interviewer effects" (i.e., tendency to sense subtle cues or biased expectations from those delivering the survey, such as social desirability bias) (Chang & Krosnick, 2009, 2010; for a review, see Thielo, 2017). There is other evidence that online surveys yield data with greater concurrent validity and less measurement error than RDD telephone interviews (for a review, see Baker et al., 2010; Yeager et al., 2011).

Third, compared to traditional surveys, online surveys show less concern for item nonresponse error because participants are motivated to participate in the survey (Fricker, Galesic, Tourangeau, & Yan, 2005; Johnson et al., 2001; Kwak & Radler, 2002; Messer, Edwards, & Dillman, 2012). Several interactive and convenient formatting features of online surveys (e.g., check boxes, skip patterns) also increase respondents' attention and motivation to complete the survey (Zhang, 1999).

Concerns with External Validity. Some researchers raise concerns that the results from online opt-in panels might lack external validity because of convenience sampling (for a review,

see Callegaro et al., 2014; Thielo, 2017). That is, each person in the population of interest does not have a non-zero probability of being selected for the sampling frame. In this regard, two issues compromise the generalizability of the findings from online surveys: (1) coverage bias and (2) selection bias (Thielo, 2017). First, coverage bias can occur when some segments of the population (e.g., Hispanics, elderly, and those with less education and income) have disproportionately less access to the internet (Couper, Kapteyn, Schonlau, & Winter, 2007; Loosveldt & Sonck, 2008; Perrin & Duggan, 2015; Zickuhr, 2013). As of 2019, 90% of U.S. adults use the internet (Pew Research Center, 2019). Thus, about 10% of American population is potentially not covered in the sampling frame.

Second, selection bias can be introduced when people who participate in online surveys are meaningfully different from people who can but do not join online panels (Bethlehem, 2010; Nicolaas, Calderwood, Lynn, & Roberts, 2014). For example, online panels are more likely to consist of active internet users, Whites, and individuals of higher socioeconomic status and educational background (e.g., Craig et al., 2013). According to Baker and colleagues (2013), this type of "selection bias … creates substantial risk that the distribution of the important covariates in the sample will differ significantly from their distribution in the target population to such an extent that inferences could be misleading if not simply wrong" (p. 94).

However, these concerns can be alleviated by targeting online panelists for sample inclusion based on demographic characteristics and by giving "post-stratification weighting" (Thielo, Graham, & Cullen, in press; see also Chang & Krosnick, 2009; Dever, Rafferty, & Valliant, 2008). A growing number of studies find that nonprobability online samples, after sampling and post-survey weights are given, generate population estimates that are comparable to those of probability samples or population benchmarks (e.g., Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014;

Berrens, Bohara, Jenkins-Smith, Silva, & Weimer, 2013; Heen, Liberman, & Miethe, 2014; Lee & Valliant, 2009; Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2015; Simmons & Bobo, 2015). Thus, with proper adjustments, the findings from opt-in internet panel surveys can be considered generalizable to the U.S. population.

Sample Characteristics

In this study, the weighted demographics of the sample closely approximate those of the adult U.S. population. The comparisons of the sample with the American Community Survey (whose estimates are presented within parentheses) are as follows: non-Hispanic White, 66.8% (64.5%); male, 48.5% (48.7%); Bachelor's degree and above, 26.5% (28.4%); married, 44.1% (48.2%). The regional breakdown is presented below, with U.S. Census estimates in parentheses: Northeast, 18.7% (17.2%); South, 36.0% (38.1%); Midwest, 20.1% (20.9%); West, 25.3% (23.8%). According to the Pew Research Center (2018b), 42% of registered voters in the United States identify themselves as Republicans or lean Republican, and 50% identify as Democrats or lean Democratic. The proportions are similar in this study's sample: 41% and 46%. Thus, the demographic and partisan characteristics of the sample are comparable to those of the U.S. population.

YouGov's Data Collection Procedures

YouGov is an international research data and analytics group headquartered in London that has one of the world's largest research networks (e.g., a global online panel of over eight million people) ("About YouGov," n.d.). Its surveys have been used in studies across various academic disciplines, including public health, medicine, sociology, psychology, and political science (for a review, see Thielo, 2017). Studies in criminology have been recently analyzing

YouGov surveys to explore public opinion and criminal justice issues and published in top-tiered journals such as *Criminology* (e.g., Enns & Ramirez, 2018), *Justice Quarterly* (e.g., Lehmann & Pickett, 2017), *Journal of Experimental Criminology* (e.g., Rydberg, Dum, & Socia, 2018), and *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* (e.g., Pickett, Loughran, & Bushway, 2016).

To administer the survey, YouGov sends email invitations to the matched sample of panelists containing a link to the questionnaire. These invitations do not reveal specific information about the survey in order to prevent the overrepresentation of respondents who are interested in criminal justice issues. After the initial email invitation, YouGov sends multiple reminders about the survey to the panelists who have not completed it during a one-week period. The respondents participate in surveys in return for small incentives. YouGov also enforces procedures to ensure high-quality data. In order to prevent "professional" survey responding behavior (i.e., completing online surveys quickly and frequently to receive rewards), YouGov limits each respondent to participate in each survey once, confirms the true identity of the respondents, tracks the amount of time taken to complete surveys, and oversees the number of email invitations sent to panelists. It costs approximately $15,000 to conduct a 30-item YouGov survey (Thielo, 2017). In addition to the commissioned survey instrument, YouGov also provides about 20 items on the respondents' demographic and political/religious characteristics ("Core Profile Items") at no charge. Within a few weeks, YouGov finishes administering the survey and returns data in a clean SPSS file.

As for sampling, YouGov employs an innovative, two-stage, sample-matching design for model-based inference: distance matching and propensity score weighting (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013; Vavreck & Rivers, 2008). First, the company uses a synthetic sampling frame constructed from other probability samples (e.g., the Current Population Survey) to select a

matched sample of respondents from its volunteer online panel (more than two million U.S. panelists) based on the joint distribution of several demographic and behavioral variables. Second, the matched cases are then weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scoring. YouGov's method makes an assumption that potential bias from nonrandom sampling and nonresponse is ignorable conditional on the variables used for matching and weighting (Ansolabehere & Rivers, 2013; Thompson & Pickett, 2019). Studies assessing this issue show that online nonprobability surveys normally produce generalizable data (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2014; Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2007; Simmons & Bobo, 2015) and sometimes outperform probability sampling methods (Kennedy et al., 2016; Vavreck & Rivers, 2008).

Distribution of the Survey

The data for this study were drawn from a national-level, opt-in internet survey of 1,000 American adults ages 18 and older, administered by YouGov between March 3 and March 7 in 2017. YouGov initially interviewed 1,161 respondents, who were matched to a sample of 1,000 to a synthetic sampling frame constructed in reference to other national probability samples (the 2010 American Community Survey, the November 2010 Current Population Survey, the 2007 Pew Religious Life Survey). The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. Velmer S. Burton, Jr. was the principal investigator (PI) of the original project. Angela J. Thielo was responsible for developing the survey instrument and for collaborating with YouGov to implement the survey. Data collection (human subject research) was originally approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Mississippi (for more details, see Thielo, 2017). The measures used in the study are provided in Appendix A (question wording for the survey items) and Appendix B (YouGov "Core Profile Items").

Measures

Measuring Support for Correctional Policies

The dependent variables in this dissertation include 13 measures of correctional policies relevant to five themes (number of corresponding measures in parentheses): (1) rehabilitation (one measure), (2) reentry (one measure), (3) reintegration (six measures), (4) redemption (two measures), and (5) punitiveness (three measures). The classification is informed by Thielo's (2017) work that defined "four major elements of offender inclusion" as rehabilitation, reentry, reintegration, and redemption (p. 13). This dissertation adds one more component, punitiveness, because the public's punitiveness has been influential in correctional policy-making decisions (Enns, 2014, 2016; Pickett, 2019). Again, this dissertation is a secondary analysis of the data set used in Thielo's (2017) dissertation and in subsequent publications (Burton et al., 2020; Butler et al., 2020; Thielo et al., 2019).

Rehabilitation. Support for rehabilitation policies is measured by a five-item "support for rehabilitation" index, which was originally adapted from previous literature: (1) "It is a good idea to provide treatment for offenders who are supervised by the courts and live in the community" (Applegate, Cullen, & Fisher, 1997); (2) "Rehabilitation programs should be available even for offenders who have been involved in a lot of crime in their lives" (Applegate et al., 1997); (3) "It is important to try to rehabilitate adults who have committed crimes and are now in the correctional system" (Applegate et al., 1997); (4) "All rehabilitation programs have done is allow criminals who deserve to be punished to get off easily" (reverse-coded; Cullen, Gilbert, & Cullen, 1983); (5) "I would not support expanding the rehabilitation programs that are now being undertaken in our prisons" (reverse-coded; Cullen, Clark, Cullen, & Mathers, 1985).

Values (1 = *strongly agree* to 6 = *strongly disagree*) are recoded in a way that higher scores

represent stronger support for rehabilitation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of

sampling adequacy and Bartlett's test of sphericity suggest that the factor analysis is useful with

the sample (KMO = .807; Bartlett's test of sphericity χ^2 = 1998.81, df = 10, p = .000). As shown

in Table 2.1, the results of unrotated exploratory factor analysis (EFA) indicate that the five

items load on a single factor (loadings from .627 to .821). A mean index, Support for

Rehabilitation, is computed based on responses to five items (α = .841).

 Reentry. Support for reentry policies is measured with five items that ask the level of

support for providing offenders with the following reentry services when they return to the

community: (1) "job training"; (2) "education"; (3) "drug treatment"; (4) "mental health

services"; (5) "help finding a place to live." These items were developed originally by Sundt and

her colleagues (2015). Values (1 = *strongly support* to 6 = *strongly oppose*) are recoded in a way

that higher scores represent stronger support for reentry. The KMO statistic and Bartlett's test

indicate that the sample is adequate to conduct the factor analysis (KMO = .889; Bartlett's test of

sphericity χ^2 = 3659.285, df = 10, p = .000). Table 2.2 shows that all items load well on a single

factor (loadings from .795 to .879). Responses to the five items are averaged to make the index,

Support for Reentry (α = .920).

 Reintegration. Attitudes toward policies that promote ex-prisoners' reintegration imply

public willingness to view offenders as equal citizens deserving American rights and

opportunities (Thielo, 2017; Uggen et al., 2006). In Thielo's (2017) original survey, support for

reintegration policies is explored on four fronts: "(1) restoration of civil rights, (2) fair-chance

hiring initiatives, (3) increasing the visibility and efficacy of collateral sanctions, and the (4)

expungement of criminal records" (p. 52). In this context, six distinct measures are employed

Table 2.1. *EFA Results for Support for Rehabilitation Scale* (Cronbach's α = .841)

Variable (Range)	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Treatment (1–6)	It is a good idea to provide treatment for offenders who are supervised by the courts and live in the community.	.63	4.80	1.14
Availability (1–6)	Rehabilitation programs should be available even for offenders who have been involved in a lot of crime in their lives.	.74	4.24	1.43
Importance (1–6)	It is important to try to rehabilitate adults who have committed crimes and are now in the correctional system.	.82	4.67	1.16
Get Off Easily (1–6)	All rehabilitation programs have done is to allow criminals who deserve to be punished to get off easily. (R)	.73	3.69	1.36
Expanding Rehabilitation (1–6)	I would not support expanding the rehabilitation programs that are now being undertaken in our prisons. (R)	.77	3.90	1.40

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; (R) = reverse-coded; KMO = 0.81; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 1998.81, df = 10, *p* = .000; eigenvalue = 2.75; %variance explained = 85.78

Table 2.2. *EFA Results for Support for Reentry Scale* (α = .920)

Variable (Range)	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Job (1–6)	Provide job training to offenders when they return to the community.	.88	5.20	1.06
Education (1–6)	Provide education to offenders when they return to the community.	.87	5.10	1.08
Drug (1–6)	Provide drug treatment to offenders when they return to the community.	.85	5.23	1.09
Mental Health (1–6)	Provide mental health treatment to offenders when they return to the community.	.79	5.30	.98
Housing (1–6)	Provide help finding a place to live to offenders when they return to the community.	.82	5.05	1.07

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = 0.89; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 3459.29, df = 10, p = .000; eigenvalue = 3.55; %variance explained = 94.35

tapping on the above four aspects of support for reintegration policies. First, Support for

Restoration of Civil Rights is measured as the sum of responses to two items that ask whether

convicted felons should lose rights to vote (0 = *Permanently lose their right to vote*, 1 = *Lose*

their right until they complete their sentence, 2 = *Not lose their right to vote at all*) or sit on

juries (0 = *Permanently excluded from sitting on juries*, 1 = *Allowed once their sentence is*

completed) (Cramer's *V* = .522).

Second, support for fair-chance hiring is measured with one binary item asking whether

the respondent agrees with "ban the box" laws (1 = *Ban the box laws are a good idea*).

Third, support for reducing collateral sanctions is measured with three survey questions

asking the degree to which respondents agree with the following statements: (1) "Offenders

should be given information regarding all of the possible collateral sanctions they may face if

they are convicted of a crime, both at the time they are charged with a crime and before entering

a plea of guilty or innocent"; (2) "Every five years, state and federal lawmakers should review all

of the existing collateral sanctions of convictions, and eliminate the ones that are found to have

no useful purpose"; (3) "A collateral sanction should be eliminated unless it is shown to reduce

crime." These items are measured on a six-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 6 =

strongly agree). Both KMO statistic and Bartlett's test indicate the suitability of this data for

structure detection (KMO = 0.648; Bartlett's test of sphericity χ^2 = 709.808, df = 3, *p* = .000). As

presented in Table 2.3, the three items load on a single factor (loadings from .635 to .859). A

mean index, Support for Reducing Collateral Sanctions, is computed by averaging responses to

these items (α = .743).

Fourth, support for the expungement of criminal records is measured with the three-item

"support for expungement" index: (1) "Juvenile records for non-violent crimes should be

Table 2.3. *EFA Results for Support for Reducing Collateral Sanctions Scale (α = .743)*

Variable (Range)	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Information (1–6)	Offenders should be given information regarding all of the possible collateral sanctions they may face if they are convicted of a crime, both at the time they are charged with a crime and before entering a plea of guilty or innocent.	.66	4.94	1.06
Review (1–6)	Every five years, state and federal lawmakers should review all of the existing collateral sanctions of convictions and eliminate the ones that are found to have no useful purpose.	.86	4.63	1.16
Eliminated (1–6)	A collateral sanction should be eliminated unless it is shown to reduce crime.	.63	4.17	1.34

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = 0.65; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 709.81, df = 3, *p* = .000; eigenvalue = 1.58; %variance explained = 95.09

automatically expunged so that the public cannot see them"; (2) "Only law enforcement agencies and some potential employers should be able to see adults' records for non-violent crimes"; (3) "If a person never has the opportunity to expunge their criminal record, they may face problems that lead them back to a life of crime." Values (1 = *strongly agree* to 6 = *strongly disagree*) are recoded in a way that higher scores represent stronger support for expungement of criminal records. The KMO and Bartlett's test suggest that the sample is acceptable to perform a factor analysis (KMO = 0.618; Bartlett's test of sphericity χ^2 = 351.212, df = 6, *p* = .000). As shown in Table 2.4, the three items load on a single factor (all factor loadings > .45). Responses to these items are averaged to compute a mean index, Support for the Expungement (α = .574). Two additional measures are used to assess General Attitudes Toward Expungement (0 = *expunging criminal records is a bad policy*, 1 = *expunging criminal records is a good policy*) and Support for the FBI Review of Criminal Records (1 = *strongly oppose* to 6 = *strongly support*).

Redemption. Thielo (2017) argues that public sentiment toward offender inclusion is expressed by their support for correctional policies that help ex-prisoners shed their criminal identities and achieve "meaningful redemption from prosocial society" (p. 59). Two measures are relevant. First, support for formal redemption rituals is measured with the mean of two items asking the extent to which a respondent agrees that rehabilitation ceremonies and certificates of rehabilitation would assist ex-offenders to reintegrate back into the community and stay out of crime (α = .835). Values (1 = *strongly agree* to 6 = *strongly disagree*) are recoded in a way that higher scores represent stronger support for formal redemption rituals.

Second, support for redeemability is relevant to four items that measure attitudes toward redeemability: (1) "Most offenders can go on to lead productive lives with help and hard work" (Maruna & King, 2009); (2) "Given the right conditions, a great many offenders can turn their

Table 2.4. *EFA Results for Support for the Expungement Scale* (α = .574)

Variable (Range)	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Juvenile (1–6)	Juvenile records for non-violent crimes should be automatically expunged so that the public cannot see them.	.63	4.33	1.39
Law Enforcement (1–6)	Only law enforcement agencies and some potential employers should be able to see adults' records for non-violent crimes.	.46	4.24	1.37
Problems (1–6)	If a person never has the opportunity to expunge their criminal record, they may face problems that lead them back to a life of crime.	.59	4.34	1.33

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; KMO = 0.62; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 264.35, df = 3, *p* = .000; eigenvalue = 0.96; %variance explained = 98.38

lives around and become law-abiding citizens" (Roberts, Doble, Clawson, Selton, & Briker,

2005); (3) "Most criminals are unlikely to change for the better" (reverse-coded); (4) "Some

offenders are so damaged that they can never lead productive lives" (reverse-coded; Maruna &

King, 2009). Values (1 = *strongly agree* to 6 = *strongly disagree*) are recoded in a way that

higher scores represent stronger support for redeemability. The KMO statistic and Bartlett's test

indicate that the factor analysis is acceptable with the current sample (KMO = 0.645; Bartlett's

test of sphericity χ^2 = 1066.557, df = 6, *p* = .000). As Table 2.5 reports, the four items load fairly

well on a single factor (all factor loadings > .45). Responses to the items are averaged to make

the index, Support for Redeemability (α = .718).

  Punitiveness. Drawing from measures to gauge public punitiveness (Enns, 2016), three

items are used to measure support for punitiveness. The first item, Support for the Court

Harshness, asks the extent to which a respondent agrees with the statement "courts deal not

harshly enough with criminals" (0 = *Too harsh*, 1 = *About right or Don't know*, 2 = *Not harshly*

enough). The second item, Support for the Death Penalty, asks whether a respondent favors

death penalty (0 = *Oppose*, 1 = *No opinion*, 2 = *Favor*). The third item, Support for the

Punishment Goal of Prisons, asks what the main emphasis of prisons should be (0 = *Trying to*

rehabilitate the individual, protecting society, not sure, 1 = *Punishing the individual*). Because

these measures have a weak association (Cramer's *V* = .179), they are analyzed in separate

models.

Measuring Generations

  Following the guideline of Pew Research Center (Dimock, 2019; Doherty et al., 2015),

five generation binary variables are constructed: Greatests/Silents (those who were born in 1945

Table 2.5. *EFA Results for Support for Redeemability Scale (α = .718)*

Variable (Range)	Item	FL	$\bar{X}$	SD
Productive Lives (1–6)	Most offenders can go on to lead productive lives with help and hard work.	.82	4.23	1.13
Law-Abiding (1–6)	Given the right conditions, a great many offenders can turn their lives around and become law-abiding citizens.	.83	4.33	1.13
No Change (1–6)	Most criminals are unlikely to change for the better. (R)	.52	3.29	1.24
Too Damaged (1–6)	Some offenders are so damaged that they can never lead productive lives. (R)	.47	2.51	1.21

Notes: FL = Factor Loading; (R) = reverse-coded; KMO = 0.65; Bartlett's Test of Sphericity χ^2 = 1066.56, df = 6, *p* = .000; eigenvalue = 1.84; %variance explained = 81.86

and before; $n = 95$), Baby Boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964; $n = 308$), Generation X

(those born between 1965 and 1980; $n = 279$), Millennials (those born between 1981 and 1996; n

$= 294$), and Generation Z (those born from 1997 onward; $n = 24$). However, a close inspection

reveals that 24 Gen Zers in the sample were born between 1997 (13 cases) and 1998 (11 cases).

Because the size of Generation Z is small and their birthyears are close to the age cutoff (i.e., the

year 1996), this group is merged with Millennials. The weighted results from two-sample equal-

variance t-tests show that Millennials and Generation Z are comparable on most covariates

(Table 2.6). Thus, four generation variables are compared in the analyses, using

Millennials/Generation Z (hereafter referred to as Millennials) as a reference group ($n = 318$).

Control Variables

The following variables are included as controls to reduce the risk of omitted variable

bias: gender (1 = *Male*), race (dummy-coded, *White* as a reference group), education (1 = *no high

school*, 6 = *graduate degree*), marital status (1 = *Married*), household composition (1 = *Child in

household*), employment (1 = *Employed*), family income (1 = *<$10K*, 16 = *$500K+*), political

interest (1 = *Hardly at all*, 4 = *Most of the time*), Republicanism (1 = *strong Democrat*, 7 =

strong Republican), and Conservatism (1 = *very liberal*, 5 = *very conservative*). As is normal in

survey research, there was a comparatively large amount of missing data on the income variable

(13.50%). These missing values were imputed using scores on the other variables in the

analyses. In addition, two measures of religious beliefs are controlled. Religiosity is a

standardized mean index ($\alpha = .803$) based on three survey questions about the importance of

religion in respondents' lives (1 = *not at all*, 4 = *very important*), how frequently they attend

church (1 = *never*, 6 = *more than once a week*), and how frequently they pray (1 = *never*, 7 =

several times a day). Born-Again Protestant is a binary indicator of whether the respondent

Table 2.6. *Test for the Equality of Means Between Millennials and Generation Z*

Variables	Millennials (*n* = 294)		Generation Z (*n* = 24)		t-test
	Mean	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**	
Support for Rehabilitation					
Rehabilitation	4.305	.070	4.224	.171	.440
Support for Reentry					
Reentry	5.052	.084	4.614	.268	1.560
Support for Reintegration					
Restoration of Civil Rights	1.651	.079	1.365	.282	.980
Fair-Chance Hiring	.632	.041	.604	.124	.210
Reducing Collateral Sanctions	4.432	.079	4.370	.221	.270
Expungement	4.310	.088	4.411	.246	-.390
General Attitudes toward Expungement	.517	.042	.593	.123	-.590
The FBI Review of Criminal Records	4.776	.086	5.017	.246	-.930
Support for Redemption					
Formal Redemption Rituals	4.322	.087	4.362	.127	-.260
Redeemability	3.723	.060	3.550	.153	1.060
Support for Punitiveness					
Court Harshness	1.095	.054	.902	.224	.840
Death Penalty	1.171	.064	1.261	.209	-.410
The Punishment Goal of Prisons	.157	.028	.115	.067	.590

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); SD: Standard deviation.

Table 2.6. *Test for the Equality of Means Between Millennials and Generation Z (Continued)*

Variables	Millennials (*n* = 294)		Generation Z (*n* = 24)		t-test
	Mean	**SD**	**Mean**	**SD**	
Control Variables					
Male	.516	.041	.463	.136	.370
White (reference group)	.542	.043	.605	.127	-.480
Black	.183	.039	.121	.091	.630
Hispanic	.161	.033	.177	.096	-.160
Other Races	.114	.030	.096	.059	.270
Education	3.082	.118	2.699	.489	.760
Married	.244	.031	0	0	7.850***
Child in Household	.301	.035	0	0	8.570***
Employed	.460	.041	.311	.117	1.200
Family Income	4.395	.215	4.138	.569	.420
Political Interest	2.710	.090	2.905	.223	-.810
Republicanism	3.474	.151	2.702	.315	2.210*
Conservatism	2.963	.072	2.417	.182	2.790**
Religiosity	-.221	.077	-.051	.282	-.580
Born-Again Protestant	.079	.019	.182	.122	-.830

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); SD: Standard deviation.

reports being born-again religiously and a member of a Protestant denomination (0 = *no*, 1 = *yes*). Table 2.7 provides the descriptive statistics for these controls and for the other variables included in the analysis.

Analytical Strategy

This dissertation will explore generational differences in the extent of support for correctional policies. For this purpose, support for each correctional policy will be calculated and compared across generation groups. Horizontal bar charts will be generated for each item used to construct measures in the analyses (e.g., six items on support for rehabilitation; see Figure 2.1 for an example). Next, using the 13 measures of corrections policies relevant to five themes (i.e., rehabilitation, reentry, reintegration, redemption, punitiveness) as outcomes, multivariate analyses will be employed to examine the effect of generational membership while controlling for demographics and political/religious affiliations. Depending of the nature of outcome variables, appropriate regression analyses will be used: Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS; Support for Rehabilitation, Reentry, Reducing Collateral Sanctions, the Expungement of Criminal Records, the FBI Review of Criminal Records, Formal Redemption Rituals, Redeemability), ordinal logistic regression (Support for the Restoration of Civil Rights, the Court Harshness, the Death Penalty), and binary logistic regression (Support for Fair-Chance Hiring, General Attitudes Toward Expungement, the Punishment Goal of Prisons). Statistical checks will be performed to inspect if regression assumptions (e.g., linearity, homoscedasticity, random errors, proportional odds) are not violated.

Furthermore, in supplementary analyses, the Millennials group will be divided into two subgroups based on the birthyear cutoff 1989: Old Millennials (birthyears: 1981–1989, $n = 175$) and Young Millennials (birthyears: 1990–1998, $n = 143$). In order to compare the differences

Table 2.7. *Descriptive Statistics*

Variables	Mean (%)	SD	Min	Max
Support for Rehabilitation				
Rehabilitation	4.192	.970	1	6
Support for Reentry				
Reentry	5.119	.913	1	6
Support for Reintegration				
Restoration of Civil Rights	1.416	.981	0	3
Fair-Chance Hiring	(64.723)		0	1
Reducing Collateral Sanctions	4.516	.930	1	6
Expungement	4.279	1.009	1	6
General Attitudes Toward Expungement	(45.060)		0	1
The FBI Review of Criminal Records	4.894	1.091	1	6
Support for Redemption				
Formal Redemption Rituals	4.290	1.072	1	6
Redeemability	3.558	.834	1	6
Support for Punitiveness				
Court Punitiveness	1.247	.704	0	2
Death Penalty	1.268	.867	0	2
The Punishment Goal of Prisons	(15.542)		0	1
Generation				
Greatest/Silent Generation	(10.757)		0	1
Baby Boom Generation	(29.378)		0	1
Generation X	(26.601)		0	1
Millennials/Generation Z (reference group)	(33.264)		0	1

Table 2.7. *Descriptive Statistics (Continued)*

Variables	Mean (%)	SD	Min	Max
Control Variables				
Male	(48.481)		0	1
White (reference group)	(66.756)		0	1
Black	(12.437)		0	1
Hispanic	(12.819)		0	1
Other Races	(7.988)		0	1
Education	3.174	1.526	1	6
Married	(44.092)		0	1
Child in Household	(24.732)		0	1
Employed	(43.912)		0	1
Family Income	5.084	2.954	1	16
Political Interest	3.109	1.004	1	4
Republicanism	3.704	2.017	1	7
Conservatism	3.140	.945	1	5
Religiosity	.013	.871	-1.593	1.438
Born-Again Protestant	(20.036)		0	1

Figure 2.1. *Example Horizontal Bar Chart*

Public Support for Rehabilitation Not Used as a Chance to Get Off Easily by Generation

between older cohorts and younger cohorts of Millennials, multivariate analyses will be repeated by modeling two subgroups in place of Millennials (reference group: Young Millennials). The equivalence of coefficients will be also tested across generations.

Conclusion

There are few generational studies in criminology, and extant research has not examined how generational membership affects support for a range of correctional policies. To fill this gap in literature, this dissertation analyzes a national-level opt-in internet survey of 1,000 Americans (ages 18 and older) collected in March 3–7, 2017. YouGov's rigorous sampling and weighting procedures increase the confidence that the current study's findings can be generalized to the American adult population. The results from univariate analyses and multivariate multiple regression analyses will be presented in the following chapter. Specifically, the associations between generational membership and 13 measures of correctional policies falling into five themes (i.e., rehabilitation, reentry, reintegration, redemption, punitiveness) will be explored. The next chapter will also report whether there is intra-variation among Millennials in their support for various correctional policy issues—focusing on the comparison between old and young Millennials—and whether the covariates have equivalent effects across Millennials and other generations. Taken together, Millennials' attitudes toward various correctional policies will foretell how this generation will shape the future of American corrections.

Chapter 3

RESULTS

In this chapter, the extent and sources of public support for correctional policies will be examined. First, univariate analyses will be performed to assess the extent of public support for correctional policies. At issue is whether there is a systematic pattern across generations showing that Millennials are distinguished from older cohorts and if so, what the pattern is like. Second, multivariate analyses will be conducted to explore the sources of public support for correctional policies. The question is whether the generational membership is a strong predictor of support for correctional policies with and without introducing control variables. Third, older cohorts and younger cohorts of Millennials will be compared to assess whether there is a within-group variation in their support for correctional policies. Last, separate regression analyses will be employed after stratifying data by generation to determine whether the effect of each covariate differs across generations.

Public Support for Correctional Policies: Are Millennials Different and How?

In this section, the weighted results from univariate analyses are presented. A total of 30 items are used to construct the outcome variables in regression analyses. For each item, a crosstab and a horizontal bar chart are generated to show the distribution of responses across generations. In horizontal bar charts, bars are colored in a way that blue bars correspond with progressive attitudes, red bars represent exclusionary attitudes, and gray bars stand for neutral attitudes toward correctional policies. Pearson's Chi-Square test of independence is employed to inspect whether the distribution is random across generations.

Public Support for Punitiveness

Death Penalty. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 report public support for the death penalty for a person convicted of murder. Notably, Millennials are the least in favor of capital punishment, with 46.1% favoring this sanction. Millennials are the only generation in which a majority of the sample opposes or has no opinion about the application of the death penalty. The other generations' support for capital punishment ranges from 57.1% (Baby Boomers) to 60.4% (Generation X)—or 11.0% to 14.3% points higher than Millennials. The differences across generations are statistically significant (Pearson's $\chi^2 = 26.549$, df = 6, $p < .05$).

Court Harshness Toward Criminals. Similar to capital punishment, Millennials are also the least punitive generation with regard to the desire for harsher courts. As seen in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2, more than 1 in 5 Millennials state that courts are "too harsh" toward criminals. Support for harsher courts from the next closest generation (Generation X) is 7.9% points higher. Only 3.8% of the Greatest/Silent respondents think that courts deal with offenders too harshly. At the same time, like other generations, more Millennials think that the courts are "not harsh enough" (29.8%) or "about right/don't know" (48.3%) than too harsh. Note that the differences among generations are statistically significant (Pearson's $\chi^2 = 40.710$, df = 6, $p < .001$).

The Punishment Goal of Prisons. Millennials are neither the most punitive nor the least punitive generation as for public support for the punishment goal of prisons (Table 3.3, Figure 3.3). Among Millennials, 15.4% endorse punishing the individual as the main emphasis in most prisons, compared to 12.6% of the Greatest/Silent, 13.3% of Baby Boomers, to 19.4% of Generation X. Of note, the greatest proportion (40.4%) of Millennials respond that rehabilitation should be the main focus of incarceration whereas other generations support the protection of

Table 3.1. *Public Support for Death Penalty, by Generation*
      (N = 998, Percentages Reported)

	Oppose	No Opinion	Favor	Favor & No Opinion
Millennials/ Generation Z	28.3	25.6	46.1	71.7
Generation X	24.3	15.4	60.4	75.8
Baby Boom	29.3	13.6	57.1	70.7
Greatest/ Silent	30.1	10.8	59.1	69.9

Item: Opinion about death penalty for a person convicted of murder;
Pearson's χ^2 = 26.549, df = 6, p < .05.

Figure 3.1. *Public Support for Death Penalty, by Generation*

112

Table 3.2. *Public Support for Court Harshness Toward Criminals, by Generation (N = 998, Percentages Reported)*

	Too Harsh	About Right/ Don't Know	Not Harsh Enough	Not Harsh Enough & About Right/ Don't Know
Millennials/ Generation Z	21.9	48.3	29.8	78.1
Generation X	14.0	46.2	39.8	86.0
Baby Boom	13.7	40.0	46.3	86.3
Greatest/ Silent	3.8	40.2	56.0	96.2

Item: The courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals; Pearson's χ^2 = 40.710, df = 6, p < .001.

Figure 3.2. *Public Support for Court Harshness Toward Criminals, by Generation*

Table 3.3. *Public Support for the Punishment Goal of Prisons, by Generation (N = 999, Percentages Reported)*

	Trying to Rehabilitate the Individual	Protecting Society	Not Sure	Punishing the Individual
Millennials/ Generation Z	40.4	32.4	11.9	15.4
Generation X	35.7	38.4	6.6	19.4
Baby Boom	39.5	41.9	5.2	13.3
Greatest/ Silent	40.4	43.4	3.6	12.6

Item: The main emphasis in most prisons;
Pearson's χ^2 = 22.521, df = 9, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.3. *Public Support for the Punishment Goal of Prisons, by Generation*

114

society the most. However, the differences across generations are not statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 22.521, df = 9, p > .05).

Public Support for Rehabilitation

Offender Treatment in the Community. Table 3.4.1 and Figure 3.4.1 suggest that public support for offender treatment in the community is widespread among the American public and that there does not appear to be a systematic pattern across generations (Pearson's χ^2 = 29.337, df = 15, p > .05). Nearly 9 in 10 Millennials support providing treatment for offenders who are supervised by the courts and live in the community. A similar level of support is observed in other generations (89.1% of Generation X, 90.3% of Baby Boomers, 85.2% of the Greatest/Silent).

Rehabilitation Availability for Offenders. As reported in Table 3.4.2 and Figure 3.4.2, Millennials have the most inclusionary attitudes toward offender rehabilitation. About 8 in 10 Millennials agree that rehabilitation programs should be available even for offenders who have been involved with a lot of crime, expressing greater support than other generations (74.3% of Generation X, 69.5% of Baby Boomers, 54.9% of the Greatest/Silent). Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 58.617, df = 15, p < .01).

Importance of Offender Rehabilitation. Similar to public support for offender treatment in the community, more than 80% of all generation groups express belief in the importance of offender rehabilitation (Table 3.4.3, Figure 3.4.3). About 87% of Millennials respond that it is important to rehabilitate adults who have committed crimes and are now in the correctional system. Comparable percentages of support are found among Generation X (87.2%) and Baby Boomers (87.2%), and support from the Greatest/Silent is about 6% lower (81.1%). Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 58.617, df = 15, p < .01).

Table 3.4.1. *Public Support for Offender Treatment in the Community, by Generation*
(*N* = 989, Percentages Reported)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	1.1	1.3	9.4	21.0	41.2	26.1	88.2
Generation X	2.5	2.6	5.8	24.7	34.1	30.3	89.1
Baby Boom	1.7	1.6	6.4	23.1	34.8	32.4	90.3
Greatest/ Silent	4.1	2.8	8.0	35.8	35.0	14.3	85.2

Item 1: It is a good idea to provide treatment for offenders who are supervised by the courts and live in the community;
Pearson's χ^2 = 29.337, df = 15, *p* > .05.

Figure 3.4.1. *Public Support for Offender Treatment in the Community, by Generation*

116

Table 3.4.2. *Public Support for Rehabilitation Availability for Offenders, by Generation (N = 984, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	1.9	5.2	12.8	30.0	27.6	22.5	80.1
Generation X	8.4	7.7	9.6	25.7	22.6	26.0	74.3
Baby Boom	6.1	11.2	13.3	28.1	22.6	18.7	69.5
Greatest/ Silent	7.3	15.1	22.8	33.1	17.0	4.7	54.9

Item 2: Rehabilitation programs should be available even for offenders who have been involved in a lot of crime in their lives;
Pearson's χ^2 = 58.617, df = 15, $p < .01$.

Figure 3.4.2. *Public Support for Rehabilitation Availability for Offenders, by Generation*

Table 3.4.3. *Public Support for Importance of Offender Rehabilitation, by Generation (N = 992, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	1.4	2.1	9.7	22.3	38.3	26.2	86.8
Generation X	1.8	3.5	7.7	31.5	29.0	26.7	87.2
Baby Boom	0.9	5.3	6.7	31.3	33.8	22.1	87.2
Greatest/ Silent	3.4	3.3	1.2	44.2	28.2	9.4	81.1

Item 3: It is important to try to rehabilitate adults who have committed crimes and are now in the correctional system;
Pearson's $\chi^2 = 41.043$, df = 15, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.4.3. *Public Support for Importance of Offender Rehabilitation, by Generation*

118

Rehabilitation Not Used as a Chance to Get Off Easily. As demonstrated in Table 3.4.4

and Figure 3.4.4, about a half (54.4%) of Millennials disagree that all rehabilitation programs

have done is to allow criminals who deserve to be punished to get off easily. Millennial belief

that rehabilitation is not used to allow offenders to "get off easily" is 2% to 5% lower than in

Generation X (56.4%) and Baby Boomers (59.3%) and is 8% higher than in the Greatest/Silent

(46.0%). However, there is lack of evidence for a systematically different pattern of responses

across generations (Pearson's χ^2 = 32.948, df = 15, p > .05).

Expanding Offender Rehabilitation. Table 3.4.5 and Figure 3.4.5 report that about 6 in

10 Millennials support expanding the rehabilitation programs that are now being undertaken in

prisons—about 3% higher than the least supportive group, the Generation X (58.8%). Compared

to Millennials, slightly higher proportions of Baby Boomers (62.7%) and the Greatest/Silent

(62.8%) agree with the expansion of rehabilitation programs. Although not substantial,

generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 43.337, df = 15, p < .05).

Public Support for Reentry

Providing Job Training to Offenders. As reported in Table 3.5.1 and Figure 3.5.1, about

9 in 10 Millennials favor providing job training to offenders when they return to the community.

Notably, the other generations' support is even higher, ranging from 92.7% (Generation X) to

99.6% (the Greatest/Silent). These data suggest that there is extensive consensus in American

society endorsing this policy. Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2

= 50.130, df = 15, p < .01).

Providing Education to Offenders. Similar to job training, the American public is

mostly supportive of providing education to offenders when they return to the community (Table

3.5.2, Figure 3.5.2). Although Millennials are the least supportive generation of offender

Table 3.4.4. *Public Support for Rehabilitation Not Used as a Chance to Get Off Easily, by Generation (N = 991, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Disagree
Millennials/ Generation Z	8.0	9.8	27.8	27.0	14.6	12.8	54.4
Generation X	6.2	14.8	22.7	32.3	15.5	8.6	56.4
Baby Boom	5.2	10.1	25.4	33.5	18.8	7.0	59.3
Greatest/ Silent	6.2	13.3	34.6	33.9	12.1	0	46.0

Item 4: All rehabilitation programs have done is to allow criminals who deserve to be punished to get off easily (reverse-coded);
Pearson's $\chi^2 = 32.948$, df = 15, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.4.4. *Public Support for Rehabilitation Not Used as a Chance to Get Off Easily, by Generation*

Table 3.4.5. *Public Support for Expanding Offender Rehabilitation, by Generation*
(N = 990, Percentages Reported)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Disagree
Millennials/ Generation Z	3.4	11.6	23.4	30.2	18.2	13.5	61.9
Generation X	9.5	9.9	21.8	29.4	17.2	12.2	58.8
Baby Boom	4.2	11.1	22.1	28.2	19.2	15.3	62.7
Greatest/ Silent	5.3	17.1	14.9	48.0	13.9	0.9	62.8

Item 5: I would not support expanding the rehabilitation programs that are now being undertaken in our prisons (reverse-coded);
Pearson's χ^2 = 43.337, df = 15, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.4.5. *Public Support for Expanding Offender Rehabilitation, by Generation*

121

Table 3.5.1. *Public Support for Providing Job Training to Offenders, by Generation (N = 985, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support	Total Support
Millennials/ Generation Z	0.6	3.5	4.5	21.1	29.1	41.2	91.4
Generation X	2.9	2.5	1.9	19.6	25.3	47.8	92.7
Baby Boom	0.4	0.9	0.4	15.5	25.7	57.3	98.5
Greatest/ Silent	0.5	0	0	13.1	35.9	50.6	99.6

Item 1: Providing job training to offenders when they return to the community; Pearson's $\chi^2 = 50.130$, df = 15, $p < .01$.

Figure 3.5.1. *Public Support for Providing Job Training to Offenders, by Generation*

Table 3.5.2. *Public Support for Providing Education to Offenders, by Generation (N = 981, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support	Total Support
Millennials/ Generation Z	0.8	4.9	5.4	22.2	24.8	42.0	89.0
Generation X	1.3	1.5	7.5	22.7	22.2	44.7	89.6
Baby Boom	0.2	0.6	3.2	19.8	26.7	49.5	96.0
Greatest/ Silent	0.5	1.3	1.4	18.4	42.6	35.8	96.8

Item 2: Providing education to offenders when they return to the community; Pearson's χ^2 = 42.391, df = 15, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.5.2. *Public Support for Providing Education to Offenders, by Generation*

education, fully 89.0% agree with the idea. Public support for educating offenders in older

generations is higher, ranging from 89.6% of Generation X to 96.0% of Baby Boomers and

96.8% of the Greatest/Silent. Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 =

42.391, df = 15, p < .05).

Providing Drug Treatment to Offenders. About 9 in 10 Millennials support providing

drug treatment to offenders when they return to the community (Table 3.5.3, Figure 3.5.3).

Compared to Millennials, public support for drug treatment is stronger among Baby Boomers

(97.2%) and the Greatest/Silent (96.5%) and slightly weaker among Generation X (89.0%).

Regardless, Americans of all generations highly favor drug treatment for offenders.

Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 40.131, df = 15, p < .05).

Providing Mental Health Treatment to Offenders. Similar to job training and drug

treatment, more than 9 out of 10 individuals in each generation support providing mental health

treatment to offenders (Table 3.5.4, Figure 3.5.4). Although Millennials are least in favor of this

reentry service, 92.8% still agree with this policy. In comparison, older generations are more

supportive of this reentry service, with 99.5% of the Greatest/Silent supporting the provision of

mental health treatment to offenders, followed by 97.9% of Baby Boomers, and 94.1% of

Generation X. Generational differences, however, are not statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 =

35.585, df = 15, p > .05).

Providing Housing Assistance to Offenders. Similar to previous reentry items, a

majority of American public favor providing housing assistance to offenders (Table 3.5.5, Figure

3.5.5). Yet again, although Millennials are least supportive of this reentry policy, nearly 9 in 10

still endorse this service for returning offenders. Individuals in older generations provide

stronger support, ranging from 91.3% of Generation X, 97.1% of Baby Boomers, to 96.5% of

Table 3.5.3. *Public Support for Providing Drug Treatment to Offenders, by Generation (N = 981, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support	Total Support
Millennials/ Generation Z	0.9	3.5	5.7	17.2	23.1	49.7	90.0
Generation X	3.5	4.2	3.4	16.4	21.5	51.1	89.0
Baby Boom	0.2	1.4	1.2	11.0	27.7	58.5	97.2
Greatest/ Silent	0.5	2.0	1.0	14.1	31.6	50.8	96.5

Item 3: Providing drug treatment to offenders when they return to the community; Pearson's $\chi^2 = 40.131$, $df = 15$, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.5.3. *Public Support for Providing Drug Treatment to Offenders, by Generation*

125

Table 3.5.4. *Public Support for Providing Mental Health Treatment to Offenders,
by Generation (N = 982, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support	Total Support
Millennials/ Generation Z	0.6	2.0	4.7	16.2	21.1	55.5	92.8
Generation X	0.7	2.9	2.4	16.4	21.2	56.5	94.1
Baby Boom	0.2	0.9	1.1	13.1	29.9	54.9	97.9
Greatest/ Silent	0.5	0	0	16.2	40.3	43.0	99.5

Item 4: Providing mental health treatment to offenders when they return to the community;
Pearson's χ^2 = 35.585, df = 15, p > .05.

Figure 3.5.4. *Public Support for Providing Mental Health Treatment to Offenders,
by Generation*

Table 3.5.5. *Public Support for Providing Housing Assistance to Offenders, by Generation (N = 985, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support	Total Support
Millennials/ Generation Z	1.1	4.2	5.3	17.2	37.4	34.9	89.5
Generation X	1.4	4.9	2.4	29.3	22.1	39.9	91.3
Baby Boom	0.2	1.1	1.6	23.7	28.7	44.7	97.1
Greatest/ Silent	0.5	2.2	0.9	25.6	39.7	31.2	96.5

Item 5: Providing help finding a place to live to offenders when they return to the community; Pearson's χ^2 = 49.282, df = 15, p < .01.

Figure 3.5.5. *Public Support for Providing Housing Assistance to Offenders, by Generation*

Public Support for Providing Housing Assistance to Offenders by Generation

the Greatest/Silent. Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's $\chi^2 = 49.282$, df = 15, $p < .01$).

### Public Support for Reintegration

Restoration of Civil Rights. Two items are used to assess public support for the restoration of offenders' civil rights: public support for protecting ex-felons' voting rights and their rights to sit on juries. First, Millennials are more likely to support the protection of ex-felons' voting rights than older generations (Table 3.6.1, Figure 3.6.1) although differences among generations are not statistically significant (Pearson's $\chi^2 = 24.591$, df = 6, $p > .05$). About 8 in 10 Millennials oppose the view that those convicted of felonies should permanently lose their voting rights, followed by 77.0% of Generation X, 71.8% of Baby Boomers, and 67.7% of the Greatest/Silent. Of note, a higher proportion (23.2%) of Millennials respond that ex-felons should not lose their voting rights at all compared to Generation X (14.7%), Baby Boomers (13.5%), and the Greatest/Silent (13.1%).

Second, as shown in Table 3.6.2 and Figure 3.6.2, Millennials also hold more liberal attitudes toward the protection of ex-felons' rights to sit on juries than previous generations (Pearson's $\chi^2 = 15.665$, df = 3, $p < .05$). Notably, more than a half (56.2%) of Millennials respond that those convicted of felonies should be allowed to sit on juries once their sentence is completed, followed by 47.3% of Baby Boomers, 43.8% of Generation X, and 37.3% of the Greatest/Silent.

Fair-Chance Hiring. Table 3.7 and Figure 3.7 show that responses on public support for fair-chance hiring, as measured by views about ban-the-box laws, are similarly distributed across generations (Pearson's $\chi^2 = 4.290$, df = 3, $p > .05$). Among Millennials, 63.0% respond that ban-the-box laws are a good idea. Regarding public support for fair-chance hiring, Millennials are

Table 3.6.1. *Public Support for Ex-Felons' Voting Rights, by Generation*
(N = 994, Percentages Reported)

	Permanently Lose Right	Lose Right Until Complete Sentence	Not Lose Right At All	Total Keep Right
Millennials/ Generation Z	17.1	59.7	23.2	82.9
Generation X	23.0	62.3	14.7	77.0
Baby Boom	28.3	58.3	13.5	71.8
Greatest/ Silent	32.3	54.6	13.1	67.7

Item 1: Opinion about voting rights for U.S. citizens who have been convicted of felonies; Pearson's $\chi^2 = 24.591$, df = 6, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.6.1. *Public Support for Ex-Felons' Voting Rights, by Generation*

Public Support for Ex-Felons' Voting Rights by Generation

Table 3.6.2. *Public Support for Ex-Felon's Rights to Sit on Juries, by Generation (N = 982, Percentages Reported)*

	Permanently Lose Right	Allowed Once Complete Sentence
Millennials/ Generation Z	43.8	56.2
Generation X	56.3	43.8
Baby Boom	52.7	47.3
Greatest/ Silent	62.7	37.3

Item 2: Opinion about people who have been convicted of felonies sitting on juries; Pearson's $\chi^2 = 15.665$, df $= 3$, $p < 0.05$.

Figure 3.6.2. *Public Support for Ex-Felon's Rights to Sit on Juries, by Generation*

Table 3.7. *Public Support for Fair-Chance Hiring, by Generation*
          (N = 978, Percentages Reported)

	Ban the Box Laws Are a Bad Idea	Ban the Box Laws Are a Good Idea
Millennials/ Generation Z	37.0	63.0
Generation X	38.6	61.4
Baby Boom	30.8	69.2
Greatest/ Silent	33.9	66.1

Item: Views about ban the box laws;
Pearson's $\chi^2 = 4.290$, df $= 3$, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.7. *Public Support for Fair-Chance Hiring, by Generation*

more inclusionary than Generation X (61.4% support) but less so than Baby Boomers (69.2%

support) and the Greatest/Silent (66.1%).

Reducing Collateral Sanctions. Three items are relevant to gauging public support for

reducing collateral sanctions: public support for (1) providing offenders with information

regarding collateral sanctions, (2) government reviews of collateral sanctions, and (3) the

elimination of ineffective collateral sanctions. First, Millennials are least likely to support

providing offenders with information regarding collateral sanctions (Table 3.8.1, Figure 3.8.1).

Still, about 86% of Millennials agree that offenders should be given information regarding all of

the possible collateral sanctions they may face if they are convicted of a crime. Compared to

Millennials, the other generations' support is from 5% (Baby Boomers), 9% (Generation X) to

12% higher (the Greatest/Silent). Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's

$\chi^2 = 59.696$, df $= 15$, $p < .001$).

Second, Millennials are again the least in favor of government reviews of collateral

sanctions, although 82.5% endorse this policy (Table 3.8.2, Figure 3.8.2). In comparison, a

higher proportion of Generation X (88.2%), Baby Boomers (88.3%), and the Greatest/Silent

(88.1%) agree that states and federal lawmakers should review all the existing collateral

sanctions of criminal convictions every five years and eliminate the ones that are found to have

no useful purpose. Note, however, generational differences are not statistically significant

(Pearson's $\chi^2 = 29.337$, df $= 15$, $p > .05$).

Third, as presented in Table 3.8.3 and Figure 3.8.3, public support for the elimination of

ineffective collateral sanctions is comparable across generations (Pearson's $\chi^2 = 22.652$, df $= 15$,

$p > .05$). About 73.3% of Millennials agree that a collateral sanction should be eliminated unless

it is shown to reduce crime. Public support for this policy in Millennials is stronger than the

Table 3.8.1. *Public Support for Providing Offenders With Information Regarding Collateral Sanctions, by Generation (N = 973, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	0	4.3	9.6	29.2	27.7	29.1	86.0
Generation X	0.4	0.9	3.4	28.6	33.3	33.4	95.3
Baby Boom	1.4	1.1	6.2	19.6	32.5	39.1	91.2
Greatest/ Silent	0.5	0.1	0	22.9	51.1	24.0	98.0

Item 1: Offenders should be given information regarding all of the possible collateral sanctions they may face if they are convicted of a crime, both at the time they are charged with a crime and before entering a plea of guilty or innocent;
Pearson's χ^2 = 59.696, df = 15, p < .001.

Figure 3.8.1. *Public Support for Providing Offenders With Information Regarding Collateral Sanctions, by Generation*

133

Table 3.8.2. *Public Support for Government Reviews of Collateral Sanctions, by Generation (N = 979, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	1.3	4.5	11.8	31.6	32.2	18.7	82.5
Generation X	2.1	2.5	7.3	29.8	29.6	28.8	88.2
Baby Boom	1.2	3.2	7.4	27.1	33.9	27.3	88.3
Greatest/ Silent	0.5	1.8	9.7	41.0	35.3	11.8	88.1

Item 2: Every five years, states and federal lawmakers should review all of the existing collateral sanctions of criminal convictions, and eliminate the ones that are found to have no useful purpose;
Pearson's χ^2 = 29.337, df = 15, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.8.2. *Public Support for Government Reviews of Collateral Sanctions, by Generation*

Table 3.8.3. *Public Support for the Elimination of Ineffective Collateral Sanctions, by Generation (N = 978, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	2.3	11.2	13.2	32.3	24.6	16.4	73.3
Generation X	5.0	6.1	11.2	34.6	28.3	14.7	77.6
Baby Boom	3.8	9.0	12.0	35.2	26.5	13.5	75.2
Greatest/ Silent	6.6	7.4	15.8	35.4	31.0	3.8	70.2

Item 3: A collateral sanction should be eliminated unless it is shown to reduce crime; Pearson's χ^2 = 22.652, df = 15, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.8.3. *Public Support for the Elimination of Ineffective Collateral Sanctions, by Generation*

135

Greatest/Silent (70.2%) but weaker than in Baby Boomers (75.2%) and Generation X (77.6%).

Expungement of Criminal Records. Three items assess the expungement of criminal records construct: (1) the expungement of juvenile records for non-violent crimes, (2) the restricted access of criminal records to law enforcement and employers, and (3) the opportunity to expunge criminal records. First, Table 3.9.1 and Figure 3.9.1 report that Millennials are most progressive on the expungement of juvenile records for non-violent crimes, with 72.9% supporting the idea. Compared to Millennials, older generations are less likely to agree that juvenile records for non-violent crimes should be automatically expunged so that the public cannot see them (72.0% of Generation X, 71.5% of Baby Boomers, 70.1% of the Greatest/Silent). However, generational differences are minimal—ranging from 1% to 3%—and not statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 22.545, df = 15, p > .05).

Second, similar to the previous item, Millennials also show the most progressive attitudes toward restricting the access of criminal records to law enforcement and employers (Table 3.9.2, Figure 3.9.2). About 8 in 10 Millennials agree that only law enforcement agencies and potential employers should be able to see adults' records for non-violent crimes. The other generations' support for the restricted access of criminal records ranges from 72.3% (Generation X), 73.4% of Baby Boomers, to 76.5% of the Greatest/Silent—or 2% to 6% lower than that of Millennials. However, generational differences are not found to be statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 24.108, df = 15, p > .05).

Third, similar to previous items, more than 7 in 10 respondents in each generation agree that offenders may face problems that lead them back to a life of crime if they never have the opportunity to expunge their criminal record (Table 3.9.3, Figure 3.9.3). Across generations, Millennial support for the opportunity to expunge criminal records is neither the highest nor the

Table 3.9.1. *Public Support for the Expungement of Juvenile Records for Non-Violent Crimes, by Generation (N = 984, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	2.3	7.3	17.5	25.9	21.9	25.1	72.9
Generation X	5.4	6.8	15.8	21.8	17.8	32.4	72.0
Baby Boom	4.7	7.9	15.9	20.6	27.3	23.6	71.5
Greatest/ Silent	4.8	10.9	14.2	18.1	29.7	22.3	70.1

Item 1: Juvenile records for non-violent crimes should be automatically expunged so that the public cannot see them;
Pearson's χ^2 = 22.545, df = 15, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.9.1. *Public Support for the Expungement of Juvenile Records for Non-Violent Crimes, by Generation*

137

Table 3.9.2. *Public Support for the Restricted Access of Criminal Records to Law Enforcement and Employers, by Generation (N = 985, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	2.3	5.6	14.0	34.2	23.7	20.4	78.3
Generation X	5.6	6.7	15.5	31.6	19.6	21.1	72.3
Baby Boom	4.8	7.4	14.4	23.8	27.5	22.1	73.4
Greatest/ Silent	2.3	6.2	14.9	23.8	36.1	16.6	76.5

Item 2: Only law enforcement agencies and some potential employers should be able to see adults' records for non-violent crimes;
Pearson's $\chi^2 = 24.108$, df = 15, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.9.2. *Public Support for the Restricted Access of Criminal Records to Law Enforcement and Employers, by Generation*

138

Table 3.9.3. *Public Support for the Opportunity to Expunge Criminal Records, by Generation (N = 987, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	4.7	4.6	14.7	28.3	25.7	22.1	76.1
Generation X	2.0	6.9	14.1	34.2	21.9	20.9	77.0
Baby Boom	4.5	9.7	15.3	24.8	25.6	20.1	70.5
Greatest/ Silent	3.1	9.0	8.5	39.8	26.2	13.4	79.4

Item 3: If a person never has the opportunity to expunge their criminal record, they may face problems that lead them back to a life of crime;
Pearson's $\chi^2 = 24.440$, df = 15, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.9.3. *Public Support for the Opportunity to Expunge Criminal Records, by Generation*

139

lowest. More than 3 in 4 Millennials support for the opportunity to expunge criminal records,

about 6% higher than Baby Boomers (70.5%) and 1% to 3% lower than Generation X (77.0%)

and the Greatest/Silent (79.4%). Generational differences are not statistically significant

(Pearson's χ^2 = 24.440, df = 15, p > .05).

   General Attitudes Toward Expungement. As illustrated in Table 3.10 and Figure 3.10,

Millennials are most likely to report that expunging criminal records is a good policy. Only

among Millennials does more than a half of the sample have favorable attitudes toward the

expungement of criminal records. The other generations' support ranges from 32.4% (the

Greatest/Silent), 38.7% (Baby Boomers), to 47.9% (Generation X). These generational

differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 19.400, df = 3, p < .05).

   FBI Review of Criminal Records. Millennials are the least in favor of the FBI review of

criminal records, with 89.9% supporting the idea (Table 3.11, Figure 3.11). Older generations

provide stronger support by 2% to 3% (92.3% of Generation X, 93.1% of Baby Boomers, 93.2%

of the Greatest/Silent). Note that about 9 in 10 respondents in every generation support the

legislation that would require the FBI to review their criminal records to make sure that citizens

are not hurt by incomplete or inaccurate records that are given out in background checks.

Although small, generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 37.683, df =

15, p < .05).

Public Support for Redemption

   Formal Redemption Rituals. The construct of public support for formal redemption

rituals is measured with two items: public support for (1) rehabilitation ceremonies and (2)

certificates of rehabilitation. First, more than 8 in 10 respondents in any generation agree that

rehabilitation ceremonies for ex-offenders will help them integrate back into the community and

Table 3.10. *Public Support for General Attitudes Toward Expungement, by Generation (N = 981, Percentages Reported)*

	Expunging Criminal Records Is a Bad Policy	Expunging Criminal Records Is a Good Policy
Millennials/ Generation Z	47.7	52.3
Generation X	52.1	47.9
Baby Boom	61.3	38.7
Greatest/ Silent	67.6	32.4

Item: Opinion about expunging criminal records;
Pearson's $\chi^2 = 19.400$, df = 3, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.10. *Public Support for General Attitudes Toward Expungement, by Generation*

Table 3.11. *Public Support for the FBI Review of Criminal Records, by Generation (N = 991, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Oppose	Oppose	Somewhat Oppose	Somewhat Support	Support	Strongly Support	Total Support
Millennials/ Generation Z	0.4	0.3	9.4	32.4	24.2	33.3	89.9
Generation X	1.9	1.6	4.2	28.1	27.7	36.5	92.3
Baby Boom	2.0	1.4	3.5	21.7	30.3	41.1	93.1
Greatest/ Silent	2.4	2.7	1.7	22.2	34.5	36.5	93.2

Item: Views about a law that would require the FBI to review their criminal records to make sure that citizens are not hurt by incomplete or inaccurate records that are given out in background checks;
Pearson's χ^2 = 37.683, df = 15, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.11. *Public Support for the FBI Review of Criminal Records, by Generation*

Public Support for the FBI Review of Criminal Records by Generation

Percent of Support for the FBI Review of Criminal Records

Views about a law that would require the FBI to review their criminal records to make sure that citizens are not hurt by incomplete or inaccurate records that are given out in background checks

Strongly Oppose | Oppose | Somewhat Oppose | Somewhat Support | Support | Strongly Support

stay out of crime (Table 3.12.1, Figure 3.12.1). Public support for rehabilitation ceremonies among Millennials (81.6%) is weaker than among the Greatest/Silent (82.0%) and Generation X (84.1%) but stronger than among Baby Boomers (80.0%). Generational differences are not statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 30.860, df = 15, p > .05).

Second, similar to the previous item, about 8 in 10 respondents in all generations agree that certificates of rehabilitation will help ex-offenders reintegrate into their communities and stay out of crime (Table 3.12.2, Figure 3.12.2). Although generational differences are not found to be statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 32.100, df = 15, p > .05), Millennials provide the strongest support (80.0%), followed by Baby Boomers (79.4%), Generation X (78.8%), and the Greatest/Silent (78.7%).

Redeemability. There are four items used to construct the measure of redeemability: public support for (1) offender capacity to lead productive lives, (2) offender capacity to become law-abiding citizens, (3) offender capacity to change for the better, and (4) the malleability of offenders. First, Millennials are more likely to believe than older generations that most offenders can go on to lead productive lives with help and hard work (Table 3.13.1, Figure 3.13.1). Although all generations strongly believe in offender capacity to lead productive lives with more than 7 in 10 respondents agreeing with the statement, the proportion of support from Millennials (82.9%) is greater than that of older generations (78.0% of Baby Boomers, 77.1% of Generation X, 71.3% of the Greatest/Silent) by 4% to 11%. Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 43.897, df = 15, p < .05).

Second, Millennials are also more inclusionary than older generations in their views regarding offender capacity to become law-abiding citizens (Table 3.13.2, Figure 3.13.2). Among Millennials, 83.1% agree that, given the right conditions, a great many offenders can turn

Table 3.12.1. *Public Support for Rehabilitation Ceremonies, by Generation (N = 992, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	1.0	2.8	14.6	39.8	23.5	18.3	81.6
Generation X	5.2	1.8	8.9	38.7	25.6	19.8	84.1
Baby Boom	3.8	5.3	10.8	38.6	23.0	18.4	80.0
Greatest/ Silent	1.4	2.1	14.5	49.2	24.7	8.1	82.0

Item 1: Rehabilitation ceremonies for ex-offenders will help them reintegrate back into the community and stay out of crime;
Pearson's χ^2 = 30.860, df = 15, p > .05.

Figure 3.12.1. *Public Support for Rehabilitation Ceremonies, by Generation*

Table 3.12.2. *Public Support for Certificates of Rehabilitation, by Generation*
             (N = 993, Percentages Reported)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	0.9	3.5	15.6	38.6	26.7	14.7	80.0
Generation X	4.5	3.2	13.5	35.0	25.7	18.1	78.8
Baby Boom	1.6	6.5	12.6	39.8	24.1	15.5	79.4
Greatest/ Silent	0.5	1.9	18.9	44.2	29.4	5.1	78.7

Item 2: "Certificates of rehabilitation" will help ex-offenders reintegrate into their communities and stay out of crime;
Pearson's χ^2 = 32.100, df = 15, $p > .05$.

Figure 3.12.2. *Public Support for Certificates of Rehabilitation, by Generation*

145

Table 3.13.1. *Public Support for Offender Capacity to Lead Productive Lives, by Generation (N = 993, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	0.9	5.3	10.9	37.9	31.7	13.3	82.9
Generation X	3.0	4.7	15.2	39.9	20.7	16.5	77.1
Baby Boom	1.6	5.5	15.0	44.3	23.9	9.8	78.0
Greatest/ Silent	0	9.6	19.1	50.1	20.3	0.9	71.3

Item 1: Most offenders can go on to lead productive lives with help and hard work; Pearson's $\chi^2 = 43.897$, df = 15, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.13.1. *Public Support for Offender Capacity to Lead Productive Lives, by Generation*

Table 3.13.2. *Public Support for Offender Capacity to Become Law-Abiding Citizens, by Generation (N = 993, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree	Total Agree
Millennials/ Generation Z	1.5	4.4	11.0	33.1	31.6	18.4	83.1
Generation X	3.6	4.0	15.0	36.8	24.7	15.8	77.3
Baby Boom	1.2	3.6	13.7	44.1	28.0	9.4	81.5
Greatest/ Silent	1.4	6.9	11.5	54.4	23.5	2.3	80.2

Item 2: Given the right conditions, a great many offenders can turn their lives around and become law-abiding citizens;
Pearson's $\chi^2 = 44.818$, $df = 15$, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.13.2. *Public Support for Offender Capacity to Become Law-Abiding Citizens, by Generation*

147

their lives around and become law-abiding citizens, followed by 81.5% of Baby Boomers, 80.2% of the Greatest/Silent, and 77.3% of Generation X. Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 44.818, df = 15, p < .05).

Third, consistent with previous items, Millennials are more likely than older generations to believe that most criminal offenders can change for the better (Table 3.13.3, Figure 3.13.3). Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 48.504, df = 15, p < .05), with the strongest support from Millennials (46.4%), followed by Baby Boomers (45.9%), Generation X (38.5%), and the Greatest/Silent (34.0%).

Last, when asked whether some offenders are so damaged that they can never lead productive lives, Millennials are distinguished from previous generations in their beliefs in the malleability of all offenders (Table 3.13.4, Figure 3.13.4). Importantly, about 1 in 4 Millennials refute the idea that some offenders are incorrigible compared to 18.6% of Generation X, 10.6% of Baby Boomers, and 7.1% of the Greatest/Silent. Generational differences are statistically significant (Pearson's χ^2 = 49.860, df = 15, p < .05).

Sources of Support for Correctional Policies: Who Provides Stronger Support?

In this section, the weighted results from multivariate multiple regression will be presented. There are 13 outcome variables under five themes of correctional policies. For each outcome variable, a reduced model and a full model will be analyzed. A reduced model will examine whether the association between an outcome variable (i.e., support for a correctional policy) and generational membership is statistically significant. A full model will explore whether any significant relationship between an outcome variable and generational membership is confounded by the inclusion of control variables and what control variables have significant effects. In sum, the results will be informative largely in twofold: (1) whether generational

148

Table 3.13.3. *Public Support for Offender Capacity to Change for the Better, by Generation* (*N* = 990, Percentages Reported)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Disagree
Millennials/ Generation Z	7.0	21.0	25.7	34.0	10.1	2.3	46.4
Generation X	14.9	15.7	31.0	22.9	10.6	5.0	38.5
Baby Boom	6.3	12.2	35.7	32.4	10.1	3.4	45.9
Greatest/ Silent	8.4	14.4	43.2	29.8	3.6	0.6	34.0

Item 3: Most criminal offenders are unlikely to change for the better (reverse-coded); Pearson's χ^2 = 48.504, df = 15, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.13.3. *Public Support for Offender Capacity to Change for the Better, by Generation*

Table 3.13.4. *Public Support for the Malleability of Offenders, by Generation (N = 989, Percentages Reported)*

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Disagree
Millennials/ Generation Z	18.6	24.2	31.4	13.9	8.2	3.8	25.9
Generation X	25.9	27.4	28.1	10.5	6.0	2.1	18.6
Baby Boom	22.3	35.6	31.5	6.7	2.0	1.9	10.6
Greatest/ Silent	20.3	44.0	28.7	3.6	0.9	2.6	7.1

Item 4: Some offenders are so damaged that they can never lead productive lives (reverse-coded);
Pearson's χ^2 = 49.860, df = 15, $p < .05$.

Figure 3.13.4. *Public Support for the Malleability of Offenders, by Generation*

membership affects support for each policy net of controls and (2) what correlates are associated with public support for punitive and progressive correctional policies.

Public Support for Punitiveness

    Death Penalty. The support for death penalty measure is ordinal with three categories (oppose, no opinion, favor). Because the proportional odds assumption is not met (approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories χ^2 = 30.84, df = 17, p < .05), generalized ordered logistic regression models are employed for both a reduced model and a full model by using Stata's gologit2 command (Williams, 2006).[1] The results from analyses are presented in Table 3.14. In the reduced model, Millennials are less likely to favor the death penalty than Generation X (OR = 1.582, p < .05) but are not different from other generations. Compared to Millennials, the odds of favoring the death penalty versus the combined lower categories (no opinion, oppose) increase by a factor of 1.582 for Generation X. However, the differences are rendered not statistically significant after control variables are included in the full model. Among the control variables, support for the death penalty is significantly higher for Republicans and conservatives but lower for Blacks.

    Court Harshness Toward Criminals. Because the outcome variable on public support for court harshness is ordinal (too harsh, about right/don't know, not harsh enough) and the proportional odds assumption is not violated (approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories χ^2 = 22.52, df = 17, p > .05), ordered logistic regression is used as presented in Table 3.15. In the reduced model, Millennials are less likely to agree that courts do not deal with criminals harshly enough compared to Generation X (OR = 1.611, p < .05), Baby Boomers (OR = 1.983, p < .01), and the Greatest/Silent (OR = 3.275, p < .001).

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[1] This function does not provide model fit statistics when used with survey weights.

Table 3.14. *Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression Models on Support for Death Penalty*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	Oppose vs. (No Opinion /Favor)	(Oppose /No Opinion) vs. Favor	Oppose vs. (No Opinion /Favor)	(Oppose /No Opinion) vs. Favor
	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)
Generation				
Generation X	1.582*	1.582*	1.366	1.366
	(.338)	(.338)	(.345)	(.345)
Baby Boom	1.046	1.464	1.131	1.131
	(.234)	(.307)	(.301)	(.301)
Greatest/Silent	1.005	1.591	.941	.941
	(.328)	(.469)	(.330)	(.330)
Control Variables				
Male			1.078	1.078
			(.200)	(.200)
Black			.964	.469*
			(.346)	(.148)
Hispanic			.596	.596
			(.181)	(.181)
Other races			1.496	1.496
			(.468)	(.468)
Education			.950	.950
			(.064)	(.064)
Married			1.141	1.141
			(.237)	(.237)
Child in household			1.156	1.156
			(.287)	(.287)
Employed			1.212	1.212
			(.233)	(.233)
Income			.982	.982
			(.035)	(.035)
Political interest			.800	1.089
			(.108)	(.119)
Republicanism			1.140*	1.140*
			(.069)	(.069)
Conservatism			1.620***	1.620***
			(.206)	(.206)
Religiosity			.914	.914
			(.103)	(.103)
Born-again Protestant			.985	.985
			(.286)	(.286)
N	998		997	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, SE: Standard error.

Table 3.15. *Ordered Logistic Regression Models on Support for the Court Harshness Toward Criminals*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	1.611*	.338	1.290	.293
Baby Boom	1.983**	.417	1.880*	.475
Greatest/Silent	3.275***	.857	3.094***	.997
Control Variables				
Male			.658*	.120
Black			.518*	.141
Hispanic			1.163	.384
Other races			1.865	.656
Education			.902	.061
Married			1.038	.217
Child in household			1.206	.271
Employed			1.442	.272
Income			.997	.029
Political interest			.865	.095
Republicanism			1.020	.054
Conservatism			1.655***	.196
Religiosity			1.016	.111
Born-again Protestant			1.336	.357
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.019		.083	
N	998		997	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error.

In the full model, the effect of generational membership is not entirely mitigated even after introducing other control variables. Millennials are still less supportive of court harshness than Baby Boomers and the Greatest/Silent. Compared to Millennials, the odds of responding that courts are not harsh enough toward criminals versus the combined lower categories (about right/don't know, too harsh) increase by about twofold for Baby Boomers (OR = 1.880, $p < .05$) and by about threefold for the Greatest/Silent (OR = 3.094, $p < .001$). The difference between Millennials and Generation X becomes statistically not significant. For the control variables, the analysis reveals that support for harsher courts is significantly higher for conservatives but lower for males and Blacks.

The Punishment Goal of Prisons. The outcome measure on public support for the punishment goal of prisons is binary where the punishment goal is coded as 1 and all other goals of prisons are coded as 0. For this reason, binary logistic regression analyses are used for the reduced model and the full model. In Table 3.16, the results show that Millennials are not different from other generations with regard to endorsing the punishment goal of prisons, with or without introducing control variables. Among the control variables, support for the punishment goal of prisons is significantly higher for conservatives.

Public Support for Rehabilitation

There is one composite measure on public support for rehabilitation. As this measure is continuous, OLS regression is conducted for the reduced model and the full model (Table 3.17). Statistical checks are performed to assess whether the assumptions of OLS regression are not violated. The results from visual diagnostics and White's test support for the normality and homoskedasticity ($\chi^2 = 153.35$, df = 152, $p > .05$). There is no concern for multicollinearity as all Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values are substantially lower than the conventional threshold

Table 3.16. *Binary Logistic Regression Models on Support for the Punishment Goal of Prisons*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	1.319	.374	1.122	.324
Baby Boom	.845	.226	.761	.233
Greatest/Silent	.790	.345	.747	.375
Control Variables				
Male			1.019	.232
Black			.573	.232
Hispanic			.849	.389
Other races			.641	.271
Education			1.110	.098
Married			.860	.208
Child in household			1.130	.327
Employed			1.272	.322
Income			1.000	.044
Political interest			.950	.106
Republicanism			1.007	.078
Conservatism			1.568**	.241
Religiosity			.927	.144
Born-again Protestant			.884	.280
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.005		.042	
N	999		998	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error.

Table 3.17. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Rehabilitation*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	β	RSE	β	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	-.049	.103	-.051	.099
Baby Boom	-.034	.099	-.068	.105
Greatest/Silent	-.165***	.126	-.159***	.131
Control Variables				
Male			-.026	.078
Black			.036	.143
Hispanic			-.047	.127
Other races			-.106**	.142
Education			.080	.026
Married			-.029	.088
Child in household			-.037	.090
Employed			.054	.082
Income			.012	.013
Political interest			.128*	.049
Republicanism			-.122**	.022
Conservatism			-.245***	.052
Religiosity			-.012	.045
Born-again Protestant			.095*	.110
R-Squared	.024		.187	
N	1000		999	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error.

(VIF range: 1.04–1.78; O'Brien, 2007). However, the results from Breusch-Pagan test signal a sign of heteroskedasticity ($\chi^2 = 16.66$, df = 1, $p < .001$). Thus, robust standard errors are estimated for hypothesis testing (Williams, 2020).

In the reduced model, Millennials are different from the Greatest/Silent in their support for rehabilitation ($\beta = -.165$, $p < .001$), but not other generations. And the effect is not erased even after introducing other control variables in the full model ($\beta = -.159$, $p < .001$). Thus, with or without controls, Millennials are significantly more supportive of rehabilitation compared to the Greatest/Silent. They also provide stronger support for rehabilitation than Generation X and Baby Boomers as indicated by negative regression coefficients although the differences do not reach statistical significance ($p > .05$). In addition to generational membership, those who support rehabilitation are more likely to be Whites compared to other races, having greater political interest, Democrat, liberal, and a born-again Protestant.

Public Support for Reentry

One composite measure is constructed to assess public support for reentry. OLS regression is used in the reduced model and the full model (Table 3.18). Statistical checks are performed to assess whether the assumptions of OLS regression are not violated. The results from visual diagnostics appear to support the normality assumption. There is no concern for multicollinearity (VIF range: 1.05–1.79). However, a sign of heteroskedasticity is indicated by both the results from Breusch-Pagan test ($\chi^2 = 72.23$, df = 1, $p < .001$) and White's test ($\chi^2 = 211.35$, df = 152, $p < .01$). Thus, robust standard errors are estimated for hypothesis testing.

In the reduced model, Millennials are less progressive in their support to provide reentry services to offenders than Baby Boomers ($\beta = .136$, $p < .01$), but they are not significantly different from Generation X and the Greatest/Silent in their support for offender reentry. In the

Table 3.18. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Reentry*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	β	RSE	β	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	.004	.119	.005	.101
Baby Boom	.136**	.094	.087	.099
Greatest/Silent	.052	.109	.003	.127
Control Variables				
Male			-.088*	.076
Black			.031	.135
Hispanic			-.151**	.149
Other races			-.052	.201
Education			-.014	.029
Married			.005	.077
Child in household			-.034	.097
Employed			.023	.084
Income			-.070	.014
Political interest			.163**	.052
Republicanism			-.099	.029
Conservatism			-.151*	.057
Religiosity			.043	.052
Born-again Protestant			.054	.100
R-Squared	.018		.127	
N	991		991	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error.

full model, however, the difference between Baby Boomers and Millennials becomes not statistically significant. Regarding the effects of control variables, support for reentry is stronger among females, non-Hispanics, those more interested in politics, and liberals.

Public Support for Reintegration

   Restoration of Civil Rights. The measure of the restoration of civil rights is composited as the sum of scores on two items: public support for ex-felons' voting rights (range: 0–2) and rights to sit on juries (range: 0–1). Therefore, this measure is ordinal where higher scores represent stronger support for the restoration of ex-felons' civil rights (range: 0–3). As presented in Table 3.19, ordered logistic regression is employed in the reduced model and the full model because the proportional odds assumption is not violated (approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories $\chi^2 = 25.41$, df $= 34$, $p > .05$).

   In the reduced model, Millennials are significantly different from all other generations. Compared to Millennials, the odds of reporting strongest support for the restoration of ex-felons' civil rights versus the combined lower categories are .581 times smaller for Generation X (OR = .581, $p < .01$), .556 times smaller for Baby Boomers (OR = .556, $p < .01$), and .429 times smaller for the Greatest/Silent (OR = .429, $p < .01$). In the full model, Millennials are only different from Baby Boomers in their support for the restoration of civil rights. That is, for Baby Boomers compared to Millennials, the odds of reporting that ex-felons' rights to vote or sit on juries should be both protected (i.e., ex-felons should not lose voting rights at all & ex-felons should be allowed to sit on juries once their sentence is completed) versus the combined lower categories decrease by a factor of .587 (OR = .587, $p < .05$) when all other variables in the model are held constant; the same decrease of .587 times is found between the odds of reporting that the highest two categories (i.e., the odds of scoring 2 and 3) versus the lowest two categories (i.e., the odds

Table 3.19. *Ordered Logistic Regression Models on Support for the Restoration of Civil Rights*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	.581**	.118	.688	.149
Baby Boom	.556**	.116	.587*	.145
Greatest/Silent	.429**	.125	.586	.184
Control Variables				
Male			1.226	.221
Black			2.357**	.702
Hispanic			.519**	.125
Other races			.792	.335
Education			1.022	.061
Married			.982	.183
Child in household			1.003	.193
Employed			.921	.168
Income			1.000	.030
Political interest			1.027	.117
Republicanism			.864	.048
Conservatism			.635**	.064
Religiosity			1.040***	.129
Born-again Protestant			.838	.215
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.005		.074	
N	979		978	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error.

of scoring 0 and 1) after controlling for all other variables in the model (OR = .587, $p < .05$).

With regard to the effects of control variables, those who support the restoration of ex-felons' civil rights are more likely to be Blacks compared to Whites and Hispanics, liberal, and religious.

Fair-Chance Hiring. To assess public support for fair-chance hiring, a binary measure is used that asks the respondent's view about ban-the-box laws. Thus, binary logistic regression analyses are used in the reduced model and the full model (Table 3.20). Across both models, there is no evidence that Millennials are different from other generations in their views that ban-the-box laws are a good idea. For the control variables, support for fair-chance hiring is significantly higher for those who are employed, who have lower income, and who are liberal.

Reducing Collateral Sanctions. A composite measure of public support for reducing collateral sanctions is continuous. For this reason, OLS regression is performed in the reduced model and the full model (Table 3.21). Statistical checks are conducted to assess whether the assumptions of OLS regression are not violated. The results from visual diagnostics and White's test support for normality and homoskedasticity ($\chi^2 = 139.50$, df = 152, $p > .05$). There is no concern for multicollinearity (VIF range: 1.04–1.78). However, the results from Breusch- Pagan test suggest a sign of heteroskedasticity ($\chi^2 = 5.11$, df = 1, $p < .05$). Thus, robust standard errors are estimated for hypothesis testing. In both the reduced model and the full model, the differences between Millennials and other generations are not statistically significant in their support for reducing collateral sanctions. Among the control variables, those who have greater interest in politics and liberals are more likely to argue that collateral sanctions should be informed to offenders, regularly reviewed by the government, or eliminated if shown ineffective.

Expungement of Criminal Records. A continuous composite measure is used to rate public support for the expungement of criminal records. In Table 3.22, OLS regression analyses

161

Table 3.20. *Binary Logistic Regression Models on Support for Fair-Chance Hiring*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	.936	.224	.909	.217
Baby Boom	1.322	.296	1.486	.377
Greatest/Silent	1.144	.359	1.611	.604
Control Variables				
Male			.933	.179
Black			.646	.229
Hispanic			.650	.204
Other races			1.059	.429
Education			.960	.067
Married			1.088	.221
Child in household			1.190	.271
Employed			1.707**	.338
Income			.924*	.032
Political interest			1.103	.113
Republicanism			.944	.055
Conservatism			.612***	.076
Religiosity			1.053	.131
Born-again Protestant			1.434	.356
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.003		.060	
N	978		977	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error.

Table 3.21. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Reducing Collateral Sanctions*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	β	RSE	β	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	.077	.099	.077	.097
Baby Boom	.080	.100	.047	.108
Greatest/Silent	-.006	.109	-.019	.125
Control Variables				
Male			.007	.078
Black			-.010	.136
Hispanic			-.095	.141
Other races			-.001	.155
Education			-.003	.027
Married			.046	.082
Child in household			-.049	.100
Employed			.064	.081
Income			-.059	.014
Political interest			.113*	.044
Republicanism			-.064	.025
Conservatism			-.175***	.046
Religiosity			-.026	.053
Born-again Protestant			.055	.100
R-Squared	.008		.082	
N	994		993	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error.

Table 3.22. *OLS Regression Models on Support for the Expungement of Criminal Records*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	β	RSE	β	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	-.018	.116	-.025	.122
Baby Boom	-.031	.114	-.063	.122
Greatest/Silent	-.020	.124	-.034	.149
Control Variables				
Male			.052	.091
Black			-.005	.177
Hispanic			-.076	.152
Other races			-.039	.188
Education			.003	.032
Married			.009	.089
Child in household			-.013	.109
Employed			.048	.098
Income			-.021	.016
Political interest			.098	.055
Republicanism			-.037	.030
Conservatism			-.130*	.059
Religiosity			-.009	.059
Born-again Protestant			.067	.117
R-Squared	.001		.048	
N	990		990	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error.

are employed in the reduced model and the full model. Statistical checks are performed to assess whether the assumptions of OLS regression are not violated. Based on the results from visual diagnostics and White's test, the normality and homoskedasticity assumptions seem to be supported ($\chi^2 = 178.36$, df = 152, $p > .05$). There is no concern for multicollinearity (VIF range: 1.05–1.78). However, the results from Breusch- Pagan test indicate a sign of heteroskedasticity ($\chi^2 = 7.65$, df $= 1$, $p < .01$). Thus, robust standard errors are estimated for hypothesis testing. The results show that Millennials do not differ from other generations in their attitudes toward the expungement of criminal records, with and without control variables introduced. For the control variables, support for the expungement of criminal records is lower for conservatives.

General Attitudes Toward Expungement. General attitudes toward expungement are gauged with a binary measure asking whether expunging criminal records is a good policy or a bad policy. Table 3.23 reports the results from binary logistic regression analyses. Millennials are more supportive of expunging criminal records than two older generations (Baby Boomers, the Greatest/Silent), and the differences are statistically significant with and without including control variables in the model. In the reduced model, compared to Millennials, the odds of responding that the expungement of criminal records is a good policy decrease by a factor of .576 for Baby Boomers (OR = .576, $p < .05$) and by a factor of .436 for the Greatest/Silent (OR = .436, $p < .01$). In the full model, the odds of supporting the expungement of criminal records in general become .558 times smaller for Baby Boomers (OR = .558, $p < .05$) and .457 times smaller for the Greatest/Silent (OR = .457, $p < .05$) than for Millennials. In addition, general attitudes toward expungement are more inclusionary among Whites compared to other races, those employed, those with smaller income, liberals, and born-again Protestants.

Table 3.23. *Binary Logistic Regression Models on General Attitudes Toward Expungement*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	.838	.196	.820	.199
Baby Boom	.576*	.127	.558*	.144
Greatest/Silent	.436**	.138	.457*	.170
Control Variables				
Male			1.232	.235
Black			1.303	.442
Hispanic			.846	.261
Other races			.458*	.174
Education			.954	.068
Married			1.270	.268
Child in household			.844	.204
Employed			1.614*	.316
Income			.903**	.034
Political interest			1.199	.128
Republicanism			.925	.054
Conservatism			.604***	.069
Religiosity			1.019	.124
Born-again Protestant			1.884*	.469
Pseudo R-Squared	.015		.097	
N	981		980	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error.

FBI Review of Criminal Records. OLS regression analyses are conducted to explore the effect of being a Millennial on public support for the FBI review of criminal records (Table 3.24). Statistical checks are performed to examine whether regression assumptions are met. The results from visual diagnostics and White's test indicate that the normality and homoskedasticity assumptions are supported ($\chi^2 = 163.77$, df $= 152$, $p > .05$). There is no concern for multicollinearity (VIF range: 1.04–1.78). However, the results from Breusch-Pagan test reveal a sign of heteroskedasticity ($\chi^2 = 13.49$, df $= 1$, $p < .001$). Thus, robust standard errors are estimated for hypothesis testing. In both the reduced model and the full model, Millennials are not different from other generations in their support for the law that would require the FBI to review their criminal records to make sure that citizens are not hurt by incomplete or inaccurate records. Among the control variables, support for the FBI review of criminal records is higher for males, those not having a child in household, and those with greater political interest.

Public Support for Redemption

Formal Redemption Rituals. Public support for formal redemption rituals is measured with a mean index of two continuous items: support for rehabilitation ceremonies and support for certificates of rehabilitation. Thus, OLS regression analyses are performed for the reduced model and the full model (Table 3.25). Statistical checks are conducted to assess whether regression assumptions are met. The assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity do not seem to be violated based on visual diagnostics, Breusch-Pagan test ($\chi^2 = 3.27$, df $= 1$, $p > .05$), and White's test ($\chi^2 = 148.57$, df $= 152$, $p > .05$). There is no concern for multicollinearity (VIF range: 1.04–1.78). Nevertheless, because the data are estimated with survey weights, robust standard errors are used for hypothesis testing. With and without control variables introduced, there do not exist significant differences between Millennials and other generations in their

Table 3.24. *OLS Regression Models on Support for the FBI Review of Criminal Records*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	β	RSE	β	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	.034	.118	.045	.111
Baby Boom	.086	.109	.030	.114
Greatest/Silent	.039	.155	-.009	.165
Control Variables				
Male			.082*	.090
Black			.028	.152
Hispanic			-.062	.129
Other races			-.037	.238
Education			-.031	.035
Married			-.001	.097
Child in household			-.089*	.110
Employed			.024	.094
Income			.070	.016
Political interest			.116*	.051
Republicanism			-.040	.025
Conservatism			-.085	.054
Religiosity			.014	.061
Born-again Protestant			.031	.115
R-Squared	.006		.066	
N	991		990	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error.

Table 3.25. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Formal Redemption Rituals*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	β	RSE	β	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	.002	.121	-.035	.112
Baby Boom	-.028	.117	-.073	.117
Greatest/Silent	-.046	.123	-.083	.150
Control Variables				
Male			-.017	.092
Black			.051	.169
Hispanic			.008	.117
Other races			-.041	.155
Education			.000	.030
Married			.088	.099
Child in household			-.044	.108
Employed			.119**	.092
Income			-.155***	.014
Political interest			.157**	.056
Republicanism			-.071	.026
Conservatism			-.131**	.048
Religiosity			.086	.056
Born-again Protestant			.072	.115
R-Squared	.002		.102	
N	996		995	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error.

support for formal redemption rituals. For the control variables, support for formal redemption rituals is higher for those who occupy jobs and who are interested in politics but lower for those with higher income and conservatives.

     Redeemability. There is one composite measure to assess public support for redeemability which is continuous. For this reason, OLS regression is used in the reduced model and the full model (Table 3.26). Statistical checks are performed to explore whether regression assumptions are supported. The results from visual diagnostics and Breusch-Pagan test ($\chi^2 = .33$, $df = 1$, $p > .05$) suggest that the normality and homoskedasticity assumptions are not violated. There is no concern for multicollinearity (VIF range: 1.04–1.78). However, a sign of heteroskedasticity is implied from the results from White's test ($\chi^2 = 215.23$, $df = 152$, $p < .001$). Thus, robust standard errors are used for hypothesis testing.

     In the reduced model, Millennials are statistically different from all other generations. They have a stronger faith in offender redeemability than Generation X ($\beta = -.189$, $p < .05$), Baby Boomers ($\beta = -.192$, $p < .05$), and the Greatest/Silent ($\beta = -.416$, $p < .001$). When control variables are included in the full model, Millennials are still more progressive than Baby Boomers and the Greatest/Silent but the difference between Millennials and Generation X becomes statistically not significant. Among the control variables, Blacks and those who are married have a stronger belief in redeemability that most offenders have the capacity to lead productive lives, become law-abiding citizens, and change for the better and that they are malleable for positive changes. Public support for redeemability is weaker among those having a child and conservatives.

Table 3.26. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Redeemability*

	Reduced Model		Full Model	
	β	RSE	β	RSE
Generation				
Generation X	-.189*	.094	-.081	.087
Baby Boom	-.192*	.085	-.143**	.093
Greatest/Silent	-.416***	.103	-.171***	.113
Control Variables				
Male			-.027	.068
Black			.129*	.128
Hispanic			-.045	.109
Other races			-.064	.112
Education			.069	.022
Married			.092*	.070
Child in household			-.135**	.075
Employed			.012	.070
Income			-.079	.012
Political interest			.028	.046
Republicanism			-.072	.020
Conservatism			-.235***	.041
Religiosity			.056	.042
Born-again Protestant			.074	.094
R-Squared	.023		.164	
N	1000		999	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error.

Are Young Millennials Different from Old Millennials?

In the main regression analyses, the Millennials group is used as a reference category to examine whether Millennials are distinct from previous generations in their support for a range of correctional policies. However, it is speculated that there might be a meaningful within-generation variation within the Millennials group in their support for public policies. To analyze whether younger cohorts of Millennials and Generation Z (hereafter young Millennials) have different attitudes toward correctional issues from older cohorts of Millennials (hereafter old Millennials), supplementary regression analyses are conducted using the combined group of younger cohorts of Millennials (those born after 1989) and Generation Z as a reference category. The year 1989 is arbitrarily used as a cutoff to demarcate old Millennials and young Millennials because it is the midpoint of birthyear range (1981–1998) for Millennials (see also Singal, 2017). The weighted results are presented in this section.

Public Support for Punitiveness

The results from three models on public support for death penalty, court harshness, and the punishment goal of prisons are presented in Table 3.27 and Table 3.28. In these models, the differences between old Millennials and young Millennials are not shown to be statistically significant. Therefore, there is no evidence for within-group variation in Millennials in their support for punitiveness.

Public Support for Rehabilitation, Reentry, and Reintegration

The results from eight regression models on rehabilitation, reentry, and reintegration are shown in Table 3.29, Table 3.30, and Table 3.31. A statistically significant difference between old Millennials and young Millennials is not detected for any of the seven outcome measures

172

Table 3.27. *Generalized Ordered/Ordered Logistic Regression Models on Support for Punitiveness, Old vs. Young Millennials*

| | Death Penalty | | | | Court Harshness | |
| | Oppose vs. (No Opinion/Favor) | | (Oppose/No Opinion) vs. Favor | | | |
	OR	SE	OR	SE	OR	RSE
Generation						
Old Millennials	1.446	.476	1.446	.476	1.236	.396
Generation X	1.658	.490	1.658	.490	1.446	.398
Baby Boom	1.352	.406	1.352	.406	2.090*	.616
Greatest/Silent	1.111	.412	1.111	.412	3.406***	1.150
Control Variables						
Male	1.071	.198	1.071	.198	.656*	.120
Black	.966	.355	.466*	.145	.517*	.141
Hispanic	.598	.180	.598	.180	1.164	.384
Other races	1.517	.489	1.517	.489	1.881	.654
Education	.945	.064	.945	.064	.899	.061
Married	1.107	.234	1.107	.234	1.023	.215
Child in household	1.102	.277	1.102	.277	1.177	.268
Employed	1.153	.227	1.153	.227	1.399	.275
Income	.986	.035	.986	.035	.999	.029
Political interest	.783	.111	1.069	.120	.858	.094
Republicanism	1.140*	.069	1.140*	.069	1.020	.054
Conservatism	1.610***	.205	1.610***	.205	1.655***	.197
Religiosity	.920	.104	.920	.104	1.016	.111
Born-again Protestant	.975	.284	.975	.284	1.330	.355
Pseudo *R*-Squared			---		.084	
N			997		997	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error, SE: Standard error.

Table 3.28. *Binary Logistic Regression Model on Support for Punitiveness, Old vs. Young Millennials*

	Punishment Goal of Prisons	
	OR	RSE
Generation		
Old Millennials	2.174	1.023
Generation X	1.838	.746
Baby Boom	1.207	.501
Greatest/Silent	1.146	.645
Control Variables		
Male	1.002	.229
Black	.558	.230
Hispanic	.850	.384
Other races	.651	.275
Education	1.098	.097
Married	.818	.197
Child in household	1.046	.315
Employed	1.157	.315
Income	1.007	.046
Political interest	.923	.105
Republicanism	1.005	.077
Conservatism	1.560**	.243
Religiosity	.932	.144
Born-again Protestant	.873	.279
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.048	
N	998	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error.

Table 3.29. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Rehabilitation, Reentry, and Reintegration, Old vs. Young Millennials*

	Rehabilitation		Reentry		Reducing Collateral Sanctions		Expungement of Criminal Records		FBI Review of Criminal Records	
	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE
Generation										
Old Millennials	.032	.126	.052	.158	.040	.161	-.050	.178	.011	.160
Generation X	-.029	.122	.040	.140	.104	.124	-.058	.145	.052	.149
Baby Boom	-.048	.126	.119	.138	.072	.126	-.094	.141	.037	.146
Greatest/Silent	-.146**	.144	.024	.154	-.003	.136	-.054	.159	-.005	.185
Control Variables										
Male	-.027	.078	-.089*	.077	.006	.077	.054	.091	.082*	.091
Black	.035	.142	.030	.134	-.011	.135	-.002	.177	.028	.151
Hispanic	-.047	.128	-.151**	.150	-.095	.141	-.076	.150	-.062	.129
Other races	-.105**	.142	-.051	.203	-.000	.157	-.040	.185	-.037	.237
Education	.078	.026	-.017	.029	-.005	.027	.006	.031	-.032	.034
Married	-.032	.089	.000	.079	.043	.083	.013	.090	-.002	.098
Child in household	-.041	.091	-.041	.097	-.055	.104	-.006	.115	-.091*	.111
Employed	.049	.086	.015	.084	.057	.086	.056	.098	.022	.092
Income	.014	.014	-.066	.014	-.056	.014	-.024	.016	.071	.016
Political interest	.125*	.049	.158**	.050	.109*	.044	.103	.055	.114*	.050
Republicanism	-.122**	.022	-.100	.029	-.065	.025	-.036	.030	-.041	.025
Conservatism	-.246***	.052	-.152*	.058	-.176***	.046	-.129*	.059	-.085	.054
Religiosity	-.012	.045	.044	.052	-.026	.053	-.009	.059	.014	.062
Born-again Protestant	.094*	.110	.053	.100	.054	.099	.068	.117	.031	.115
R-Squared	.188		.128		.083		.049		.066	
N	999		991		993		990		990	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error.

Table 3.30. *Binary Logistic Regression Models on Support for Rehabilitation, Reentry, and Reintegration, Old vs. Young Millennials*

	Fair-Chance Hiring		General Attitudes Toward Expungement	
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE
Generation				
Old Millennials	1.388	.490	1.082	.371
Generation X	1.090	.333	.858	.271
Baby Boom	1.756	.542	.581	.186
Greatest/Silent	1.881	.760	.475	.195
Control Variables				
Male	.924	.177	1.229	.234
Black	.638	.223	1.302	.440
Hispanic	.652	.205	.846	.263
Other races	1.071	.440	.459*	.174
Education	.955	.067	.953	.068
Married	1.066	.220	1.263	.268
Child in household	1.146	.263	.836	.201
Employed	1.637*	.326	1.598*	.316
Income	.927*	.032	.904**	.034
Political interest	1.089	.111	1.196	.128
Republicanism	.943	.055	.925	.054
Conservatism	.609***	.075	.603***	.069
Religiosity	1.054	.132	1.019	.125
Born-again Protestant	1.425	.352	1.881*	.468
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.061		.097	
N	977		980	

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error.

Table 3.31. *Ordered Logistic Regression Model on Support for Rehabilitation, Reentry, and Reintegration, Old vs. Young Millennials*

	Restoration of Civil Rights	
	OR	RSE
Generation		
Old Millennials	.777	.252
Generation X	.598	.162
Baby Boom	.515*	.155
Greatest/Silent	.519	.179
Control Variables		
Male	1.230	.222
Black	2.342**	.710
Hispanic	.514**	.126
Other races	.785	.328
Education	1.024	.061
Married	1.001	.188
Child in household	1.036	.208
Employed	.953	.178
Income	.997	.030
Political interest	1.038	.118
Republicanism	.863**	.048
Conservatism	.637***	.064
Religiosity	1.039	.128
Born-again Protestant	.841	.216
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.074	
N	978	

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error.

including public support for rehabilitation, reentry, reducing collateral sanctions, the

expungement of criminal records, the FBI review of criminal records, fair-chance hiring, general

attitudes toward expungement, and the restoration of ex-felons' civil rights. Thus, Millennials as

a whole have analogous attitudes toward offender rehabilitation, reentry, and reintegration.

Public Support for Redemption and Redeemability

The results from regression analyses on two outcome measures on redemption and

redeemability are presented in Table 3.32. Consistent with previous models under different

correctional themes, the notion of within-group variation among Millennials is not supported in

both models on public support for formal redemption rituals and redeemability. In other words,

members of Millennials have similar beliefs in the redemption and redeemability of ex-offenders

regardless of whether they are born earlier or later.

Do the Covariates Have Equivalent Effects Across Generations?

To examine whether the size of a regression coefficient varies across generations,

stratified analyses are performed after sorting the sample into the subgroups of generations.

Next, one way to compare regression coefficients across three or more groups is by conducting

significance tests of interaction terms ("How Can I Compare Regression Coefficients," n.d.)—in

this case, interactions between generation and the variable of interest. Because the small size of

the Greatest/Silent category ($n = 95$) makes models unstable, a new generation variable is created

that combines the Greatest/Silent and Baby Boomers (i.e., revised categories: the

Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers, Generation X, Millennials/Generation Z). Next, using the pooled

sample, a statistical significance is tested for the interaction of this 3-category generation

variable and each covariate across 13 models. In this section, the weighted results from stratified

Table 3.32. *OLS Regression Model on Support for Redemption and Redeemability, Old vs. Young Millennials*

	Formal Redemption Rituals		Redeemability	
	β	RSE	β	RSE
Generation				
Old Millennials	.007	.149	.029	.121
Generation X	-.031	.145	-.061	.115
Baby Boom	-.069	.143	-.125	.119
Greatest/Silent	-.080	.165	-.159**	.130
Control Variables				
Male	-.017	.092	-.028	.068
Black	.051	.169	.128*	.127
Hispanic	.008	.117	-.045	.110
Other races	-.041	.155	-.063	.112
Education	-.001	.030	.068	.021
Married	.087	.099	.090*	.071
Child in household	-.045	.110	-.139***	.076
Employed	.117**	.093	.007	.073
Income	-.154***	.015	-.078	.012
Political interest	.156**	.056	.025	.047
Republicanism	-.071	.026	-.072	.020
Conservatism	-.131**	.049	-.236***	.041
Religiosity	.086	.056	.057	.042
Born-again Protestant	.072	.116	.074	.094
R-Squared	.102		.165	
N	995		999	

p < .05; **p* < .01; ***p* < .001 (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error.

analyses and interaction analyses will be discussed in threefold: (1) the comparison of regression coefficients across generations, (2) significant predictors of an outcome measure for each generation, (3) the existence of age effect per generation.

Public Support for Punitiveness

Death Penalty. First, the size of regression coefficient is different across generations for male, marital status, and religiosity (Table 3.33). Being male has the opposite effects between Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers although both effects are not statistically significant. Getting married increases public support for death penalty in Generation X although its effects on Millennials and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers are the opposite and statistically not significant. In Generation X, a higher level of religiosity is associated with weaker support for capital punishment but its association becomes positive in older generations (the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers) although not statistically significant. Second, public support for punitiveness is affected by different predictors across generations. For Millennials, significant covariates include age, Black, Hispanic, other races, and Conservatism. For Generation X, they are marital status, Republicanism, and religiosity. For the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers, Conservatism is the only significant covariate. Third, the age effect is found in Millennials but not in other generations. For a year increase in age, the odds of favoring the death penalty versus the combined lower categories increase by a factor of 1.094 for Millennials.

Court Harshness Toward Criminals. First, the effects of age, male, and child in household on public support for the court harshness toward criminals are different across generations (Table 3.34). In Generation X, for a year increase in age, the odds of responding that the courts are not dealing with criminals harshly enough versus the combined lower categories become .929 times smaller. However, the effect of age becomes positive and not statistically

Table 3.33. *Generalized Ordered /Ordered Logistic Regression Models on Support for Death Penalty, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	Oppose vs. (No Opinion /Favor)	(Oppose /No Opinion) vs. Favor					
	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	
Age	1.004 (.041)	1.094* (.044)	.970	.033	.979	.022	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	1.166 (.360)	1.166 (.360)	1.815	.634	.683	.199	X-G/S/B
Black	2.320 (1.326)	.208** (.101)	.748	.404	.897	.556	n.s.
Hispanic	.759 (.387)	.248* (.136)	.842	.406	1.152	.565	n.s.
Other races	3.445* (2.101)	.947 (.532)	2.325	1.387	1.613	1.191	n.s.
Education	.880 (.109)	.880 (.109)	.990	.118	.923	.087	n.s.
Married	.638 (.258)	.638 (.258)	2.612**	.940	.832	.282	M/Z-X X-G/S/B
Child in household	1.470 (.679)	1.470 (.679)	1.119	.369	.793	.368	n.s.
Employed	1.050 (.333)	1.050 (.333)	1.100	.436	.839	.299	n.s.
Income	.946 (.057)	.946 (.057)	.964	.070	1.043	.057	n.s.
Political interest	1.016 (.169)	1.016 (.169)	.899	.146	.985	.210	n.s.
Republicanism	1.210 (.162)	.953 (.110)	1.294*	.158	1.178	.109	n.s.
Conservatism	1.766* (.398)	1.766* (.398)	1.298	.241	1.963***	.371	n.s.
Religiosity	.787 (.160)	1.139 (.233)	.565**	.124	1.138	.193	X-G/S/B
Born-again Protestant	.681 (.411)	.681 (.411)	1.720	.766	.776	.308	n.s.
Pseudo *R*-Squared	---		.123		.095		
N	316		278		403		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

Table 3.34. *Ordered Logistic Regression Models on Support for the Court Harshness Toward Criminals,*
Per Generation

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	
Age	1.008	.041	.929*	.029	1.017	.022	X-G/S/B
Control Variables							
Male	.354**	.115	1.335	.452	.733	.202	M/Z-X
Black	.504	.208	.475	.209	.330	.201	n.s.
Hispanic	1.159	.700	1.560	.782	.627	.228	n.s.
Other races	1.223	.611	4.395*	2.682	2.427	1.491	n.s.
Education	.930	.130	1.058	.127	.815*	.074	n.s.
Married	.577	.235	.613	.219	1.466	.451	n.s.
Child in household	1.945	.874	1.139	.370	.634	.247	M/Z-G/S/B
Employed	1.577	.594	1.377	.511	1.265	.406	n.s.
Income	.990	.054	1.030	.060	.993	.048	n.s.
Political interest	.798	.106	.758	.122	1.094	.283	n.s.
Republicanism	1.081	.108	.975	.107	.970	.080	n.s.
Conservatism	1.598*	.307	1.865**	.375	1.731**	.324	n.s.
Religiosity	.891	.179	1.006	.200	1.311	.217	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	1.248	.756	2.316	.874	.916	.363	n.s.
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.117		.117		.085		
N	316		278		403		

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

significant among the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Males in Millennials are less likely to support the court harshness but the effect of male becomes positive but not statistically significant in Generation X. Having a child in household increases support for court harshness in Millennials but reduces support in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers although both effects are not statistically significant.

Second, except for Conservatism, significant covariates are dissimilar across generations: male for Millennials; age and other races for Generation X; education for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, the age effect is observed only among Gen Xers. For one year increase in age, the odds of responding that the courts deal with offenders not harshly enough versus the combined lower categories decrease by a factor of .929 in Generation X, but not in other generations.

The Punishment Goal of Prisons. First, out of all covariates, only age variable has different effects on public support for the punishment goal of prisons across generations (Table 3.35). The effects of age are in the opposite directions between Millennials and Generation X but both effects are not statistically significant. Second, significant covariates are not the same across generations: Conservatism for Generation X and marital status for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, there is no evidence for the age effect in any generation.

Public Support for Rehabilitation, Reentry, and Reintegration

Rehabilitation. First, the size of regression coefficient is different across generations for the following covariates: age, other races, and born-again Protestant (Table 3.36). Although both effects are not statistically significant, the effect of age on public support for rehabilitation is positive for Generation X and negative for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. The effect of other races on public support for rehabilitation is different for Millennials than for older

183

Table 3.35. *Binary Logistic Regression Models on Support for the Punishment Goal of Prisons, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	
Age	1.096	.070	.937	.040	1.011	.022	M/Z-X
Control Variables							
Male	.716	.330	2.049	.784	.736	.268	n.s.
Black	.225	.176	.803	.573	2.047	1.390	n.s.
Hispanic	.811	.620	.903	.490	.133	.144	n.s.
Other races	.442	.310	1.737	1.057	.511	.537	n.s.
Education	.931	.168	1.165	.152	1.122	.158	n.s.
Married	.704	.362	1.550	.669	.466*	.180	n.s.
Child in household	.866	.480	.743	.308	1.482	.918	n.s.
Employed	1.281	.732	.805	.337	1.015	.443	n.s.
Income	1.015	.080	.996	.081	1.022	.079	n.s.
Political interest	.882	.186	.909	.178	.997	.190	n.s.
Republicanism	.983	.130	.971	.108	1.184	.132	n.s.
Conservatism	1.646	.458	1.560*	.343	1.208	.293	n.s.
Religiosity	1.178	.324	.688	.192	.898	.206	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	.338	.233	1.929	.974	.596	.280	n.s.
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.104		.092		.068		
N	317		279		402		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

Table 3.36. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Rehabilitation, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE	
Age	-.015	.013	.085	.016	-.116	.007	X-G/S/B
Control Variables							
Male	-.039	.113	-.045	.150	-.013	.121	n.s.
Black	.066	.175	-.023	.289	.107	.296	n.s.
Hispanic	-.057	.182	-.001	.187	-.073	.217	n.s.
Other races	.017	.160	-.173**	.198	-.166*	.316	M/Z-G/S/B, M/Z-X
Education	.126*	.040	.047	.051	.091	.040	n.s.
Married	.061	.139	-.065	.163	-.057	.140	n.s.
Child in household	-.055	.122	-.072	.142	.032	.174	n.s.
Employed	.049	.116	.039	.156	.072	.141	n.s.
Income	-.001	.018	.037	.030	-.004	.023	n.s.
Political interest	.226***	.051	.139*	.069	.040	.114	n.s.
Republicanism	-.049	.033	-.241**	.041	-.049	.040	n.s.
Conservatism	-.327***	.057	-.184*	.086	-.254**	.094	n.s.
Religiosity	-.069	.064	.085	.093	-.060	.074	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	.270***	.157	-.019	.186	.051	.154	M/Z-G/S/B M/Z-X
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.314		.209		.192		
N	317		279		403		

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

generations. Other races in Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers are less likely to support rehabilitation whereas the sign of the effect in Millennials becomes the opposite yet not statistically significant. Being a born-again Protestant is significantly associated with stronger support for rehabilitation in Millennials. However, the effect of this covariate is different in Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers.

Second, except for Conservatism, public support for rehabilitation is significantly affected by similar but not entirely the same covariates across generations: education, political interest, and born-again Protestant for Millennials; other races, political interest, and Republicanism in Generation X; other races for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, the age effect is not statistically significant within each generation.

Reentry. First, the regression coefficients of Hispanic, other races, and born-again Protestant are not equivalent across generations (Table 3.37). Hispanic Baby Boomers are more likely than White Baby Boomers to support providing reentry services to offenders who are returning to the community. In comparison to Whites, however, Hispanics in Generation X are less supportive and Hispanic Millennials are not statistically different. Other races in Millennials and Generation X are statistically different in their support for reentry. The effect of other races in Generation X is negative whereas the effect of other races in Millennials is positive and not statistically significant. The effect of born-again Protestant is only significant and positive among Millennials. Being a born-again Protestant is not predictive of support for reentry in Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/ Baby Boomers.

Second, public support for reentry is associated with different covariates depending on generational membership: political interest and born-again Protestant for Millennials; male, Hispanic, other races, and Republicanism for Generation X; male, Hispanic, and Conservatism

Table 3.37. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Reentry, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE	
Age	.035	.017	.010	.017	-.030	.005	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	-.001	.162	-.152*	.153	-.163**	.080	n.s.
Black	.126	.228	-.078	.243	.058	.140	n.s.
Hispanic	-.125	.219	-.310**	.271	.107**	.125	M/Z-G/S/B X-G/S/B M/Z-X
Other races	.088	.340	-.208***	.191	-.056	.157	
Education	.022	.057	-.043	.051	-.008	.027	n.s.
Married	-.001	.163	-.054	.160	.001	.100	n.s.
Child in household	.026	.156	-.087	.164	.045	.118	n.s.
Employed	-.019	.153	.025	.149	.051	.108	n.s.
Income	-.088	.022	.011	.032	-.114	.019	n.s.
Political interest	.227*	.096	.103	.074	.120	.062	n.s.
Republicanism	-.001	.054	-.221*	.052	-.074	.025	n.s.
Conservatism	-.169	.094	-.097	.095	-.169*	.061	n.s.
Religiosity	.026	.092	.003	.093	.064	.060	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	.168***	.160	.019	.195	-.004	.105	M/Z-G/S/B M/Z-X
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.163		.210		.137		
N	314		276		401		

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, age is not significantly related to public support for reentry in all generations examined.

Restoration of Civil Rights. First, the effects of two covariates—other races and child in household—on public support for restoring ex-felons' civil rights are different across generations (Table 3.38). Although none of the effects are statistically significant, the effect of other races on support for the restoration of civil rights in Millennials is positive whereas the effects of other races in Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers are negative. Having a child in household is significantly associated with stronger support for the restoration of ex-felons' rights to vote or sit on juries whereas it has statistically not significant, negative effects in Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers.

Second, significant covariates of public support for the restoration of civil rights vary across generations: child in household and Conservatism for Millennials; Black and Republicanism for Generation X; Black and Conservatism for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, within each generation, public support for the restoration of ex-felons' civil rights does not vary with age.

Fair-Chance Hiring. First, the following covariates have different effects on public support for fair-chance hiring across generations: Black, child in household, political interest, religiosity, and born-again Protestant (Table 3.39). The effects of being Black are in the opposite directions between Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Black Gen Xers are less likely to respond that ban-the-box laws are a good idea, but Blacks in older generations (Baby Boomers through the Greatest) are more supportive of fair-chance hiring although the effect is not statistically significant. On the contrary, the regression coefficient for having a child in household is negative in Generation X and positive in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers.

Table 3.38. *Ordered Logistic Regression Models on Support for the Restoration of Civil Rights, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	
Age	.966	.034	.999	.028	.982	.020	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	1.255	.396	.841	.270	1.496	.399	n.s.
Black	1.998	.830	3.139*	1.479	4.416*	2.896	n.s.
Hispanic	.451	.228	.568	.177	.512	.221	n.s.
Other races	2.036	1.242	.402	.262	.343	.225	M/Z-G/S/B M/Z-X
Education	1.107	.132	.963	.110	1.046	.092	n.s.
Married	.977	.331	1.136	.380	.881	.278	n.s.
Child in household	2.133*	.802	.603	.189	.810	.235	M/Z-X
Employed	.678	.217	.902	.339	1.182	.380	n.s.
Income	.993	.057	1.048	.067	.968	.045	n.s.
Political interest	1.070	.184	1.171	.232	1.063	.245	n.s.
Republicanism	.966	.115	.829*	.072	.904	.078	n.s.
Conservatism	.655**	.103	.698	.133	.518**	.099	n.s.
Religiosity	.913	.208	.900	.201	1.168	.202	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	.777	.428	.855	.352	.720	.295	n.s.
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.061		.089		.099		
N	313		272		393		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

Table 3.39. *Binary Logistic Regression Models on Support for Fair-Chance Hiring, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	
Age	.992	.039	1.055	.037	.974	.017	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	1.202	.447	.610	.230	.759	.214	n.s.
Black	.626	.360	.273*	.177	1.891	1.311	X-G/S/B
Hispanic	.666	.326	.477	.235	1.220	.778	n.s.
Other races	2.490	2.011	1.204	.710	.384	.213	n.s.
Education	.973	.127	.859	.107	1.000	.113	n.s.
Married	1.707	.773	1.575	.602	.562	.175	n.s.
Child in household	1.592	.725	.666	.229	2.388	1.237	X-G/S/B
Employed	2.153*	.833	2.106	.810	.843	.281	n.s.
Income	.838**	.051	.912	.072	1.049	.058	n.s.
Political interest	1.567**	.267	1.024	.203	.981	.167	M/Z-X
Republicanism	.994	.105	.906	.096	.886	.079	n.s.
Conservatism	.679*	.133	.493**	.110	.779	.148	n.s.
Religiosity	1.029	.223	.770	.181	1.111	.209	M/Z-X X-G/S/B
Born-again Protestant	1.204	.743	1.106	.466	2.038*	.709	X-G/S/B
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.117		.159		.086		
N	312		275		390		

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

although both effects are not statistically significant. Political interest has a different effect on support for fair-chance hiring between Millennials and Generation X. The effect of religiosity on support for fair-chance hiring in Generation X is in the opposite direction to that in Millennials and that in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers although these effects are not statistically significant. The effect of being a born-again Protestant on support for fair-chance hiring is substantially greater among the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers than in Generation X.

Second, significant covariates of support for fair-chance hiring across generations are as follows: employed, income, political interest, and Conservatism for Millennials; Black and Conservatism for Generation X; born-again Protestant for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, age does not have statistically significant effect on support for fair-chance hiring.

Reducing Collateral Sanctions. First, the regression coefficients of Black and political interest are not equivalent across generations (Table 3.40). Although both effects are not statistically significant, Black has the opposite effects on public support for reducing collateral sanctions between Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. The effect of political interest is statistically significant only among Millennials and its effect is positive. Political interest has a negative but statistically not significant effect on support for reducing collateral sanctions among the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Second, significant covariates of support for reducing collateral sanctions are different across generations: political interest and Conservatism for Millennials; religiosity for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, age does not have a statistically significant effect on support for reducing collateral sanctions across generations.

Expungement of Criminal Records. First, the effects of two regression coefficients—marital status and Republicanism—are not equivalent across generations (Table 3.41). Although

191

Table 3.40. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Reducing Collateral Sanctions, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE	
Age	.021	.020	-.021	.013	-.027	.007	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	-.064	.149	-.015	.125	.052	.111	n.s.
Black	.001	.184	-.099	.210	.048	.226	X-G/S/B
Hispanic	-.121	.265	-.051	.157	-.092	.219	n.s.
Other races	.110	.240	-.018	.345	-.074	.241	n.s.
Education	-.002	.053	-.024	.052	.008	.038	n.s.
Married	.024	.170	.053	.144	-.004	.130	n.s.
Child in household	-.011	.215	-.097	.135	-.031	.230	n.s.
Employed	.055	.150	.050	.145	.036	.143	n.s.
Income	-.097	.021	-.004	.025	-.019	.024	n.s.
Political interest	.295***	.066	.087	.068	-.041	.079	M/Z-G/S/B
Republicanism	.033	.049	-.092	.034	-.121	.037	n.s.
Conservatism	-.202**	.076	-.132	.067	-.148*	.077	n.s.
Religiosity	-.068	.090	-.073	.101	.018	.078	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	.071	.206	.056	.176	.029	.133	n.s.
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.174		.073		.085		
N	316		279		398		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

Table 3.41. *OLS Regression Models on Support for the Expungement of Criminal Records, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE	
Age	-.052	.020	.088	.014	.042	.008	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	-.062	.174	.134	.163	.078	.126	n.s.
Black	-.045	.239	-.067	.325	.054	.270	n.s.
Hispanic	-.077	.262	-.112	.203	-.073	.277	n.s.
Other races	.022	.304	-.050	.333	-.062	.264	n.s.
Education	-.048	.063	.060	.054	-.004	.047	n.s.
Married	.046	.185	.122	.155	-.096	.138	X-G/S/B
Child in household	-.062	.233	.001	.155	.045	.241	n.s.
Employed	.068	.161	.047	.188	.009	.146	n.s.
Income	-.063	.024	-.049	.032	.028	.027	n.s.
Political interest	.252**	.079	.068	.078	.018	.108	n.s.
Republicanism	.067	.057	-.181*	.046	-.006	.039	M/Z-X
Conservatism	-.076	.099	-.145	.085	-.171*	.089	n.s.
Religiosity	.002	.103	.014	.107	-.047	.080	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	-.046	.252	.076	.190	.104	.161	n.s.
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.078		.121		.063		
N	314		276		400		

*$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$ (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

both effects are not statistically significant, the effects of marriage on public support for the expungement of criminal records are in the opposite directions between Generation X and older generations. As for the effect of Republicanism, it reduces support for the expungement of criminal records in Generation X and has a positive but not statistically effect in Millennials. Second, public support for the expungement of criminal records is significantly associated with political interest in Millennials, Republicanism in Generation X, and Conservatism in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, the age effect is not observed in any generation.

General Attitudes Toward Expungement. First, the regression coefficients of four variables have different sizes across generations: Hispanic, other races, marital status, and Republicanism (Table 3.42). Being a Hispanic in Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers predicts general attitudes toward the expungement of criminal records in the opposite directions although both effects are not statistically significant. Other races in Generation X are distinguished in their support for the expungement of criminal records from other races in Millennials and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Notably, the odds of responding that the expungement of criminal records is a good policy increase by almost fivefold for those married in Generation X than for those not married. However, the marriage has a negative but not statistically effect in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Republicans in Generation X are less likely to support the expungement of criminal records whereas Republicanism has a positive but not statistically significant effect in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers.

Second, general attitudes toward the expungement of criminal records are associated with different covariates depending on generational membership: political interest and Conservatism for Millennials; other races, marital status, employment status, income, Republicanism, and Conservatism for Generation X; Black and Conservatism for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers.

194

Table 3.42. *Binary Logistic Regression Models on General Attitudes Toward Expungement, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	OR	RSE	
Age	1.002	.037	1.020	.039	.985	.019	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	.904	.316	1.303	.498	1.309	.354	n.s.
Black	.967	.519	1.020	.586	4.015*	2.226	n.s.
Hispanic	.643	.355	1.242	.592	.383	.233	X-G/S/B
Other races	.555	.276	.083**	.063	1.468	.845	M/Z-X X-G/S/B
Education	1.086	.148	.839	.113	.836	.088	n.s.
Married	.973	.414	4.579***	1.932	.572	.172	X-G/S/B
Child in household	1.103	.469	.605	.216	2.325	1.196	n.s.
Employed	1.587	.539	2.651*	1.153	1.009	.328	n.s.
Income	.897	.062	.808*	.069	.974	.053	n.s.
Political interest	1.500*	.253	1.125	.200	1.070	.186	n.s.
Republicanism	.944	.095	.727**	.077	1.156	.106	X-G/S/B
Conservatism	.649*	.124	.641*	.131	.426***	.085	n.s.
Religiosity	.936	.190	1.129	.286	1.094	.214	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	1.047	.542	1.697	.737	1.743	.618	n.s.
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.103		.228		.120		
N	314		274		392		

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); OR: Odds ratio, RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

Third, there is no evidence for the age effect on general attitudes toward expungement across generations.

  The FBI Review of Criminal Records. First, there are five covariates that have different effects across generations: Hispanic, other races, political interest, Republicanism, and Conservatism (Table 3.43). Although the effects are not statistically significant, the effect of Hispanics on support for the FBI review is positive in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers whereas the effects of Hispanics in Millennials and Generation X are negative. In comparison, other races in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers have more exclusionary attitudes toward the FBI review compared to Whites whereas other races in Millennials and Generation X are not statistically different from their White counterparts. The effects of political interest on support for the FBI review of criminal records are not equivalent between Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. The effect of Republicanism on support for the FBI review is positive in Millennials but negative in Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers although all these effects are not statistically significant. Similarly, the effect of Conservatism on support for the FBI review is positive in Millennials but negative in Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers although the effect of Conservatism is statistically significant only among Generation X.

  Second, significant covariates of public support for the FBI review of criminal records across generations are as follows: political interest for Millennials; political interest and Conservatism for Generation X; male and other races for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, within each generation, age is not significantly associated with support for the FBI review.

Public Support for Redemption and Redeemability

  Formal Redemption Rituals. First, generation has statistically significant interaction

Table 3.43. *OLS Regression Models on Support for the FBI Review of Criminal Records, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE	
Age	-.012	.017	-.039	.017	.016	.008	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	.024	.172	.038	.156	.125*	.124	n.s.
Black	-.018	.235	.055	.250	.020	.232	n.s.
Hispanic	-.134	.202	-.061	.211	.049	.227	M/Z-G/S/B X-G/S/B
Other races	.026	.337	.060	.220	-.187***	.262	M/Z-G/S/B X-G/S/B
Education	-.049	.064	-.090	.059	.016	.050	n.s.
Married	.165	.208	-.029	.189	-.074	.143	n.s.
Child in household	-.185	.225	-.115	.156	-.004	.189	n.s.
Employed	.016	.155	.091	.164	-.010	.159	n.s.
Income	.003	.026	.098	.029	.093	.027	n.s.
Political interest	.230**	.076	.213**	.084	-.026	.081	X-G/S/B
Republicanism	.015	.045	-.026	.038	-.073	.039	M/Z-X M/Z-G/S/B
Conservatism	.079	.084	-.233***	.074	-.079	.091	M/Z-X M/Z-G/S/B
Religiosity	-.128	.104	.026	.100	.105	.090	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	.048	.280	.089	.186	-.043	.157	n.s.
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.125		.173		.092		
N	313		279		398		

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

effects with the following covariates: Hispanic, marital status, child in household, and political interest (Table 3.44). Hispanics in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom generations are more likely to support formal redemption rituals such as rehabilitation ceremonies and certificates of rehabilitation compared to Whites whereas being Hispanic has a negative but not statistically significant effect on support for formal redemption rituals in Millennials. Those married in Generation X provide stronger support for formal redemption rituals than those not married, but marital status does not affect support for formal redemption rituals in Millennials. Having a child increases support for formal redemption rituals in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers, but it has negative but not statistically significant effects in Millennials and Generation X. Political interest has a substantially greater effect on support for formal redemption rituals in Millennials than in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers.

Second, significant covariates of public support for formal redemption rituals are dissimilar across generations: employment status, income, political interest, and born-again Protestant in Millennials; marital status in Generation X; Hispanic, child in household, employment status, and Conservatism in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, the association between age and support for formal redemption rituals is not statistically significant in all generations.

Redeemability. First, generation has moderating effects on the relationships between public support for redeemability and the following covariates: other races, Republicanism, Conservatism, and born-again Protestant (Table 3.45). Other races in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers are less likely to believe in offender redeemability than Whites, whereas other races in Millennials have stronger support for redeemability although this effect is not statistically significant. Republicanism has a negative effect on support for redeemability in Generation X,

198

Table 3.44. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Formal Redemption Rituals, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE	
Age	.069	.016	-.001	.017	.034	.007	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	-.002	.160	-.072	.170	-.014	.128	n.s.
Black	.018	.265	.070	.286	.100	.245	n.s.
Hispanic	-.061	.164	.024	.194	.137*	.295	M/Z-G/S/B
Other races	-.014	.240	-.005	.163	-.072	.313	n.s.
Education	-.012	.048	.029	.061	-.099	.042	n.s.
Married	.002	.197	.208*	.203	.039	.133	M/Z-X
Child in household	-.130	.174	-.083	.164	.138*	.214	M/Z-G/S/B X- G/S/B
Employed	.158*	.140	-.021	.199	.191**	.143	n.s.
Income	-.196***	.019	-.099	.033	-.136	.026	n.s.
Political interest	.286**	.081	.076	.091	.030	.107	M/Z-G/S/B
Republicanism	-.083	.045	-.120	.047	.034	.039	n.s.
Conservatism	-.140	.075	-.088	.082	-.164*	.083	n.s.
Religiosity	.099	.079	.057	.122	.067	.086	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	.128**	.180	.094	.205	.021	.158	n.s.
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.238		.111		.125		
N	315		279		401		

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error;

n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

Table 3.45. *OLS Regression Models on Support for Redeemability, Per Generation*

	Millennials/Generation Z		Generation X		Baby Boom/ Silent/Greatest		Equivalence Test
	β	RSE	β	RSE	β	RSE	
Age	.011	.013	.046	.013	-.091	.006	n.s.
Control Variables							
Male	-.011	.115	-.021	.118	-.017	.101	n.s.
Black	.162*	.159	.059	.216	.196	.287	n.s.
Hispanic	-.025	.202	-.083	.165	.008	.175	n.s.
Other races	.042	.148	-.093	.164	-.157**	.178	M/Z-G/S/B
Education	.072	.037	.088	.042	.059	.035	n.s.
Married	.068	.126	.118	.123	.071	.107	n.s.
Child in household	-.095	.120	-.165**	.117	-.061	.148	n.s.
Employed	-.005	.121	-.076	.135	.103	.110	n.s.
Income	-.126*	.017	.016	.028	-.121	.019	n.s.
Political interest	.100	.059	-.019	.065	.014	.105	n.s.
Republicanism	-.003	.037	-.183*	.038	-.014	.033	M/Z-X X-G/S/B
Conservatism	-.261**	.061	-.301***	.060	-.170*	.073	X-G/S/B
Religiosity	-.076	.070	.204**	.089	.065	.056	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	.214***	.172	-.041	.153	.030	.123	M/Z-G/S/B M/Z-X
Pseudo *R*-Squared	.174		.280		.147		
N	317		279		403		

p < .05; **p* < .01; ***p* < .001 (two-tailed); RSE: Robust standard error;
n.s.: statistically not significant, G/S/B: Greatest/Silent/Baby Boom, X: Generation X, M/Z: Millennial/Generation Z.

but its effects on Millennials and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers are not statistically significant. Conservatism reduces support for redeemability to a greater extent in Generation X than in the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. The effect of being a born-again Protestant is positive and statistically significant in Millennials, but its effects become statistically not significant in Generation X and the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers.

Second, except for Conservatism, significant covariates of public support for offender redeemability vary across generations: Black, income, and born-again Protestant for Millennials; child in household, Republicanism, and religiosity for Generation X; other races for the Greatest/Silent/Baby Boomers. Third, regardless of generational membership, age is not significantly predictive of support for redeemability.

Conclusion

The findings from main regression analyses that compares Millennials with previous generations are summarized in Table 3.46. The results indicate that generational differences in public support for correctional policies are statistically significant for 5 out of 13 outcome measures. To be specific, regarding public support for punitiveness, generational differences are statistically significant for 1 out of 3 outcome measures. Millennials are less likely to argue for greater court harshness toward criminals than Baby Boomers and the Greatest/Silent. On rehabilitation, reentry, and reintegration issues, Millennials are more progressive on 3 out of 8 outcome measures than older generations. They have more inclusionary attitudes compared to Baby Boomers (the restoration of civil rights), the Greatest/Silent (rehabilitation), or both (general attitudes toward the expungement of criminal records). As for public support for redemption and redeemability, Millennials are different from other generations in 1 out of 2

Table 3.46. *Summary Findings from Main Regression Analyses*

	Punitiveness			Rehabilitation, Reentry, & Reintegration								Redemption & Redeemability	
	DP	CH	PG	RH	RE	CR	FH	CS	EP	GA	FR	RR	RD
Generation													
Generation X	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Baby Boom	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	(-)
Greatest/Silent	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	(-)
Control Variables													
Male	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	n.s.
Black	(-)	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(+)
Hispanic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Other races	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Education	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Married	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(+)
Child in household	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	(-)
Employed	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	(+)	n.s.
Income	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	(-)	n.s.
Political interest	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	(+)	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	(+)	n.s.
Republicanism	(+)	n.s.	n.s.	(-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Conservatism	(+)	(+)	(+)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	n.s.	(-)	(-)
Religiosity	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	(+)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

(+): significant positive effect, (-): significant negative effect, n.s.: statistically not significant effect;
DP: Death penalty, CH: Court harshness, PG: Punishment goal of prisons, RH; Rehabilitation, RE: Reentry, CR: Restoration of civil rights, FH: Fair-chance hiring, CS: Reducing collateral sanctions, EP: Expungement of criminal records, GA: General attitudes toward expungement, FR: FBI review of criminal records, RR: Formal redemption rituals, RD: Redeemability.

models. That is, they have stronger beliefs in offender redeemability than Baby Boomers and the Greatest/Silent.

Of note, differences between Millennials and Generation X are not statistically significant in any model. Similarly, the results from supplementary analyses that examine the differences between old Millennials and young Millennials suggest that the notion of within-group variation among Millennials is not supported in all models—at least when the grouping is based on age.

Table 3.47 reports the summary of results from stratified analyses and interaction analyses that are used to test the equivalence of regression coefficients across generations. Several findings merit discussion. First, generational membership has a moderating effect on the association between control variables and support for correctional policy outcomes. In every model, at least one (e.g., support for the punishment goal of prisons) and as many as five covariates (e.g., support for fair-chance hiring, the FBI review of criminal records) have regression coefficients of different sizes across generations. Second, in all models, significant predictors of public support for correctional policies are found to be different across generations. Third, evidence for the age effect (i.e., public support for correctional policies is affected by the aging process) is weak. Age is significantly associated with policy support within generations in 2 out of 13 models (Millennials for the death penalty, Generation X for the court harshness).

Table 3.47. *Summary Findings from the Equivalence Test*

	Punitiveness			Rehabilitation, Reentry, & Reintegration								Redemption & Redeemability	
	DP	CH	PG	RH	RE	CR	FH	CS	EP	GA	FR	RR	RD
Age	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Control Variables													
Male	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Black	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Hispanic	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.
Other races	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	Sig.
Education	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Married	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	Sig.	n.s.
Child in household	n.s.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	n.s.
Employed	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Income	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Political interest	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.
Republicanism	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	Sig.
Conservatism	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	n.s.	Sig.
Religiosity	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Born-again Protestant	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.	Sig.	n.s.	Sig.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	Sig.

Sig.: the interaction with generation is statistically significant, n.s.: the interaction with generation is statistically not significant;
DP: Death penalty, CH: Court harshness, PG: Punishment goal of prisons, RH; Rehabilitation, RE: Reentry, CR: Restoration of civil rights, FH: Fair-chance hiring, CS: Reducing collateral sanctions, EP: Expungement of criminal records, GA: General attitudes toward expungement, FR: FBI review of criminal records, RR: Formal redemption rituals, RD: Redeemability.

Chapter 4

DISCUSSION:
THE FUTURE OF CORRECTIONS

There is a mysterious cycle in human events. To some generations much is given. Of other generations much is expected. This generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny (Franklin D. Roosevelt at the 1936 Democratic National Convention).

Although classic studies on generations began to emerge as long as a century ago (e.g., Mannheim, 1928/1970), academic interest in generations accelerated in the last decade. Most of this interest was tied to an intense focus on Millennials—a generation notable because of its large size and distinctive experiences technologically (e.g., internet, cell phones) and socially (e.g., increased social diversity, 9/11 attack). As a result, a large volume of research has been conducted to probe the attitudes and behaviors of the Millennial generation across diverse fields, ranging from political science, to business, psychology, and education. Notably, criminology was a late comer to the study of generations. Recently, a few studies have appeared that examined the effect of generational membership (or cohort effect) on a limited scope of criminology and criminal justice topics such as death penalty attitudes and crime salience (e.g., Anderson et al., 2017; Shi et al., 2020). No investigation, however, has focused on generational differences on a range of correctional issues at large.

The current project seeks to address this omission in the literature. Importantly, in addition to contributing to a growing body of generational research, the main purpose of this dissertation is to prognosticate what the future of American corrections might entail. At a time when American corrections is experiencing a historic turning point toward offender inclusion (e.g., Cullen et al., 2020; Petersilia & Cullen, 2015; Simon, 2014), little scientific information exists as to whether this trend will persist. Thus, the examination of the views of Millennials on

205

correctional policies will serve to reveal what this generational group might favor as they move into prominent roles as citizens and policy makers in the foreseeable future.

In this regard, this dissertation project set up the theoretical framework by reviewing existing generational research in other disciplines (in Chapter 1) and then presented analyses using the data drawn from a national-level, opt-in internet panel survey (in Chapters 2–3). As reported, the results support that Millennials embrace correctional policies that are inclusionary rather than exclusionary in nature. However, the distinctiveness of Millennials is salient for only a limited number of policies. The findings thus suggest that the progressive views of Millennials might not be exclusive to this specific generation but are shared by all Americans.

This concluding chapter is divided into four sections. The first section summarizes the descriptions of Millennials—who they are, why they are expected to differ from other generations, and in what areas they have been found to be different (or not different) in previous research across diverse fields. The second section reviews the empirical results from the current project and discusses the trend regarding which correctional ideals are more strongly espoused by the Millennial generation. Based on the findings, it is argued that the progressive views manifested by Millennials might not be entirely generational but also American. The third section reiterates the implications of this dissertation and presents ideas that future research might consider to advance the understanding of Millennial effects on public policy opinions. Finally, the dissertation offers concluding comments that foretell how Millennials will shape the future of American corrections.

Millennial Effects

This section will take stock of extant research from other fields on Millennial effects as reported in Chapter 1. Defined as those born between 1981 and 1996 in this study, Millennials

206

have outnumbered Baby Boomers and now comprise "the nation's largest living adult generation" (Fry, 2020, para. 1). In order to contextualize why Millennials might be different from other generations, Chapter 1 discusses several generation theories that contend individuals born during a particular epoch develop common characteristics because of common experiences. Thus, Mannheim (1928/1970) posits that a generation develops "collective impulses and formative principles original to itself" (p. 189) and exerts an inseparable "gestalt" effect of combined biological, social, and historical processes. In Ryder's (1965) framework, a generation is used a proxy for the broader sociocultural environment and generational commonalities are measured by mean scores on attitudinal and behavioral variables. Similarly, Strauss and Howe (1991) argue that individuals of the same generation are united through "age-determined participation in epochal events that occur during its lifecycle" (p. 32).

A closer inspection of Millennials suggests that this generation group might be distinguished from older generations due to both compositional and contextual influences. With regard to its composition, the Millennial generation is more diverse in its social origins—both racially and ethnically (Bialik & Fry, 2019; Frey, 2018; Jones et al., 2012)—and is more college-educated. Regarding major historical events, Millennials were affected by the 9/11 attack (when they were ages 5 to 20) and global terror threats, the 2008 economic recession (ages 12 to 27), and the technology revolution in the 2000s and the 2010s that diffused the personal use of computers, cell phones, and social media (ages 4 to 19 through 23 to 38). In addition, at the time of writing this dissertation, Millennials are experiencing the COVID-19 pandemic (ages 24 to 39), an issue that will be revisited later.

According to previous studies, major experiences during individuals' formative years (late adolescence and early adulthood or ages between 17 and 25) are of particular importance in

formulating the generational identity (e.g., Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Mannheim, 1928/1970; Schuman & Scott, 1989). In this respect, it is important to consider that Millennials were immersed by a societal trend moving toward offender inclusion during their formative years. For example, in the year 2010 marked by some scholars as "correctional turning point" (e.g., Cullen et al., 2020), members of Millennial generation were 14 to 29 years old. Thus, it is plausible that the ethos of offender inclusion is engraved in this generation's "historically oldest stratum of consciousness" (Mannheim, 1928/1970, p. 179) or exerts "generational imprinting" (Schuman & Scott, 1989, p. 378), both of which likely influence their lasting perspectives.

In Chapter 1, the findings on generational differences were reviewed from other disciplines, including political science, business, psychology, and education. In brief, according to the literature in political science, Millennials more likely side with Democrats (Kiley & Dimock, 2014; Maniam & Smith, 2017; Pew Research Center, 2014) and hold liberal views on social issues such as same-sex marriage, interracial marriage, marijuana legalization, immigration reform, and an activist government (Daniller, 2019; Geiger, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2014). They are also more likely to take an active approach to environmental and energy issues (Funk & Hefferon, 2019). Millennials have a more inclusive view of national identity (e.g., the importance of birthplace, national customs/traditions, religion to national identity) than older generations (Stokes, 2017), but they are less likely to consider themselves patriotic and volunteer to serve in the army (Pew Research Center, 2014). Lastly, Millennials think more positively of social institutions (Fingerhut, 2016).

In business, Millennials comprise the largest force both as workers and consumers (Costin, 2019; Eastman & Liu, 2012; Nichols et al., 2015). Millennial workers are found to have greater interests in careers that demonstrate social influence (Bubany & Hansen, 2011), focus

more on leisure values while valuing less intrinsic values (Cogin, 2012; Smola & Sutton, 2002; Twenge, Campbell et al., 2010; Wray-Lake et al., 2011), and place a greater emphasis on work-life balance (Gursoy et al., 2013; Sullivan et al., 2009; Twenge, Campbell et al., 2010; Wray-Lake et al., 2011). Millennials consumers take into account different factors when making a wine purchase (Atkin & Thach, 2012; Teagle et al., 2010; Qenani-Petrela et al., 2007) and are more likely engage in status consumption (Eastman & Liu, 2012). They exhibit different sport consumption behaviors (e.g., event attendance, social media activity) that are community-driven, emotional, peer pressure-influenced, fan engaging, and tech-savvy (Yim, 2015). They also are more sensitive to trend and less loyal to brand (Ordun, 2015).

Previous research in psychology has accumulated showing that, compared to their elders, younger generations such as Millennials show higher levels of personality traits and cognitive orientation as follows: anxiety (Twenge, 2000a), neuroticism (Roberts & Helson, 1997; Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010; Twenge, 2000a), narcissism (Robert & Helson, 1997; Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010; Twenge & Foster, 2010; Twenge et al., 2008), externality in locus of control (Twenge et al., 2004), positive self-views and agentic self-evaluations (Reynolds et al., 2006; Twenge & Campbell, 2008; Twenge et al., 2012), and depression (Klerman & Weissman, 1989; Lewinsohn et al., 1993; Robins & Regier, 1991; Steward & Bernhardt, 2010; Swindle et al., 2000; but see Twenge & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2002). By contrast, younger generations score lower on creativity (Kim, 2011), self-assuredness, achievement, impulse control (Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010), the need for social approval (Twenge & Im, 2007), empathetic concern and perspective taking (Konrath et al., 2011), and feelings of sexual guilt (Wells & Twenge, 2005).

Finally, studies in education report exploratory findings that depict Millennial students as better educated and having higher educational expectations (Bialik & Fry, 2019; Frey, 2018;

Jenkins, 2019; Rudolph & Zacher, 2017). Some scholars characterize them as special, sheltered, confident, team-oriented, conventional, pressured, and achieving (Howe & Strauss, 2003). Still other scholars describe them as optimistic, goal-oriented, ambitious, and collaborative (Borges et al., 2006; DiLullo et al., 2001; Pardue & Morgan, 2008; Sandfort & Haworth, 2002; Wesner & Miller, 2008). Millennial students also prefer distinguished learning styles such as multitasking and interactive media (Borges et al., 2006; DiLullo et al., 2001; Mangold, 2007; Pardue & Morgan, 2008; Wesner & Miller, 2008). However, these studies express concerns that Millennial students might be "less knowledgeable and academically skilled" (Stewart & Bernhardt, 2010, p. 580; see also Bauerlein, 2008; Pardue & Morgan, 2008) due to receiving inflated grades (Astin et al., 2002) and reporting less academic engagement and studying time (DeBard, 2004; Dumais, 2009; Schneider & Stevenson, 1999). As a result, Millennial students are recorded to be less literate than older generations (National Endowment for the Arts, 2004, 2007), show weak media literacy (DiLullo et al., 2001; Hargittai et al., 2010; Weiler, 2004), and have poor skills to critically analyze information and determine the validity (Considine et al., 2009; DiLullo et al., 2001; Hargittai et al., 2010).

To date, there are only a handful of criminological studies on the effect of generation although they focus more on a birth cohort than a generation per se. Existing studies in criminology mostly rely on the HAPC models and have examined topics such as death penalty attitudes (Anderson et al., 2017), crime salience (Shi et al., 2020), marijuana legalization (Schwadel & Ellison, 2017), and worry about crime and perceptions of antisocial behavior (Gray et al., 2019). As a whole, these studies report that Millennials are less supportive of death penalty than Generation X but not much different from Silents and Baby Boomers, are more likely view crime as the most important problem in the country, provide weaker support for

marijuana legalization than Baby Boomers (but see Pew Research Center, 2014), and have stronger fear of crime than other generation (note, however, this finding was drawn from British samples).

Even with these findings, however, this research suggests that caution must be exercised before claiming that Millennials may always be different from other generations. Indeed, the view that there is a distinct Millennial generational effect is not always supported because of contradictory findings. For example, empirical evidence is inconsistent regarding whether Millennial workers have weaker organizational commitment compared to previous generations (e.g., D'Amato & Hertzfeldt, 2008; Brunetto et al., 2012; Ferres et al., 2003; Lub et al., 2012; but see Costanza et al., 2012) or job satisfaction (Costanza et al., 2012; Lyons & Kuron, 2014; but see Cennamo & Gardner, 2008; Westerman & Yamamura, 2007). Additionally, a number of scholars assert that generational differences do not appear to exist on a range of psychological traits such as narcissism, egotism, self-enhancement, individualism, self-esteem, locus of control, hopelessness, happiness, life satisfaction, loneliness, antisocial behavior, time spent working or watching television, political activity, the importance of religion, the importance of social status, neuroticism, and extraversion (Terracciano et al., 2006; Trzesniewski & Donnellan, 2010).

Taken together, previous research reveals several findings suggesting that Millennials might hold more progressive views compared to older generations. The reasoning is twofold. First, Millennials are compositionally more prone to liberal views due to their racial/ethnic diversity (Barkan & Cohn, 2010; Unnever & Cullen, 2007a, 2007b), educational attainment (Davis, 1975; Loftus, 2001; Schwadel & Garneau, 2014, 2017; Stouffer, 1955), political ideologies (Applegate et al., 2002; Barkan & Cohn, 1994; Britt, 1998; Pew Research Center, 2015a; Ramirez, 2013; Toch & Maguire, 2014), and religious affiliations (Bobo & Licari, 1989;

Nunn et al., 1978; Sullivan et al., 1982; Treas, 2002). Second, Millennials have been contextually exposed to inclusionary sociopolitical culture. Political tolerance for marginalized groups have been increasing (Davis, 1975; Schafer & Shaw, 2009; Schwadel & Garneau, 2014, 2017), whereas the crime rates and public punitiveness have been in decline (Baumer et al., 2003; Enns, 2014, 2016; Gramlich, 2019; Ramirez, 2013; Soss et al., 2003). As noted, however, studies do not always find generational effects. The limited number of crime-related effects also report findings that are complex, showing less punitiveness but more concern over the salience of crime. Again, this dissertation sought to explore both the nature of Millennials' attitudes about corrections (i.e., are they inclusionary or not?) and how they compare to other generations (i.e., are they more progressive or not?). These issues are next addressed.

The Future of Corrections

This section first addresses how Millennials view correctional policies as a generation in and of themselves. Numbering more than 75 million and ages 24 to 39 in 2020, they promise to be a major political force in shaping the future of American corrections. At issue is whether they favor a get-tough, punitive approach to crime control or policies that endorse offender reform through rehabilitation, reentry, and redemption. As will be shown, this generation is moderate in its punitiveness and clear in its support for offender inclusion as opposed to exclusion. The section then turns to a second consideration: how Millennials' correctional opinions compare with older generations. When generational difference arise, they mainly suggest that Millennials are more progressive. However, because all generations tend to be inclusionary in their views, sharp attitudinal cleavages are generally not found. The analysis thus suggests that correctional policy opinions should not be seen mainly as generational but as American in nature.

Overall Views of Millennials

  Millennial Support for Punitiveness. Punitive attitudes among Millennials appear to be relatively low. Less than half of this generation in our sample (46.1%) evidence support of the death penalty. Similarly, only 29.8% feel that courts are not harsh enough and 15.4% believe that punishment should be the main emphasis in most prisons. To place these results in context, Millennials are the only generation in the current study where the death penalty is supported by less than half of the sample and the harsher courts are favored by fewer than 3 in 10 respondents.

  Notably, these findings are consistent with the public opinion trends in the United States that have been tracked by other national polls. Regarding the death penalty, public support among Americans has declined according to both the General Social Survey (Figure 4.1) and the Gallup Poll (Figure 4.2). For example, according to the Gallup Poll, more than three quarters (78%) of the American public were favorable to the death penalty for a person convicted of murder in 1989, whereas only little more than half (56%) favor the same policy in 2019. Similarly, both the General Social Survey (Figure 4.3) and the Gallup Poll demonstrate that public support for court harshness was much stronger in the 1970s and 1980s. According to the Gallup Poll, Americans who think that the courts deal not harshly enough with criminals were 75% in 1969, 74% in 1972, and 83% in 1989 (Gallup Organization, 1969b, 1972, 1989)—more than two to three times higher than Millennials' support in this study (29.8%). Moreover, although the differences are not as substantial as for the death penalty or the harsher courts, public support for the punishment as the main emphasis in most prisons was recorded as 17% and 19% in the 1981 and 1982 Louis Harris and Associates Polls (Louis Harris & Associates, 1981, 1982)—similar to Generation X's support (19.4%) and slightly higher than other generations' support (12.6%–15.4%) in this study.

**Figure 4.1.** *Public Support for the Death Penalty, 1972–2018.*

Item: Opinion about death penalty for a person convicted of murder;
Source: General Social Surveys (Smith, Davern, Freese, & Morgan, n.d.)

Figure 4.2. *Public Support for the Death Penalty, 1969–2019.*

Item: Opinion about death penalty for a person convicted of murder;
Source: Gallup Polls (Gallup Organization, 1969a, 1978, 1999, 2009, 2019; Times Mirror Center for the People & the Press, 1989)

Figure 4.3. *Public Support for Court Harshness, 1972–2018.*

Item: The courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals;
Source: General Social Surveys (Smith, Davern, Freese, & Morgan, n.d.)

Millennial Support for Rehabilitation, Reentry, Reintegration. This study shows that Millennials are clearly supportive of inclusionary correctional policies. First, Millennials are highly supportive of rehabilitation. Five items used to assess public support for rehabilitation are endorsed by more than half of Millennials—ranging from 54.4% (rehabilitation not used as a chance to get off easily) to 88.2% (offender treatment in the community). Of note, more than 8 in 10 Millennials support providing treatment for offenders under community supervision and making rehabilitation available to even high risk criminals. Second, public support for reentry among Millennials is even more striking. About 9 in 10 Millennials favor providing all five reentry services examined (i.e., job training, education, drug treatment, mental health treatment, housing assistance). Last, Millennials mostly support liberal policies for offender integration. In this generation, 82.9% and 56.2% believe that ex-felons should keep their rights to vote and sit on juries. About 6 in 10 have favorable attitudes toward ban-the-box laws. Policy initiatives to reduce collateral sanctions and expunge criminal records are also strongly supported by Millennials, with 7 to 8 in 10 Millennials agreeing with the specific policy (e.g., government reviews, expungement of juvenile records for non-violent crimes). In addition, about half of Millennials think expunging criminal records is a good policy, and 9 in 10 Millennials support for the FBI review of incomplete or inaccurate criminal records.

Millennial Support for Redemption and Redeemability. The results in this area further confirm Millennials' faiths in an inclusionary correctional system. First, public support for formal redemption rituals from Millennials is high, with 8 in 10 Millennials favoring rehabilitation ceremonies and certificates of rehabilitation. Second, Millennials strongly believe in offender redeemability. More than 8 in 10 Millennials think highly of offender capacity to lead productive lives and become law-abiding citizens, and slightly less than half report that

most offenders can change for the better. When asked whether some offenders are so damaged that they can never lead productive lives, about a quarter of Millennials disagree with the statement. This figure is substantially higher than that found for other generations.

Potential Effects of Age and Period. In short, the results from this study reveal that Millennials are likely to favor inclusionary policies in the future. However, because the findings are drawn from cross-sectional data, it is important to consider whether age and/or period effects might have an influence. Thus, to examine whether there are likely to be aging effects, stratified analyses were conducted that ran separate regression models using the subsample of each generation. Empirical evidence for an age effect is not robust because the age variable is statistically significant in only 2 out of 13 models: Millennials on support for death penalty, Generation X on support for court harshness. Additionally, research shows that people's political perspectives tend to remain stable across their life span once established in the formative period (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Peterson et al., 2020). Thus, it is less likely that a left-leaning youth will become a Republican later in life.

On the other hand, three possibilities exist regarding whether period effects could occur: (1) period effects might be minimal, (2) period effects could regress American society to favor punitive correctional policies, (3) period effects could further promote progressive correctional policies. The first possibility was advocated by Twenge's research (e.g., Twenge, 2008) but often contradicted by subsequent research—notably related to public opinion on criminal justice issues (e.g., Anderson et al., 2017; Schwadel & Ellison, 2017; Shi et al., 2020). Thus, it is speculated that a period effect might exist regardless of its direction. On this point, Chapter 1 presents a discussion on the correctional turning point as suggested by progressive developments across in multiple contexts such as criminal justice reform and a growing public awareness of

racial injustice. Given that the United States has made an informed judgment based on scientific evidence (e.g., ABA, 2018; Alexander, 2010; Enns, 2016; Mears & Cochran, 2014; Petersilia, 2003; Travis, 2000; USCCR, 2019) to reject the four-decade era of punitiveness and mass incarceration, it is unlikely that the country will move back in a get tough direction in the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, since the current survey was conducted in March 2017, a number of historical events have taken place. In 2017, following the Women's March in January (Chenoweth & Pressman, 2017), the women's rights movement continued to gain momentum as exemplified by the #MeToo movement later in that year. After a series of mass shootings (e.g., the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School), the gun control movement yielded legislative changes across 50 states (Vasilogambros, 2018). Recently, the Black Lives Matter protests make the "largest movement in the country's history" (Buchanan, Bui, & Patel, 2020, para. 3). These events might reinforce more liberal perspectives among contemporaries. In addition, the consequences of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic are expected to be even more detrimental for Millennials (Collins, 2020) and, for this reason, this generation is likely to favor the government intervention (e.g., welfare). Therefore, as much as Millennials do not have appetite for exclusionary correctional system, the current period is conducive for the American public to support for more progressive, reform-oriented views.

Millennials' Policy Opinions: American or Generational Views?

As a generation in and of itself, Millennials thus promise to favor a correctional future that is inclusive in its policies. At issue, however, is whether Millennials represent a distinctive generation—as many have claimed—or harbor correctional policy opinions that are similar to their fellow citizens of all generations. The current study's data reveal that some generational

differences exist and, when they do, Millennials appear to be less punitive and more progressive. Still, for the majority of correctional policies, either no generational differences are present or the differences, even when statistically significant, do not exceed 10 percentage points. That is, generational gaps generally are a matter of degree and not qualitatively distinct. These results suggest that in the United States, correctional policy views tend to be "American attitudes," not "generational attitudes." A few examples will illustrate these conclusions.

In the current study, Millennial views on corrections are reported to be fairly progressive, but most of them are also similar to those of other generations. On the whole, the differences between Millennials and older generations are generally not substantial. Generational difference in the percentage of public support for each individual correctional policy is mostly minor—less than 10% in 20 out of 30 items (Table 4.1). For example, about 9 in 10 people in every generation support for providing reentry services to offenders when they return to the community (e.g., job training, education). Similarly, about 80% of all generations agree that formal redemption rituals (rehabilitation ceremonies, certificates of rehabilitation) will help ex-offenders reintegrate back into the community and stay out of crime.

In multivariate analyses, the Millennial effect—or the difference of Millennials with older generations—is detected for fewer than half (5 out of 13) of the models. Thus, public support among Millennials is similar to that of other generations for correctional policies including the death penalty, the punishment goal of prisons, reentry, fair-chance hiring, reducing collateral sanctions, expungement of criminal records, the FBI review of criminal records, and formal redemption rituals. Furthermore, when a statistically significant difference exists, Millennials tend to vary from a subset of older generations but not all. In particular, Millennials' attitudes on correctional issues are not distinguished from Generation X across all models and

Table 4.1. *Percentage of Public Support for Individual Item and Generational Difference*

Theme	Item	% Public Support			
		Min	Max	Mill	Diff
Punitiveness	Death Penalty	69.9	75.8	71.7	5.9
	Court Harshness	78.1	96.2	78.1	18.1
	The Punishment Goal of Prisons	12.6	19.4	15.4	6.8
Rehabilitation	Offender Treatment in the Community	85.2	90.3	88.2	5.1
	Rehabilitation Availability for Offenders	54.9	80.1	80.1	25.2
	Importance of Offender Rehabilitation	81.1	87.2	86.8	6.2
	Rehabilitation Not Used as a Chance to Get Off Easily	46.0	59.3	54.4	13.3
	Expanding Offender Rehabilitation	58.8	62.8	61.9	4.0
Reentry	Providing Job Training to Offenders	91.4	99.6	91.4	8.2
	Providing Education to Offenders	89.0	96.8	89.0	7.8
	Providing Drug Treatment to Offenders	89.0	97.2	90.0	8.2
	Providing Mental Health Treatment to Offenders	92.8	99.5	92.8	6.7
	Providing Housing Assistance to Offenders	89.5	97.1	89.5	7.6
Reintegration	Ex-Felons' Voting Rights	67.7	82.9	82.9	15.2
	Ex-Felon's Rights to Sit on Juries	37.3	56.2	56.2	18.9
	Fair-Chance Hiring	61.4	69.2	63.0	7.8
	Providing Offenders With Information	86.0	98.0	86.0	12.0
	Government Reviews of Collateral Sanctions	82.5	88.3	82.5	5.8
	Elimination of Ineffective Collateral Sanctions	70.2	77.6	73.3	7.4
	Expungement of Juvenile Records	70.1	72.9	72.9	2.8
	Restricted Access of Criminal Records	72.3	78.3	78.3	6.0
	Opportunity to Expunge Criminal Records	70.5	79.4	76.1	8.9
	General Attitudes Toward Expungement	32.4	52.3	52.3	19.9
	The FBI Review of Criminal Records	89.9	93.2	89.9	3.3
Redemption	Rehabilitation Ceremonies	80.0	84.1	81.6	4.1
	Certificates of Rehabilitation	78.7	80.0	80.0	1.3
	Offender Capacity to Lead Productive Lives	71.3	82.9	82.9	11.6
	Offender Capacity to Become Law-Abiding Citizens	77.3	83.1	83.1	5.8
	Offender Capacity to Change for the Better	34.0	46.4	46.4	12.4
	The Malleability of Offenders	7.1	25.9	25.9	18.8

Note) Min: Minimum, Max: Maximum, Mill: Millennials, Diff: Generational difference.

from Baby Boomers and the Greatest/Silent in 9 out of 13 models respectively.

Nevertheless, it bears mentioning that Millennials do hold attitudes that are distinguished from (some of) their older cohorts. To be specific, the analyses reveal that Millennials are less supportive of court harshness toward criminals than Baby Boomers by about twofold and the Greatest/Silent by about threefold. In contrast, Millennials are more favorable to offender rehabilitation than the Greatest/Silent. This generation also takes a more progressive stance on the restoration of ex-felons' civil rights when compared to Baby Boomers. In addition, Millennials are more likely to express that expunging criminal records is a good policy than Baby Boomers and the Greatest/Silent. Last but not least, Millennials have a stronger faith in offender redeemability than Baby Boomers and the Greatest/Silent.

Ultimately, however, the "big picture" drawing from this study is that Americans have a shared culture regarding corrections—which is mostly to favor punishment to an extent but also to favor support for "treating" offenders and making "room" for them to fit into society. In other words, the Millennial effect does not appear prevalent in the results because Americans of all generations are similarly progressive in their support for correctional policies. From the policy perspective, these findings imply that Millennials will not likely comprise a separate electorate group represented by a "new" political or ideological culture, but their policy preferences will be aligned with those of the generations that have preceded them. Therefore, generational conflicts are not likely to occur regarding which correctional policies should be supported, which bodes well for the future of corrections. Instead, it is expected that the future of corrections will continue to have more inclusionary policies endorsed by all Americans.

222

Future Research

A host of studies have joined to explore whether generations are distinguished by different sets of attitudes and behaviors—a body of research to which this dissertation has attempted to contribute. However, this study's findings should be viewed with appropriate caution given its possible shortcomings. In this section, the common defects of previous generational research will be discussed. Drawing from this general discussion, the limitations of the present study will be acknowledged and the suggestions for future research will be made.

In general, two issues pose a threat to the accuracy of studies that examine the generation effect. First, studies showing generational differences often suffer from methodological problems that reduce confidence in their conclusions. A sizeable number of studies are limited by poor sampling methods and small sample sizes (e.g., Nicholas, 2008; Sandfort & Haworth, 2002) or exploratory in nature (e.g., Borges et al., 2006; Murray, 1997; Oblinger & Oblinger, 2005; Smith, 2005). As a result, these studies fall short of more accurately identifying the Millennial effect—or the generation effect in general. Furthermore, as seen by debates on the application of CTMA (e.g., Costanza et al., 2017; Rudolph et al., 2019; Rudolph & Zacher, 2017; Terracciano, 2010; Trzesniewski & Donnellan, 2010), even the findings from research using more advanced statistical techniques might be compromised by criticisms questioning the validity of methods. In addition, there is a possibility that the known Millennial effect might be exaggerated because of publication bias—that studies reporting significant generational differences are likely to be seen as interesting and worthy of publication whereas studies with null findings go unnoticed.

Second, the credibility of the generation effect might be undermined if the effects of age and period are not accurately controlled for. Indeed, several recent studies indicate that the

period effect could be stronger than the cohort effect on public attitudes toward criminological and criminal justice issues (Anderson et al., 2017; Schwadel & Ellison, 2017; Shi et al., 2017; but see Gray et al., 2019). Note that such findings are more common in studies employing the HAPC models (e.g., generalized additive models were used in Gray et al., 2019). Thus, as suggested by Costanza et al. (2017), the type of analytical method might influence the identification of generational differences. In this context, studies that are cross-sectional or that treat the period effect as minimal (e.g., CTMA) should devote more efforts to determining and disclosing the potential effect of period events at the time of study or cross-check their findings using different statistical models if possible.

This dissertation project was fortunate to have access to national-level survey data with a sufficient sample size. For this reason, the first issue discussed above might be of less consequence, but the second issue might be of more relevance because the data are cross-sectional. Namely, the Millennial effects observed in this study might in fact be due to the age effect (i.e., people vary in their public support due to age, not generational membership) or to the period effect (i.e., the shown variation across generation is in fact a temporary manifestation influenced by the period event and might not hold in other data collection points). Admittedly, studies using cross-sectional data are inherently confounded by the inseparability of age, period, and cohort because these three variables are collinear. Therefore, any significant differences between Millennials and older generations might be attributable to their younger age or the influences of contemporary historical events that affect them to a greater degree.

With regard to these concerns, several points can be made. First, supplementary analyses indicate that the age effect might not be substantial. Second, as discussed previously, the time is now ripe for liberal social movements (e.g., women's rights, racial equity) so the period effect

224

will likely reinforce the Millennials' progressive views of corrections. This speculation, of course, should be tested in future research. Last, according to the results, it might be considered that public support for correctional policies are not generational but American. Thus, not much of a generational effect is observed whose source is disputable between age, period, and cohort.

In our discipline, available longitudinal data sets are lacking measures to assess public opinion on correctional policies. For example, the General Social Survey only provides data on a limited number of crime and criminal justice issues such as the death penalty, court harshness, and marijuana legalization. Moreover, in order to apply more advanced statistical techniques (e.g., HAPC model, CTMA), a large number of cross-sectional studies need to be accumulated that contain the same public policy opinion measures. Thus, future studies might consider replicating this study's measures using quality survey methods (e.g., an opt-in internet panel survey by YouGov). The other option is to create a longitudinal study that follows Americans over time and measures an array of correctional attitudes. Given that there is now a dearth of such data sets, the current study is important because it undertakes a generational analysis of the most comprehensive measures of correctional ideology and specific policies. Accordingly, it presents the best assessment of what Millennials think about American corrections. In doing so, this study concludes that Millennials will continue the nation's support of a new era in corrections that endorses policies advancing greater offender inclusion.

Conclusion

In the context of American corrections, Millennials came of age during the historic turning point that demarcates the past era of offender exclusion and the new era of offender inclusion. For nearly 40 years, the United States was entrenched in a seemingly intractable get-tough, punitive era that emphasized the exclusion of offenders. During this time, offenders were

removed and/or ostracized from society through exclusionary policies such as the death penalty, deterrence- or incapacitation-based correctional programs, a war on drugs, and mandatory minimum sentencing laws (Cullen & Jonson, 2017; Pfaff, 2017; Tonry, 2019). They faced invisible punishment through various forms of collateral consequences (Mauer & Chesney-Lind, 2002; see also ABA, 2018; Jacobs, 2015; USCCR, 2019).

Then, around 2010, a turning point in corrections occurred in which support for offender exclusion was relinquished and support for offender inclusion was embraced (Butler et al., 2020; Cullen et al., 2020; Petersilia & Cullen, 2015). The growth of prison populations stopped for the first time in nearly four decades (Petersilia & Cullen, 2015). Enthusiasm for locking up offenders lost its appeal as political rhetoric (Benenson Strategy Group, 2017). And a dramatic ideological transformation regarding offenders emerged across multiple social domains as evidenced by reforms such as reductions in collateral consequences and advocacy of prisoner reentry programs (Alexander, 2010; Enns, 2016; Mears & Cochran, 2014; Petersilia, 2003; Travis, 2000).

Against this backdrop, one way to prognosticate about the future is to examine younger generations. In this sense, public policy opinions of Millennials are important in and of themselves. Millennials have received inordinate attention because they are the largest generation (more than 75 million) and are at an age where they will play an increasingly important role in determining public policy. Thus, what they think about corrections could dictate what kind of era lies ahead in the United States. This dissertation is important precisely because it is the first to explore in detail the Millennials' public opinion on corrections.

Examining Millennials by themselves, it is clear that they manifest moderate levels of punitiveness. Punitive sentiments exist, but they are lower than what the American public

226

believed even a decade ago. More instructive, Millennials are consistently in favor of inclusionary policies. They clearly endorse a rehabilitative correctional orientation, believe in offender redeemability, and support policies that reduce exclusion (e.g., restoration of ex-felons' civil rights) and increase inclusion (e.g., expungement of criminal records). Therefore, in the future, they can be expected to be supportive of a correctional system that is inclusionary.

A collateral issue is not just what Millennials favor but how their views compare with other generations. Most generational research across fields is designed to detect differences between Millennials and older generations. The current project, however, did not find substantial generational gaps in public policy opinions. Millennials did tend to be less punitive and, in some instance, more favorable to liberal policies. But large differences were not found because of an important reality revealed by the study: Regardless of generation, most Americans are now modestly punitive and highly in supportive of inclusionary corrections. In the time ahead, there is likely to be generational consensus and not conflict over correctional policies.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the United States experienced the Progressive Era, which was an "age of reform" (Hofstadter, 1955). During this time, the modern American correctional system was constructed (Rothman, 1980). Now in the first stages of the 21st century, the United States again is embarking on a new era in corrections—and perhaps in society in general (e.g., Viser, 2020). This dissertation suggests that the American public will support a correctional system that is inclusionary—rehabilitative, reintegrative, and redemptive. Importantly, Millennials will play an important role in ensuring that the current turning point is transformed into a lengthy era of reform in which American corrections pursues a future that is, at once, more socially just and better able to protect the public's well-being.

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231

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National Survey of Public Opinion on Criminal Justice

1. First, we would like to know your views on several different parts of the criminal justice system in the United States.

What do you think should be the *main emphasis* in most prisons – <u>punishing the individual</u> convicted of a crime, <u>trying to rehabilitate the individual</u> so that he or she might return to society as a productive citizen, or <u>protecting society</u> from future crimes he or she might commit?

Punishing the individual
Trying to rehabilitate the individual
Protecting society
Not sure

{show answer options not selected in Q1}
2. Now, what do you think should be the *second most important emphasis* in most prisons– <u>punishing the individual</u> convicted of a crime, <u>trying to rehabilitate the individual</u> so that he or she might return to society as a productive citizen, or <u>protecting society</u> from future crimes he or she might commit?

Punishing the individual
Trying to rehabilitate the individual
Protecting society
Not sure

3. In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?

Too harsh
Not harsh enough
About right
Don't know

4. Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?

Favor
Oppose
No opinion

{dynamic grid – randomize, center items}
5. Policymakers concerned with developing effective crime policies need to better understand how people feel about those who commit crimes. We would like your opinion on some of these

policies.

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

a. It is important to try to rehabilitate adults who have committed crimes and are now in the correctional system.
b. It is a good idea to provide treatment for offenders who are supervised by the courts and live in the community.
c. Rehabilitation programs should be available even for offenders who have been involved in a lot of crime in their lives.
d. Most criminal offenders are unlikely to change for the better.

<1> Strongly
Agree
<2> Agree
<3> Somewhat
Agree
<4> Somewhat
Disagree
<5> Disagree
<6> Strongly
Disagree

{dynamic grid – randomize, center items}
6. Now, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

a. Most offenders can go on to lead productive lives with help and hard work.
b. Some offenders are so damaged that they can never lead productive lives.
c. All rehabilitation programs have done is to allow criminals who deserve to be punished to get off easily.
d. Given the right conditions, a great many offenders can turn their lives around and become law-abiding citizens.
e. I would <u>not</u> support expanding the rehabilitation programs that are now being undertaken in our prisons.

<1> Strongly
Agree
<2> Agree
<3> Somewhat
Agree
<4> Somewhat
Disagree
<5> Disagree
<6> Strongly
Disagree

7. If an effort is made to provide specialized rehabilitation services in prisons,
what <u>percentage of prison inmates</u> do you think can lead a law-abiding life after they are released to the community?

Under 20%
21-30%
31-40%
41-50%

51-60%
61-70%
71-80%
Over 80%

{grid – randomize rows}
8. Recently, a number of places have started what are known as "problem-oriented" (or specialty) courts. These courts deal with a specific kind of offender—such as someone using drugs. The goal is to try to treat the underlying problem (e.g., drug addiction) by placing an offender in a rehabilitation program in the community rather than sending them to prison for punishment.

We would like to know the extent to which you would support or oppose this kind of problem-oriented court for each of the types of offenders listed below.

a. Offenders who are addicted to drugs
b. Offenders who are mentally ill
c. Offenders who are veterans
d. Offenders who are homeless
e. Offenders who engage in domestic violence
<1> Strongly
Support
<2> Support
<3> Somewhat
Support
<4> Somewhat
Oppose
<5> Oppose
<6> Strongly
Oppose

{Q9_Q10_page}
As you may know, many U.S. citizens convicted of a "felony" crime—which often leads to a prison sentence—*lose the rights to vote and to sit on juries.*

Notably, elected officials in many states are now debating legislation that would give back these rights to individuals.

We would like to learn about your opinion on these important matters.

9. Which of the following comes closest to your opinion about voting rights for U.S. citizens who have been convicted of felonies?

They should permanently lose their right to vote
They should lose their right to vote only until they have completed their sentence
They should not lose their right to vote at all

10. Which of the following comes closest to your opinion about people who have been convicted of felonies sitting on juries?

They should be permanently excluded from sitting on juries
They should be allowed to sit on juries once their sentence is complete
{end Q9_Q10_page}

{Q11_intro_page}
There has been some debate recently about *expunging criminal records* for offenders who have completed their sentences and thus paid for their crime.

When a criminal record is *expunged,* this means that the criminal record is removed or sealed and thus is no longer something that the public, including employers, can see. It's like starting over from scratch.

We would like to know your views on this matter.
{end Q11_intro_page}

{randomize answer options}
11. Some people argue that *expunging criminal records* is a good policy because it gives criminal offenders the opportunity to wipe their slate clean and get their lives back on track. Other people believe that *expunging criminal records* is a bad policy because public access to criminal records helps keep communities safe.

Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion?

Expunging criminal records is a good policy because it gives criminal offenders a chance to get their lives back on track
Expunging criminal records is a bad policy because public access to criminal records helps keep communities safe

12. In some states, individuals who have *stayed out of crime* for a certain period of time are eligible to have their criminal record expunged (that is, removed and sealed so nobody can look at it any longer).

In your opinion, how many years must an individual stay out of crime before they should be eligible to have their criminal record expunged?
1 year
2 years
3 years
4 years
5 years
6 years
7 years
8 years
9 years
10 years
15 years
20 years

Individuals should never be eligible to have their criminal records expunged

{grid – randomize rows}
13. Please consider each criminal offense listed below. For each one, indicate if you think individuals who were convicted of that offense in the past should or should not be able to have their criminal record expunged (that is, removed and sealed so nobody can look at it any longer).

If you think people convicted of that offense should be able to have their record expunged, indicate how long they should have to stay out of crime (i.e. stay "crime-free") before they can be eligible to have their record expunged.

a. Shoplifting
b. Burglary
c. Sex offense involving a child
d. Domestic battery of a spouse
e. White-collar crimes (e.g. tax evasion; embezzlement)
f. Driving under the influence (DUI)
g. Possession of illegal drugs

<1> No – Should never be expunged
<2> Yes – After 3 years of being crime-free
<3> Yes – After 5 years of being crime-free
<4> Yes – After 10 years of being crime-free

{multiple – randomize answer options 1-6}
14. Below are some factors that a judge might consider when deciding whether or not to approve criminal offenders' requests to expunge their criminal records, meaning that the records would no longer be available for the public to see.
Check each factor that you think *judges should consider* when making decisions about whether or not criminal record should be expunged. Please check ALL of the factors listed below that you think judges should consider.

The offender attends church services regularly
The offender has a letter of support from his or her neighbors
The offender completed a rehabilitation program
The offender has been employed full time for a year
The offender is a community volunteer
The offender is married with kids
{space}
None of these

15. At times, the criminal records kept on people are not accurate or kept up to date, and if used can hurt their chances to get jobs, rent apartments, or get approved by credit agencies.

The U.S. Congress is now considering a law that would require the FBI to review their criminal records to make sure that citizens are not hurt by incomplete or inaccurate records that are given

out in background checks.

How much, if at all, do you support this effort on the part of the federal government?

Strongly Support
Support
Somewhat Support
Somewhat Oppose
Oppose
Strongly Oppose

{grid – randomize rows}
16. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

a. <u>Juvenile</u> records for non-violent crimes should be automatically expunged so that the public cannot see them.
b. More often than not, it is a good idea to put criminal records on the Internet for <u>anyone</u> to see.
c. Only law enforcement agencies and some potential employers should be able to see <u>adults'</u> records for non-violent crimes.
d. If a person never has the opportunity to expunge their criminal record, they may face problems that lead them back to a life of crime.

<1> Strongly
Agree
<2> Agree
<3> Somewhat
Agree
<4> Somewhat
Disagree
<5> Disagree
<6> Strongly
Disagree

{randomize answer options}

17. As you may know, many job applications contain a "box" that a person applying for the job must check if they have a criminal record from their past. Recently, however, many elected officials have passed "ban the box" laws. These laws say that employers must remove this "box" on job applications that people must check if they have been arrested and/or convicted of a crime.

With ban the box laws, employers can still conduct criminal background checks and choose to not hire someone who has a criminal record. However, they can only do this AFTER they have looked at the person's job application and decided to interview them or give them a job offer.

Which of the following views about ban the box laws is closer to your own?

<1> "Ban the box" laws are a <u>good idea</u> because ex-offenders' skills and qualifications for jobs will be considered. This could help them get jobs because they won't just be rejected right away

for having criminal records.
<2> "Ban the box" laws are a <u>bad idea</u> because they make employers waste time considering hiring people that they may end up rejecting later when they find out about their criminal records.

{dynamic grid – randomize, center item}
21. As you may know, when people are convicted of many types of misdemeanor and felony crimes, they often also face a lot of other regulatory or civil penalties, called **collateral sanctions.**

Collateral sanctions are separate from the direct punishments for crimes (such as a prison sentence or a probation term) and offenders are generally not told about these restrictions when they are convicted of a crime. Thus, someone convicted of a crime might face many different types of restrictions on the rights and privileges that U.S. citizens typically have.

Such collateral sanctions include not being allowed to work in a lot of jobs, to serve on a jury, to join the military, to receive student loans and other forms of public assistance, and to have a driver's license.

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

a. Offenders should be given information regarding all of the possible collateral sanctions they may face if they are convicted of a crime, both at the time they are charged with a crime and before entering a plea of guilty or innocent.
b. Every five years, states and federal lawmakers should review all of the existing collateral sanctions of criminal convictions, and eliminate the ones that are found to have no useful purpose.
c. A collateral sanction should be eliminated unless it is shown to reduce crime.

<1> Strongly
Agree
<2> Agree
<3> Somewhat
Agree
<4> Somewhat
Disagree
<5> Disagree
<6> Strongly
Disagree

22. Do you think that collateral sanctions generally make offenders more or less likely to commit more crimes?

A lot more likely
A little more likely
A little less likely
A lot less likely

{multiple – randomize answer options 1-5}
23. For offenders who come back into society after being in prison for five years, what

would help them stay out of crime?

Please check ALL items below that you think would help them stay crime-free.

Employers who give them a chance to work
Church groups where they meet friends
Mentors who guide them
A supportive family
Community service activities
{space}
None of these

{grid – randomize rows}
24. Most criminal offenders will be released from prison to the community after serving their sentence. Listed below are services that could be made available *after people are released from prison* to help prevent their return to crime.

How much do you support or oppose providing each of the following services to offenders when they return to the community?

a. Mental Health Treatment
b. Drug Treatment
c. Help Finding a Place to Live
d. Close Supervision by a Parole Officer
e. Education
f. Job Training

<1> Strongly
Support
<2> Support
<3> Somewhat
Support
<4> Somewhat
Oppose
<5> Oppose
<6> Strongly
Oppose

25. Some courts hold "rehabilitation ceremonies" for ex-offenders who have done certain things to prove to the community that they have left behind a life of crime—such as completing rehabilitation programs and community service activities, taking responsibility and apologizing for their past crimes, and/or staying crime-free for a certain period of time (such as five years).

At these public rehabilitation ceremonies, ex-offenders are declared "rehabilitated" and free from all legal penalties and other collateral sanctions of their crimes.

How much would you agree or disagree that rehabilitation ceremonies for ex-offenders will help them reintegrate back into the community and stay out of crime?

Strongly Agree

Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

26. At some rehabilitation ceremonies, ex-offenders are given "certificates of rehabilitation." These certificates are like letters of recommendation, which state that an ex-offender has been formally "rehabilitated."

Ex-offenders can give these certificates to licensing agencies, employers, and state officials to show that they have paid their debt to society for their crimes.

How much would you agree or disagree that "certificates of rehabilitation" will help ex-offenders reintegrate into their communities and stay out of crime?

Somewhat Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX B. YOUGOV CORE PROFILE ITEMS

1. In what year were you born?

2. Are you a male or female?

A. Male
B. Female

3. What racial or ethnic group best describes you?

A. White
B. Black
C. Hispanic/Latino
D. Asian
E. Native American
F. Middle Eastern
G. Mixed Race
H. Other

4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

A. No high school degree
B. High school graduate
C. Some college, but no degree (yet)
D. 2-year college degree
E. 4-year college degree
F. Postgraduate degree

5. What is your marital status?

A. Married, living with spouse
B. Separated
C. Divorced
D. Widowed
E. Single, never married
F. Domestic partnership

6a. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?

A. Less than $10,000
B. $10,000-$19,999
C. $20,000-$29,999
D. $30,000-$39,999
E. $40,000-$49,999

F. $50,000-$59,999
G. $60,000-$69,999
H. $70,000-$79,999
I. $80,000-$99,999
J. $100,000-$119,999
K. $120,000-$149,999
L. $150,000 or more
M. Prefer not to say

6b. What was your family's annual income last year? (asked if "$150,000 or more" is selected for item 6a)

A. $150,000-$199,999
B. $200,000-$249,999
C. $250,000-$349,999
D. $350,000-$499,999
E. $500,000 or more

7. What is your state of residence?

8a. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a….?

A. Democrat
B. Republican
C. Independent
D. Other
E. Not sure

8b. Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? (asked if "Democrat" is selected for item 8a)

A. Strong Democrat
B. Not very strong Democrat

8c. Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? (asked if "Republican" is selected for item 8a)

A. Strong Republican
B. Not very strong Republican

8d. Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party? (asked if "Independent," "Other" or "Not Sure" is selected for item 8a).

A. The Democratic Party
B. The Republican Party
C. Neither

D. Not sure

9. In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?

A. Very liberal
B. Liberal
C. Moderate
D. Conservative
E. Very Conservative
F. Not sure

10. How important is religion in your life?

A. Very important
B. Somewhat important
C. Not too important
D. Not at all important

11. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs….?

A. Most of the time
B. Some of the time
C. Only now and then
D. Hardly at all
E. Don't know

12. What is your employment status?

A. Working full time now
B. Working part time now
C. Temporarily laid off
D. Unemployed
E. Retired
F. Permanently disabled
G. Taking care of home or family
H. Student
I. Other