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I, Caitlin B Henriksen, hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminal Justice.

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Tangled Webs: A Test of Routine Activities Theory to Explain Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization

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Tangled Webs: A Test of Routine Activities Theory to Explain Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization

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by
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Abstract

In recent years, the phenomenon of nonconsensual pornography, and more specifically "revenge porn", has become front-page news. The tragic outcomes, including several suicides by young people, have become well known. However, very little research has been done into the prevalence of nonconsensual pornography or the predictors of victimization. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap. First, this research examines the actual prevalence of nonconsensual pornography victimization among a sample of college undergraduates from two large Midwestern and Southern universities. This dissertation attempts to apply the lifestyle routine activities framework to explain nonconsensual pornography victimization. Results from this dissertation show moderate support for applying this framework to explain nonconsensual pornography victimization. Finally, this dissertation provides suggestions for future research, as well as implications for the lifestyle routine activities approach and prevention of nonconsensual pornography.

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Chapter One: Introduction to Nonconsensual Pornography

Introduction

On October 10, 2012, fifteen-year old Amanda Todd of British Columbia, Canada hung herself in her mother's home after years of online harassment and abuse. The origin of this abuse was a photograph taken from a webcam video in which Amanda had been persuaded to flash the camera. The man who had taken the photo contacted Amanda a year after the web chat, threatening that if she did not put on more "shows" for him, he would send the photo to her friends and family. When Amanda refused, the man followed through on his threats. The photo was sent to Amanda's mother and classmates and was posted online. Over the next year and a half, Amanda was tormented online and in person by strangers and classmates. Amanda developed anxiety and depression. She began cutting herself and attempted suicide twice. In September 2012, she posted a nine-minute video on YouTube telling her story and asking for help. Unfortunately, help did not come soon enough, and Amanda died by suicide on October 10, 2012.

Sadly, the source of Amanda's cyber abuse is not unique. Nonconsensual pornography (NCP), defined as "the distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals without their consent" (Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, 2016), has become a well-known phenomenon (Hall and Hearn, 2017). While consensual sexting is the most common origin of this nonconsensual pornography, there are many ways it can be created. In some cases, the subject may be coerced into taking the photograph or video. Or, as in the case of sportscaster Erin Andrews who was videotaped by her stalker without her knowledge, the subject may not even know an explicit photograph or video of them exists.

Despite the growing media attention to nonconsensual pornography, empirically very little is known about this phenomenon. This research seeks to further the field of knowledge by examining the prevalence of nonconsensual pornography among a large random sample of undergraduate students. Additionally, this research aims to preliminarily assess the usefulness of Lifestyle Routine Activities Theory to explain victimization risk.

Nonconsensual Pornography

Nonconsensual Pornography and Revenge Porn

Although many people consider nonconsensual pornography (NCP) and revenge porn to be one and the same, they are two related but distinct issues (Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, 2016). Nonconsensual pornography includes sexually explicit media that is shared with others, without the subject's consent, for any reason. Revenge porn, as the name implies, technically refers only to media that is shared for the purpose of revenge, generally by a former intimate partner. All revenge porn, however, would be considered nonconsensual pornography. Like many other types of NCP, revenge porn often begins as a consensual sext (sexual text message) between two significant others (Eaton, Jacobs, and Ruvalcaba, 2017). However, when the relationship ends, one partner may take revenge on the subject of the photo or video by sharing it with other people to humiliate the subject. This is the type of nonconsensual pornography that has arguably received the most attention in today's media. However, revenge may not be the most common reason for sharing intimate media (Lenhart, Ybarra, Zickuhr and Price-Feeney, 2016). Instead, individuals may share intimate media for fun or to brag, without necessarily intending to harm the subject of the media.

Nonconsensual Pornography and Sexting

Research suggests that the vast majority of images and videos used in nonconsensual pornography began as consensual sexting (Eaton, et al., 2017). Sexting is sending sexually explicit messages and/or photos or videos, usually done between two intimate partners (Slane, 2013). While this act is usually consensual, it may occur when one party is pressured or coerced into sharing the intimate media.

Although estimates vary, sexting is a fairly common and accepted practice, especially among college students. Reyns, Burek, Henson and Fisher (2013) found that 20% of college students had sent a nude or seminude photo to someone and 36% had received one. Similarly, Woolard (2011) found that higher percentages of college students send and receive more general sexual messages and content (75% and 81%, respectively). Similarly, among a sample of 18-55 year olds, Clancy, Kletke and Hallford (2019) found that 85% of respondents had received sexts, and 73.3% has sent sexts. While sexting practices are commonly used as "victim blaming" tactics in nonconsensual pornography cases, Bambauer (2014) argues that this practice is healthy and beneficial to relationships, when trust is maintained. However, sexting has been linked to risk of several types of cybervictimization (Reyns, et al., 2013), and is likely linked to risk of nonconsensual pornography as well. According to Johnson (2013), 80% of revenge porn victims originally took the pictures themselves.

History of Nonconsensual Pornography

Nonconsensual pornography is not as new of a phenomenon as many believe. In the 1980s, Hustler Magazine published photographs of women submitted by readers. These photos were often accompanied by personal information. Unfortunately, many of the women depicted in the photographs were unaware their private photographs were being submitted and published in a

national magazine. Therefore, the women had never given consent for their intimate photos to be shared with readers. Many of the women sued Hustler and won; Hustler was found liable for invasion of privacy and the women were given compensation for emotional distress (Poole, 2014).

The nonconsensual pornography most people think of (online photos or videos) became more common in the 2000s. In 2007, the term "revenge porn" was first used on the Urban Dictionary website (Hall and Hearn, 2017). Urban Dictionary defined the term as "homemade porn uploaded by an ex-girlfriend or (usually) ex-boyfriend after particularly vicious breakup as a means of humiliating the ex or just for own amusement." In 2008, the term "revenge porn" was first used by mass media by Richard Morgan in Dossier Magazine (Hall and Hearn, 2017).

"Realcore" pornography, or digital amateur porn, which typically featured ex-girlfriends, began to gain popularity, as audiences liked the idea of exes "getting what they deserved." In 2008, the porn website Xtube began receiving two to three complaints a week that content on their site was posted without consent, a trend which continues today (Scheller, 2015).

Revenge porn became a well-known phenomenon in 2010 when the first major revenge porn website, IsAnyoneUp, was created by Hunter Moore, who became known as "the King of Revenge Porn" and "the Most Hated Man on the Internet" (Bolton, 2015). This website allowed angry ex-lovers or other individuals with a grudge to post sexually explicit photographs or videos of the object of their anger. In addition, the website allowed submitters to share personal information, such as the name, age, occupation, location, etc. of the subject of the media, as well as links to their social media accounts. Viewers were also able to submit comments, most of which blamed the subject of the media for the personal photograph or video being shared. To make matters worse, if the subjects contacted Moore to have the pictures removed, Moore

responded by featuring their pictures on the site, meaning they would be shown on the homepage, so anyone who visited the site would see the photos (Bolton, 2015).

The beginning of the end for IsAnyoneUp came in February 2011, when the website posted sexually explicit photographs of famous musicians. This brought the website into public view and the public was outraged. In April 2012, IsAnyoneUp was sold to BullyVille, an anti-bullying group, and in February of 2015, Hunter Moore pled guilty to two felonies related to IsAnyoneUp and was sentenced to 2.5 years in California state prison. However, the two felonies had very little to do with revenge pornography. Instead he pled guilty to unauthorized access to a protected computer to obtain information for purposes of private financial gain and aggravated identity theft (Bolton, 2015). Although some laws do exist to specifically criminalize revenge pornography, they are not always applied or be too restrictive to cover all cases (see discussion below, see Table 1.3). California's law, for example, was only signed into law the September before Hunter Moore pled guilty to the other felonies and was used sparingly.

There are still hundreds of "revenge porn" sites operating and encouraging users to share media (Morczek, 2016). For example, the homepage of MyEx.com tells visitors "What's the ultimate humiliation when your girlfriend cheats on you or acts like a crazy bitch? Put them on the internet of course!" (MyEx.com, 2017). Additionally, given the popularity of these sites, mainstream pornography websites have started producing "faux nonconsensual pornography," or pornography featuring consenting adults, but made to look like it was shared without consent (Morczek, 2016).

Issues Studying Nonconsensual Pornography

One reason why nonconsensual pornography is under-studied is the difficulty in defining and measuring the phenomenon (Table 1.1.). First, there is no single definition for non-

consensual pornography (Roffer, 2017). Some definitions include only photographs or only videos (e.g. Eaton et al., 2017), while others include any type of media, including text messages (Cox Communications, 2009). Additionally, some researchers (and laws) include only nudity as nonconsensual pornography (e.g. § 18.2-386.2, Code of Virginia). Other definitions include any type of sexually explicit act or media (e.g. Lee, 2017). For example, Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines revenge porn as "sexually explicit images of a person posted online without that person's consent especially as a form of revenge or harassment." However, according to Arkansas' (as well as a handful of other states) law regarding nonconsensual pornography, the nonconsensual sharing of a voice or audio recording would also be considered nonconsensual pornography (see Table 1.3).

As discussed above, nonconsensual pornography and revenge pornography are often considered to be one and the same (Citron and Franks, 2014). As shown in Table 1.1, this leads to issues in communicating and naming the phenomenon. For example, researchers may refer to their topic of study as "revenge porn," when in actuality they are studying the broader nonconsensual pornography (or vice versa). Other researchers refer to the issue as "secondary sexting" (Calvert, 2009), or "not-allowed sharing of sexts" (Morelli, Bianchi, Baiocco, Pezzuti and Chirumbolo, 2016), which only refers to the nonconsensual sharing of sexts, originally shared by the subject of the media. Still others refer to involuntary pornography, nonconsensual distribution of intimate images, or image-based sexual exploitation (Morczek, 2016) or image-based sexual abuse (Henry, Flynn, and Powell, 2019). Having no consensus on a title for the phenomenon makes it more difficult for researchers and others to properly identify what research has been conducted.

Additionally, as Table 1.1 shows, there is debate about where the media must originate from in order to be considered nonconsensual pornography. Sometimes nonconsensual pornography is only considered to have occurred when the media was both obtained and shared without the victim's consent. As discussed below, this would greatly underestimate the prevalence of nonconsensual pornography, as the majority of photographs or videos used were originally taken by the victim.

Table 1.1

Issues in Studying Nonconsensual Pornography

Issue	Questions
Definition	- What type of media is included (pictures, videos, audio recordings, text messages, etc.)? - Does nudity need to be included, or does anything sexually explicit qualify?
Names	- What are differences (if any) between "nonconsensual pornography ," "revenge porn ," "involuntary pornography ," "nonconsensual sharing of sexts ," "nonconsensual distribution of intimate images ," "image-based sexual exploitation ," "image-based sexual abuse"?
Origin	- Does media need to be created and shared without consent? - Can images that originated as consensual sexts qualify?

What is Known about Nonconsensual Pornography

Very few published studies have looked at the prevalence and characteristics of nonconsensual pornography. This issue is compounded by the inconsistent use of terms in the

research of nonconsensual pornography. Additionally, much of the current research focuses on revenge porn, and not additional types of nonconsensual pornography, making it difficult to get a true estimate of the scope of the problem.

Prevalence. Given the issues outlined above, estimates of how common nonconsensual pornography and revenge porn are vary widely. Hunter Moore, creator of the revenge porn website IsAnyoneUp, claimed that within the first three months of running his website he received 10,000 images (Hill, 2014), then averaged 150,000-240,000 unique page views per day (Dodero, 2012), and 35,000 submissions per week (50% claiming to be consensual) (Hill, 2012). However, a study completed by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) found a total of 1,160 incidents of revenge pornography were reported to 31 police forces from April 2015 to December 2015.

According to O'Connor, Drouin, Davis, and Thompson's (2017) study of 184 introductory psychology students, only 3% of the students were aware of a revenge porn incident occurring on campus. Looking at self-reports of victimization, Hinduja and Patchin (2010) found that 5.4% of boys and 3.4% of girls among 4,400 11-18 year olds said their romantic partner uploaded or shared a humiliating or harassing picture of them without their consent (whether these photos all meet the criteria for nonconsensual pornography is unknown). McAfee (2013) conducted a survey of adult internet users on relationships and technology and found that 10% of respondents reported that ex-partners had threatened to expose sexually explicit photos of the respondent online. Additionally, 60% of these threats were followed-through on, constituting revenge porn. More recently, and using a nationally representative sample, Lenhart et al., (2016) found that among 3,002 internet users age 15 or older, 4% had someone threaten to post and/or actually post sexually explicit images of them without their consent. Branch, Hilinski-Rosick,

Johnson and Solano (2017) found that out of 470 undergraduate students, 10.5% had someone forward a private picture of them.

These low estimates differ considerably from the estimates of nonconsensual pornography from other research of 520 adults conducted by Holly Jacobs (2013) (in Bambauer, 2014), which found that 22.1% of heterosexual respondents and 23.3% of LGBT respondents had intimate media distributed without their consent. Similarly, Taube, Kolmes and Vogele (2014) found that of 359 respondents aged 18-91, 26% (n=94) respondents had experienced revenge porn. Additionally, 33% (n=120) had pictures of them shared online without their consent, although the researchers did not ask what type of photos. Henry et al. (2019) found among a sample of 4,274 individuals aged 16-49 that 20% of individuals had nude or sexual images of them taken without their consent, while 11% had nude or sexual images distributed without consent. Of those who had a nude or sexual image of them taken without their consent, 45% had those images shared without their consent.

In 2017, the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative published the first nationwide study of nonconsensual pornography (Eaton, et al., 2017). The researcher recruited adult internet users through Facebook advertisements. Of 3,055 participants, 8% (n=244) reported nonconsensual pornography victimization. An additional 4.8% (n=145) reported that someone had threatened to share (but did not actually distribute) sexually explicit images or videos of them without their consent.

Similarly, Patchin and Hinduja (2018) studied “sextortion” (sexual extortion) among teens aged 12-17. Of the 5,568 respondents, 5% had experienced sextortion. Of these, 25.5% of male victims and 29.6% of female victims had the sexual image actually sent to someone else.

Additionally, 24.8% of male victims and 26.1% of female victims had the sexual images posted online.

Since it has been found that 80% of photos published in revenge porn cases were "selfies" (photographs originally taken by the victim) (CCRI, 2013), some sexting researchers have asked teens and college students if they have ever had their sexts shared with others, or if they have shared someone else's sexts, without that person's permission. This would constitute either victimization or perpetration of nonconsensual pornography. Dir and Cyder (2015) found that 12% of college students had ever had a sext shared with someone else.

Even more individuals indicate that they have had sexually explicit materials or nude/seminude images meant for someone else shared with them (37% and 24% of female teens and young adults and 47% and 40% of male teens and young adults, respectively) (NCPTUP, 2008). This indicates that teens and young adults may not be aware that the sexts are being forwarded by the recipients.

Who is Affected. Researchers have primarily assessed the gender of nonconsensual pornography victims. The BBC (2016) found that 80% of cases reported to police involved images of women. Similarly, in another study of adults, the vast majority of victims were female (90%) (CCRI, 2013). Looking at revenge porn websites offers similar statistics. According to Poole (2014), on the popular revenge porn website "MyEx.com," 83% of the posts on the site were of women. Additionally, visitors to the site viewed posts of women much more frequently (roughly 10 times more frequently) than posts of males. This is in line with past research that indicates that the majority of cyber abuse victims are female. It also lends legitimacy to scholars referring to revenge porn and nonconsensual pornography as a gender-based crime. Similarly,

Uhl, Rhyner, Terrance and Lugo (2018) found in a content analysis on 134 photographs from seven revenge porn websites that 91.8% of photographs were of females.

However, in a self-report survey, Eaton et al. (2017) found that the gap in victimization may not actually be that dramatic. Specifically, just under 62% of victims of nonconsensual pornography were female, leaving roughly 38% of victims who identified as male. The researchers found this was still a significant difference, with females being roughly 1.5 times as likely to be victimized as males. Likewise, females were 2.5 times more likely to report being threatened with victimization, compared to males. Similarly, Lenhart et al. (2016) found that 5% of women had someone threaten to post, or actually post intimate images, compared to 3% of men surveyed. However, Patchin and Hinduja (2018) found that males were more likely than females to be victims of sextortion. Females were still slightly more likely to have images shared or posted. Similarly, Henry et al. (2019) found that males reported slightly higher rates of having nude or sexual images created without consent (21.5% v. 19.2%, respectively), having nude or sexual images distributed without their consent (12.5% v. 9.2%, respectively), and being threatened with distribution of nude or sexual images without consent (10.6% v. 7.1%, respectively), however these differences were not significant.

In the study of cases reported to the police, completed by the BBC (2016) in England and Wales, the youngest victims of revenge porn were 11 years old. In total, the average age of victims was 25, with 30% of victims under the age of 19. Lenhart et al. (2016) found that the highest percentage of victims fell within the age range of 18-29 years old. Roughly 10% of individuals in this age range had someone threaten to or actually post intimate photos, compared with 4% of 15-17 year olds and 30-49 year olds, 1% of 50-64 year olds, and less than 1% of those aged 65 or older. Similarly, Henry et al. (2019) found that the two age groups of 16-19 and

20-29 had the highest rates of different facets of nonconsensual pornography. While 16-19 year olds had higher rates of overall victimization and having nude or sexual images taken without consent, 20-29 year olds had the highest rates of having sexual or nude images shared without their consent of being threatened with such. Eaton, et al. (2017) found that a slightly older group had the highest levels of NCP. Specifically, 12.4% of 34-41 year olds reported victimization, followed by 26-33 year olds (11.7%), 42-49 year olds (10.0%), 18-25 year olds (8.8%), and a significant reduction from age 50 upwards.

Finally, Patchin and Hinduja (2018) found that nonheterosexual individuals were much more likely to be victims of sextortion (10.9% compared to 4.5% of heterosexual individuals). However, the researchers did not study how many then became victims of nonconsensual pornography.

Henry et al. (2019) also found that certain vulnerable populations were also more at risk for nonconsensual pornography. More than half (56%) of respondents that needed assistance with daily living activities, body movement activities and/or communication needs reported at least one facet of NCP, compared to only 18% of respondents who did not report needing assistance. Similarly, 50% of those who identified as having Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent reported some form of NCP victimization, versus only 22% of non-indigenous respondents. Finally, LGB respondents (36%) were more likely to experience NCP than heterosexual respondents (21%).

Additional Information Shared. According to McAfee (2013), a photograph is generally not the only information about a victim that is shared. In 59% of revenge porn cases, the full name of the victim also was shared. Social network information (45%) and email addresses (26%) were also commonly shared. Offline information also was shared. Physical

home address was shared in 16% of cases, and work address was shared in 14% of cases. This information can flood search engines, so that anytime a victim's name or other identifying characteristic is searched, top results are of nonconsensual pornography (Morczek, 2016).

However, Uhl et al. (2018) found that significantly less information was shared. Only 18.7% of photographs included a first name, while 17.9% included a last name, age, and/or city. 1.5% included an occupation. This difference may be due to an increase in laws and consequences in recent years.

Where Information is Shared. The majority of nonconsensual pornography is shared via text message (44.7%) (Eaton, et al., 2017). Another 18.9% is shared on social media and 17.6% via email. Almost 11% is shared on a website. Over 30% is shared by some other means (e.g. in person/hard copy, or in a chat). In cases where social media was used to share nonconsensual pornography, Facebook was used in 68% of cases, followed by Instagram (12%) and Snapchat (5%) (BBC, 2016).

Effects of Nonconsensual Pornography. Victims of nonconsensual pornography often suffer a number of negative consequences, including public shame and humiliation, relationship problems, depression, anxiety, and job loss (Bates, 2016). Chisala-Tempelhoff and Kirya (2016) found that in one well-known case in Malawi, one victim left the country to avoid the shame and punishment, while another now has their name used as slang for porn. As seen in the story of Amanda Todd, the tragic story from the beginning of this chapter, victims of nonconsensual pornography may even be driven to take their own lives.

Compared to non-victims, victims of NCP have a lower mental health well-being, and higher physical burdens on a somatic symptom scale (Eaton, et al., 2017). In a qualitative study

of 18 nonconsensual pornography victims[1], Bates (2016) found that victims shared a loss of trust, issues with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety and/or depression, and a reduction in self-esteem, confidence, and feelings of control. CCRI (2013) found that 93% of revenge porn victims suffered significant emotional distress. Almost half of victims also experienced harassment or stalking online by individuals who saw the photographs. In some cases, this harassment and stalking can escalate to offline offenses (Citron and Franks, 2016; Morczek, 2016). Britton (2014) found that increasing numbers of nonconsensual pornography victims report feeling suicidal, or have committed suicide, an unfortunate aim for a small number of perpetrators (Examiner, 2015).

Perpetrators. Some research has begun to examine perpetrators of nonconsensual pornography. According to Patchin and Hinduja (2018), 3% of teens aged 12-17 had threatened to share a sexual image of someone else. However, the researchers did not study how many followed through on their threats.

According to the study completed by Eaton, et al. (2017), 5.2% of respondents (n=159) had knowingly shared a sexually explicit image or video of someone else without his/her consent. Similarly, the Teen Online and Wireless Safety Survey found that among 655 teens (age 13-18), only 3% had ever forwarded a sext, as did a study conducted by Mitchell, Finkelhor, Jones and Wolak (2012). Hinduja and Patchin (2010) found that 5% of boys and 3% of girls among 4,400 11-18 year olds uploaded or shared a humiliating or harassing picture of their romantic partner (whether these photos all meet the criteria for nonconsensual pornography is unknown). However, the AP-MTV Digital Abuse Study (2013) found a much higher estimate of 11% among 1,297 14-24 year olds. Similarly, Henry et al. (2019) found that just over 10% of

[1] Bates (2016) refers to these women as "revenge porn victims." However, her definition of revenge porn more closely fits the broader term of "nonconsensual pornography."

respondents had engaged in any facet of NCP. The most common behavior was taking a nude or sexual image without the subject's consent (8.9%), followed by distributing a nude or sexual image without the subject's consent (6.7%) and threatening to distribute such images (5.0%). When asking whether participants had ever shared sexts sent to them, Strohmaier, Murphy, and Dematteo (2014) found that 26% had.

Looking at the content of sext, Perkins, Becker, Tehee and Mackelprang (2013) found that among 287 undergraduate psychology students, 22% had forwarded a seminude sext, while 20% had forwarded a fully nude sext. Among adult cell phone users aged 18 and up, the prevalence of forwarding intimate sexts in one study was around 3% (Pew Research Center, 2009).

Pina, Holland, and James (2017) examined responses from 100 adults, aged 18-54 to determine how these individuals would potentially respond to common reasons for revenge pornography. Respondents were given five scenarios that each ended with the sharing of intimate media. Respondents were then asked whether they agreed with the action, and whether they would likely do the same. The researchers found that 28.6% of respondents had some proclivity for perpetration (i.e. did not respond with "strongly disagree" for all scenarios), and 99% showed some level of approval for revenge pornography being committed.

In line with other sexual perpetration research, Morelli et al. (2016) found that females were less likely to engage in not-allowed sharing of sexts. According to Eaton, et al. (2017), males were two times as likely to engage in NCP perpetration as females (65% of perpetrators in the study were male). Similarly, Patchin and Hinduja (2018) found that males were significantly more likely to engage in sextortion that females (4.1% compared to 1.9%, respectively). Henry et al. (2019) found that males were significantly more likely to engage in all types of NCP

behavior, including overall perpetration (13.7% compared to 7.4%, respectively), creating nude/sexual images without consent (12.2% compared to 6.5%, respectively), distributing such images (9.3% compared to 4.6%, respectively), and threatening to distribute such images (7.2% compared to 3.4%), respectively. Interestingly, perpetrators were equally likely to report distributing images of males (35%) and females (37%).

Age also seems to play a role in who is perpetrating nonconsensual pornography. Morelli et al. (2016) found that in a study of 715 13-30 year olds, younger participants were more likely to share sexts. Specifically, adolescents showed higher levels of not-allowed sext sharing, compared to young adults. However, the CCRI found that the highest level of perpetration was found in the age group of 18-25 year olds. This percentage (8.2%) was significantly higher than any other age group, as well as the overall percentage of perpetration (5.2%). Similarly, Henry et al. (2019) found that the age groups of 20-29 year olds and 30-39 year olds had the highest rates of perpetration for all types of NCP.

Relationship status may also be important in perpetration of nonconsensual pornography. Looking at the prevalence of forwarding sexts, the Pew Research Center (2009) found that individuals who were "single and looking" (10%) or engaged in online dating (9%) were more likely to forward sexts than individuals who were in a committed relationship (2%), especially those in a long term relationship of 10+ years (1%).

Other correlates of perpetration include domestic violence perpetration (Morelli et al., 2016), technology facilitated sexual violence and cyberdating abuse (Pina et al., 2017), and harassment (Kamal and Newman, 2016; Pina et al., 2016) or stalking (Kamal and Newman, 2016). This relationship to domestic violence perpetration may indicate that nonconsensual pornography may, in some cases, be part of more extensive abuse.

Additionally, personality factors have been linked to nonconsensual pornography. These factors have also been linked to other types of violence, especially rape and other types of sexual violence (Pina et al., 2017). Specifically, individuals with higher levels of Machiavellianism (characterized by callousness and formation of alliances to manipulate others), narcissism (self-perceived entitlement and grandiosity) and psychopathy (lack of empathy and increased impulsivity) were more likely to engage in nonconsensual pornography (Pina et al., 2017). Hostile sexism was also linked to offending (Morelli et al., 2016; Pina et al., 2017).

Perpetrators seem to have other motivations for engaging in nonconsensual pornography than revenge (Eaton, et al., 2017). The vast majority of perpetrators indicated that they just shared images with friends and did not intend to hurt anyone (79%, n=126). Only 0.6% (n=1) indicated he/she was upset with the subject for breaking up with them, and 11% (n=17) indicated they were upset with the subject of the media for another reason. Similarly, only 0.6% (n=1) indicated he/she wanted to ruin the other person's life. According to Uhl, et al. (2018) only 48 of 134 photographs studied contained a reason for submission. Of these, 21.6% referred to the subject as an "ex." An additional 21.6% gave the reason as the subject being "hot" or "sexy." Finally, 14.9% referred to the subject as a "slut" and 6% called the subject unfaithful. These findings support the argument against referring to this issue as revenge porn, as this seems to be a very small portion of nonconsensual pornography.

Additionally, a study of 4,930 nonconsensual posts about former intimate partners on the popular revenge porn website MyEx.com found that revenge for being cheated on or feeling conned in a relationship was a popular reason given for posting images (Hall and Hearn, 2017). However, bragging, promotion, rating and sharing a "trophy" were also common reasons.

Collectively, studies on nonconsensual pornography perpetration show that more individuals admit to perpetrating nonconsensual pornography than admit to victimization. Perpetrators are most likely to be young males (under the age of 30). Most are not currently in a significant romantic relationship (e.g. a serious or long-term relationship or living with a partner). Their perpetration may extend to other crimes, notably, domestic violence perpetration, and they may to show personality traits in line with Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sexism. A large number of individuals who engage in nonconsensual pornography, however, do not seem to intend to hurt anyone.

Finally, some research indicated a victim-offender overlap. Patchin and Hinduja (2018) found that roughly half of the students who had been victims of sextortion also admitted to perpetrating sextortion (2.2% out of 5%). Likewise, over two thirds who admitted to perpetration said they had also been victims (2.2% out of 3%). Although the researchers did not examine how many of these threats were carried out, this research preliminarily suggests an overlap between victims and offenders. However, Branch et al. (2017) found that nonconsensual pornography victims were less likely to perpetrate.

Explaining Nonconsensual Pornography

Hall and Hearn (2017) offer five broad categories in which nonconsensual pornography could be placed to help explain the phenomenon (Table 1.2). These categories are better-known phenomenon that have been well studied. However, the authors focus on revenge pornography specifically and do not offer a specific and testable theoretical framework for studying and explaining NCP.

Table 1.2

Categorizing Nonconsensual Pornography

Category	Explanation
Pornography	- Offshoot of online porn explosion/normalization - Universal availability - Speed of access
Interpersonal Revenge	- Blame victim for exposure - Perpetrator takes moral high ground - Consumers displace responsibility
Violence and Abuse	- Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) - Gender-based violence - Power and control
Information and Computer Technologies	- Facilitated via computer/online - Anonymous posting - Time/space compression - Instantaneousness - Ability to reproduce images
Gendered Sexual Practices	- Male/masculinity display

First, NCP can simply be seen as an off shoot of mainstream pornography (Hall and Hearn, 2017). With the advent of the internet, pornography has essentially become universally available with rapid speeds of access. Any type of pornography imaginable is easily available to anyone with an internet connection. This may create the feeling that "anything goes" and nothing is off limits.

Second, NCP can be viewed through the lens of interpersonal revenge (Hall and Hearn, 2017). Perpetrators blame the victim for the exposure (e.g. the victim "deserved" it), and consumers can displace responsibility (they did not share the intimate media). This explanation, however, falls short when examining research discussed above, which shows that revenge is not the most common reason for sharing intimate media.

Third, NCP may be another tactic used in intimate partner violence (IPV) (Hall and Hearn, 2017). In this case, NCP is used by the perpetrator to maintain power and control over the victim. Again, this explanation falls short when looking at the research into reasons for sharing intimate media.

NCP may be explained in the realm of information and computer technologies (Hall and Hearn, 2017). NCP is most often facilitated via a computer or online. The online world has several unique features that facilitate NCP. First, the poster can remain anonymous – anyone can post anything from anywhere. Second, the victim and perpetrator do not have to be in the same physical space at the same time. Third, media can be uploaded instantaneously. Fourth, images and media are easily reproduced. This explanation is closest to the Lifestyle/Routine Activity approach discussed in Chapter 2.

Finally, Hall and Hearn (2017) offer that NCP may be an extension of normal gendered sexual practices. Since males are most often the perpetrators, NCP is a form of masculinity displays. This explanation, however, does not account well for female perpetrators, male victims, or same-sex perpetration. Additionally, as Henry (2019) found, although men are most often perpetrators of NCP, they are equally likely to share images of males and females. Men were also more likely to be victims of non-consensual sexting (e.g. being pressured to send a sexual self-image when they did not really want to). Additionally, in their study of motivations, Hall and Hearn (2017) find similar motivations for revenge porn perpetration, regardless of gender and sexual orientation.

Summary

Research into nonconsensual pornography is rather new and very little is known about the phenomenon, including the extent of NCP, who is involved in NCP (victims, perpetrators or bystanders), how or why NCP occurs, or a theoretical framework for explaining NCP.

In general, estimates of victimization prevalence vary widely among studies. Low estimates indicate around 3% of individuals studied had their images shared without consent (Lenhart et al., 2016), while other research indicates 20-30% ((Jacobs, 2013) in Bambauer, 2014). Victims are more likely to be female and under the age of 40, rather than male or older. Additional personal and identifying information is often shared along with photographs or videos, such as name or address. This additional information can compound negative effects felt by victims, such as public shame, depression, anxiety, job loss, and even suicidal ideation.

Perpetrators also tend to be younger (under 40), but males are more likely to be perpetrators than females. Individuals who perpetrate domestic violence and have negative attitudes towards women are also more likely to offend than individuals without these characteristics.

Finally, Hall and Hearn (2017) offer five lenses in which to view revenge pornography in order to explain the phenomenon. However, viewing NCP as pornography, interpersonal revenge, violence and abuse, information and computer technologies, or gendered sexual practices is only helpful as a way to categorize revenge pornography. In other words, these do not offer testable theories with which to explain the broader nonconsensual pornography. A theoretical framework, such a Lifestyle/Routine Activity Theory covered in Chapter 2 and tested in this dissertation, is still needed to understand the phenomenon.

Responses to Nonconsensual Pornography

Public Responses. Researchers and journalists have argued that for much of the history of nonconsensual pornography, the public has acted with more support towards the perpetrator rather than the victim. According to Mary-Anne Franks, nonconsensual pornography has actually increased the benefits of abuse by offering social validation and boosts to the perpetrator's reputation (Reynolds, 2016). Victims, on the other hand, at best are simply told to ignore it or "log off," according to attorney Ann Olivarius (Reynolds, 2016). At worst, victims are held accountable for the pornography (Reynolds, 2016).

Misogyny. When several celebrities' iClouds were hacked in 2014, nude photos of female celebrities were leaked to the public (Hall and Hearn, 2017). While some responses were positive and supportive of victims, many individuals commented in ways that indicated male entitlement to women's bodies (CCRI, 2014). Comments included saying the celebrities "deserved this," because they would never date someone like the commenter. Other commenters said it "wasn't fair" that only people the women chose to share their bodies with got to see them (CCRI, 2014).

Victim Blaming. Another common response to the iCloud hacks was victim blaming (CCRI, 2014). The argument by commenters in this case was that celebrities willingly made their lives public. Therefore, any aspect of their private life became fair game for public knowledge and they "have no right to be upset about it." Even famous actor Ricky Gervais fell into victim blaming after the attack. Gervais tweeted "Celebrities, make it harder for hackers to get nude pics of you from your computer by not putting nude pics of yourself on your computer." This sentiment tells the victim the attack was their fault, not the offenders.

Victim blaming is not just limited to celebrities, however. Non-famous victims of nonconsensual pornography face blame for taking risqué photographs of themselves as well

(Bloom, 2014). Critics argue that in cases where the media was originally taken by the victim, no one forced the victim to take off his or her clothes (Poole, 2014). If they had not freely done so, the media would not exist, and could not be put on the internet. According to Lageson, McElrath and Palmer (2018), among a sample of 497 respondents aged 18-75, although 94.4% of respondents support criminalization of revenge porn, this percentage drops dramatically to 76.3% if the revenge porn began as a consensual selfie. To stop NCP, victims are told to stop taking photos, rather than perpetrators being told to stop sharing the photos.

Victim blaming against women often takes the form of "slut shaming" (Poole, 2014). Women who take these sorts of photos and share them with intimate partners become known as "sluts" by those who become aware of the photos (Poole, 2014). These women are shamed for sharing their sexuality, while men often do not face the same negative consequences. Chisala-Tempelhoff and Kirya (2016) found that in Malawi and Uganda, the response is overwhelmingly victim blaming, with victims being seen as "sluts" and being arrested or punished for their victimization. Arora and Scheiber (2017) found similar sentiments in Brazil, with victims blamed for the release of media. However, the researchers found opposite sentiments in India, especially among young women. These young women felt a sense of camaraderie with victims and were sympathetic to them.

Positive Responses. The public has not responded in a wholly negative way to victims, however. John Oliver, host of Last Week Tonight devoted 15 minutes of one of his shows in 2015 to discussing the harm of online harassment, including revenge porn. His segment received praise for supporting victims of revenge porn, rather than blaming them. Oliver went so far as to condemn those who would blame victims for having their trust violated. Additionally, Jennifer

Lawrence, one of the victims of the celebrity photo hack, has received praise and support for speaking out against nonconsensual pornography and the photo hack (Vanity Fair, 2014).

Organizations, such as the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, have also been founded solely to support victims of nonconsensual pornography. The public also has started to push for laws to outlaw nonconsensual pornography (CCRI, 2013). Although there is debate about whether or not a legal response is the best course of action for combating nonconsensual pornography, this push has been largely successful in creating new legislation.

Legislative Responses. Although IsAnyoneUp was the first major website of its kind, it certainly was not the last. Numerous web creators have followed in the footsteps of Hunter Moore. Fortunately, laws are beginning to catch up, and many of these web creators are being charged and convicted. For example, in April 2015, Kevin Bollaert (UGotPosted) was sentenced to 18 years in state prison, and the following month, Casey Meyering (WinByState) was sentenced to 3 years in state prison.

Victims of nonconsensual pornography under the age of 18 may already be protected under current child pornography laws (Lounsbury, Mitchell and Finkelhor, 2011). However, the majority of these laws only apply to nude or sexually explicit images or videos (Lounsbury et al., 2011). Although law specifics vary by state, many laws would not protect minors from intimate text messages being shared, or some forms of "semi-nude" images, such as a youth wearing only a bathing suit. Additionally, these laws were created to protect vulnerable children from falling victim to more culpable adults (Dodge and Spencer, 2018). These laws may be ill-suited for situations when the perpetrators of NCP are also under the age of 18. Often, these laws are seen by police as too harsh and stigmatizing for adolescents (Dodge and Spencer, 2018), especially when the reason for sharing the media may not be malevolent.

Today, 46 states and the District of Columbia have created laws against nonconsensual pornography. However, these laws vary widely, both in what is considered illegal under the law, and what the penalties are (Hall and Hearn, 2017). Some states, such as Alaska, have simply included nonconsensual pornography with another crime (in this example, Harassment). Others, such as Arkansas, have created a completely new class of crime, known as unlawful distribution of sexual images. Similarly, in some states, nonconsensual pornography is considered a misdemeanor, while it is a felony in others. Additionally, these laws are now being challenged in the courts, based on an argument that they infringe upon First Amendment rights.

There are eight broad requirements that vary across states' laws (ICAC Task Force, 2015) (see Table 1.3). First is the requirement of malicious intent, found in twenty-eight state laws. The laws in these states, such as Maryland, only include cases that would likely constitute revenge pornography in their law. Specifically, this law requires that an individual act:

> "intentionally causing serious emotional distress to another by intentionally placing on the Internet a certain reproduction of the image of the other person knowing that the other person did not consent to the placement of the image on the Internet under certain circumstances." (House Bill 43).

As this example shows, the individual must *intentionally* cause emotional harm.

The second requirement, found in fifteen states, is the requirement that actual harm must be shown (ICAC Task Force, 2015). Depending on the law, this may include emotional or psychological harm, harm done to employment or schooling opportunities, etc. For example, California and Colorado require that the distribution of the image must cause the person depicted "serious emotional distress."

Twenty-one states also have the requirement of a violation of an expectation of privacy (ICAC Task Force, 2015). One such state is Wisconsin. Wisconsin's law pertaining to "Crimes against reputation, privacy and civil liberties" (942), specifically "Representations depicting

nudity" (942.09) includes three actions that would make an individual guilty of a Class I felony. First, capturing a representation depicting nudity without the subject's knowledge and consent violates the law. Second, reproducing a representation depicting nudity without consent also violates the law. The third possible violation includes possessing, distributing or exhibiting such a representation without the subject's consent. Included in each of these actions is the requirement that the action must take place under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The fourth requirement is that of knowing or it being an intentional act (found in twenty-one state laws) (ICAC Task Force, 2015). In other words, the perpetrator must know the victim does not consent to the sharing of the intimate media, and intentionally share it anyway.

Fifth is the requirement of disclosure or distribution without consent (ICAC Task Force, 2015). This is found in thirty state laws. This requirement simply means that it is only a crime if the victim did not consent to the media being shared.

In seven states, nonconsensual pornography is only outlawed if the media is shared through electronic posting (ICAC Task Force, 2015). Therefore, any hard copies of images shared would not be covered under these laws. However, in Arizona, the threat to disseminate via electronic means is also considered a misdemeanor.

Additionally, Virginia requires nudity to be present in the media shared (ICAC Task Force, 2015)[2]. Images or video that depict semi-nudity (e.g. underwear or a sex act in which nudity is not shown) are not included.

Finally, some states have age requirements, likely in the belief that minors are already covered under child pornography laws (ICAC Task Force, 2015). In three states, the defendant

[2] ICAC Task Force, 2015 states that five states require actual nudity to be present, however, examination of the laws in each state by this author shows only one state explicitly stating this requirement.

must be at least eighteen years old to be charged under the law. Additionally, in ten states, the victim must be at least eighteen (in Louisiana, the victim must be seventeen).

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Alabama	A person commits the crime of distributing a private image if he or she knowingly posts, emails, texts, transmits, or otherwise distributes a private image with the intent to harass, threaten, coerce, or intimidate the person depicted when the depicted person has not consented to the transmission and the depicted person had a reasonable expectation of privacy against transmission of the private image.	X		X	X	X			
Alaska	A person commits the crime of harassment in the second degree if, with intent to harass or annoy another person, that person… …publishes or distributes electronic or printed photographs, pictures, or films that show the genitals, anus, or female breast of the other person or show that person engaged in a sexual act	X			X				
Arizona	It is unlawful for a person to intentionally disclose an image of another person who is identifiable from the image itself or from information displayed in connection with the image if all of the following apply: 1. The person in the image is depicted in a state of nudity or is engaged in specific sexual activities.			X	X				

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Arizona (cont.)	2. The depicted person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.								
Arkansas	A person commits the offense of unlawful distribution of sexual images or recordings if, being eighteen (18) years of age or older, with the purpose to harass, frighten, intimidate, threaten, or abuse another person, the actor distributes an image, picture, video, or voice or audio recording of the other person to a third person by any means if the image, picture, video, or voice or audio recording: (1) Is of a sexual nature or depicts the other person in a state of nudity; and (2) The other person is a family or household member of the actor or another person with whom the actor is in a current or former dating relationship	X							X
California	(4) (A) Any person who intentionally distributes the image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable person, or an image of the person depicted engaged in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, oral copulation, sexual penetration, or an image of masturbation by the person depicted or in which the person depicted participates, under circumstances in which the persons agree or understand that the image shall remain private, the person distributing the image knows or should know that distribution of the image	X	X	X	X				

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
California (cont.)	will cause serious emotional distress, and the person depicted suffers that distress.								
Colorado	(1) (a) an actor who is eighteen years of age or older commits the offense of posting a private image for harassment if he or she posts or distributes through the use of social media or any web site any photograph, video, or other image displaying the private intimate parts of an identified or identifiable person eighteen years of age or older: (i) with the intent to harass the depicted person and inflict serious emotional distress upon the depicted person; (ii) (a) without the depicted person's consent; or (b) when the actor knew or should have known that the depicted person had a reasonable expectation that the image would remain private; and (iii) the conduct results in serious emotional distress of the depicted person.	X	X	X	X		X		X
Connecticut	(a) A person is guilty of unlawful dissemination of an intimate image when (1) such person intentionally disseminates by electronic or other means a photograph, film, videotape or other recorded image of (A) the genitals, pubic area or buttocks of another person with less than a fully opaque covering of such body part, or the breast of such other person who is female with less than a fully opaque covering of any		X		X	X			

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Connecticut (cont.)	portion of such breast below the top of the nipple, or (B) another person engaged in sexual intercourse, as defined in section 53a-193 of the general statutes, (2) such person disseminates such image without the consent of such other person, knowing that such other person understood that the image would not be so disseminated, and (3) such other person suffers harm as a result of such dissemination								
Delaware	Knowingly reproduces, distributes, exhibits, publishes, transmits, or otherwise disseminates a visual depiction of a person who is nude, or who is engaging in sexual conduct, when the person knows or should have known that the reproduction, distribution, exhibition, publication, transmission, or other dissemination was without the consent of the person depicted and that the visual depiction was created or provided to the person under circumstances in which the person depicted has a reasonable expectation of privacy.			X	X	X			
District of Columbia	Sec. 3. Unlawful disclosure. (a) It shall be unlawful in the District of Columbia for a person to knowingly disclose one or more sexual images of another identified or identifiable person when: (1) The person depicted did not consent to the disclosure of the sexual image; (2) There was an agreement or	X			X	X			

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
District of Columbia (cont.)	understanding between the person depicted and the person disclosing that the sexual image would not be disclosed; and (3) The person disclosed the sexual image with the intent to harm the person depicted person depicted or to receive financial gain.								
Florida	"Sexually cyberharass" means to publish a sexually explicit image of a person that contains or conveys the personal identification information of the depicted person to an Internet website without the depicted person's consent, for no legitimate purpose, with the intent of causing substantial emotional distress to the depicted person.	X			X	X			
Georgia	A person violates this Code section if he or she, knowing the content of a transmission or post, knowingly and without the consent of the depicted person: (1) Electronically transmits or posts, in one or more transmissions or posts, a photograph or video which depicts nudity or sexually explicit conduct of an adult when the transmission or post is harassment or causes financial loss to the depicted person and serves no legitimate purpose to the depicted person; or (2) Causes the electronic transmission or posting, in one or more transmissions or posts, of a photograph or video which depicts nudity or sexually explicit conduct of an adult when	X			X	X			

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Georgia (cont.)	the transmission or post is harassment or causes financial loss to the depicted person and serves no legitimate purpose to the depicted person								
Hawaii	The person knowingly discloses an image or video of another identifiable person either in the nude, as defined in section 712-1210, or engaging in sexual conduct, as defined in section 712-1210, without the consent of the depicted person, with intent to harm substantially the depicted person with respect to that person's health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships	X			X	X			
Idaho	…either intentionally or with reckless disregard disseminates, publishes or sells or conspires to disseminate, publish or sell any image or images of the intimate areas of another person or persons without the consent of such other person or persons and he knows or reasonably should have known that one (1) or both parties agreed or understood that the images should remain private.			X	X	X			
Illinois	A person commits non-consensual dissemination of private sexual images when he or she: (1) intentionally disseminates an image of another person: (A) who is at least 18 years of age; and (B) who is identifiable from the image itself or			X	X	X			X

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Illinois (cont.)	information displayed in connection with the image; and (C) who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed, in whole or in part; and (2) obtains the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and (3) knows or should have known that the person in the image has not consented to the dissemination.								
Indiana	A person who:(1) knows or reasonably should know that an individual depicted in an intimate image does not consent to the distribution of the intimate image; and (2) distributes the intimate image; commits distribution of an intimate image, a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Level 6 felony if the person has a prior unrelated conviction under this section.					X			
Iowa	A person commits harassment when, with intent to intimidate, annoy, or alarm another person, the person does any of the following:… … Disseminates, publishes, distributes, posts, or causes to be disseminated, published, distributed, or posted a photograph or film showing another person in a state of full or partial nudity or engaged in a sext act, knowing that the other person has not consented	X				X			

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Iowa (cont.)	to the dissemination, publication, distribution or posting.								
Kansas	(a) Breach of privacy is knowingly and without lawful authority:… …disseminating any videotape, photograph, film or image of another identifiable person 18 years of age or older who is nude or engaged in sexual activity and under circumstances in which such identifiable person had a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to harass, threaten or intimidate such identifiable person, and such identifiable person did not consent to such dissemination.	X		X	X	X			X
Kentucky	A person is guilty of distribution of sexually explicit images without consent when: (a) He or she intentionally distributes to any third party private erotic matter without the written consent of the person depicted, and does so with the intent to profit, or to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted; and (b) The disclosure would cause a reasonable person to suffer harm.	X			X	X			
Louisiana	A person commits the offense of nonconsensual disclosure of a private image when all of the following occur: (1) The person intentionally discloses an image of another person who is	X		X	X	X			X

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Louisiana (cont.)	seventeen years of age or older, who is identifiable from the image or information displayed in connection with the image, and whose intimate parts are exposed in whole or in part. (2) The person who discloses the image obtained it under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private. (3) The person who discloses the image knew or should have known that the person in the image did not consent to the disclosure of the image. (4) The person who discloses the image has the intent to harass or cause emotional distress to the person in the image, and the person who commits the offense knew or should have known that the disclosure could harass or cause emotional distress to the person in the image								
Maine	A person is guilty of unauthorized dissemination of certain private images if the person, with the intent to harass, torment or threaten the depicted person or another person, knowingly disseminates, displays or publishes a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording of another person in a state of nudity or engaged in a sexual act or engaged in sexual contact in a manner in which there is no public or newsworthy purpose when the person knows or should have known that the depicted person: A. Is 18	X		X	X	X			X

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Maine (cont.)	years of age or older; B. Is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in connection with the image; and C. Has not consented to the dissemination, display or publication of the private image.								
Maryland	A person may not intentionally cause serious emotional distress to another by intentionally placing on the internet a photograph, film, videotape, recording, or any other reproduction of the image of the other person that reveals the identity of the other person with his or her intimate parts exposed or while engaged in an act of sexual contact: (1) knowing that the other person did not consent to the placement of the image on the internet; and (2) under circumstances in which the other person had a reasonable expectation that the image would be kept private.	X		X	X	X	X		
Michigan	(1) A person shall not intentionally and with the intent to threaten, coerce, or intimidate disseminate any sexually explicit visual material of another person if all of the following conditions apply: (a) The other person is not less than 18 years of age. (b) The other person is identifiable from the sexually explicit visual material itself or information displayed in connection with the sexually explicit	X		X	X	X			X

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Michigan (cont.)	visual material. This subdivision does not apply if the identifying information is supplied by a person other than the disseminator. (c) The person obtains the sexually explicit visual material of the other person under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the sexually explicit visual material was to remain private. (d) The person knows or reasonably should know that the other person did not consent to the dissemination of the sexually explicit visual material.								
Minnesota	A cause of action against a person for the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images exists when: (1) a person disseminated an image without the consent of the person depicted in the image; (2) the image is of an individual depicted in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed in whole or in part; (3) the person is identifiable: (i) from the image itself, by the person depicted in the image or by another person; or (ii) from the personal information displayed in connection with the image; and (4) the image was obtained or created under circumstances in which the person depicted had a reasonable expectation of privacy.			X		X			

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Missouri	A person commits the offense of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images if he or she: (1) Intentionally disseminates with the intent to harass, threaten, or coerce an image of another person: (a) Who is at least eighteen years of age; (b) Who is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in connection with the image; and (c) Who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed, in whole or in part; (2) Obtains the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and (3) Knows or should have known that the person in the image did not consent to the dissemination.	X		X	X	X			X
Montana	(1) Except as provided in 69-6-104, a person commits the offense of violating privacy in communications if the person knowingly or purposely: (a) with the purpose to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, or injure, communicates with a person by	X		X	X		X		

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Montana (cont.)	electronic communication and uses obscene, lewd, or profane language, suggests a lewd or lascivious act, or threatens to inflict injury or physical harm to the person or property of the person. (b) uses an electronic communication to attempt to extort money or any other thing of value from a person or to disturb by repeated communications the peace, quiet, or right of privacy of a person at the place where the communications are received; (c) records or causes to be recorded a conversation by use of a hidden electronic or mechanical device that reproduces a human conversation without the knowledge of all parties to the conversation; or (d) with the purpose to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, or injure, publishes or distributes printed or electronic photographs, pictures, images, or films of an identifiable person without the consent of the person depicted that show: (i) the visible genitals, anus, buttocks, or female breast if the nipple is exposed; or (ii) the person depicted engaged in a real or simulated sexual act.								
Nebraska	It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally distribute or otherwise make public an image or video of another person's intimate area or of another person engaged in sexually explicit	X		X	X	X			X

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Nebraska (cont.)	conduct when (a) the other person had a reasonable expectation that the image would remain private, (b) knowing the other person did not consent to distributing or making public the image or video, and (c) distributing or making public the image or video serves no legitimate purpose. Violation of this subsection is a Class I misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation of this subsection is a Class IV felony.								
Nevada	…a person commits the crime of unlawful dissemination of an intimate image when, with the intent to harass, harm or terrorize another person, the person electronically disseminates or sells an intimate image which depicts the other person and the other person: (a) Did not give prior consent to the electronic dissemination or the sale of the intimate image; (b) Had a reasonable expectation that the intimate image would be kept private and would not be made visible to the public; and (c) Was at least 18 years of age when the intimate image was created.	X		X		X	X		X
New Hampshire	A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if that person knowingly disseminates or causes the dissemination of any photograph or video recording of himself or herself engaging in sexual activity with another person without the express consent of the				X	X			

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
New Hampshire (cont.)	other person or persons who appear in the photograph or videotape.								
New Jersey	An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he discloses any photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other reproduction of the image of another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, unless that person has consented to such disclosure.				X	X			
New Mexico	Unauthorized distribution of sensitive images consists of distributing, publishing or otherwise making available, by an electronic communications device or other means, sensitive images of a person, with or without information identifying that person, without that person's consent: (1) with the intent to: (a) harass, humiliate or intimidate that person; (b) incite another to harass, humiliate or intimidate that person; (c) cause that person to reasonably fear for that person's own or family members' safety; (d) cause that person to suffer unwanted physical contact or injury; or (e) cause that person to suffer emotional distress; and (2) where the conduct is such that it	X				X			

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
New Mexico (cont.)	would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.								
New York	A person is guilty of unlawful dissemination or publication of an Intimate image when: (a) with intent to cause harm to the emotional, financial or physical welfare of another person, he or she intentionally disseminates or publishes a still or video image of such other person, who is identifiable from the still or video image itself or from information displayed in connection with the still or video image, without such other person's consent, which depicts: (i) an unclothed or exposed intimate part of such other person; or (ii) such other person engaging in sexual conduct as defined in subdivision ten of section 130.00 of this chapter with another person; and (b) such still or video image was taken under circumstances when the person depicted had a reasonable expectation that the image would remain private and the actor knew or reasonably should have known the person depicted intended for the still or video image to remain private, regardless of whether	X		X	X				

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
New York (cont.)	the actor was present when the still or video image was taken.								
North Carolina	A person is guilty of disclosure of private images if all of the following apply: (1) The person knowingly discloses an image of another person with the intent to do either of the following: a. Coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or cause financial loss to the depicted person. b. Cause others to coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or cause financial loss to the depicted person. (2) The depicted person is identifiable from the disclosed image itself or information offered in connection with the image. (3) The depicted person's intimate parts are exposed or the depicted person is engaged in sexual conduct in the disclosed image. (4) The person discloses the image without the affirmative consent of the depicted person. (5) The person discloses the image under circumstances such that the person knew or should have known that the depicted person had a reasonable expectation of privacy.	X		X	X	X			
North Dakota	A person commits the offense of distribution of intimate images if the person knowingly or intentionally distributes to any third party any		X	X	X	X			X

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
North Dakota (cont.)	intimate image of an individual eighteen years of age or older, if: a. The person knows that the depicted individual has not given consent to the person to distribute the intimate image; b. The intimate image was created by or provided to the person under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and c. Actual emotional distress or harm is caused to the individual as a result of the distribution under this section.								
Ohio	No person shall knowingly disseminate an image of another person if all of the following apply: (1) The person in the image is eighteen years of age or older. (2) The person in the image can be identified from the image itself or from information displayed in connection with the image and the offender supplied the identifying information. (3) The person in the image is in a state of nudity or is engaged in a sexual act. (4) The image is disseminated without consent from the person in the image. (5) The image is disseminated with intent to harm the person in the image.	X			X	X	X		X
Oklahoma	A person commits nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images when he or she: 1. Intentionally disseminates an image of another person: a. who is at least eighteen (18) years of age,	X		X	X	X			X

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Oklahoma (cont.)	b. who is identifiable from the image itself or information displayed in connection with the image, and c. who is engaged in a sexual act or whose intimate parts are exposed, in whole or in part; 2. Disseminates the image with the intent to harass, intimidate or coerce the person, or under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that dissemination of the image would harass, intimidate or coerce the person; 3. Obtains the image under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; and 4. Knows or a reasonable person should have known that the person in the image has not consented to the dissemination.								
Oregon	A person commits the crime of unlawful dissemination of an intimate image if: (a) The person, with the intent to harass, humiliate or injure another person, knowingly causes to be disclosed through an Internet website an identifiable image of the other person whose intimate parts are visible or who is engaged in sexual conduct; (b) The person knows or reasonably should have known that the other person does not consent to the disclosure; (c) The other person is harassed, humiliated or injured	X	X			X	X		

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Oregon (cont.)	by the disclosure; and (d) A reasonable person would be harassed, humiliated or injured by the disclosure								
Pennsylvania	…a person commits the offense of unlawful dissemination of intimate image if, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm a current or former sexual or intimate partner, the person disseminates a visual depiction of the current or former sexual or intimate partner in a state of nudity or engaged in sexual conduct.	X							
Rhode Island	(a) A person is guilty of unauthorized dissemination of a sexually explicit visual image of another person when the person intentionally, by any means, disseminates, publishes or sells: (1) A visual image that depicts another identifiable person eighteen (18) year or older engaged in sexually explicit conduct or of the intimate areas of that person; (2) The visual image was made, captured, recorded, or obtained under such circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; (3) The visual image was disseminated, published or sold without the consent of the depicted person; and	X		X	X	X			X

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Rhode Island (cont.)	(4) With knowledge or with reckless disregard for the likelihood that the depicted person will suffer harm, or with the intent to harass, intimidate, threaten or coerce the depicted person.								
South Dakota	No person may use or disseminate in any form any visual recording or photographic device to photograph or visually record any other person without clothing or under or through the clothing, or with another person depicted in a sexual manner, for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn by, that other person, without the consent or knowledge of that other person, with the intent to self-gratify, to harass, or embarrass and invade the privacy of that other person, under circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.	X		X		X			
Tennessee	A person commits unlawful exposure who, with the intent to cause emotional distress, distributes an image of the intimate part or parts of another identifiable person if: (1) The image was photographed or recorded under circumstances where the parties agreed or understood that the image would remain private; and (2) The person depicted in the image suffers emotional distress.	X	X	X					

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Texas	A defendant is liable, as provided by this chapter, to a person depicted in intimate visual material for damages arising from the disclosure of the material if: (1)the defendant discloses the intimate visual material without the effective consent of the depicted person; (2)the intimate visual material was obtained by the defendant or created under circumstances in which the depicted person had a reasonable expectation that the material would remain private; (3)the disclosure of the intimate visual material causes harm to the depicted person; and (4)the disclosure of the intimate visual material reveals the identity of the depicted person in any manner, including through: (A)any accompanying or subsequent information or material related to the intimate visual material; or (B)information or material provided by a third party in response to the disclosure of the intimate visual material.		X	X		X			
Utah	An actor commits the offense of distribution of intimate images if the actor, with the intent to cause emotional distress or harm, knowingly or intentionally distributes to any third party any intimate image of an individual who is 18 years of age or older, if:	X	X	X		X			X

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Utah (cont.)	(a) the actor knows that the depicted individual has not given consent to the actor to distribute the intimate image; (b) the intimate image was created by or provided to the actor under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy; and (c) actual emotional distress or harm is caused to the person as a result of the distribution under this section.								
Vermont	A person violates this section if he or she knowingly discloses a visual image of an identifiable person who is nude or who is engaged in sexual conduct, without his or her consent, with the intent to harm, harass, intimidate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted, and the disclosure would cause a reasonable person to suffer harm. A person may be identifiable from the image itself or information offered in connection with the image. Consent to recording of the visual image does not, by itself, constitute consent for disclosure of the image.	X			X	X			
Virginia	Any person who, with the intent to coerce, harass, or intimidate, maliciously disseminates or sells any videographic or still image created by any means	X						X	

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
Virginia (cont.)	whatsoever that depicts another person who is totally nude, or in a state of undress so as to expose the genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast, where such person knows or has reason to know that he is not licensed or authorized to disseminate or sell such videographic or still image is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.								
Washington	A person commits the crime of disclosing intimate images when the person knowingly discloses an intimate image of another person and the person disclosing the image: (a) Obtained it under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand that the image was to remain private; (b) Knows or should have known that the depicted person has not consented to the disclosure; and (c) Knows or reasonably should know that disclosure would cause harm to the depicted person.	X		X	X	X			
West Virginia	No person may knowingly and intentionally disclose, cause to be disclosed or threaten to disclose, with the intent to harass, intimidate, threaten, humiliate, embarrass, or coerce, an image of another which shows the intimate parts of the depicted person or shows the depicted person engaged in sexually explicit conduct which was captured under circumstances where the person depicted had a	X		X	X				

Table 1.3

State Nonconsensual Pornography Laws

State	Law	Requirements							
		Malicious Intent	Actual Harm	Violation of Expectation of Privacy	Intentional Act	Disclosure or Distribution without Consent	Electronic Posting	Nudity	Age
West Virginia (cont.)	reasonable expectation that the image would not be publicly disclosed.								
Wisconsin	Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor: 1. Posts, publishes, or causes to be posted or published, a private representation if the actor knows that the person depicted does not consent to the posting or publication of the private representation. 2. Posts, publishes, or causes to be posted or published, a depiction of a person that he or she knows is a private representation, without the consent of the person depicted.			X		X			

According to Cyber Civil Rights Initiative (2016), the most comprehensive law that currently exists was enacted in Illinois in 2015. The Illinois statute does not require the offender to intend to cause emotional distress to the victim. Additionally, images that were originally taken by the victim are still protected under this law. The image does not have to depict actual nudity under the Illinois law. Any type of sexual act, even if the individual is fully clothed, depicted in the image would fall under their definition of pornography. Importantly, however, this law again only covers sexually explicit images or video, not additional forms of explicit media. Finally, this law does not only apply to the individual who first distributed the image without the victim's consent. Employing the "reasonable person" standard, anyone who shares the image, who should reasonably be aware that the victim did not consent to it being shared, can be prosecuted under this law.

Given the wide range of laws, and the lack of a guiding federal statute, there is debate as to whether or not laws are the best way to combat nonconsensual pornography. In addition to the vast differences between each state, these laws face several difficulties. According to Citron and Franks (2014), few criminal laws exist to combat nonconsensual pornography because (1) there is a lack of understanding about the severity and dynamics of the problem; (2) historically there has been indifference and even hostility to the idea of women's autonomy; (3) people have differing opinions on contextual privacy; and (4) the belief that the First Amendment protects nonconsensual pornography under the idea of freedom of speech. These obstacles, however, can and are being overcome through education. The scant research available, as well as this dissertation, seek to increase knowledge and understanding of the problem. The continuing feminist movement encourages women's autonomy.

Additionally, as Citron and Franks (2014) argue, there should be no issues regarding contextual privacy. Courts have upheld in several settings that information shared with an understanding of privacy should not be shared outside that relationship (e.g. sharing health information with your doctor does not give him/her permission to share that information outside his/her role as your physician). Finally, the authors argue that a law against nonconsensual pornography would not violate the First Amendment under a number of well-established exceptions, such as obscenity and confidentiality.

However, these laws are being challenged in the courts under the First Amendment (Paul, 2019). For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that the law was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Court argued that the law went too far by not requiring an intent to harm. The ruling will now likely be appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. This appeal is, in part, due to other states' laws withstanding challenges. Illinois' law was brought before the Appeals Court, which overturned the law as unconstitutional, and then the Illinois Supreme Court, which declared the law constitutional. It is now being appealed to the United States Supreme Court, in hopes the Court will make a final ruling on these laws.

However, even if a federal law were enacted to make nonconsensual pornography a federal crime, some scholars, such as Hall and Hearn (2017), still argue this is not enough. First, even in states where nonconsensual pornography is illegal, prosecutions are very rare (Hall and Hearn, 2017). If state prosecutions are so rare, it is plausible to assume federal prosecutions would not be more common. Additionally, many websites are hosted overseas, making it difficult to prosecute using American laws (Hall and Hearn, 2017). Instead, Hall and Hearn (2017) argue that international laws would be required to actually outlaw nonconsensual pornography.

Summary. States are beginning to respond to nonconsensual pornography by making it a crime. However, there is no unified approach to states' responses. Some states, such as Alaska, have simply amended existing statutes to include nonconsensual pornography (i.e. harassment in the second degree). Other states have created entirely new statutes specific to NCP (e.g. West Virginia). Likewise, in some states (e.g. Hawaii) nonconsensual pornography is considered a felony, while others (e.g. Oklahoma) consider it a misdemeanor. Still others, such as Delaware or Florida have a tiered system to determine whether the offense is a misdemeanor or felony. The requirements for nonconsensual pornography to be considered a crime also varies by state. Factors such as consent, expectation of privacy, and actual harm may be included in statutes. Finally, there is no federal law against nonconsensual pornography, although many researchers and activities are pushing for such a law. Other researchers, however, argue that international laws are required to combat nonconsensual pornography.

Other Official Responses. Given these difficulties, popular websites have begun taking action. In February 2015, the popular sharing website Reddit announced its ban of any sexually explicit content posted without consent. Following suit a month later, Twitter also banned revenge porn. Later that year, Google announced that it will remove links to revenge pornography by request. A month later, Microsoft pledged the same.

Summary

Amanda Todd was 15 years old when she took her own life after years of online abuse and harassment stemming from a topless photo of her that was shared online. Nonconsensual pornography, although not a new phenomenon, has continued to become a problem across the world. Individuals as young as 11 have become victims, with devastating, and even deadly

consequences. In light of several high-profile cases, the phenomenon has become commonly known and has sparked a movement towards awareness, prevention, and prosecution.

Although nonconsensual pornography, and especially revenge porn, are beginning to gain increased media attention, and have inspired states to take legal action, there are many unanswered questions surrounding nonconsensual pornography. Although there are studies and estimates of the frequency of nonconsensual pornography, there is a great deal of variability in these estimates, possibly due to the samples that have been previously studied. This dissertation seeks to examine frequency using a large random sample of college students. Since only a few studies have examined motivations for committing nonconsensual pornography, this dissertation aims to provide more insight into the reasons perpetrators share sexual media without consent. Additionally, much of the research on where images and videos originate from are focused on sexting. This dissertation broadens that focus to look at additional origins of this intimate media. Before action against nonconsensual pornography can be effective, the phenomenon must be fully understood, or any action will be incomplete.

Research Questions

Given the difficulties in studying nonconsensual pornography outlined in this chapter, there are still many unanswered questions. Nonconsensual pornography has not been clearly defined or named, nor has the question of its origin been answered. This dissertation uses a broad definition of nonconsensual pornography, so it is not limited to revenge porn or only nonconsensual images. Estimates of victimization vary widely among studies. This dissertation uses a large random sample of college students to estimate the frequency of victimization. Additionally, a theoretical framework has yet to be applied to help understand the phenomenon.

This dissertation seeks to answer some of these remaining questions through the following research questions:

1. Does a lifestyle routine activities framework explain risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    a. Do proximity and exposure to motivated offenders increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    b. Does increased target suitability increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    c. Does a lack of capable guardianship increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to extend current knowledge of nonconsensual pornography (NCP). In addition to examining descriptive information about victimization, this research also seeks to apply theory to explain the risk for nonconsensual pornography victimization. Two complementary theories are used for this purpose: Lifestyle-Exposure and Routine Activities Theories.

This chapter begins with an overview of Lifestyle-Exposure and Routine Activities Theories and how they have been merged into a single framework. Next, the application of this framework in the digital age is examined. Although the framework has not yet been applied to nonconsensual pornography, it has been applied to other online crimes. This chapter offers a review of the current literature applying Lifestyle/Routine Activities to online crimes, and how it could be applied to NCP.

Lifestyle/Routine Activities Theories

Lifestyle-Exposure and Routine Activities Theories began as two distinct opportunity theories. Both have enjoyed a fair amount of support in research examining traditional offline crimes. Additionally, although significantly more limited, both have received support for their ability to explain many online crimes. Over time, due to their similarity and compatibility, the two theories have been combined in the research to form a singular opportunity approach to explaining victimization, known as a lifestyle/routine activities approach. Although the lifestyle/routine activities approach has never been applied to explaining nonconsensual pornography, the relevant literature regarding online victimization offers insight as to how this approach may be applied to this phenomenon.

Lifestyle-Exposure Theory

Lifestyle-Exposure Theory was first introduced by Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo (1978) in their book *Victims of Personal Crime*. The authors analyzed data from the National Crime Survey (NCS) and found that victimization seemed to be more common among certain demographic factors. Specifically, the authors noted that personal victimization varied by age, sex, race, income level, marital status, education, and occupation. The researchers theorized that there was more to this link than simply a direct relationship.

Instead, the researchers argued that several different variables were at play. The demographics, which were found to be linked to differing rates of victimization, are actually just the start of a more complicated relationship. These demographics influence both role expectations and structural constraints on an individual (Hindelang et al., 1978). Role expectations are cultural norms that influence behavior. They do so by defining what is seen as appropriate behavior based on an individual's demographics. For example, an adult is generally expected to act more maturely and engage in different activities than a child.

Structural constraints are also limitations placed on an individual, but by societal institutions (Hindelang et al., 1978). There are a number of structural constraints in place, including economic, familial, educational, and legal constraints. For example, an individual's income may limit access to certain schools, limiting their educational achievement. Importantly, role expectations and structural constraints also affect each other (Hindelang et al., 1978). For example, an individual's familial constraints may define certain norms of behavior for an individual.

However, the authors noted that even if two individuals have identical demographics and face the same role expectations and structural constraints, they may behave differently

(Hindelang et al., 1978). Therefore, the next part of the theory lays out individual adaptations. These adaptations are in direct response to the expectations and constraints placed on an individual. Many adaptations are known as individual adaptations, meaning they are uniquely based in an individual's beliefs or attitudes (e.g. beliefs or attitudes about crime) (Hindelang et al., 1978). However, adaptations can also be subcultural, meaning individuals with common demographics, expectations and constraints have a tendency to create a subculture with shared values and attitudes.

Individual and subcultural adaptations, in turn, create a person's lifestyle (Hindelang et al., 1978). A lifestyle is a person's behavioral patterns, which turn into daily routines. Lifestyle is a central part of the theory, as an individual's lifestyle determines with whom they associate most often. Individuals with similar lifestyles tend to associate more than individuals with different lifestyles (Hindelang et al., 1978). Both lifestyle and associations determine an individual's exposure to potential offenders. This is crucial, as it is this exposure that leads to an increased risk of victimization.

Routine Activities Theory

First conceptualized by Cohen and Felson (1979), Routine Activities Theory has become a staple in criminology for explaining victimization risk. The researchers sought to explain changing crime rates (specifically the rates of direct-contact predatory violations) following World War II. Direct-contact predatory violations are crimes that involve direct physical contact between at least one perpetrator and one target (being a person or a thing). Cohen and Felson (1979) believed that changes in these crime rates could be explained by social changes occurring at the same time – specifically, changes in Americans' routine activities.

Routine activities are defined by Cohen and Felson (1979) as any activities that are (1) recurrent and prevalent and (2) provide for basic needs. These activities fall into three basic categories: (1) activities that occur at home; (2) activities that occur at jobs away from the home; and (3) other activities that are not work-related, but also occur away from home. Shifts in the structure and location of these activities can be used to explain changes in crime rates. Cohen and Felson (1979) hypothesized that a shift towards more activities that occurred away from the home would lead to an increase in direct-contact predatory violations.

In order for a crime to occur, Cohen and Felson (1979) argue that three elements must converge in time and space: (1) a motivated offender, (2) a suitable target, and (3) a lack of a capable guardian. If any one of these elements is not present, a crime will not occur. The routine activities approach assumes motivation on the part of the offender. The presence of a motivated offender, suitable target and/or a capable guardian in a specific time and location are determined by routine activities. As routine activities shifted away from the home, the researchers argued that there was a greater likelihood of convergence of the three elements necessary for crime. This would occur because (1) potential victims would come into contact with motivated offenders they would not normally come into contact with at home, or (2) goods at home would be left unguarded. Additionally, as goods became more expensive and moveable, personal and household theft should increase. These goods would make a more suitable target, as they are monetarily worth more, and are easier for a motivated offender to take without a guardian being aware.

The research originally completed by Cohen and Felson (1979) found strong support for the routine activities approach. The researchers noted that following World War II, there were increases in female college students, married female labor force participation, percent of

individuals living as primary individuals, unattended households, and out-of-town travel. All of these changes in routine activities were hypothesized to increase certain types of crime. Specifically, as individuals spend more time outside of the home, personal victimization should increase away from home, as potentially suitable targets are exposed to motivated offenders. Additionally, household thefts and burglaries should increase as there is a lack of guardianship at the home. As hypothesized, rates of victimization were lower at or near home than in other locations. Additionally, household burglaries during the daytime increased.

The following year, Cohen, Felson and Land (1980) found further evidence to support a routine activities approach to explaining direct-contact predatory violations. The researchers this time examined the effect of population density on crime rates and trends. The researchers hypothesized that if there is a decrease in population density in areas where people generally engage in routine activities, there should be an increase in criminal opportunities, and therefore these predatory violations. Confirming this hypothesis, the researchers found that residential population had a strong negative effect on robbery rates. Additionally, rates of unemployment, which would affect routine activities and population densities, also negatively affected robbery rates. Similar trends were found for burglary rates. This is consistent with routine activities theory, as higher unemployment rates would lead to more individuals engaging in activities at home, reducing risk of predatory violations.

Other researchers also have found support for a routine activities approach. For example, Messner and Blau (1987) studied the effect of leisure activities on rates of serious crime (e.g. homicide, rape, aggravated assault). Specifically, the researchers hypothesized that the volume of leisure activities taking place within a household should be inversely related to rates of serious crime, and vice versa. This hypothesis was supported by the finding that household activities,

such as television viewing, were negatively related to rates of serious crime. At the same time, indicators of nonhousehold activities, such as volume of cinemas or professional sports establishments, were positively related to all types of serious crimes, except auto theft.

Summary - Combined Lifestyle/Routine Activities Theory

When Lifestyle-Exposure Theory and Routine Activities Theory were first theorized, they were two distinct theories. Lifestyle-Exposure Theory focused on explaining personal victimization risk, while Routine Activities Theory was attempting to explain macro-level predatory crime rates. However, Routine Activities Theory has since been adapted to explain individual victimization risk, making the two theories very similar. Shortly after Routine Activities Theory was first researched, Cohen, Kluegel and Land (1981) laid out the original integration of these two theories. Instead of three core concepts, the authors defined four factors related to risk. The concept of contact with a motivated offender was split into two factors: exposure and proximity to motivated offenders. Exposure refers to physical visibility and accessibility of a target to motivated offenders. Proximity, on the other hand, refers to physical distance between areas where targets are and areas where large populations of motivated offenders are found. The final two concepts: guardianship and target attractiveness are similar to those concepts described by Cohen and Felson (1979). Guardianship refers to the ability of people or objects to prevent crime. Target attractiveness refers to the desirability of a person or object. This desirability may be based on material desirability (e.g. financial worth) or symbolic desirability (e.g. revenge) (Cohen et al., 1981).

More recently, Choi (2008) argues that routine activities theory was merely an extension of lifestyle-exposure theory, so the integration makes sense. The lifestyle/routine activities theory, therefore, focuses on two main concepts (DeGarmo, 2011). First, victimization occurs

when a motivated offender comes into contact with an unguarded, but desirable target. Second, individuals' routine activities affect the likelihood of different acts, including crime and victimization, occurring.

Research has shown support for the application of a lifestyle/routine activities approach to explain individual victimization risk. Miethe, Stafford and Long (1987) found strong support for this approach to explaining property crimes, but less support for explaining violent crimes. Miethe et al. (1987) examined the effect of nighttime routine activities versus daytime activities on victimization risk. Although engagement in nighttime activities increased risk of violent victimization, daytime activities either within or outside of the home had no effect. However, both nighttime and daytime routine activities were significantly related to risk of property victimization.

Mustaine and Tewksbury (1998) studied a larger number of college students' routine activities and other behaviors that may increase an individual's risk of victimization according to a routine activities approach. First, the researchers looked at activities typically engaged in away from home, such as eating out or having drinks at a bar. Next, the researchers examined the amount of time an individual spends exposed to motivated offenders and self-reported illegal activities, as both of these should increase victimization risk, by increasing both exposure and proximity to offenders. The researchers found that many of these variables increased risk of larceny victimization, despite taking into account a number of demographic characteristics.

Support for this integrated approach has continued into the 2000's. Researchers have expanded the theory in three important ways: 1) examining routine activities and lifestyle variables within different contexts; 2) studying LRAT across countries; and 3) adapting LRAT to apply to online crimes (discussed in the following section).

Schreck and Fisher (2004) examined the effect of routine activities and lifestyle variables within different family and peer contexts. The researchers, in line with their hypotheses, found that family and peer contexts are important in predicting victimization risk. Teenagers in high attachment families were less at risk for violent crime victimization. Peer context was also important. Teens whose friends engaged in delinquency were at higher risk for violent victimization. These context factors remained significant net of routine activities and lifestyle factors.

Similarly, Burrow and Apel (2008) examined victimization risk across community and school contexts. The researchers found that although an LRAT framework was useful for studying victimization risk in any context, there were a number of differences across contexts. Some individual variables, such as having a history of fighting, were important in predicting risk across contexts. Others, however, such as age, increased risk in one setting (non-school/community victimization), while decreasing it in another (school victimization).

Wilcox, Madensen and Tillyer (2007) also examined routine activities and lifestyle variables in different contexts, this time using different neighborhood contexts to examine a multilevel model of guardianship. Similar to Schreck and Fisher (2004), the researchers found that context does matter. Three of the four neighborhood level guardianship measures (target hardening, informal social control, and defensible space) conditioned the individual level guardianship measures. For example, in neighborhoods with high informal social control, individual guardianship measures (such as home occupancy) had a stronger effect on reducing victimization risk. The three studies discussed not only offer support for using the LRAT approach, but also demonstrate that context is an important consideration for studying the framework.

The second way the LRAT approach has been improved in the 2000s is by examining the applicability of the theory across countries. Similar to the research above studying LRAT across contexts, research on LRAT across countries indicates that LRAT can be universally applied, but the country of study is also an important consideration.

Fisher and Wilkes (2003) studied victimization risk of university students in the United States and England. Using a single survey in both countries, the researchers found that measures of proximity, exposure, guardianship, and target attractiveness were important in predicting violence, theft, and burglary victimization in both countries. However, which measures were significant varied based on country context. Use of recreational drugs and financial spending were risk factors for multiple crime types and in both countries. Other variables, however, such as number of nights spent partying or membership in a society were only significant in England and for certain types of crime (violent victimization (both) and property theft (society membership only)).

Tseloni, Wittebrood, Farrell and Pease (2004) also studied victimization risk across countries. Specifically, the researchers studied burglary victimization in England and Wales, the United States, and the Netherlands. Although the researchers used different surveys in each of the countries, their results highlight similar findings to Fisher and Wilkes (2003). For example, marital status was an important predictor in the United States, but not in any other country. Similarly, employment status was significant in the Netherlands, but not in the United States or England and Wales. Measures of urbanization (although the measures varied slightly by country) were important across countries.

The final way research into LRAT has expanded is by taking on the digital age. The original framework was applied to in person crimes, where offender and target must meet in time

and space. With the popularity of the internet ever growing, that convergence is no longer necessary. How the framework has been adapted is the focus of the following section.

This dissertation uses a combined approach to examine risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization. The relationship between elements of both theories, including both exposure and proximity to motivated offenders, target suitability, and lack of capable guardianship and nonconsensual pornography victimization are examined. As these theories have not yet been applied to nonconsensual pornography, the following literature review on Lifestyle/Routine Activities as applied to other online crimes is used as an indicator of how this approach may explain nonconsensual pornography.

Lifestyle/Routine Activities in the Digital Age

Just as Cohen and Felson (1979) noted that technology had changed crime trends following World War II, today's technology has also had an impact on crime. Easy access to computers, smart phones and the internet have led to a new phenomenon collectively known as "cybercrime." As cybercrime continues to grow, researchers have attempted to explain it using both new and traditional theories. Lifestyle/Routine Activities Theory is one approach, which researchers have successfully applied to explaining some trends in cybercrime.

The key elements of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Theory remain the same when applying it to online crimes. There must be exposure and proximity to a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the lack of a capable guardian for an online crime to occur. However, the key concept of convergence in time and space must be altered to fit cyberspace, as the motivated offender, suitable target and capable guardian may be in three different physical locations but connected through an online network. Eck and Clarke (2003) argued that routine activity theory can be used to explain crimes that occur without direct interaction between an offender and a target. Eck and

Clarke (2003) modified the crime triangle to replace the concept of "place" with "network." In Eck and Clarke's (2003) work, this network referred to any sort of system that allowed people to interact without being in the same physical space (e.g. phone or mail systems).

Reyns (2010) takes this a step further to apply to online places and systems. The new revised crime triangle, called "Routine Activities in an Online Domain," found in Reyns (2010), replaces "place" and "network" with "web domain." Reyns (2010) hypothesized that although offender and suitable target may originally come into contact over a network, the actual victimization takes place in an online space, or domain.

With the network and web domain, the elements of Lifestyle/Routine Activities no longer need to meet in a physical space at the same time. People have access to the internet in nearly all places and at nearly all times. Therefore, an offender could attack a victim who is thousands of miles away, and a victim may not realize it until much later. This change requires a reformulation of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Theory to focus on the web domain rather than a physical time and space. Crime is therefore possible when a motivated offender, suitable target and lack of a capable guardian converge on the online network.

Once that reformulation is accepted, the Lifestyle/Routine Activities approach operates in a similar way online as offline. Researchers have therefore applied the concepts of motivated offenders (exposure and proximity), target suitability and lack of a capable guardian to the online world. However, operationalization of each concept is inconsistent across studies, complicating a full review of the research. Research findings are summarized in Table 2.1, and especially relevant findings for each concept are discussed below.

Exposure and Proximity to Motivated Offenders. Although exposure and proximity are actually two distinct concepts, researchers have struggled to develop a reliable measurement of each idea.

Exposure refers to being visible to motivated offenders (e.g. lifestyles that would make a target more visible to offenders). Proximity, then, refers to how spatially near a target physically is to motivated offenders (Reyns, 2010). Most research tends to use similar measures, referring to them as either exposure or proximity. For example, exposure to offenders online has been measured using a variety of behaviors. In general, this concept focuses on easy access to the internet and time spent online, as lifestyles that include easy and regular internet access would leave someone exposed to motivated offenders they would not be visible to without that internet access. However, time spent online also has been used as a measure of proximity (Bossler, Holt and May, 2012), as well as activities engaged in online, peer engagement in online harassment, and an individual's own engagement in computer deviance or online harassment (also used by some as a measure of target suitability (e.g. Navarro and Jasinski, 2013).

Navarro and Jasinski (2013) examined what they called "availability" through asking respondents (1500 10-17 year olds) how many days per week and how many hours per day they typically spent on the internet. These researchers found that teens who were cyberbullied were online more often than non-victimized teens. However, this relationship was no longer significant when examining the full logistic regression, indicating that the bivariate relationship between time spent online and bullying victimization was spurious once measures of target suitability (e.g. activities engaged in online) were taken into account in the multivariate logistic model.

Table 2.1.

Effects of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Concepts on Cybervictimization

Study	Sample	Type of Victimization	Motivated Offender (Exposure and Proximity)	Target Attractiveness	Lack of Capable Guardianship	Significant Effect
Bossler, Holt and May (2012)	434 Middle and High School Students	Online Harassment (posting messages to make you feel bad, posting messages to threaten, sent messages to make your feel bad, sent messages to threaten)	Average Number of Hours Spent on Online Activities Having a Social Networking Account Peer Harassment Computer Deviance Online Harassment Offending	Gender Race Academic Standing Grades	Physical Guardianship Software Social Guardianship Computer Location Peer Deviance Personal Guardianship Skill Level Risky Info Sharing	Hours Spent Online (+) Having Social Networking Account (+) Peer Harassment (+) Online Harassment Offending (+) Software (+) Peer Deviance (+) Skill Level (-) Risking Info Sharing (+)
Holt and Bossler (2008)	788 College Students	Online Harassment (harassment in chatroom, IRC or instant message)	Computer Ownership Internet Connection Speed Computer Activities: Work/School Non-Work/School Shopping Video Games Email Chat Rooms Programming MySpace	Computer Deviance Piracy Pornography Hacking Editing Others' Information	Physical Guardianship Antivirus Software Spybot Software Ad-aware Software Microsoft Update Security Center Hardware Firewall Social Guardianship Peer Deviance Personal Guardianship Knowledge Skill	Chatrooms (+) Hacking (+) Peer Deviance (+)

Table 2.1.

Effects of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Concepts on Cybervictimization

Study	Sample	Type of Victimization	Motivated Offender (Exposure and Proximity)	Target Attractiveness	Lack of Capable Guardianship	Significant Effect
Holt, Bossler, Malinski and May (2016)	439 Middle and High School Students	Online Sexual Harassment (pressured to have online sexual conversations)	Online Activities Social Networking Checking Email Posting Pictures Sending Pictures Posting Personal Information Viewing Sexual Materials	Grade Race Gender	Social Guardianship Computer Location	Social Networking (+) Chatroom/Instant Messenger (+) Posting Pictures (+) Gender (+)
Leukfeldt and Yar (2016)	9161 Individuals aged 15+ (in Netherlands)	Malware Stalking (repeated harassment) Online Threats (threat of physical violence or death) Hacking Identity Theft		Value Personal Income Household Income Financial Assets Financial Possessions Savings Visibility Frequency of Internet Use Targeted Browsing Direct Communication Chatting Online Online Gaming Online Forums	Physical Guardianship Computer Software Personal Guardianship Online Risk Awareness Computer Knowledge	Personal Income (-) Direct Communication via Email (+) Direct Communication via MSN/Skype (+) Online Forums (+) Social Networking (+) Frequency of Internet Use (+) Online Gaming (+) Shopping Online (+) Untargeted Browsing (+) Targeted Browsing (+) Twitter (+)

Table 2.1.

Effects of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Concepts on Cybervictimization

Study	Sample	Type of Victimization	Motivated Offender (Exposure and Proximity)	Target Attractiveness	Lack of Capable Guardianship	Significant Effect
				Social Networking Twitter Downloading Untargeted Browsing Shopping Online Accessibility Operating System Browser		Windows Operating System (+) Firefox Browser (+) Online Risk Awareness (-)
Marcum, Higgins and Ricketts (2010)	744 College Freshmen	Receiving Sexually Explicit Material (pornography) Non-Sexual Harassment (unwanted emails/instant messages) Sexual Solicitation (requests for online or offline sexual interaction)	Exposure General Internet Use Online Activities Research Gaming Planning Travel Website Design Shopping Socializing Email Instant Messaging Chat Rooms Social Networking	Privacy Settings Information Shared on Social Networking Communication with Strangers Sharing Personal Information with Strangers	Social Guardianship Parental Restrictions on Internet Use Location of Computer Use Who in Room During Internet Use	Shopping Online (+) Chatrooms (+) Facebook (-) Email (+) Instant Messaging (+) Communication with Strangers (+) Information Shared (+) Who in Room During Internet Use (+/-) Location of Computer (+/-)

Table 2.1.

Effects of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Concepts on Cybervictimization

Study	Sample	Type of Victimization	Motivated Offender (Exposure and Proximity)	Target Attractiveness	Lack of Capable Guardianship	Significant Effect
Marcum, Ricketts and Higgins (2010)	744 College Freshmen	Receiving Sexually Explicit Material (pornography) Non-Sexual Harassment (unwanted emails/instant messages) Sexual Solicitation (requests for online or offline sexual interaction)	Exposure General Internet Use Online Activities Research Gaming Planning Travel Website Design Shopping Socializing Email Instant Messaging Chat Rooms Social Networking	Privacy Settings Personal Information Shared Communicating with Strangers Sharing Personal Information with Strangers	Social Guardianship Location of Computer Frequency of Computer Use Presence of Others While Using Computer Parental Restrictions Parental Monitoring Physical Guardianship Filtering/Blocking Software	Internet Use (-) Chatrooms (+ Email (+) Instant Messaging (+) Social Networking (+/-) Communicating with Strangers (+) Sharing Personal Information (+) Location of Computer (+/-) Presence of Others (+) Parental Restrictions (-) Parental Monitoring (+)
Navarro and Jasinski (2013)	1500 students aged 10-17	Cyberbullying (worried or threatened by online harassment, posts to threaten/embarrass, sexual solicitation)	Days per Week on Internet Hours per Day on Internet	Delinquent Activity Engaging in Cyberbullying Engaging in Online Harassment Online Activities Blogging Email Instant Messaging	Physical Guardianship Computer Software	Days per Week on Internet (+) Hours per Day on Internet (+) Engaging in Cyberbullying (+) Engaging in Online Harassment (+) Blogging (+) Email (+)

Table 2.1.

Effects of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Concepts on Cybervictimization

Study	Sample	Type of Victimization	Motivated Offender (Exposure and Proximity)	Target Attractiveness	Lack of Capable Guardianship	Significant Effect
				Chatrooms		Instant Messaging (+) Chatrooms (+)
Ngo and Paternoster (2011)	295 University Students	Computer Virus Unwanted Exposure to Pornography Sexual Solicitation Phishing Online Harassment Online Defamation	Hours/Week on: Online Shopping Research Gathering Information Email Instant Messaging Chat Rooms	Communicate with Strangers Online Share Personal Information Open Email/IM Attachments, Web Links, Pop-Ups	Physical Guardianship Antivirus Software Spyware Firewall Software Personal Guardianship Computer Knowledge/Skills Education on Cybercrime	Security Software (+) Education on Computer Crime (+)
Reyns, Henson and Fisher (2011)	974 University Students	Unwanted Contact (repeated contact after being asked to stop) Harassment (persistent harassment online) Unwanted Sexual Advances (repeated online advances) Threats of Violence Cyberstalking (any of the other online pursuit behaviors)	Exposure Time Spent Online Number of Social Networking Accounts Number of Updates to Social Network Number of Photos Online Use of Instant Messenger Proximity Adding Strangers Friends on Social Network	Relationship Status Sexual Orientation Information Sharing Visiting Risky Sites	Physical Guardianship Social Network Privacy Profile Tracker Social Guardianship Peer Deviance	Number of Updates to Social Network (+) Adding Strangers Online (+) Profile Tracker (+) Peer Deviance (+)

Table 2.1.

Effects of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Concepts on Cybervictimization

Study	Sample	Type of Victimization	Motivated Offender (Exposure and Proximity)	Target Attractiveness	Lack of Capable Guardianship	Significant Effect
			Friend Service			
Reyns (2015)	19422 Individuals aged 15+	Phishing (received fraudulent emails) Hacking Malware (viruses, malware or adware)	Exposure Banking Booking/Reservations Purchasing Social Networking	Information Sharing Posting Accurate Information Visiting Risky Sites	Physical Guardianship Anti-Virus Software Personal Guardianship Deleting Dangerous Emails Changing Passwords	Banking (+) Booking/Reservations (+) Purchasing (+) Social Networking (+) Information Sharing (+) Posting Accurate Information (-) Anti-Virus (+) Deleting Dangerous Emails (+) Changing Passwords (+)
Reyns, Henson and Fisher (2016)	850 University Students	Unwanted Contact (repeated contact after being asked to stop) Harassment (persistent harassment online) Unwanted Sexual Advances (repeated online advances) Cyberstalking (any of the other online pursuit behaviors)		Adding Strangers Privacy Settings	Social Guardianship Who Individual Lives With Peer Deviance	Adding Strangers (+) Who Individual Lives With (+) Peer Deviance (+)

Table 2.1.

Effects of Lifestyle/Routine Activities Concepts on Cybervictimization

Study	Sample	Type of Victimization	Motivated Offender (Exposure and Proximity)	Target Attractiveness	Lack of Capable Guardianship	Significant Effect
Wolfe, Marcum, Higgins and Ricketts (2016)	625 Teens aged 12-17	Sexting (receiving sexual photo)	Routine Cell Phone Activity Number of Daily Calls and Texts Frequency of Talking to/Texting Friends Frequency of Talk to/Texting Significant Others Time Spent on Media-Related Online Activities Sending/Receiving Emails, Pictures, Instant Messages Access to Social Networking Cell Phone Use During School		Social Guardianship Parental Supervision Frequency of Talking/Texting Parents Having Phone on Family Plan School Cell Supervision	Number of Texts (+) Talking to Significant Other (+) Time Spent on Media-Related Activities (+) Cell Phone Use During School (+) Being on Family Plan (-) School Cell Supervision (-) Frequency of Talking to Parents (+)

Bossler et al. (2012) examined risk of online harassment victimization among 434 middle and high school students, using hours spent online, use of a social networking site, peer online harassment, computer deviance and online harassment offending as measures of "proximity ." In line with Navarro and Jasinski's (2013) findings, hours spent online was positively associated with online harassment victimization risk at a bivariate level, but not in the full logistic model, which also included measures of guardianship and target suitability. Maintaining a social networking site and associating with peers who engaged in harassment were both significantly related to victimization in the full model, especially for harassment that occurred more publicly (e.g. posted on a social networking site for anyone to see) versus private harassment (e.g. sent via private message), where engagement in harassing offending increased risk of victimization instead.

Holt and Bossler (2008) also linked computer-based deviance to harassment victimization. Specifically, among a sample of 788 college students, these researchers found that engagement in activities such as pirating, viewing pornography and guessing other users' passwords to access their computers or files was positively related to online harassment victimization, even when measures of guardianship and target suitability were included in the logistic model.

Among 723 Finnish Facebook users, aged 15-18, Räsänen, Hawdon, Holkeri, Keipi, Näsi and Oksanen (2016) linked exposure to motivated offenders (measured by engaging in the production of hate materials) to self-reported victimization by online hate materials. Individuals producing hate materials increased their risk of victimization by four times, compared to individuals who did not produce hate materials themselves.

Similar results were found by Reyns, Henson and Fisher (2011) who examined five types of online victimization – unwanted contact, harassment, unwanted sexual advances, threats of violence, and cyberstalking – among a random sample of 974 university students. However, the researchers argued that amount of time spent online per day, the number of social networking sites used, number of times social networking sites were updated per day, number of photos online and usage of instant messaging were measures of exposure, not proximity. This conceptualization is consistent with lifestyle routine activities theory, as they measure how visible an individual is to motivated offenders, rather than "physical" (in terms of networks) proximity to offenders. Instead, proximity was measured by asking respondents if they added strangers as friends on social networking sites, the number of friends they had on these sites, and whether they had ever used an online service to find friends to chat with online. These actions would actually connect potential targets to potential offenders, fitting the theoretical definition of proximity.

Reyns et al. (2011) found only one exposure measure, number of social network updates per day, was statistically significant for any type of victimization. There was a positive relationship between these updates and unwanted sexual advances. Among measures of proximity, adding strangers online was statistically and positively related to every type of online victimization except for threats of violence.

Social networking also was studied in Holt, Bossler, Malinski and May's (2016) examination of online sexual harassment among 439 middle and high school students in Kentucky. However, this measure of exposure was only significantly related to online sexual harassment for females. The researchers also examined a number of other activities youth engage in online, including checking email, using a chat room or instant messenger, chatting with

people, posting pictures, sending pictures, posting personal information and viewing sexual materials. Among these other measures of exposure, only chatting and posting pictures were positively related to online sexual harassment, but only for males.

Similarly, Marcum, Higgins and Ricketts (2010) examined online victimization differences between senior year in high school and freshman year in college, arguing that an individual's routine activities change significantly between those two years. The researchers surveyed 744 freshman university students to determine whether risk factors changed as the students entered college. Exposure to motivated offenders was measured through general internet use and the types of activities individuals most often engaged in online (e.g. email, instant messaging, chat rooms and social networking). The researchers examined the effect of these variables on three types of online victimization – receiving sexually explicit material, non-sexual harassment and sexual solicitation – in both high school and freshman year of college. With respect to exposure, the researchers found that shopping online or using chat rooms were strongly and positively related to risk of receiving sexually explicit materials for seniors, but not for college freshman. Instead, using Facebook was the only exposure variable related to receiving sexually explicit material for college students, and that relationship was negative. Similarly, use of a chat room increased risk of sexual solicitation in high school, while use of email and instant messaging had a stronger relationship in college. None of the exposure to motivated offender measures were significantly related to risk of non-sexual harassment in either the individuals' senior year of high school or freshman year of college.

Holt and Bossler (2008) also used measures of computer use to study exposure to motivated offenders to predict harassment in chat rooms. The researchers found that most measures of computer use were unrelated to victimization, with the exception of regular use of

chatrooms and other computer communications. This indicated to the authors that simply spending time online is not as important as the specific actions engaged in.

Wolfe, Marcum, Higgins and Ricketts (2016) examined risk factors for adolescent sexting among 625 teens aged 12-17. Using a Routine Activities approach, they hypothesized that the exposure measures of routine cell phone activity (number of daily calls and texts, and the frequency of talking to and/or texting friends and significant others), time spent engaged in media-related online activities (sending/receiving emails, pictures and instant messages, as well as access to social networking) and cell phone use during school hours would all be related to sexting behaviors. These hypotheses were largely supported by the analysis. Specifically, an increase in the number of texts sent and received daily, an increase in talking to a significant other, an increase in the frequency of media-related online activities and using a phone during school hours were all associated with an increased risk for sexting. When guardianship measures were included in the full model, only the frequency of talking to a significant other and using a cell phone at school remained significantly related to sexting. An increased in talking to a significant other and using a phone during school hours were associated with an increase in sexting behaviors.

Summary. Although researchers have not used consistent variables differentiating exposure and proximity to motivated offenders, there is a fair amount of research indicating these measures are useful in explaining online personal victimization. Spending more time online (Bossler et al. (2012), Navarro and Jasinski (2013)), and engagement in various online activities (such as social networking (Bossler et al. (2012), Holt et al. (2016), Marcum et al. (2010b), Reyns (2015)); instant messaging (Holt et al. (2016), Marcum et al. (2010 a & b)); or using chatrooms (Holt and Bossler (2008), Holt et al. (2016), and Marcum et al (2010 a & b)) have

consistently shown a positive relationship with different online victimizations. Since previous researchers have been able to correlate these measures to various types of online victimization, it is possible they may also be applicable to nonconsensual pornography victimization.

However, there has not been consistent measurement of exposure and proximity. Many of the same behaviors have been used to operationalize both concepts, as well as the concepts of target suitability and guardianship. This makes it difficult to generalize findings across studies. Additionally, this causes problems in trying to understand the applicability of the Lifestyle/Routine Activities Approach to understanding cybercrime. The original theory explained by Cohen et al. (1981) laid out four distinct concepts. The above discussion attempts to explain how concepts have been applied by researchers, and in cases where behaviors have been used to operationalize multiple concepts, to determine what concept, based on the original theory, the behavior best operationalizes.

Exposure and Proximity to Motivated Offenders and Nonconsensual Pornography. Although the concepts of proximity and exposure have not been applied to nonconsensual pornography, it is likely that nonconsensual pornography would have many of the same predictors as other types of cybercrime. Time spent online, on social networks, and texting could affect risk of victimization by increasing an individual's exposure to motivated offenders. The more time an individual spends engaged in these activities, the more potential he or she has to come into contact with an offender. With respect to proximity, having a higher number of friends on social media, adding and communicating with strangers online, and having peers engaged in delinquency, especially online delinquency, would increase risk.

Target Suitability. Target suitability is most often measured through the amount and type of information shared with others online. Marcum et al. (2010) measured freshman university

students' suitability through assessing whether their social networking sites were marked private (i.e. only select people could view their profile), what information was shared on the social networking accounts, and whether they communicated with people they did not know online. Similar to the researchers' findings on the exposure measures, significance of the different suitability measures differed by victimization type and age. In high school, communicating with unknown persons online increased risk for receiving sexually explicit material and non-sexual harassment. In college, this variable was significant for non-sexual harassment and sexual solicitation. Providing more information on social networks increased risk of non-sexual harassment and sexual solicitation for high school seniors, while it only increased risk of receiving sexually explicit materials for college freshmen. Marking a social networking profile as private was not related to any type of victimization at either age level.

Similarly, Reyns et al. (2011) and Reyns (2015) both used information sharing and visiting risky sites (e.g. online pornography websites) as indicators of target suitability. However, Reyns (2015) found significant and positive relationships between information sharing and phishing victimization, hacking victimization and malware victimization, as well as significant, negative relationships between posting accurate information and those three victimization types. Reyns et al. (2011), however, did not find a relationship between information sharing and any type of victimization studied (phishing, hacking and malware victimizations).

Similarly, Choi and Lee (2017) examined risky online lifestyles among a stratified-cluster random sample of 272 college students. The authors looked a three facets of a risky online lifestyle: risky social networking site activities (e.g. sharing life events and personal information), risky leisure activities (e.g. downloading games or music), and risky vocational activities (e.g. opening email attachments, clicking pop-up ads, etc.). Choi and Lee (2017) found

some support for the claim that risky online lifestyles are related to the risk of cyber-interpersonal violence. Specifically, risky leisure activities significantly predicted cyber-interpersonal violence (engaging in risky leisure activities was positively associated with cyber-interpersonal violence). Räsänen et al. (2016) similarly found that visiting harmful sites increased risk of victimization by online hate materials by almost three times, compared to those individuals who never visited harmful sites.

Navarro and Jasinski (2013) measured target suitability through an individual's own delinquent actions. The researchers argued that individuals who engaged in online activities, such as cyberbullying or harassment perpetration, would have an increased risk for cyberbullying or harassment victimization themselves. This would be in line with offline findings of a victim/offender overlap. The researchers found a positive bivariate relationship between engaging in cyberbullying and harassment online and becoming a victim of cyberbullying. In the full model, cyberbullying perpetration remained significant and positive, while harassment perpetration was no longer significant.

Navarro and Jasinski (2013) also measured suitability through activities typically engaged in online. As discussed above, this is generally used as a measure of exposure to motivated offenders. Although this complicates the understanding of the role routine activities play in online victimization risk, these results can be helpful for seeing that regardless of which concept they are argued to be measuring, these variables are important in determining victimization risk. The researchers found a significant and positive correlation between each of the online activities measured (use of blogging sites, email, instant messaging and chat rooms) and cyberbullying victimization. In the full model, use of email became statistically insignificant. The researchers also found that risk of victimization based on these activities varied by gender.

For males, use of blogging sites significantly increased risk, while for females, use of instant messaging increased risk. Use of chat rooms significantly increased risk of victimization for both males and females.

Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) also included measures of online activities as part of their measurement of target suitability. However, these researchers expanded the concept suitability to include measures of each Value, Visibility and Accessibility, which, along with Inertia, were identified by Cohen and Felson (1979) as the key factors motivated offenders look for in a target (i.e. VIVA). Value was measured through the victim's personal income, household income, financial assets, financial possessions and savings. Visibility was measured through the online activities an individual engaged in. These activities included the frequency of internet use, targeted browsing, direct communication via email, MSN or Skype, chatting online, online gaming, online forums, social networking, twitter, downloading, untargeted browsing and shopping online. Finally, accessibility was measured by which operating system and browser the respondent most commonly used.

Overall, few of these measures were statistically significantly correlated to victimization risk. Of the Value measures, personal income was significantly and negatively correlated to malware victimization. Direct communication via email was positively correlated to both stalking and online threats. Direct communication via MSN or Skype was positively correlated to stalking, online threats and hacking victimization. Online forums and social networking sites were positively correlated to hacking victimization. Frequency of internet use, online gaming and shopping online were positively correlated to malware victimization. Untargeted browsing was positively correlated to malware victimization, but negatively correlated to online threats. Targeted browsing was positively correlated to identity theft and malware victimization. Use of

Twitter was positively correlated to threat of victimization. Using a Windows operating system and using the browser Firefox were positively correlated to malware victimization. Using Internet Explorer as a browser was positively correlated to stalking victimization. In sum, the researchers found some support for these routine activities impacting victimization risk. The effect of these target suitability measures seems to vary by crime type.

Summary. The research on target suitability and online victimization has produced some consistent results. First, communication with strangers (Marcum et al., 2010 a & b and Reyns et al., 2016) and sharing information online (Marcum et al., 2010a, Marcum et al., 2010b and Reyns, 2015) are consistently and positively related to online victimization. Additionally, when engagement in online deviance is used as a measure of target suitability, it also has been positively correlated to online victimization (Holt and Bossler, 2008 and Navarro and Jasinski, 2013). Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) also applied the concept of VIVA (Value, Inertia (not studied), Visibility and Accessibility) to online crimes, and found that many of the measures of this concept were positively correlated to malware, stalking, online threat, hacking and identity theft victimization. However, very few studies have tested measures of target suitability and more research is needed on the applicability of this concept to explaining online victimization risk, especially nonconsensual pornography, which has yet to be studied using an LRAT framework.

Target Suitability and Nonconsensual Pornography. Applying the concept of target suitability to nonconsensual pornography, engaging in risky behaviors would increase an individual's attractiveness to a motivated offender. Sharing more information online would give an offender access to pictures and other media, as well as the ability to link these personal details to nonconsensual pornography posted on other sites. Visiting risky sites increases an individual's chances of downloading a virus that could potentially be used to hack accounts, one method of

obtaining explicit media. Additionally, engaging in sexting behaviors provides offenders with another means of obtaining media used in nonconsensual pornography.

Lack of Capable Guardianship. There are three main ways guardianship has been measured in online lifestyle routine activities research. First, there is the concept of physical guardianship. This measure focuses on software and other programs installed on a device to keep it safe from outside threats (e.g. malware). Second is social guardianship. This is generally measured through the presence of supervision by others, especially parents. However, the presence of others (e.g. friends, roommates, teachers, etc.) may also act as social guardianship. Location of the device most often used has also been used as a measure of social guardianship, as use of a device in public may offer an individual more guardianship than using a device in private. Finally, researchers have measured personal guardianship, usually through knowledge and skill of computers and the internet.

Use of physical guardianship as the measure of capable guardianship online has produced inconsistent findings with respect to correlation and prediction of online victimization. Navarro and Jasinski (2013) used presence of protective computer software as their measure of guardianship online. This variable was not significantly related to risk of teen cyberbullying victimization. Similarly, Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) studied the effect of computer software on several types of online crime, including hacking, malware, identity theft, consumer fraud, cyberstalking and cyberfraud. This physical guardianship measure was not significantly related to any type of victimization. Bossler et al. (2012) also measured physical guardianship through the use of computer software. In the full logistic regression, the researchers found that the measure of physical guardianship, protective software, increased risk of online harassment. Similarly, Reyns et al. (2011) found that one type of physical guardianship was correlated to

some types of victimization, but in direction opposite of the hypothesized inverse relationship. Specifically, use of a profile tracker was positively correlated to unwanted contact, threats of violence, and cyberstalking. Reyns (2015) found that anti-virus software was also positively related to malware victimization. However, this may be an issue with temporal ordering (i.e. victims add this protection after experiencing one or more of these victimizations to protect themselves from further attacks), due to the cross-sectional nature of the research design. Choi and Lee (2017), however, found that poor security management was linked to an increased risk for cyber-interpersonal violence.

Wolfe et al. (2016) measured social guardianship in their test of online Routine Activity Theory. The researchers hypothesized that parental supervision, the frequency of texting and/or talking to parents, having a phone on a family cell phone plan, and school cell supervision would all be correlated to sexting. Their analysis showed that both being on a family cell phone plan and attending a school where cell phone use was supervised were both negatively associated with sexting. However, the frequency of talking to parents was actually positively associated with sexting, while parental supervision was unrelated. In the full model including exposure measures, only having a phone on a family cell phone plan and school cell supervision remained significantly negatively correlated to sexting.

Marcum et al. (2010) also examined the effect of parental supervision on online victimization risk, including receipt of sexually explicit material, non-sexual harassment, and sexual solicitation. These researchers specifically looked at the presence of parental restrictions on internet use for both high school seniors and college freshmen (who presumably have fewer restrictions). The researchers added additional measures of social guardianship by asking respondents where they typically use the computer (or other device used to connect to the

internet) and who is typically in the same room as them when they are on the internet. The researchers found evidence to support the idea that social guardianship can influence risk of online victimization. For example, using the internet without anyone else present increased risk of non-sexual harassment in high schools, while using the internet in a location with more people decreased risk. Additionally, using the internet in a dorm room as opposed to a more public location also increased risk of non-sexual harassment for college freshmen. However, researchers also found that the presence of a parent or teacher in the same room as the device being used increased risk for receiving sexually explicit material for high school seniors. The researchers argue that this may be an issue with temporal ordering, due to the cross-sectional research design used – i.e. after a teen receives explicit material, a parent or teacher increases their presence to prevent further victimization. Finally, for college freshmen, having someone categorized as "other" in the room with them increases risk for both receiving sexually explicit material and sexual solicitation. It may be that these "others" are delinquent peers who increase an individual's risk for victimization.

Interestingly, Reyns, Henson and Fisher, (2016) also included a measure of offline social guardianship, asking who the individual lives with. The researchers did not consider whether or not the person or persons an individual lived with were present while using the internet. However, the researchers still found that living with parents was positively associated with cyberstalking and unwanted contact among college students.

Conversely, Räsänen et al. (2016) found that not living with parents doubled the risk for victimization by online hate materials. However, when additional LRAT measures were included in the full multivariate regression model, this relationship was no longer significant.

Bossler et al. (2012) also attempted to look social guardianship using a measure of computer location. However, this variable was not found to be related to online harassment victimization. Similarly, Holt et al. (2016) found no relationship between computer location and online sexual harassment among middle and high school students.

Bossler et al. (2012) also measured social guardianship as peer engagement in computer deviance. Peer engagement in online harassment was not included in this measurement of computer deviance, as this was considered a measure of proximity. Instead, this measure focused on behaviors such as hacking or pirating and found this variable was related to online private harassment (e.g. sent via direct message versus posted on a public form), but not overall or public online harassment. Reyns et al. (2011) and Reyns et al. (2016) also used deviant peers as a measure of social guardianship. Both found that deviant peers (indicating a lack of capable guardianship) could be related to online victimization. Specifically, both studies found deviant peers were correlated to unwanted online contact, online harassment, online sexual advances, and cyberstalking.

Bossler et al. (2012), also studied personal guardianship, which was conceptualized as an individual's online skill level. The researchers also included a measure of risky information sharing as a measure of guardianship, however, as discussed above this is likely a better measure of target suitability, as motivated offenders would likely be drawn to targets with easily accessible information. In the full logistic regression, the researchers found that low skill level was positively correlated to private harassment and sharing personal information was positively correlated to overall harassment victimization. Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) similarly found that online risk awareness was negatively correlated to hacking victimization, but not to any other

type of victimization. Computer knowledge was also not significantly related to any type of victimization studied.

Reyns (2015) found that two measures of personal guardianship, deleting potentially dangerous emails and changing passwords frequently were related to some types of victimization. Specifically, deleting emails was positively related to phishing victimization and malware victimization, while changing passwords was positively related to phishing victimization and hacking victimization. Again, these findings may be an issue with temporal ordering in the cross-sectional design – once a person is victimized, they become more likely to take protective actions.

Summary. The final concept of LRAT has the most mixed findings when applied to online victimization. In general, measures of physical guardianship (e.g. software) have actually been positively correlated to online victimization (Bossler et al., 2012, Ngo and Paternoster, 2011, Reyns et al., 2011 and Reyns, 2015). However, this may be due to issues in temporal order found in cross-sectional studies. After an individual becomes a victim of an online crime, they may update or install additional software protections. Research on social guardianship is also mixed, also possibly due to temporal ordering. Marcum et al. (2010 a & b) found that location of the computer may have a positive or negative correlation with victimization, depending on the type of victimization studied. Additionally, Marcum et al. (2010 a & b) and Reyns et al. (2016) found that the presence of others is positively correlated to risk of victimization. However, Marcum et al. (2010b) found that the presence of parental restrictions was correlated with decreased risk of victimization. Similarly, Wolfe et al. (2016) found that being on a family cell phone plan or going to a school that supervised cell phone use also was negatively correlated to sexting.

Finally, personal guardianship suffers from the same mixed results. Personal skill level and awareness has shown to be both positively (Ngo and Paternoster, 2011 and Reyns, 2015) and negatively (Bossler et al., 2012 and Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016) correlated to victimization. Again, as with the other types of guardianship, these mixed results may be due to temporal ordering. Individuals may learn more and engage in more protective behaviors after falling victim to an online crime.

Capable Guardianship and Nonconsensual Pornography. The concepts of capable guardianship discussed above could also be applied to nonconsensual pornography. In terms of physical guardianship, presence of an antivirus software or firewall would help protect an individual from being hacked. Having stricter social networking settings and private passwords on a phone or computer may protect media from offenders known to the potential victim. Social guardianship may work by preventing a potential victim from taking the explicit photographs or videos to begin with. Living with one's parents (or simply having parental monitoring on a computer or phone) or having a computer in a public place may provide more oversight. Finally, personal guardianship may also play a part in decreasing risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization. The more computer knowledge and/or skills an individual has, the better the individual may be able to protect their media. Additionally, frequently changing passwords may protect media from motivated offenders both known and unknown (i.e. hackers) to the potential victim.

Summary

The above research indicates that a lifestyle/routine activities approach can be useful in explaining not only offline crimes, but also online crimes. Although there is debate among researchers regarding what constitutes exposure v. proximity to motivated offenders, some

measures of these concepts have been linked to online victimization. Hours spent online, connecting with strangers online, and participating in certain online activities (e.g. social networking or shopping) have all been positively associated with victimization. Target suitability, as measured through information sharing, has also been linked to online victimization in some studies. Finally, there is somewhat mixed evidence on the applicability of the concept of capable guardianship to online victimization. Researchers have found that physical, social and individual guardianship measures are all related to online victimization. However, in many studies, the relationship seems to be contrary to the direction hypothesized by the lifestyle/routine activities approach. Since none of these studies are longitudinal, it is possible that these guardianship measures were introduced after victimization, in an attempt to prevent further victimization. It is also possible that guardianship is simply a difficult concept to accurately measure.

Conclusion

Lifestyle/Routine Activities as Applied to Nonconsensual Pornography

To date, there has been no examination of nonconsensual pornography victimization within a lifestyle/routine activities framework. However, given that the approach has been somewhat successfully applied to other types of cybercrime, including personal crimes, such as cyberbullying, it stands to reason that routine activities may be helpful in explaining nonconsensual pornography. Exposure to motivated offenders, proximity to motivated offender, target suitability and lack of a capable guardianship may all influence risk for becoming a victim of NCP. The remainder of this dissertation will focus on testing this idea.

This research seeks to answer some questions left unanswered in the current literature, through the following research questions:

1. Does a lifestyle routine activities framework explain risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    a. Do proximity and exposure to motivated offenders increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    b. Does increased target suitability increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    c. Does a lack of capable guardianship increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?

It is hypothesized that the prevalence of nonconsensual pornography is fairly low. This is because an individual may be a victim of nonconsensual pornography without knowing it, or there may be more shame in admitting victimization. Finally, it is hypothesized that a lifestyle routine activities framework will be helpful in explaining the risk of victimization. Proximity, exposure, increased target suitability and decreased guardianship are all hypothesized to increase risk of victimization.

Chapter 3: Methods

Introduction

The previous chapters have introduced the concept of nonconsensual pornography and reviewed the current literature on the lifestyle routine activities framework, including how the framework has been applied to online victimization. The remainder of this dissertation focuses on the current research, applying the lifestyles routine activities framework to explaining nonconsensual pornography victimization. This chapter reviews the methods conducted to answer the following research questions:

1. Does a lifestyle routine activities framework explain risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    a. Does proximity to motivated offenders increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    b. Does exposure to motivated offenders increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    c. Does increased target suitability increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?
    d. Does a lack of capable guardianship increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization?

Since little is empirically known by researchers about the phenomenon of nonconsensual pornography, this research first will provide a basic understanding of the prevalence and correlates of nonconsensual pornography. The second research question takes the analysis a step further, applying and testing a lifestyle routine activities framework to the phenomenon.

With respect to these questions, four hypotheses are offered:

1. A lifestyle routine activities framework is helpful for explaining risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization. Specifically:
    a. Students who are in closer proximity to motivated offenders are at an increased risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.
    b. Students who are more exposed to motivated offenders are at an increased risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.
    c. Students who are more suitable targets are at an increased risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.
    d. Students with decreased guardianship are at an increased risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.

Methods

Research Design

The data were collected during Spring of 2015 as part of a larger project supported by University of Kentucky and NIH (5R21HD069897) examining victimization and perpetration among college students at two large urban public universities in the Midwest and southern United States. This research used a cross-sectional survey design to collect information on nonconsensual pornography among college students, as well as other interpersonal crimes, including sexual assault, intimate partner violence, and reproductive coercion (behavior related to reproductive health intended to exert power and control in a relationship). Additionally, information on students' demographics and lifestyles was also collected.

IRB Process

As part of the larger study beginning in 2010, original IRB approval was granted in Fall 2009, at both university 1 and university 2, prior to the launch of the survey. Continued IRB

approval was obtained in each year of the study, at both universities (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 (although no study was conducted that year) and 2015). Approval for the survey used in the current research was obtained in April 2015. A Certificate of Confidentiality was also obtained from NIH.

Informed consent was obtained from each participant in the study. This was done by providing the participants with a consent form at the beginning of the survey. Participants were informed of the purpose of the research, benefits and risks, length of the survey, confidentiality and incentives. Participants also were given contact information for the lead researcher at their respective university, as well as the respective IRB. Following this information, participants could choose to either continue with the survey or opt out. The informed consent form is in Appendix 1.

Sample Design

Sampling Frame. The sampling frame included undergraduate students enrolled at the main campus of each of the two universities. Age was restricted to those aged 18-24 years old (traditional undergraduate college students). This sampling frame was chosen as the focus on the project because past research indicates that this age group is at an increased risk for a number of interpersonal victimizations, including sexual assault and intimate partner violence. The sample was drawn from the undergraduate population in late January 2015.

Sampling Design. The universities' registrar's offices provided a random sample of undergraduate students aged 18-24 years old. At each university, 5,000 (1,250 from each year in school: first year, sophomore, junior and senior) undergraduates were selected to receive an email invitation to participate in the survey. The sample was also stratified by gender. For each

year in school, 625 males and 625 females were selected to receive an invitation to participate in the survey.

Data Collection. Email invitations were sent to the student email address on file with the registrar's office. The first email was sent the day the survey was launched at each university, April 13, 2015 (at university 1) and April 7, 2015 (at university 2) (to accommodate the different school schedules at the two universities, invitations were sent on two different days). Following Dillman's (2007) tailored design method, students received multiple waves of invitations. Each wave was sent roughly 3-5 days apart in an attempt to increase responses. This design allowed for an email to be sent on every day of the week in hope of increasing the chances of students viewing the invitation. Different subject lines were used with each wave of emails to attract students' attention. The final reminder was sent on the day the survey closed. The different email invitations are included in Appendices 2, 3 and 4.

SurveyMonkey was used as the platform for the online survey. An online survey was used to reach a large number of students at each university. SurveyMonkey was chosen as the platform as both universities had accounts, allowing for the survey to easily be shared across sites.

Finally, students were offered an incentive for participation in the survey. Upon completion of at least a majority of the survey, students received a $5 gift card to Amazon.com. This gift card was emailed to the same email address the invitation had been sent.

Response Rate. One limitation of online surveys is a lower response rate than some other survey designs (Dillman, 2007). Invitations to the survey were sent to 10,000 students (5,000 students) at each university. A total of 4,063 students responded to the invitation, making a total

response rate of 40.63%. The response rate was slightly lower at the university 1 (37.70%) than at university 2 (43.56%).

Sample Characteristics. The sample consisted of 4063 undergraduate students attending one of two large Midwestern and Southern universities during the spring of 2015. The sample had the following characteristics: the majority of respondents were female (57.4%), Caucasian (81.3%), and full-time students (97.8%). Additionally, most respondents were heterosexual (85.2%) and in some form of romantic relationship (62.8%, with 44.9% in a serious relationship). Table 3.1 provides an overview of key sample demographic characteristics.

Table 3.2 compares the samples from both universities to their respective university populations, found on the universities' institutional records websites for the 2014-2015 academic year. As the percentages show, the sample and population key demographic characteristics are very similar across sex, year in school, and residence. The sample did include a higher percentage of Caucasian students at both universities (81.1% and 81.4%, compared to population percentages of 73.6% and 77.5%, respectively), as well as Asian students (7.1% and 5.1% compared to 2.8% and 2.6%, respectively). Additionally, there was a much larger difference in proportion of full-time students included in the sample at university 1 than university 2 (compared to their respective populations (97.8%, compared to 79.2% at university 1, versus 97.9%, compared to 92.7% at university 2).

Survey Instrument

The survey was originally designed in 2009 for the first year of the study in the spring of 2010. The instrument was tailored each subsequent year of the study, with the most substantial changes coming in the final year, 2015, the year used in this dissertation. The survey instrument used in the 2015 administration is in Appendix 5.

The survey instrument includes a number of different sections, including (1) demographic characteristics; (2) interpersonal violence victimization; (3) Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs); (4) online victimization; (5) bystander intervention; and (6) lifestyle. First is basic demographic information, including age, gender and race. The second section moves into different types of interpersonal violence victimization, including (1) stalking; (2) intimate partner violence; (3) reproductive coercion; and (4) sexual harassment. This section includes many of the questions central to this dissertation: sexting and nonconsensual pornography. This section also asks questions about nonconsensual sexual activity. This section is followed by a section on ACEs. The fourth section includes questions on online victimization. Next is a section asking students about bystander intervention. The sixth section ask about perceptions of risk, control, and self-control, as well as questions focused on lifestyle, including drinking and drug use, living arrangements and online activities. Finally, at university 1, respondents also were asked about drugging victimization and perpetration.

Table 3.1

*Sample Demographic Characteristics (Overall N=4063)**

Variable	*N*	*Valid %*
Sex		
Male	1665	42.6
Female	2243	57.4
Year in School		
First Year	1069	27.3
Second Year	939	24.0
Third Year	977	25.0
Fourth Year	930	23.8
Race		
Caucasian	3148	81.3
African American	202	5.2
Asian	234	6.0
Hispanic	80	2.1
American Indian/Alaska Native	12	0.3
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	6	0.2
Multiracial	192	5.0
Student Status		
Full-time	3525	97.8
Part-time	55	1.5
Current Residence		
On Campus	1378	38.5
Off Campus	2202	61.5
Sexual Orientation		
Heterosexual	3295	85.2
Gay Male	61	1.6
Lesbian Female	27	0.7
Bisexual Male	135	3.5
Bisexual Female	348	9.0
Relationship Status		
Casual Dating	414	10.6
Sexual Relationship Only	285	7.3
Dated in Past Year	356	9.1
Committed Relationship	1498	38.2
Living with Partner	264	6.7
Other	421	10.7

*Categories not summing to 4063 is due to missing data

Measures

Dependent Variable

Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization. Nonconsensual pornography victimization is defined as a respondent having intimate media depicting themselves shared with others without their permission. Two questions were asked regarding an individual's nonconsensual pornography victimization. First, respondents were asked if they had ever sent a nude, nearly nude or sexually explicit photograph or video of themselves to someone. If the respondent answered "Yes," they were asked if the photo or video was shared with others. Respondents who indicated that a photo or video was shared with others was coded as a nonconsensual pornography victim (n=26; 0.6%).

Second, respondents were asked if anyone had distributed nude, mostly nude or sexually suggestive photographs or videos of them without their permission. If respondents answered "Yes," they were coded as a nonconsensual pornography victim (n=58; 1.4%). Two questions were asked, as some individuals may not consider having their sexts shared as a victimization. A single dichotomous victimization variable was created from the responses to these questions. If respondents answered "Yes" to either question, they were coded as a nonconsensual pornography victim. If respondents answered "Yes" to both questions, they were included as a victim once (ensuring no double counting) (n=9; 0.2%). If respondents answered "No" to both questions, they were coded as a non-victim. In total, 75 respondents (2.0%) were identified as victims of nonconsensual pornography. Individuals coded as a non-victim were assigned the value "0," while individuals coded as victims were assigned "1."

Table 3.2

Key Sample and Population Demographics

Demographics	*Sample University 1 (n=1885)*	*Population University 1 (n=32677)*	*Sample University 2 (n=2178)*	*Population University 2 (n=21495)*
	% (n)	*% (n)*	*% (n)*	*% (n)*
Sex				
Male	42.5 (777)	47.9 (15647)	42.7 (888)	47.9 (9841)
Female	57.5 (1050)	52.1 (17030)	57.3 (1193)	52.1 (10692)
Year in School				
First Year	34.7 (633)	32.2 (10527)	20.9 (436)	19.7 (5776)
Second Year	24.0 (438)	25.1 (8212)	24.0 (501)	15.3 (4489)
Third Year	23.8 (435)	18.3 (5984)	25.9 (542)	16.0 (4691)
Fourth Year	17.4 (318)	24.3 (7954)	29.3 (612)	20.7 (6094)
Race				
Caucasian	81.1 (1466)	73.6 (24062)	81.4 (1682)	77.5 (16669)
African American	5.0 (90)	8.8 (2883)	5.4 (112)	7.7 (1658)
Asian	7.1 (128)	2.8 (911)	5.1 (106)	2.6 (551)
Hispanic	1.1 (20)	2.6 (849)	2.9 (60)	3.3 (705)
American Indian/Alaska Native	0.3 (5)	0.2 (72)	0.3 (7)	0.2 (38)
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	0.1 (2)	0.1 (32)	0.2 (4)	NA*
Multiracial	5.3 (96)	2.5 (809)	4.6 (96)	2.8 (602)
Student Status				
Full-time	97.8 (1606)	79.2 (25886)	97.9 (1919)	92.7 (19884)
Part-time	1.3 (21)	20.8 (6791)	1.7 (34)	7.2 (1557)
Current Residence				
On Campus	39.8 (648)	24.0 (5157)	37.4 (730)	NA*
Off Campus	60.2 (982)	76.0 (20915)	62.6 (1220)	NA*

*This information was not available in universities' statistics

Independent Variables

Table 3.3 outlines the independent variables, their coding, and their frequency distributions. The creation of the variables is discussed below.

Exposure to Motivated Offenders. The first component of the Lifestyle Routine Activities framework is exposure to motivated offenders. This refers to activities and behaviors that would make a potential target more visible to motivate offenders. In this study, exposure was operationalized through two general measures: texting activities (texting frequency, texting friends frequency, texting significant others frequency, texting family frequency, and texting strangers frequency) and time spent engaged in activities online (time spent engaged in risky activities, school activities and social activities). Different activities online (e.g. risky behaviors) and increased texting may make an individual more visible to offenders online/via phone.

Texting Activities. Since nonconsensual pornography can also be perpetrated via text, respondents' texting activities were also examined. Respondents were asked five questions regarding their typical texting activities. First, respondents were asked how often they send and receive text messages in general. Follow-up questions included how often respondents send and receive text messages from friends, a boyfriend/girlfriend/partner, family, and finally, strangers. For each question, respondents were given response options of "Never," "Less than once a week," "At least once a week," "At least once a day," and "Several times a day." For each of these questions, the responses were recoded "Never (0)," "Less than once a day (1)," and "At least once a day (2)."

Time Engaged in Activities Online. Respondents were asked "In an average day, how many hours do you spend online doing the following activities?" The ten activities included were: sending and/or responding to email; social networking; communicating with someone

through instant messaging; video chatting; blogging; downloading music, films, or podcasts; participating in chat rooms or other forums; watching TV, YouTube videos, or listening to the radio; participating in class discussions; and visiting pornographic websites. For each activity, respondents were given a response set of "0 hours," "1 hour," "2 hours," "3-5 hours," "6-9 hours" and "10+ hours."

Based on LRAT and past research, these activities were divided into three types: time spent engaged in "risky activities," time spent engaged in school activities and time spent engaged social activities. Time spent engaged in risky activities included four items: communicating with someone through instant messaging; downloading music, films or podcasts; participating in chat rooms or other forums; and visiting pornographic websites. It is important to note that these behaviors are not necessarily "bad" or illegal, however they are "risky" in the sense of offering exposure to potential offenders. Time spent engaged in school activities included three items: sending and/or responding to email; participating in class discussions; and watching TV, YouTube videos, or listening to the radio. Finally, time spent engaged in social activities included three items: social networking; video chatting; and blogging.

Items used to measure each of these three constructs were summed to create the three new multi-item measures. Any amount past 3 hours was recoded to "3+ hours," as it was impossible to tell how many hours past that point. The new scales then were "0 hours" (coded 0), "1 hour" (coded 1), "2 hours" (coded 2), and "3+ hours" (coded 3).

Proximity to Motivated Offenders. The second component of the Lifestyle Routine Activities framework is proximity to motivated offenders. This is very similar to exposure, but instead of mere visibility, proximity refers to actual physical (in this case via network or domain) closeness to motivated offenders. Proximity is operationalized through five measures: number of

friends on social networks, percent of online friends talk to weekly, talking to strangers online and peer deviance (peer online deviance and peer sexting). Having more friends and talking to strangers online could connect potential targets to motivated offenders. Additionally, having peers and friends who engage in online deviance or sexting also could put a potential target in closer proximity to motivated offenders.

Table 3.3

Independent Variables – Concepts, Variables, Coding and Descriptive Statistics

Concept	*Variable*	*Coding*	*N*	*Valid %*
Exposure to Motivated Offenders				
	Texting Activities			
	Texting Frequency	0=Never	50	1.5
		1=Less than once a day	89	2.7
		2=At least once a day	3150	95.8
	Texting Friends Frequency	0=Never	56	1.7
		1=Less than once a day	250	7.6
		2=At least once a day	2983	90.7
	Texting Significant Others Frequency	0=Never	1168	35.5
		1=Less than once a day	189	5.7
		2=At least once a day	1932	58.7
	Texting Family Frequency	0=Never	70	2.1
		1=Less than once a day	1261	38.3
		2=At least once a day	1958	59.5
	Texting Strangers Frequency	0=Never	2269	69.0
		1=Less than once a day	934	28.4
		2=At least once a day	86	2.6
	Time Spent Engaged in Activities Online			
	Time spent engaged in risky activities	0=0 Hours	806	24.5
		1=1 Hour	684	20.8
		2=2 Hours	573	17.4
		3=3+ Hours	1226	37.3
	Time spent engaged in social networking activities	0=0 Hours	445	13.5
		1=1 Hour	1117	34.0
		2=2 Hours	888	27.0
		3=3+ Hours	839	25.5
	Time spent engaged in school activities	0=0 Hours	267	8.1
		1=1 Hour	656	19.9
		2=2 Hours	749	22.8
		3=3+ Hours	1617	49.2

Table 3.3

Independent Variables – Concepts, Variables, Coding and Descriptive Statistics

Concept	*Variable*	*Coding*	*N*	*Valid %*
Proximity to Motivated Offenders				
	Number of friends on social networks	0=0-500	1923	58.7
		1=501+	1355	41.3
	Percent online friends talk to weekly	0=0-50%	3111	94.9
		1=51-100%	167	5.1
	Talking to Strangers online	0=0 People	2441	74.5
		1=1-5 People	619	18.9
		2=6+ People	218	6.7
	Peer Deviance			
	Peer online deviance	0=0-50%	3240	98.8
		1=51-100%	38	1.2
	Peer sexting	0=0-50%	2930	89.4
		1=51-100%	348	10.6
Suitable Target				
	Post Personal Information			
	Post Personal Information	0=0 Items	181	6.4
		1=1 Item	488	17.2
		2=2 Items	770	27.1
		3=3 Items	704	24.8
		4=4 Items	701	24.6
	Post Contact Information	0=0 Items	464	16.3
		1=1 Item	1080	38.0
		2=2 Items	850	29.9
		3=3 Items	378	13.3
		4=4 Items	72	2.5
	Post Media Information	0=0 Items	353	12.4
		1=1 Item	1527	53.7
		2=2 Items	742	26.1
		3=3 Items	222	7.8

Table 3.3

Independent Variables – Concepts, Variables, Coding and Descriptive Statistics

Concept	*Variable*	*Coding*	*N*	*Valid %*
	Sharing Personal Information			
	Sharing Personal Information	0=0 Items	1335	46.9
		1=1 Item	571	20.1
		2=2 Items	364	12.8
		3=3 Items	308	10.8
		4=4 Items	266	9.4
	Sharing Contact Information	0=0 Items	1717	60.4
		1=1 Item	599	21.1
		2=2 Items	375	13.2
		3=3 Items	131	4.6
		4=4 Items	22	0.8
	Sharing Media Information	0=0 Items	1954	68.7
		1=1 Item	599	21.1
		2=2 Items	221	7.8
		3=3 Items	70	2.5
	Social Networking Frequency	0=Once a month or less	1600	56.3
		1=Less than once a day	972	34.2
		2=At least once a day	272	9.6
	Sexting Behaviors			
	Engaged in sexting	0=No	1859	65.4
		1=Yes	985	34.6
	Has anyone ever filmed you nude?	0=No	2442	85.9
		1=Yes	402	14.1
	Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetration	0=No	2638	92.8
		1=Yes	206	7.2
Capable Guardianship				
	Physical Guardianship			
	Computer Password Protected	0=Private	1382	44.9
		1=Not Private	1697	55.1
	Antivirus installed	0=No	416	13.5

Table 3.3

Independent Variables – Concepts, Variables, Coding and Descriptive Statistics

Concept	*Variable*	*Coding*	*N*	*Valid %*
		1=Yes	2663	86.5
	Phone Password Protected	0=Private	2167	70.4
		1=Not Private	912	29.6
	Email/Social Media Passwords Protected	0=Private	2545	82.7
		1=Not Private	534	17.3
	Social network protections (Dummy Variables)	0=Private (Reference Group)	561	18.2
		1=Only friends	1320	42.9
		1=Friends of friends	634	20.6
		1=Public	564	18.3
	Social Guardianship			
	Where Living (Dummy Variables)	0=On Campus (Reference Group)	1084	35.2
		1=Off Campus	1877	61.0
		1=Fraternity/Sorority	118	3.8
	Who Living With (Dummy Variables)	0=Parents/Adult Family (Reference Group)	370	12.0
		1=Romantic Partner	173	5.6
		1=Roommate	2288	74.3
		1=Alone	248	8.1

Number of Friends on Social Networks. To assess how many individuals respondents came into contact with online, respondents were asked "How many friends do you have on your social networks?" Responses included "Under 100," "100-500," "501-1000," and "Over 1000." Due to the distribution, these responses were recoded into "500 and under" (coded 0) and "Over 500" (coded 1). In a follow-up question, respondents were asked what percentage of those friends they talked to on a weekly basis. Responses included: "0-25%" (coded 0), "26-50%" (coded 1), "51-75%" (coded 2), and "76-100%" (coded 3). These were coded into the variable "Percent of online friends talk to weekly."

Talking to Strangers Online. Respondents were asked "How many individuals do you talk to online who you have not met in real life." Responses included: "0 people," "1 person," "2 people," "3-5 people," "6-9 people," "10+ people" and "Choose not to answer." For the purposes of this analysis, those who responded, "Choose not to answer" (n=63; 1.8%) were excluded. The remaining responses were recoded into three response categories: "0 people (coded 0)," "1-5 people (coded 1)" and "6+ people (coded 2)."

Peer Deviance. Two questions were asked to assess peer deviance. First, respondents were asked what percentage of their friends engaged in cyberbullying (i.e. posting mean, insulting or humiliating comments about others online, in emails, text, instant messages or voicemails) (coded into the variable "Peer online deviance." Second, respondents were asked what percentage of their friends engaged in sexting behaviors (i.e. sending nude, nearly nude, or sexually explicit photographs or videos of themselves to others) (coded into the variable "Peer sexting." For both questions, respondents could answer with "0-25%," "26-50%," "51-75%," and "76-100%." Due to both frequency distributions being skewed right, (posting comments

skewness=5.34 and kurtosis=31.33; sexting skewness=1.95 and kurtosis=2.85) these responses were recoded to "0-50% (coded 0)" and "51-100% (coded 1) ."

Suitable Target. Target suitability refers to characteristics of the person or thing that make them more desirable to motivated offenders. This study operationalized target suitability with six variables: posting personal information, sharing personal information, social networking frequency, engaging in sexting, being photographed/filmed nude and nonconsensual pornography perpetration. The more information a person shares online, and the more they engage in social networking, the more information a motivated offender has to use to victimize them. Sexting behaviors are an important form of information shared for nonconsensual pornography because they can provide the motivated offender with the media needed to engage in nonconsensual pornography perpetration. Finally, perpetration is used as a measure of target suitability for victimization, as researchers have reported a victim/offender overlap has been found with other types of crime.

Posting Personal Information. How much information a person posts online was assessed with multiple single-response questions. First, respondents were simply asked "What, if any, personal information do you post online?" Responses included: "Full name ," "Phone number ," "Email ," "Address ," "Work/School ," "Relationship Status ," "Sexual Orientation ," "Addresses for other social networking/blog sites ," "Interests/activities ," "Photos of myself ," "Videos of myself ," and "I do not post/share personal information online ." Respondents were instructed to mark all that apply, meaning they could choose as many options as applied.

These options were combined into three categories: post personal information, post contact information, and post media. Post personal information included: full name, relationship status, sexual orientation and interests/activities. Post contact information included: phone

number, email, address, work/school. Finally, post media included: addresses for other social networking/blog sites, photos of myself and videos of myself. The new scale was a count of how many items were posted in each category (personal information and contact information had up to four items, while media had up to three items). If respondents did not check any items, they were coded as 0. One item was coded as 1. Two items were coded as 2. Three items was coded as 3, and for the first two categories, four items was coded as 4.

Sharing Personal Information. Respondents were also asked "What, if any, personal information do you share with people you meet online?" Responses included: "Full name ," "Phone number ," "Email ," "Address ," "Work/School ," "Relationship Status ," "Sexual Orientation ," "Addresses for other social networking/blog sites ," "Interests/activities ," "Photos of myself ," "Videos of myself ," and "I do not post/share personal information online ." Respondents were again instructed to mark all that apply.

These options were combined in an identical manner to posting information online. Three categories (share personal information, share contact information and share media). The new variable responses included zero items (coded 0), one item (coded 1), two items (coded 2), three items (coded 3), and four items (coded 4). For "share contact information" no respondents who were identified as nonconsensual pornography victims chose response options 3 or 4. Therefore, for the purpose of analysis, this variable was coded as zero items (coded 0), one item (coded 1), and two or more items (coded 2).

Social Networking Frequency. Respondents were asked "How often do you update your social networking accounts?" Responses included "Less than once a month," "Once a month," "Once a week," "A few times a week," "Everyday," "Multiple times a day" and "Other." Respondents were specifically asked how often they "update" social networking versus "use" to

capture how often they are actively sharing information about themselves, versus passively viewing others' information. Due to the frequency distribution being skewed right (skewness=0.83; kurtosis= -0.857), these responses were recoded into "Once a month or less (coded 0) ," "Less than once a day (coded 1)" and "At least once a day (coded 2) ."

Engaged in Sexting. Respondents were asked to report their own engagement in sexting in the past year. Specifically, respondents were asked "Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, have you ever sent a nude, nearly nude or sexually explicit photograph or video of yourself to someone?" Respondents were also asked if they had received a nude, nearly nude or sexually explicit photograph or video of someone since the beginning of fall term. Respondents could each answer with "Yes," "No," or "Choose not to answer." Those who chose "Choose not to answer" (n=150; 3.9%) were excluded from analysis. Individuals who answered no were considered non-sexters and coded 0, while individuals who answered yes were considered sexters and coded 1.

Ever Photographed/Filmed Nude. Respondents were also asked how many times someone had photographed or filmed them nude or mostly nude, to account for media that may not have been originally shared via sexting. Responses included: "0 times ," "1 time ," "2 times ," 3-5 times ," "6-9 times ," "10+ times ," "Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term" and "Choose not to answer ." This distribution was heavily skewed left, so responses were recoded into a dichotomous variable with either "Never been photographed or filmed nude (coded 0) or "Have been photographed or filmed nude (coded 1). Those who responded "Choose not to answer" (n=71; 1.9%) were removed from analysis.

Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetration. Nonconsensual pornography perpetration is defined as sharing any type of intimate media with another person or people, without the consent

of the subject of the media. Two questions were asked regarding nonconsensual pornography perpetration. First, respondents were asked about perpetration indirectly. Respondents were first asked if they had received a nude, nearly nude or sexually explicit photograph or video since the beginning of the Fall term. If the respondent answered yes, he/she was asked what happened as a result of receiving the photograph or video. One response option was "It was shared with others." If respondent chose this response, he/she was considered a nonconsensual pornography perpetrator (n=31; 0.8%). This captures only intimate media that was originally shared with the perpetrator by someone else (e.g. consensual sext or another perpetration of nonconsensual pornography). It does not include photographs or videos that were originally taken by the perpetrator.

Second, respondents were asked directly if they had ever shared a nude, nearly nude or sexually explicit photograph or video of someone else. If respondents answered "Yes," they were also coded as a nonconsensual pornography perpetrator (n=242; 6.0%). This question was asked to include additional origins of the media outside consensual sexting.

A single dichotomous variable was created from these two measures (perpetrator/non-perpetrator). If a respondent answered "Yes" to either question, they were coded as a perpetrator (coded 1). If the respondent answered "Yes" to both, they were coded as a perpetrator only once (n=6). If they answered "No" to both questions, they were coded as a non-perpetrator (coded 0). In total, 267 respondents (7.7%) were coded as nonconsensual pornography perpetrators. Table 3.3 shows the prevalence of perpetration since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term.

Capable Guardianship. The final component of the Lifestyle Routine Activities framework is capable guardianship. There are three forms of capable guardianship: physical, social and personal. Unfortunately, this survey only asked about physical guardianship (e.g.

software installed and password protection) and social guardianship, so personal guardianship was not assessed.

Physical Guardianship. Guardianship was assessed primarily through physical guardianship measures. First, respondents were then asked a series of Yes/No questions (they could choose not to answer any). These questions included: "Is your computer password protected? ," "Does anyone else know your computer password? ," "Does your computer have antivirus software installed? ," "Is your phone password/passcode protected? ," "Does anyone else know your password for your phone? ," and "Does anyone else know your password for email or social media accounts?"

The two questions, "Does your computer have antivirus software installed?" ("Antivirus installed") and "Does anyone else know your password for email or social media accounts" ("Email/Social Media Password Protected") were left as single dichotomous variables. "Is your computer password protected?" and "Does anyone else know your computer password?" were combined into a single variable ("Computer Password Protected"). If the computer was password protected and no one else knew the password, the response was coded 0 (Private). If the computer was password protected but someone else knew the password, it was coded 1 (Not Private). Finally, if the computer was not password protected, it was also coded 1 (Not Private). "Is your phone password/passcode protected?" and "Does anyone else know the password for your phone?" were combined in the same way ("Phone Password Protected").

Respondents were also asked what protection settings they used on social media. Responses included: "My account is public ," "Only friends and friends of friends can view my account ," "Only friends can view my account ," "I have to give permission before anything is posted to my account ," and "Other ." For the purposes of this analyses, those that chose "Other"

(n=134; 3.3%) were removed from analysis. This variable was recoded into Social Network Protections dummy variables, with "I have to give permission" as the reference category.

Social Guardianship. To assess for social guardianship, respondents were asked two questions. First, respondents were asked where they lived. Second, respondents were asked who they lived with.

With respect to where respondents lived, options included: "In an on-campus dorm, apartment or house ," "In an on-campus fraternity or sorority house ," "In an off-campus fraternity or sorority house ," or "Off-campus ." For this analysis, "On-campus dorm, apartment or house" became simple "On-Campus." The second and third categories were collapsed into "Fraternity or Sorority," and the final category stayed "Off-Campus." This variable was converted into Where Living dummy variables, with "On-Campus" as the reference category.

Responses to "With whom do you live?" included: "Live alone ," "With my parents or other adult relatives ," "With a roommate/roommates (not a romantic partner) ," and "With my husband/wife, boyfriend/girlfriend or other romantic partner ." These categories stayed the same for the purpose of this analysis, but the order was changed. The categories became: "Parents/Adult Family," "Romantic Partner," "Roommate" and "Alone." This variable became Who Living With dummy variables, with "Parents/Adult Family" as the reference category.

Control Variables

Table 3.4 shows the frequencies for the control variables used in this analysis. The creation of the variables is outline below.

Gender. Respondents were asked whether they identified as male or female. Respondents were also given the option not to answer. For the purposes of this analysis, those who chose "Choose not to answer" were excluded (n=155; 3.8%). The majority of respondents

were female (57.4%) (coded 1, with males coded 0). Gender was included as a control variable, as victims of nonconsensual pornography are primarily female (CCRI, 2013), and perpetrators are primarily male (Eaton, et al., 2017).

Table 3.4

Control Variables – Variables, Coding and Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*Coding*	*N*	*%*
Gender	0=Male	1665	42.6
	1=Female	2243	57.4
Year in School	0=First Year (Reference Category)	1069	27.3
(Dummy Variables)	1=Second Year	939	24.0
	1=Third Year	977	25.0
	1=Fourth Year	930	23.8
Relationship Status	0=Not in a Committed Relationship	1055	37.5
	1=In a Committed Relationship	1762	62.5
Sexual Orientation	0=Heterosexual	3295	85.2
	1=Nonheterosexual	571	14.8
Race/Ethnicity	0=White	3148	81.3
	1=Nonwhite	726	18.7

Year in School. Respondents were asked to identify their current year in school. Options included: "Freshman," "Sophomore," "Junior," "Senior" and "Other." If respondents chose "Other," they were asked to explain their class standing. If responses fit within one of the additional response options, the response was recoded. If responses could not be linked to another option (e.g. the respondent identified as a graduate student), they were excluded from analysis. For the purpose of this analysis, categories were renamed "First Year," "Second Year," "Third Year" and "Fourth Year." This variable was recoded into a dummy variable with "First Year" as the reference category. Each category included about 25% of the sample. Age was included as a control variable, as it has also been linked to victimization and perpetration. Specifically, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (2016) found that 30% of victims of nonconsensual pornography cases reported to the police were under the age of 19. However,

Eaton, et al. (2017) found that older individuals (specifically aged 26-29) were more likely to report victimization than young adults aged 18-25.

Relationship Status. Respondents were asked what best described their dating status: "Casual dating, not in a committed relationship ," "Doing something sexual with someone, not in a committed relationship ," "Not currently dating, but I have dated since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term ," "Not currently dating, but I have in the past (before the beginning of the Fall 2014 term) ," "I am in a committed relationship with my boyfriend or girlfriend, not living together ," "Living with my boyfriend or girlfriend, or married ," and "None of the above ." For the purposes of this analysis, the first four responses were recoded to "Not in a committed relationship" (n=1055) (coded 0). The next two responses were recoded to "In a committed relationship" (n=1762) (coded 1). The final category, "None of the above" (n=421; 10.7%) was excluded from analysis, as it was impossible to determine the status of these respondents. Relationship status was included as a control variable, as roughly 80% of nonconsensual pornography begins as a selfie, taken by the victim and sent to another individual, usually a romantic partner (CCRI, 2013).

Sexual Orientation. Respondents were asked what best described their sexual orientation. Responses included "Only attracted to females," "Mostly attracted to females," "Equally attracted to males and females," "Mostly attracted to males," "Only attracted to males" and "Not sure." This variable was used in conjunction with sex to determine sexual orientation. If a female responded she was only attracted to females, mostly attracted to females, or equally attracted to males and females, or other, she was coded as "Non-heterosexual" (n=375; 9.2%). Likewise, if a male responded he was only attracted to males, mostly attracted to males, equally attracted to males and female, or others, he was coded as "Non-heterosexual" (n=196; 4.8%). If a

female responded she was only attracted to males, or if a male responded he was only attracted to females, they were coded as "Heterosexual" (n=3295; 81.1%). Individuals who were considered heterosexual were coded 0, while those considered non-heterosexual were coded 1. Individuals who responded "Not sure" (n=27; 0.7%) were excluded from analysis. Although research is lacking in this area, there is some evidence that sexual orientation may also play a role in nonconsensual pornography and motivations (Hall and Hearn, 2017).

Race/Ethnicity. Respondents were asked "How would you describe yourself? Check all that apply." The response options were: "American Indian or Alaska Native" (n=55), "Asian" (n=272), "Black or African American" (n=275), "Hispanic or Latino/Latina" (n=146), "Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander" (n=19), "White" (n=3316) or "Other" (n=63). If a respondent chose "Other," they were prompted to submit their own response. The majority could be classified as one of the given choices or "Multiracial." Those that could not be classified as such were recoded as missing (n=10). Given that the vast majority of respondents identified as White, Race/Ethnicity was recoded as "White" (coded 0) and "Nonwhite" (coded 1).

Analytic strategy

The analytic strategy contained four steps. First, missing data analyses were conducted. Next, descriptive statistics were assessed to get a better understanding of the nonconsensual pornography phenomenon in general. Third, bivariate chi-square tests of independence were conducted to determine if the variables related to a lifestyle routine activities framework were related to nonconsensual pornography victimization. Finally, multivariate logistic regression models were estimated to answer the research questions as to whether (1) proximity and exposure to motivated offenders increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization, (2)

increased target suitability increases risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization, and (3) lack of capable guardianship increases risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization..

Missing Data Analyses. First, due to missing data, pairwise comparisons (z-scores) were made between the proportion of each category of respondents in the overall sample, and those that would be included in each regression (e.g. the respondents that responded to each question in the regression). This was done to analyze any significant differences between the overall study sample and the analytic samples used in the regressions. The results indicate very few significant differences between the overall study sample and the analytic sample (see Appendix 6). The only regression that had a high number of significant differences was the Target Attractiveness Regression. The analytic sample posted and shared more information than the total study sample. Only 6.4% of the analytic sample posted 0 of the personal information items asked about, versus 20.2 of the total sample ($p=0.00$), and Additionally, 27% of the analytic sample posted 3 items versus 22.5% of the total sample ($p=0.03$). Although not significant at $p=0.05$, 24.6% of the analytic sample posted all four of the personal information items, while only 20.9% of the total sample posted all four ($p=0.08$).

With respect to contact information, only 16.4% of the analytic sample posted 0 items, while 28.8% of the total sample did not post any of the items ($p<0.00$). The differences in both posting 1 contact information item and 2 contact information items was also statistically significant. In the analytic sample, 37.9% of respondents posted 1 contact information item and 29.8% posted 2 items, compared to 31.9% and 25.7% of the total sample, respectively ($p<0.00$ and $p=0.05$, respectively).

The final question about information posted, media posted also had significant differences between the analytic sample and total sample, with respect to posting 0 items and

posting 1 item. In the analytic sample, only 12.5% of respondents posted no items, compared to 25.8% of the total sample (p=0.00). Additionally, 53.5% of the analytic sample posted 1 item, while only 25.7% of the total sample posted 1 item (p=0.00).

There were also significant differences with respect to sharing personal information, contact information, and media. Unlike posting information, however, these differences were limited to sharing 0 of each of the items. Within the analytic sample, only 46.9% shared 0 personal information items, 60.4% shared 0 contact information items and 68.8% shared 0 media items. This was compared to 54.3%, 66.1% and 72.9% of the total sample (p=0.00 for all comparisons).

The analytic sample was also significantly less likely to have engaged in sexting behavior (34.6% v. 40.0%, p=0.01). This regression may include more significant differences because this is arguably the most personal information. Given that victim blaming is so prevalent when discussing the issue of nonconsensual pornography, these are the questions that are most often used to blame victims for what happened to them. For example, this sample grew up with the internet and devices such as personal cell phones. Sexting has been widely talked about, and those who engage in sexting are often shamed and blamed for negative consequences.

Descriptive Statistics. Second, descriptive statistics of the phenomenon of nonconsensual pornography were assessed. First, crosstabs were completed comparing demographics of victims and nonvictims. This analysis was completed to better understand the basic phenomenon of nonconsensual pornography, specifically what types of students most commonly became victims.

Bivariate Chi-Square Tests of Independence. Next, bivariate chi-square tests of independence and pairwise comparisons (z-scores comparing means) were analyzed to determine

significant differences between each independent and control variable and the dependent variable, nonconsensual pornography victimization. This was done to build upon the previous step of examining demographics and simple descriptive statistics, to determine if any demographics or independent variables were significantly different among victims and nonvictims.

Multivariate Logistic Regression Models. Finally, multivariate logistic regression models were estimated to analyze the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, controlling for gender, year in school, relationship status, sexual orientation and race/ethnicity. Due to the small sample size, separate logistic regressions were estimated among each grouping of independent variable (e.g. exposure, proximity, attractiveness and guardianship). Variables were coded as discussed above.

As shown in Table 3.5, first, logistic regressions were estimated including only the independent variables. Then, each logistic regression was completed with the control variables included in the regression, to determine if any significant relationships still existed after taking into account the control variables.

Table 3.5

Multivariate Regression Models

Model Number	*Dependent Variable*	*Independent Variables*	*Control Variables*	*Research Question*
1	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization	Texting Frequency Texting Friends Frequency Texting Significant Others Frequency Texting Family Frequency Texting Strangers Frequency Time spent engaged in risky activities Time spent engaged in school activities Time spent engaged in social activities	N/A	1a.
2	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization	Texting Frequency Texting Friends Frequency Texting Significant Others Frequency Texting Family Frequency Texting Strangers Frequency Time spent engaged in risky activities Time spent engaged in school activities Time spent engaged in social activities	Gender Year in School (Dummy Variables) Relationship Status Sexual Orientation Race/Ethnicity	1a.
3	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization	Number of friends on social networks Percent of friends talk to weekly Talk to Strangers online Peer online deviance Peer sexting	N/A	1b.
4	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization	Number of friends on social networks Percent of friends talk to weekly Talk to Strangers online Peer online deviance Peer sexting	Gender Year in School (Dummy Variables) Relationship Status Sexual Orientation Race/Ethnicity	1b.
5	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization	Post Personal Information Post Contact Information Post Media Information Sharing Personal Information Sharing Contact Information Sharing Media Information Social Networking Frequency Engaged in sexting Has anyone ever filmed you nude? Nonconsensual pornography perpetrator	N/A	1c.
6	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization	Post Personal Information Post Contact Information Post Media Information Sharing Personal Information Sharing Contact Information Sharing Media Information Social Networking Frequency Engaged in sexting Has anyone ever filmed you nude? Nonconsensual pornography perpetrator	Gender Year in School (Dummy Variables) Relationship Status Sexual Orientation Race/Ethnicity	1c.
7	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization	Computer Password Protected Antivirus installed Phone Password Protected Email/Social Media Password Protected Social network protections (Dummy Variables) Where Living (Dummy Variables) Who Living With (Dummy Variables)	N/A	1d.
8	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization	Computer Password Protected Antivirus installed Phone Password Protected Email/Social Media Password Protected Social network protections (Dummy Variables) Where Living (Dummy Variables) Who Living With (Dummy Variables)	Gender Year in School (Dummy Variables) Relationship Status Sexual Orientation Race/Ethnicity	1d.

The first logistic regression used nonconsensual pornography victimization as the dependent variable. The exposure to motivated offender variables were independent variables. The second logistic regression included these independent variables and dependent variable, but also included the control variables of gender, year in school, relationship status and sexual orientation. This was done to determine if any significant relationships found in the first regression remained after taking into account the control variables, or if the magnitude or direction was altered. These models were estimated to answer research question 1a, with respect to whether exposure to motivated offenders increased risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.

The third logistic regression also used nonconsensual pornography victimization as the dependent variable, but then used the proximity to motivated offender variables as independent variables. The fourth regression included the control variables. These models were also estimated to answer research question 1a, but with respect to whether proximity to motivated offenders increased risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.

The fifth and sixth regressions used the target suitability variables regressed on nonconsensual pornography victimization as the dependent variable, with the sixth regression adding in control variables. These models were estimated to answer research question 1b, with respect to whether increased target attractiveness increased risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization. Likewise, the seven and eighth regressions used the guardianship variables as the dependent variables, with the eighth regression including control variables. These models were estimated to answer research question 1c, whether a lack of capable guardianship increased risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.

Summary

This dissertation seeks to examine the correlates and predictors of nonconsensual pornography victimization, using a lifestyle routine activity framework. It uses data from a 2015 self-report online survey completed at two college campuses. The dependent variable is nonconsensual pornography victimization. Independent variables are based off the four primary concepts of LRAT: exposure to motivated offenders, proximity to motivated offenders, target suitability and lack of a capable guardian.

Descriptive statistics were calculated to better describe the phenomenon of nonconsensual pornography victimization. Chi-square and pairwise comparisons were completed with the independent variables and the dependent variable, to determine any significant bivariate relationships between the dependent variable and independent or control variables. Finally, eight logistic regressions were completed to answer the research questions – two for each grouping of independent variables (once with control variables) on nonconsensual pornography victimization. The results of these analyses are discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Results

Introduction

This chapter presents the empirical results of the statistical analyses used to test the hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter. There are two sections of empirical results that address the research questions. In the first section, Bivariate Results, the results of the bivariate chi-square tests of independence are presented to answer the first research question: are the lifestyle/routine activities variables related to nonconsensual pornography victimization. In the second section, Multivariate Results, are multivariate logistic regression models to answer the research questions 1a, 1b and 1c, do (a) proximity and exposure to motivated offenders increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization, (b) increased target suitability increases risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization, and (c) lack of capable guardianship increases risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.

Bivariate Results

Descriptive Chi-Square Results

Table 4.1 presents the results comparing the demographic variables for nonconsensual pornography non-victims and victims. As the results in the table shows, the only statistically significant differences were found with respect to Race/Ethnicity ($p=0.003$). While less than 2% of White respondents reported victimization, over 3% of Nonwhite respondents were victims of nonconsensual pornography.

Table 4.1

Demographic Chi-Square Tests of Independence between Demographic Control Variables and Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization (n=4063)

Demographic Variable	Nonconsensual Pornography Victim		Chi-Square	Significance (p-value)
	No n (%)	Yes n (%)		
Gender			1.526	0.217
Male	1553 (97.7)	37 (2.3)		
Female	2126 (98.2)	38 (1.8)		
Year in School			4.382	0.223
First Year	1007 (98.1)	19 (1.9)		
Second Year	869 (97.3)	24 (2.7)		
Third Year	922 (97.9)	20 (2.1)		
Fourth Year	887 (98.7)	12 (1.3)		
Relationship Status			0.176	0.674
Not in a committed relationship	2035 (97.9)	43 (2.1)		
In a committed relationship	1672 (98.1)	32 (1.9)		
Sexual Orientation			1.056	0.304
Heterosexual	3113 (98.1)	60 (1.9)		
Nonheterosexual	534 (97.4)	14 (2.6)		
Race/Ethnicity			8.862	0.003*
White	2984 (98.4)	50 (1.6)		
Nonwhite	723 (96.7)	25 (3.3)		

* P-value is significant at p<0.05

Exposure to Motivated Offenders Bivariate Results

As the results from the bivariate chi-square tests of independence in Table 4.2 show, contrary to Hypothesis 1a, that an increase in exposure to motivated offenders is associated with in an increase in nonconsensual pornography victimization, the majority of exposure to motivated offenders variables were not significantly related to nonconsensual pornography victimization. Only one variable, Time Spent on Social Media was statistically significant (p=0.040). However, contrary to the relationship that was hypothesized, individuals who spent 0 hours on social media had a higher percentage of victimization than those who spent more time on social media. Additionally, Texting Strangers Frequently approached significance (p=0.053).

Table 4.2

Chi-Square Tests of Independence Results between Exposure Variables and Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization

Variable	Value Label (Code)	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization		Significance (p-value)
		No n (%)	Yes n (%)	
Texting Frequency				
	Never (0)	48 (96.0)	2 (4.0)	0.572
	Less than once a day (1)	87 (97.8)	2 (2.2)	
	At least once a day (2)	3089 (98.1)	61 (1.9)	
Texting Friends Frequency				
	Never (0)	54 (96.4)	2 (3.6)	0.687
	Less than once a day (1)	245 (98.0)	5 (2.0)	
	At least once a day (2)	2925 (98.1)	58 (1.9)	
Texting Significant Other Frequency				
	Never (0)	1153 (98.7)	15 (1.3)	0.103
	Less than once a day (1)	185 (97.9)	4 (2.1)	
	At least once a day (2)	1886 (97.6)	46 (2.4)	
Texting Family Frequency				
	Never (0)	69 (98.6)	1 (1.4)	0.835
	Less than once a day (1)	1234 (97.9)	27 (2.1)	
	At least once a day (2)	1921 (97.6)	37 (1.9)	
Texting Strangers Frequency				
	Never (0)	2233 (98.4)	36 (1.6)	0.053
	Less than once a day (1)	907 (97.1)	27 (2.9)	
	At least once a day (2)	84 (97.7)	2 (2.3)	
Time Spent Engaged in Risky Online Activities				
	0 hours (0)	786 (97.5)	20 (2.5)	0.446
	1 hour (1)	673 (98.4)	11 (1.6)	
	2 hours (2)	565 (98.6)	8 (1.4)	
	3+ hours (3)	1200 (97.9)	26 (2.1)	
Time Spent Engaged in School Activities				
	0 hours (0)	437 (98.2)	8 (1.8)	0.240
	1 hour (1)	1090 (97.6)	27 (2.4)	
	2 hours (2)	868 (97.7)	20 (2.3)	
	3+ hours (3)	829 (98.8)	10 (1.2)	
Time Spent Engaged in Social Networking Activities				
	0 hours (0)	256 (95.9)	11 (4.1)	0.040*
	1 hour (1)	648 (98.8)	8 (1.2)	
	2 hours (2)	734 (98.0)	15 (2.0)	
	3+ hours (3)	1586 (98.1)	31 (1.9)	
Gender				
	Male (0)	1383 (97.9)	29 (2.1)	0.782
	Female (1)	1841 (98.1)	36 (1.9)	
Relationship Status				
	Not in a Committed Relationship (0)	1767 (98.0)	36 (2.0)	0.926
	In a Committed Relationship (1)	1457 (98.0)	29 (2.0)	
Sexual Orientation				
	Heterosexual (0)	2750 (98.1)	52 (1.9)	0.234
	Nonheterosexual (1)	474 (97.3)	13 (2.7)	
Year in School				
	First Year (Reference Category) (0)	866 (98.2)	16 (1.8)	0.575
	Second Year (1)	764 (97.7)	18 (2.3)	
	Third Year (1)	803 (97.7)	19 (2.3)	
	Fourth Year (1)	791 (98.5)	12 (1.5)	
Race/Ethnicity				
	White (0)	2652 (98.2)	48 (1.8)	0.080
	Nonwhite (1)	572 (97.1)	17 (2.9)	

* P-value is significant at $p<0.05$

Individuals who texted strangers less than once a day (n=2.9%) or at least once a day (n=2, 2.3%) , were more likely to be victims than those who never texted strangers (n=36, 1.6%). Race/Ethnicity also approached statistical significance (p=0.080). Individuals who identified as Nonwhite (n=17, 2.9%) were more likely to be victims of nonconsensual pornography (n=48, 1.8%).

Proximity to Motivated Offenders Bivariate Results

Table 4.3 shows two proximity to motivated offenders variables were significant in the chi-square tests of independence analyses with nonconsensual pornography victimization. Talking to Strangers (p=0.002), and Peer Sexting (p=0.006), were both statistically significant. Of those who talked to 1-5 strangers online, 3.5% were nonconsensual pornography victims, compared to 1.5% and 1.0% of those who spoke to 0 strangers online or 6+ strangers, respectively. In line with the hypothesized relationship that proximity to motivated offenders would increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization, 3.7% of respondents whose peers engaged in sexting were victims, compared to only 1.6% of those without peers who engaged in sexting. Additionally, Percent of Online Friends Talked to Weekly (p=0.089) approached statistical significance. Individuals who talked to more than half of their online friends weekly were more likely to be victims compared to those who talked to less than half of their online friends weekly (3.0% compared to 1.8%).

Table 4.3

Chi-Square Tests of Independence Results Between Proximity Variables and Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization

Variable	Value Label (Code)	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization		Significance (p-value)
		No n (%)	Yes n (%)	
Number of Friends on Social Networks				
	500 or Fewer (0)	1883 (97.9)	40 (2.1)	0.269
	501 and Above (1)	1334 (98.5)	21 (1.5)	
Percent of Online Friends Talk to Weekly				
	0%-50% (0)	3056 (98.2)	55 (1.8)	0.089
	51%-100% (1)	161 (97.0)	6 (3.0)	
Talk to Strangers Online				
	0 people (0)	2404 (98.5)	37 (1.5)	0.002*
	1-5 people (1)	597 (96.5)	22 (3.5)	
	6+ people (2)	216 (99.0)	2 (1.0)	
Peer Online Deviance				
	0%-50% (0)	3180 (98.1)	60 (1.9)	0.724
	51%-100% (1)	37 (97.4)	1 (2.6)	
Peer Sexting				
	0%-50% (0)	2882 (98.4)	48 (1.6)	0.006*
	51%-100% (1)	335 (96.3)	13 (3.7)	
Gender				
	Male (0)	1367 (98.1)	26 (1.9)	0.984
	Female (1)	1850 (98.1)	35 (1.9)	
Relationship Status				
	Not in a Committed Relationship (0)	1749 (98.1)	33 (1.9)	0.967
	In a Committed Relationship (1)	1468 (98.1)	28 (1.9)	
Sexual Orientation				
	Heterosexual (0)	2759 (98.3)	49 (1.7)	0.230
	Nonheterosexual (1)	458 (97.4)	12 (2.6)	
Year in School				
	First Year (Reference Category) (0)	871 (98.3)	15 (1.7)	0.709
	Second Year (1)	756 (97.9)	16 (2.1)	
	Third Year (1)	803 (97.8)	18 (2.2)	
	Fourth Year (1)	787 (98.5)	12 (1.5)	
Race/Ethnicity				
	White (0)	2655 (98.3)	46 (1.7)	0.148
	Nonwhite (1)	562 (97.4)	15 (2.6)	

* P-value is significant at $p<0.05$

Target Attractiveness Bivariate Results

The third set of chi-square tests of independence analyses included target attractiveness and nonconsensual pornography victimization. As shown in Table 4.4, Posting Personal Information ($p=0.046$), Sharing Contact Information ($p=0.038$), Sharing Media ($p=0.012$), Social Networking Frequency ($p=0.018$), Engaging in Sexting ($p<0.001$), Being Filmed Nude ($p<0.001$), and Engaging in Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetration ($p<0.001$) were all statistically significant. Individuals who posted one item or three items were more likely to be victims of nonconsensual pornography (2.3% and 2.4%, respectively, compared with those who

Table 4.4

Chi-Square Tests of Independence Results Between Target Attractiveness Variables and Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization

Variable	Value Labels (Code)	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization		Significance (p-value)
		No n (%)	Yes n (%)	
Post Personal Information				
	0 Items (0)	178 (98.3)	3 (1.7)	0.046*
	1 Item (1)	477 (97.7)	11 (2.3)	
	2 Items (2)	766 (99.5)	4 (0.5)	
	3 Items (3)	687 (97.6)	17 (2.4)	
	4 Items (4)	689 (98.3)	12 (1.7)	
Post Contact Information				
	0 Items (0)	456 (98.3)	8 (1.7)	0.972
	1 Item (1)	1061 (98.2)	19 (1.8)	
	2 Items (2)	838 (98.6)	12 (1.4)	
	3 Items (3)	371 (98.1)	7 (1.9)	
	4 Items (4)	71 (98.6)	1 (1.4)	
Post Media Information				
	0 Items (0)	347 (98.3)	6 (1.7)	0.813
	1 Item (1)	1504 (98.5)	23 (1.5)	
	2 Items (2)	727 (98.0)	15 (2.0)	
	3 Items (3)	219 (98.6)	3 (2.0)	
Sharing Personal Information				
	0 Items (0)	1320 (98.9)	15 (1.1)	0.069
	1 Item (1)	558 (97.7)	13 (2.3)	
	2 Items (2)	359 (98.6)	5 (1.4)	
	3 Items (3)	298 (96.8)	10 (3.2)	
	4 Items (4)	262 (98.4)	4 (1.6)	
Sharing Contact Information				
	0 Items (0)	1694 (98.7)	23 (1.3)	0.038*
	1 Item (1)	582 (97.2)	17 (2.8)	
	2+ Items (2)	521 (98.7)	7 (1.3)	
Sharing Media Information				
	0 Items (0)	1929 (98.7)	25 (1.3)	0.012*
	1 Item (1)	580 (96.8)	19 (3.2)	
	2 Items (2)	219 (99.1)	2 (0.9)	
	3 Items (3)	69 (98.6)	1 (1.4)	
Social Networking Frequency				
	Once a month or less (0)	1579 (98.7)	21 (1.3)	0.018*
	Less than once a day (1)	956 (98.4)	16 (1.6)	
	At least once a day (2)	262 (96.3)	10 (3.7)	
Engaged in Sexting				
	No (0)	1841 (99.0)	18 (1.0)	0.000*
	Yes (1)	956 (97.1)	29 (2.9)	
Ever Filmed Nude				
	No (0)	2418 (99.0)	24 (1.0)	0.000*
	Yes (1)	379 (94.3)	23 (5.7)	
Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetration				
	No (0)	260 (98.7)	34 (1.3)	0.000*
	Yes (1)	193 (93.7)	13 (6.3)	
Gender				
	Male (0)	1185 (98.6)	17 (1.4)	0.394
	Female (1)	1612 (98.2)	30 (1.8)	
Relationship Status				
	Not in a Committed Relationship (0)	1597 (98.3)	27 (1.7)	0.962
	In a Committed Relationship (1)	1200 (98.4)	20 (1.6)	
Sexual Orientation				
	Heterosexual (0)	2413 (98.5)	36 (1.5)	0.057
	Nonheterosexual (1)	384 (97.2)	11 (2.8)	
Year in School				
	First Year (Reference Category) (0)	756 (98.3)	13 (1.7)	0.383
	Second Year (1)	641 (98.3)	11 (1.7)	
	Third Year (1)	715 (99.2)	16 (0.8)	
	Fourth Year (1)	685 (99.0)	7 (1.0)	
Race/Ethnicity				
	White (0)	2300 (98.5)	36 (1.5)	0.317
	Nonwhite (1)	497 (97.8)	11 (2.2)	

* P-value is significant at $p<0.05$

posted zero items (1.7%), two items (0.5%) or four items (1.7%). Individuals who shared one item of contact information (2.8%) were more likely to be victims than those who shared zero items (1.3%) or two or more items (1.3%). Similarly, those who shared only one item of media were more likely to be victims than those who shared zero items, two items or three items (3.2% v. 1.3%, 0.9% and 1.4%, respectively). Supportive of the Hypothesis 1c, a higher percentage of individuals who engaged in sexting (2.9% v. 1.0%), had been filmed nude (5.7% v. 1.0%), or engaged in nonconsensual pornography perpetration (6.3% v. 1.3%) were victims of nonconsensual pornography. Additionally, Sharing Personal Information (p=0.069) and Sexual Orientation (p=0.057) approached statistical significance. Specifically, individuals who shared one (2.3%) or three items (3.2%) were more likely to be victims (compared to zero items (1.1%), two items (1.4%), or four items (1.6%)). Finally, a higher percentage of individuals who identified as nonheterosexual reported nonconsensual pornography victimization than those who identified as heterosexual (2.8% v. 1.5%, respectively).

Lack of Capable Guardianship Bivariate Results

The final set of chi-square test of independence results included guardianship measures. Table 4.5 shows only Having a Password Protected Computer (p=0.012) was statistically significant. Consistent with the hypothesized relationship (1d) that a lack of capable guardianship would increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization, a higher percentage of individuals who did not have their computer password protected were victims of nonconsensual pornography, compared to those who did have their computer password protected (2.6% (n=36) v. 1.4% (n=23), respectively). Having Email/Social Networks Password Protected (p=0.098) approached statistical significance. Contrary to Hypothesis 1d, a higher percentage of individuals who had their email and/or social networks password protected were victims of NCP

than individuals who did not have their email and/or phone password protected (2.8% v. 1.7%, respectively).

Table 4.5

Chi-Square Tests of Independence Results Between Guardianship Variables and Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization

Variable	Value Labels (Code)	Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization		Significance (p-value)
		No n (%)	Yes n (%)	
Computer Password Protected				
	No (0)	1346 (97.4)	36 (2.6)	0.012*
	Yes (1)	1674 (98.6)	23 (1.4)	
Antivirus Installed				
	No (0)	404 (97.1)	12 (2.9)	0.121
	Yes (1)	2616 (98.2)	47 (1.8)	
Phone Password Protected				
	No (0)	2123 (98.0)	44 (2.0)	0.476
	Yes (1)	897 (98.4)	15 (1.6)	
Email/Social Media Password Protected				
	No (0)	2501 (98.3)	44 (1.7)	0.098
	Yes (1)	519 (97.2)	15 (2.8)	
Social Media Protections				
	Permission Before Anything Posted (Reference Category) (0)	549 (97.9)	12 (2.1)	0.603
	Only Friends (1)	1299 (98.4)	21 (1.6)	
	Friends of Friends (1)	622 (98.1)	12 (1.9)	
	Public (1)	550 (97.5)	14 (2.5)	
Where Living				
	On Campus (Reference Category) (0)	1065 (98.2)	19 (1.8)	0.468
	Off Campus (1)	1841 (98.1)	36 (1.9)	
	Fraternity/Sorority (1)	114 (96.6)	4 (3.4)	
Who Living With				
	Parents/Adult Family (Reference Category) (0)	365 (98.6)	5 (1.4)	0.845
	Romantic Partner (1)	169 (97.7)	4 (2.3)	
	Roommate (1)	2243 (98.0)	45 (2.0)	
	Alone (1)	243 (98.0)	5 (2.0)	
Gender				
	Male (0)	1262 (98.1)	24 (1.9)	0.864
	Female (1)	1758 (98.0)	35 (2.0)	
Relationship Status				
	Not in a Committed Relationship (0)	1641 (98.1)	31 (1.9)	0.784
	In a Committed Relationship (1)	1379 (98.0)	28 (2.0)	
Sexual Orientation				
	Heterosexual (0)	2581 (98.2)	48 (1.8)	0.376
	Nonheterosexual (1)	439 (97.6)	11 (2.4)	
Year in School				
	First Year (Reference Category) (0)	823 (98.2)	15 (1.8)	0.494
	Second Year (1)	712 (97.7)	17 (2.3)	
	Third Year (1)	751 (97.8)	17 (2.2)	
	Fourth Year (1)	734 (98.7)	10 (1.3)	
Race/Ethnicity				
	White (0)	2494 (98.3)	44 (1.7)	0.110
	Nonwhite (1)	139 (99.3)	1 (0.7)	

* P-value is significant at $p<0.05$

Multivariate Regression Results

Exposure to Motivated Offenders Multivariate Logistic Regression Results

Two logistic regression models were estimated using exposure to motivated offenders variables as the independent variables, with nonconsensual pornography victimization as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 4.6, in the first regression model, only the exposure to motivated offenders variables were included. The overall model was not statistically significant (p=0.113), meaning the model as estimated did not significantly predict nonconsensual pornography victimization. Nagelkerke r-squared shows that only 2.2% of the variation in nonconsensual pornography victimization was explained by this model.

In this regression, Texting Significant Others (p=0.026) and Texting Strangers Frequency (p=0.033) were statistically significant. Consistent with the hypothesized relationship (Hypothesis 1a) that an increase in exposure to motivated offenders would result in increased nonconsensual pornography victimization, for each unit increase in Texting Significant Others, odds of nonconsensual pornography victimization increased by 1.417, indicating a weak relationship. Also consistent with the hypothesized relationship, for each unit increase in Texting Strangers Frequency the odds of nonconsensual pornography victimization increased by 1.581, indicating a weak to moderate relationship.

Table 4.6

Exposure Multivariate Logistic Regression Results

Variable	*Model 1*			*Model 2*		
	B coefficient	Standard Error	Exp(B)	B coefficient	Standard Error	Exp(B)
Texting Frequency	-0.460	0.547	0.631	-0.407	0.554	0.665
Texting Friends Frequency	-0.012	0.479	0.988	-0.086	0.481	0.918
Texting Significant Others Frequency	0.349*	0.157	1.417	0.566*	0.188	1.761
Texting Family Frequency	-0.050	0.253	0.952	-0.006	0.257	0.994
Texting Strangers Frequency	0.458*	0.215	1.581	0.355	0.220	1.427
Time Spent Engaged in Risky Activities	-0.032	0.110	0.968	-0.074	0.115	0.929
Time Spent Engaged in School Activities	-0.152	0.131	0.859	-0.176	0.133	0.838
Time Spent Engaged in Social Activities	-0.069	0.130	0.934	-0.088	0.130	0.915
Gender	-	-	-	-0.005	0.270	0.995
Relationship Status	-	-	-	-0.562	0.308	0.570
Sexual Orientation	-	-	-	0.320	0.323	1.376
Year in School (2nd Year)[1]	-	-	-	0.219	0.393	1.245
Year in School (3rd Year)[1]	-	-	-	0.428	0.380	1.534
Year in School (4th Year)[1]	-	-	-	0.455	0.375	1.576
Race/Ethnicity	-	-	-	0.508	0.295	1.662
	Model: χ^2=12.981 p=0.113 Nagelkerke r-squared=0.022			Step: χ^2=9.536, p=0.216 Model: χ^2=22.517 p=0.095 Nagelkerke r-squared=0.039		

* P-value is significant at p<0.05

[1] In this analysis, 1st Year was the reference category

In the second regression model, demographic variables were included in the estimation of the model. The inclusion of these variables did not significantly improve the model (χ^2=9.536, p=0.216). The overall model approached significance at (p=0.095) and explained 3.9% of the variation. Texting significant others remained significant (p=0.003). For each unit increase in Texting Significant Others, the odds of victimization increased by 1.761, indicating a weak to moderate relationship. Text Strangers Frequency was no longer statistically significant. Relationship status approached statistical significance (p=0.068). Being in a relationship decreased the odds of victimization by 0.570. Race/Ethnicity also approached statistical significance (p=0.085). Identifying as Nonwhite increased odds of victimization by 1.662.

Proximity to Motivated Offenders Multivariate Logistic Regression Results

The first proximity to motivated offenders logistic regression model estimated only proximity measures as independent variables, and nonconsensual pornography victimization as

the dependent variable. As shown in Table 4.7, the overall model approached statistical significance (p=0.081). However, only 2.0% of the variation in nonconsensual pornography victimization was explained by proximity to motivated offenders measures. One independent variable was statistically significant: Peer Sexting (p=0.008). In support of Hypothesis 1b, having more than half of peers engaging in sexting, increased the odds of victimization by 2.388, indicating a moderate to strong relationship. The number of online friends talked to offline approached significance (p=0.096).

The second proximity regression model included demographic measures as independent variables. Including demographic variables did not significantly improve the model (χ^2=3.857 p=0.796). The overall model not statistically significant (p=0.247) and explained 2.7% of the variation. Peer Sexting (p=0.009) remained the only significant variable. Having more than half of peers engaging in sexting increased the odds of victimization by 2.376, again indicating a moderate to strong relationship.

Table 4.7

Proximity Multivariate Regression Results

Variable	*Model 1*			*Model 2*		
	B	Standard Error	Exp(B)	B	Standard Error	Exp(B)
Number of Friends On Social Networks	-0.370	0.277	0.690	-0.381	0.280	0.683
Percent of Online Friends Talk To Weekly	0.646	0.441	1.908	0.669	0.444	1.952
Talk to Strangers Online	0.194	0.196	1.214	0.174	0.205	1.190
Peer Online Deviance	-0.081	1.042	0.922	-0.181	1.052	0.835
Peer Sexting	0.871*	0.328	2.388	0.866*	0.333	2.376
Gender	-	-	-	0.053	0.269	1.055
Relationship Status	-	-	-	0.026	0.268	1.026
Sexual Orientation	-	-	-	0.168	0.341	1.183
Year in School (2nd Year)[1]	-	-	-	0.052	0.394	1.053
Year in School (3rd Year)[1]	-	-	-	0.299	0.388	1.348
Year in School (4th Year)[1]	-	-	-	0.379	0.377	1.461
Race/Ethnicity	-	-	-	0.440	0.306	1.553
	Model: χ^2=11.035 p=0.051 Nagelkerke r-squared=0.020			Step: χ^2=3.857 p=0.796 Model: χ^2=14.892 p=0.247 Nagelkerke r-squared=0.027		

* P-value is significant at p<0.05

[1] In this analysis, 1st Year was the reference category

Target Attractiveness Multivariate Logistic Regression Results

The results from the logistic regression models for target attractiveness are presented in Table 4.8. The results presented in Table 4.8 show the first target attractiveness regression model (estimating only target attractiveness variables) was statistically significant (χ^2=65.310, p<0.001). Nagelkerke r-squared shows that the target attractiveness variables explain 14.6% of the variation in nonconsensual pornography victimization. Both Being Filmed Nude (p<0.001) and Engaging in Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetration (p<0.001) were both statistically significant, in the hypothesized direction of Hypothesis 1c (an increase in target attractiveness would result in an increase in victimization). Being filmed nude increased odds of victimization by 5.787, indicating a strong relationship. Being a perpetrator of nonconsensual pornography increased odds of victimization by 6.704, also indicating a strong relationship. Additionally, Updating Social Media Frequency (p=0.052) and Engaging in Sexting (0.051) approached statistical significance. Each unit increase in updating social media increased odds of victimization by 1.524. Engaging in sexting increased odds of victimization by 1.934.

Table 4.8

Target Attractiveness Multivariate Regression Results

Variable	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	Significance (p-value)	Exp(B)	B	Significance (p-value)	Exp(B)
Post Personal Information	-0.026	0.153	0.975	0.038	0.158	1.039
Post Contact Information	-0.053	0.176	0.948	-0.065	0.179	0.937
Post Media Information	-0.172	0.230	0.842	-0.204	0.234	0.816
Sharing Personal Information	0.204	0.161	1.226	0.188	0.160	1.206
Sharing Contact Information	-0.269	0.233	0.764	-0.247	0.236	0.781
Sharing Media Information	-0.062	0.273	0.940	-0.087	0.273	0.917
Social Networking Frequency	0.421	0.217	1.524	0.397	0.217	1.487
Engaged in Sexting	0.659	0.339	1.934	0.662	0.345	1.939
Has Anyone Ever Filmed You Nude?	1.646*	0.332	5.187	1.686*	0.346	5.399
Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetrator	1.903*	0.357	6.704	1.984*	0.365	7.269
Gender	-	-	-	0.203	0.331	1.225
Relationship Status	-	-	-	0.383	0.486	1.467
Sexual Orientation	-	-	-	0.312	0.503	1.367
Year in School (2nd Year)[1]	-	-	-	0.778	0.470	2.176
Year in School (3rd Year)[1]	-	-	-	-0.315	0.318	0.730
Year in School (4th Year)[1]	-	-	-	0.266	0.375	1.304
Race/Ethnicity	-	-	-	0.473	0.372	1.605
	Model: χ^2=65.310 p=0.000 Nagelkerke r-squared=0.146			Step: χ^2=6.792 p=0.451 Model: χ^2=72.102 p=0.000 Nagelkerke r-squared=0.162		

* P-value is significant at p<0.05

[1] In this analysis, 1st Year was the reference category

When demographic measures were included in the second regression, the overall fit of the model remained statistically significant (p<0.001), however, the inclusion of these variables did not significantly improve the model (χ^2=6.792, p=0.451), explaining 16.2% of the variation. Supporting Hypothesis 1c, that an increase in target attractiveness would result in an increase in nonconsensual pornography victimization, Have You Ever Been Filmed Nude (p<0.001) and Engaging in Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetration (p<0.001) remained statistically significant. In this model, being filmed nude increased odds of victimization by 5.399, still indicating a strong relationship. Being a perpetrator of nonconsensual pornography increased odds of victimization by 7.269, again indicating a strong relationship. Updating Social Networking Frequency (p=0.068) and engaging in sexting (p=0.055) remained approaching significance. Every unit increase in updating social network frequency increased odds of

victimization by 1.487. Finally, engaging in sexting increased odds of victimization by 1.939. One of the Year in School dummy variables (2nd Year) approached statistical significance (p=0.098). Being a 2nd Year student (compared to a 1st Year student) increased risk of victimization by 2.176.

Lack of Capable Guardianship Multivariate Logistic Regression Results

Table 4.9 shows the lack of capable guardianship logistic regression model results. The first guardianship regression model (including only lack of capable guardianship variables) was not statistically significant (p=0.435). This model only explained 2.3% of the variation in victimization. None of the guardianship variables were statistically significant. However, Having a Private Computer Password (p=0.053) approached statistical significance. In the direction expected by Hypothesis 1d (an increased lack of capable guardianship would result in increase in nonconsensual pornography victimization), Having a computer password protected decreased odds of victimization by 0.555.

The second guardianship regression model, taking into account demographic variables, was also not statistically significant (p=0.451), with only 3.4% of variation explained. Including the demographic variables did not significantly improve the model (χ^2=5.882, p=0.554). Having a Private Computer Password remained approaching statistical significance (p=0.052). Supporting Hypothesis 1d, Having a Private Computer Password decreased odds of victimization by 0.552. No other variables in the model approached statistical significance.

Table 4.9

Guardianship Multivariate Regression Results

Variable	*Model 1*			*Model 2*		
	B	Standard Error	Exp(B)	B	Standard Error	Exp(B)
Computer Password Protected	-0.586	0.303	0.556	-0.595	0.306	0.552
Antivirus installed	-0.410	0.324	0.664	-0.442	0.334	0.643
Phone Password Protected	0.089	0.330	1.093	0.060	0.335	1.062
Email/Social Media Password Protected	0.275	0.329	1.316	0.290	0.330	1.336
Social network protections (Only Friends)[1]	-0.125	0.403	0.882	-0.085	0.413	0.919
Social network protections (Friends of Friends)[1]	-0.408	0.352	0.665	-0.357	0.361	0.700
Social network protections (Public)[1]	-0.244	0.400	0.784	-0.221	0.403	0.802
Where Living (Off Campus)[2]	-0.704	0.563	0.494	-0.760	0.607	0.468
Where Living (Fraternity/Sorority)[2]	-0.575	0.546	0.563	-0.492	0.554	0.612
Who Living With (Romantic Partner)[3]	-0.455	0.646	0.634	-0.501	0.657	0.606
Who Living With (Roommate)[3]	-0.131	0.694	0.877	-0.083	0.711	0.920
Who Living With (Alone)[3]	-0.039	0.481	0.962	-0.014	0.486	0.986
Gender	-	-	-	-0.005	0.281	0.995
Relationship Status	-	-	-	0.002	0.505	1.002
Sexual Orientation	-	-	-	0.284	0.416	1.329
Year in School (2nd Year)[4]	-	-	-	0.544	0.407	1.723
Year in School (3rd Year)[4]				0.603	0.287	1.827
Year in School (4th Year)[4]				0.524	0.344	1.688
Race/Ethnicity	-	-	-	0.488	0.308	1.630
	Model: χ^2=12.133 p=0.435 Nagelkerke r-squared=0.023			Step:χ^2=5.882 p=0.554 Model: χ^2=18.015 p=0.521 Nagelkerke r-squared=0.034		

[1] In this analysis, Private was the reference category
[2] In this analysis, On Campus was the reference category
[3] In this analysis, With Parents/Other Adult Relative was the reference category
[4] In this analysis, 1st Year was the reference category

Summary

This chapter used bivariate chi-square analyses and multivariate logistic regression analyses to examine the effects of lifestyle routine activities on nonconsensual pornography victimization. These analyses provided moderate support for the application of the lifestyle routine activities framework to explaining odds of nonconsensual pornography victimization. A summary of these logistic regression results is presented in Table 4.10.

Table 4.10

Summary of Statistically Significant or Approaching Statistical Significance Variables in Multivariate Logistic Regression Results

	Hypothesis 1a		Hypothesis 1 b		Hypothesis 1c		Hypothesis 1d	
Variable Name	Without Demographics B Coefficient (p-value)	With Demographics B Coefficient (p-value)	Without Demographics B Coefficient (p-value)	With Demographics B Coefficient (p-value)	Without Demographics B Coefficient (p-value)	With Demographics B Coefficient (p-value)	Without Demographics B Coefficient (p-value)	With Demographics B Coefficient (p-value)
Texting Significant Others Frequency	0.349 (0.026)	0.566 (0.003)						
Texting Strangers Frequency	0.458 (0.033)	NS						
Peer Sexting			0.871 (0.008)	0.866 (0.009)				
Social Networking Frequency					0.421 (0.052)	0.397 (0.068)		
Engaged in Sexting					0.659 (0.051)	0.662 (0.055)		
Filmed Nude					1.646 (0.000)	1.686 (0.000)		
Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetration					1.903 (0.000)	1.984 (0.000)		
Computer Password Protected							-0.586 (0.053)	-0.595 (0.052)

Hypothesis 1a was supported first in the bivariate chi-square analyses. Time Spent Engaging in Social Networking Activities was statistically significant. In the multivariate regressions, Texting Significant Others Frequency and Texting Strangers Frequency were statistically significant. The directions of the relationships were consistent with Hypothesis 1a. More time texting significant others and more time texting strangers both increased risk of victimization.

Hypothesis 1b was also supported in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses. Talking to Strangers Online and Peer Sexting were significant in the chi-square analyses. Peer sexting

remained significant in the multivariate regression models. In support of the hypothesis, having more than half of peers engaging in sexting increased odds of victimization.

Hypothesis 1c had the strongest support in theses analyses. In the chi-square analyses, Posting Personal Information, Sharing Contact Information, Sharing Media Information, Social Networking Frequency, Engaging in Sexting, Being Filmed Nude, and Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetration were all statistically significant. In the multivariate regressions, Being Filmed Nude and Nonconsensual Pornography Perpetration both significantly increased odds of victimization. Social Networking Frequency and Engaged in sexting both approached statistical significance, in the direction expected by Hypothesis 1c. More time spent on social networks and engaging in sexting both increased risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.

Finally, there was limited support for Hypothesis 1d. Only Having a Computer Password Protected was statistically significant in the chi-square analyses. This variable only approached significance in the multivariate regressions, with Having a Computer Password Protected decreasing odds of victimization.

The next chapter discusses these results in more detail and interprets them within the lifestyle routine activities framework. The next chapter also discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the findings.

Chapter 5

Discussion

Introduction

The first two chapters of this dissertation focused on background information about nonconsensual pornography as well as the lifestyle routine activities framework. The third and fourth chapters turned to the current research, examining nonconsensual pornography victimization under the lifestyle routine activities framework. Specifically, it was hypothesized that the lifestyle routine activities framework would explain risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization. Hypothesis 1a stated that exposure to motivated offenders would increase risk of NCP victimization. Hypothesis 1b was that proximity to motivated offenders would increase risk of victimization. Hypothesis 1c stated that increased target attractiveness would increase risk of victimization. Finally, Hypothesis 1d was that lack of capable guardianship would increase risk of victimization. Chapter Four presented the results of the testing of these hypotheses using chi-square tests of independence for the bivariate tests and logistic regressions for the multivariate tests. Support for the Lifestyle/Routine Activities framework was found for each of the hypotheses. The remainder of this dissertation discusses the support for each hypothesis, implications for the Lifestyle/Routine Activities framework and for prevention, as well as limitations to this research and future directions.

Hypothesis 1a: Exposure to Motivated Offenders

Exposure to motivated offenders refers to how often potential victims and motivated offenders interact in environments that allow for victimization to take place. In the traditional lifestyle routine activities framework, this refers to time spent in a physical location. However, for nonconsensual pornography and other online crimes, this instead refers to time spent doing certain activities online or via cell phone.

This study examined eight measures of exposure: texting frequency, texting friends frequency, texting significant others frequency, texting family frequency, texting strangers frequency, time spent engaged in risky online activities, time spent engaged in online school activities, and time spent engaged in social networking activities. In general, more time spent online or texting should increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization, as it increases the amount of time a potential victim may be exposed to a potential offender. However, some online activities, such as texting family or time spent engaged in school activities may act as a protective factor since these are activities that would not normally expose an individual to potential offenders.

There was limited support for Hypothesis 1a in both the bivariate and multivariate results. In the bivariate results, Time Spent Engaged in Social Networking Activities was statistically significant (p=0.040). However, contrary to Hypothesis 1a, it was individuals who spent 0 hours Engaged in Social Networking Activities that had the highest risk of victimization (4.1%, compared to 1.2% (1 hour), 2.0% (2 hours), and 1.9% (3+hours)). Since this study was cross-sectional, it is possible that individuals who have been victims of nonconsensual pornography decreased their social media use after nonconsensual pornography victimization.

In the multivariate regressions, Time Spent Engaged in Social Networking Activities was not significant. This indicates that when controlling for all other exposure variables, Time Spent Engaged in Social Networking no longer had the significant effect on nonconsensual pornography victimization shown in the bivariate results.

Two other exposure variables, however, were significant in the multivariate logistic regressions. How often one texts a significant other (p=0.026) and how often one texts strangers (p=0.033) were both statistically significant in the logistic regression without demographic

variables. Holding the other variables constant, every one unit increase in the frequency of texting a significant other increased odds of victimization by 1.417. This indicates a weak relationship between texting a significant other and NCP victimization. Likewise, every one unit increase in the frequency of texting strangers increased the odds of victimization by 1.581. This indicates a weak to moderate relationship between texting strangers and NCP victimization. When demographic variables were included in the regression, frequency of texting significant others remained statistically significant (p=0.003). Every one unit increase in frequency texting significant others increased risk of victimization by 1.761. This now indicates a slightly stronger (weak to moderate) relationship between texting significant others and NCP victimization. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1a, as significant others, or former significant others, are often the perpetrators of nonconsensual pornography, and therefore more time spent in contact with them should increase odds of victimization. Likewise, texting strangers increases exposure to motivated offenders, which should increase risk of nonconsensual pornography victimization.

Hypothesis 1b: Proximity to Motivated Offenders

Proximity to motivated offenders is similar to exposure to motivated offenders. While exposure refers to time spent in the same location, proximity refers to physical distance. For the traditional lifestyle routine activities framework, this was a simple measurement of one physical location (that of the victim) to another physical location (that of the motivated offender). However, with online crimes, such as nonconsensual pornography, potential victims and motivated offenders can converge in space from anywhere in the world. Instead of a physical location, the focus is on the online network.

This study examined five measures of proximity to motivated offenders: number of friends on social networks, percent of online friends one talks to weekly, how many strangers

one talks to online, a measure of peer deviance, and how many peers engage in sexting. Similar to exposure, there was some support for these measures affecting risk of victimization.

In the bivariate chi-square analyses, two variables were statistically significant. The first statistically significant variable was the number of strangers one talks to online. The highest percentage of victims was found in the group that talked to 1-5 strangers online (3.5%). Hypothesis 1b supports the idea that this group would have higher rates of victimization than the group that talked to no strangers online. However, the group that spoke to 6 or more strangers had the lowest percentage of victims (1.0%), contrary to the hypothesis (among those who spoke to zero strangers, 1.5% reported nonconsensual pornography victimization). This could simply be due to this group having the lowest number of respondents (218, with only 2 reporting victimization).

In support of Hypothesis 1b, percentage of peers who engage in sexting was also statistically significant in the bivariate chi-square analyses. Individuals who reported that more than half of their peers engaged in sexting were more likely to be victims of nonconsensual pornography than those who reported less than half of their peers sexted (3.7% compared to 1.6%).

These results carried through to the multivariate logistic regressions, where Peer Sexting remained a significant variable. In the full model (including demographics), when holding all other variables constant, reporting that at least half of one's peers engaged in sexting resulted in a 2.376 increase in odds of victimization. This finding indicates a moderate to strong relationship between peer sexting and NCP victimization. This finding is supportive of Hypothesis 1b and the lifestyle routine activities framework. Having more peers who engage in sexting indicates a closer proximity to motivated offenders, as individuals are indicating that more than half of their

peers are engaging in the act in which most nonconsensual pornography begins. Peers are likely to influence beliefs and behaviors, so sexting and sharing of sexts may be seen as normal.

Hypothesis 1c: Target Attractiveness

Hypotheses 1c had the greatest amount of support in the current study, based on the number of significant variables in the analyses, as well as the strength of those significant relationships. Target attractiveness refers to behaviors and characteristics of the potential victim that make them more attractive to motivated offenders. This varies based on what the potential victim or target is. In the case of nonconsensual pornography, this refers to what information a person shares about themselves online or with people they meet online, as well as other risky behaviors a person may engage in.

This study examined ten measures of target attractiveness. The first seven referred to how much information an individual shares about themselves, including: how many items of personal information a person posts online, how many items of contact information a person posts online, how much media (photos, videos, etc.) a person posts online, how many items of personal information a person shares with people they meet online, how many items of contact information a person shares with people they meet online, how much media (photos, videos, etc.) a person shares with people they meet online, and how often one updates social media (e.g. how often one updates followers on their behaviors). The last three variables refer to other risky behaviors which may make someone more attractive to potential nonconsensual pornography perpetrators, including: engaging in sexting, being filmed or photographed nude, or engaging in nonconsensual pornography perpetration. For the final variable, it has been well documented in previous research that there is an overlap between victimization and perpetration for other crimes

(e.g. Bossler et al. (2012) and Navarro and Jasinski (2013)), therefore it is hypothesized that a similar trend would be seen here.

Six of the ten target attractiveness variables were statistically significant at the bivariate level. Individuals who posted one (2.3%) or three items (2.4%) of personal information were more likely to be victims. Individuals who shared one item of contact information (2.8%) or one item of media (3.2%) were more likely to be victimized than individuals who shared zero items or more than one item. This is mostly in line with Hypothesis 1c, however these results may indicate that it is not the number of items one shares, but rather the specific items that are shared that impact risk.

In line with Hypothesis 1c, updating social networks more often increased victimization in the bivariate results. Individuals who reported updating social networks at least once a day had the highest percentage of victims (3.7%), compared to those who updated social networks once a month or less (1.3%) or less than once a day (1.6%). This is consistent with Hypothesis 1c in that sharing information more often would make a target more attractive to potential offenders since they would have more information about the potential victim.

Also in line with Hypothesis 1c, all three of the final target attractiveness variables were statistically significant in the bivariate chi-square analyses. Individuals who engaged in sexting were more likely to be victims than those who did not (2.9% v. 1.0%). Individuals who reported being filmed or photographed nude had higher percentages of victimization than those who had never been filmed or photographed nude (5.7% v. 1.0%). This is consistent with the lifestyle routine activities framework in that individuals who shared explicit pictures or videos of themselves or who were knowingly filmed or photographed nude would make easier targets for motivated offenders, since they would not have to create the media themselves. Finally,

individuals who admitted to perpetrating nonconsensual pornography had higher percentages of victimization than those who were not also perpetrators (6.3% v. 1.3%). This is consistent with previous research of other types of personal crimes showing the victim-offender overlap.

In the multivariate logistic regressions, the two variables, posting or sharing information, were no longer statistically significant. However, two of the final three measures of target attractiveness: being filmed/photographed nude, and nonconsensual pornography perpetration, remained statistically significant (engaging in sexting approached significance), when controlling for other relevant variables.

In the full model, responding that one had been filmed or photographed nude increased odds of victimization by 5.399, relative to never having been filmed or photographed nude. This indicates a strong relationship between being filmed or photographed nude and NCP victimization. Finally, responding that one had engaged in nonconsensual pornography perpetration increased odds of victimization by 7.269, relative to never having engaged in nonconsensual pornography victimization. This also indicates a strong relationship between NCP perpetration and victimization. These results strongly support Hypothesis 1c and the lifestyle routine activities framework. Creating the media used in nonconsensual pornography perpetration makes one a very attractive target to potential offenders, as it makes perpetration easier. Additionally, these results reinforce the idea of the victim-offender overlap found in many other types of personal crimes. This supports the idea of applying a lifestyle routine activities framework to nonconsensual pornography victimization as another type of personal crime.

Hypothesis 1d: Lack of Capable Guardianship

Similar to applications of the lifestyle routine activities framework to other types of crime, lack of capable guardianship in this study had very limited support. Previous researchers

have argued this is due to the difficulty in measure capable guardianship. In this study, seven measures were used to measure guardianship: having a computer password protected, having antivirus software installed, having a phone password protected, having email/social media password protected, permissions or publicity of social media accounts, where one is living, and with whom one is living.

The only variable that was statistically significant in either the bivariate analyses or multivariate logistic models was having a password protected computer (significant in the bivariate chi-square analyses ($p=0.012$) and approached significance in the logistic regression ($p=0.053$)). In line with Hypothesis 1d, in the bivariate analyses, individuals who did not have their computer password protected had a higher percentage of victims than those that did have a computer password protected (2.6% v. 1.4%).

In the full logistic regression model, having a computer password protected approached significance. Having a computer password protected decreased odds of victimization by 0.552. In other words, having a computer password protected acted as a protective barrier to victimization. This finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1d and the lifestyle routine activities framework. Having this form of guardianship protected individuals from becoming victims, while not having a password protected computer increased risk of victimization. The computer password acted as a capable guardian of an individual's personal information and media. This would make it harder for a potential motivated offender to access this information/media without the potential victim's consent.

Demographics

Demographics were included in both the bivariate chi-square analyses and the full models of the multivariate logistic regressions. This was done as demographic variables have been found

in previous research to be related to nonconsensual pornography victimization. In this study, gender, relationship status, sexual orientation, year in school and ethnicity were included as demographic control variables.

In the bivariate analyses, ethnicity was the only demographic variable to be statistically significant. Ethnicity was significant in the demographic chi-square analyses, with 3.3% of individuals who identified as Nonwhite also reporting victimization, compared to 1.6% of individuals who identified as White. Race/Ethnicity also approached significance in the exposure chi-square, where 2.9% of individuals who identified as Nonwhite were victims, compared to 1.8% of individuals who identified as White. This is consistent with past research of personal crimes wherein minorities are more likely to be victimized.

In the multivariate logistic regressions, however, no demographic variables were statistically significant. In the exposure logistic regression, relationships status approached significance (p=0.065). In this regression, being in a committed relationship served as a protective factor, reducing the odds of victimization by 0.570, relative to not being in a relationship. This is in line with past research than indicates that former romantic partners are more often perpetrators of nonconsensual pornography than current partners. Being in a committed relationship may also reduce one's risk by reducing their involvement in certain activities that may increase risk. Race/Ethnicity also approached significance in the exposure logistic regression (p=0.085). Identifying as White increased risk of victimization by 1.662, relative to identifying as Nonwhite.

In the target attractiveness logistic regression, year in school approached significance. Being a 2nd year student increased risk of victimization by 2.176 (p=0.098), as compared to being a 1st year student.

Lifestyle Routine Activities Framework and Nonconsensual Pornography Victimization

To date, research on nonconsensual pornography victimization has been primarily exploratory. Researchers have examined prevalence of the phenomenon, some correlates (demographic) at a bivariate level, as well as outcomes of victimization. However, there has been no attempt to apply criminological theory to explain nonconsensual pornography victimization. This was the primary goal of the current dissertation.

This research provides moderate support for applying a lifestyle routine activities framework to the study of nonconsensual pornography. All four concepts – exposure, proximity, target attractiveness, and guardianship – had at least one measure statistically significantly impact the odds of victimization. However, only the proximity and target attractiveness models were overall statistically significant (exposure approached statistical significance). The statistically significant variables in the target attractiveness model (being filmed nude and perpetrating nonconsensual pornography) showed the highest number of variables associated with nonconsensual pornography victimization (e.g. statistically significant), as well as the variables with the largest odds ratio with nonconsensual pornography victimization.

Implications for the Lifestyle Routine Activities Framework

The goal of this dissertation was to determine the applicability of the lifestyle routine activities framework to explaining nonconsensual pornography victimization. This research found moderate support for using LRAT to explain nonconsensual pornography victimization, however, the concepts of exposure, proximity and guardianship did not show much of a relationship with victimization. The target attractiveness multivariate regressions were shown to significantly predict victimization, while the other multivariate regressions did not.

While some researchers have argued that the lifestyle routine activities framework cannot be applied to cybervictimization (e.g. Yar, 2015), this research joins past research in showing that the key concepts of the framework can be reconceived for an online application. However, this research indicated that only a small percentage of variation in NCP victimization can be accounted for using the concepts of LRAT (3.9% explained by exposure variables, 2.7% explained by proximity variables, 16.2% explained by target attractiveness variables, and 3.4% explained by guardianship variables). While motivated offenders cannot converge with their victims in time and space, they can converge across networks. As discussed in Chapter 2, this means that a motivated offender and victim do not have to physically be in the same place at the same time for crime to occur. If they are connected by a network, victimization can occur even if the victim is in a different physical location and may not know about the victimization until a later time (e.g. until the log on to social media).

This dissertation showed a significant relationship between measures of exposure, proximity and target attractiveness and nonconsensual pornography victimization. This shows that the framework can be applied with some success to nonconsensual pornography victimization. However, none of the guardianship variables were statistically significant in the multivariate regressions (having a password protected computer approached statistical significance).

It is possible that this dissertation did not find more support for the framework due to the measurements of key concepts. If, as previous research indicates, the majority of NCP begins of consensual sexting, different measurement may be more appropriate. For example, many of the exposure variables focus on texting behaviors in general, rather than asking about frequency of specific types of texting behaviors (sending pictures/videos, sending text only, etc.). Asking

about recent breakups may also be a good measure of exposure, as many cases of NCP are cases of "revenge porn" committed by scorned ex-partners. Additional measures of proximity may be asking specifically how many peers engage in NCP (e.g. share sexual media without the subject's consent), as well as perceived peer attitudes toward sexting and sharing sexts. Target attractiveness had the strongest support, but additional items focused on interactions with the most likely perpetrators (former or current romantic partners) may also be significant (e.g. number of pictures shared with significant others, specific content of media, etc.). Finally, guardianship measures could be greatly improved. Unless the photos/videos are obtained nonconsensually (e.g. through hacking), measures of physical guardianship are likely less important to prediction of risk than additional measures of social and personal guardianship. Rather than simply knowing who someone lives with knowing where their computer is located and if they share a room may provide more insight. Additionally, one's knowledge on the dangers of sexting and risk of NCP may serve as effective personal guardianship, which was not explored in this dissertation.

Prevention Implications

Based on the discussion above, this research provides a number of avenues to prevent and reduce nonconsensual pornography victimization. Each of the significant variables above can be targeted to prevent victimization. The practicality of these prevention methods, however, varies.

Cornish and Clarke (2003) identify five avenues of situational crime prevention (with 25 different techniques). Although these were developed for in-person crimes, given the results of this study, they may also prove to be useful in preventing nonconsensual pornography. The five main avenues are: increasing the effort, increasing the risk, reducing the rewards, reducing provocations and removing excuses. A number of these prevention methods focus on changing

the behavior of potential targets. It is important to keep in mind that these methods can be useful for risk reduction and can help empower individuals to have concrete steps to reduce their risk of victimization, However, the burden of prevention ultimately falls on changing the behavior of the potential offender. Unfortunately, regardless of steps a potential victim may take, a motivated enough offender will be able to find a target. Therefore, to see a true reduction in NCP, motivations of the potential offenders may be a better target for change.

Increasing the Effort. Hasinoff (2017) suggests additional technology could serve as a guardian of sensitive photos. Hasinoff argues that we use technology to prevent the sharing of other digital media without permission (e.g. e-books). This technology, then, could be used to keep someone from forwarding a picture without consent. Secure messaging services already exist and can be used for safer sexting (e.g. Signal) (Duffy and Eddy, 2019). This, however, will not prevent the sharing of media originally created by the perpetrator or prevent the perpetrator from sharing the media in person. Additionally, just as technology can be developed to protect information, technology can also be developed to override these protections. Therefore, guardianship measures may not be effective against the most motivated of offenders.

Increasing the Risks. Cornish and Clarke (2003) argue that extending guardianship can be used to increase the risks and thereby reduce crime. This research found that having a password protected computer reduces odds of victimization. Creating and keeping a computer password private is a simple way to extend guardianship over personal media. However, as discussed above, this approach has its limitations.

Reducing the Rewards. Engaging in sexting was statistically significant in the bivariate analyses. At the individual level, one way of preventing nonconsensual pornography victimization is to be very careful who one engages in sexting with, or to not engage in sexting at

all. Similar prevention potential comes from the finding that individuals who have ever been filmed or photographed nude are at an increased risk for victimization. Individuals can protect themselves by again, taking care about who they allow to film or photograph them, or by not allowing anyone to film or photograph them nude. This, however, does not prevent cases in which individuals do not know they are being filmed or photographed. Finally, being a nonconsensual pornography perpetrator was also statistically significant. This may make someone an attractive target as someone may want revenge or think this individual "deserves" to become a victim.

Potential targets can also take care to hide identifying features in the media, such as their face, birthmarks, tattoos and surroundings (Duffy and Eddy, 2019). For offenders looking to get revenge, removing any identifying information reduces the reward in sharing the media, as there is not a way to prove the photograph or video is of the intended target.

Reduce Provocations. While practicing safe sexting is a positive idea, the responsibility for preventing nonconsensual pornography cannot fall on the potential victim. As twitter user "Itsmotherswork" (2012) points out, "If you're promoting changes to women's behavior to 'prevent' rape, you're really saying 'make sure he rapes the other girl'." The same is true for nonconsensual pornography. Focusing on the potential victim, rather than the potential offender does not change the potential offender's beliefs or actions. Additionally, this study found that almost 35% of the sample engaged in sexting. This indicates this behavior is a fairly normal practice, and one that does not normally end in nonconsensual pornography.

Offender provocations can be reduced by educating individuals on healthy relationships and communication. Teaching individuals to handle frustration, stress and disputes in a healthy manner can prevent them from seeking revenge as an outlet for their frustration or anger.

Another way to reduce provocations is to neutralize peer pressure. In the proximity regressions, peer sexting was statistically significant. Having more than half of peers engaging in sexting increased odds of victimization. At the individual level, individuals choose who they wish to spend time with. Spending time with peers that do not engage in risky behaviors, such as sexting, may serve as a protective factor. Again, education on healthy relationships, including healthy friendships, could be targeted to address this issue. If norms are shifted to protect digital privacy and value consent, sexting can become less of a risky behavior.

Remove Excuses. Learning about healthy relationship dynamics may also prevent individuals from perpetrating and becoming victims of nonconsensual pornography, by teaching motivated offenders that sharing media without consent is not "ok" or "fun," and in many cases, may be illegal. This removes the excuses that the offender did not know that sharing the media was not acceptable, so that those who choose to engage in sexting or being filmed/photographed nude, have the freedom to continue to do so, within a healthy relationship.

Hasinoff (2017) argues that the answer to prevention is not in shaming victims or criminalizing sexting, but rather in teaching and encouraging consent. She argues that there is nothing wrong with consensual sexting, and policies or laws that focus on "just don't do it" are ineffective. While consent is often key in prevention education about sexual assault, when it comes to digital privacy, consent is often forgotten. Hasinoff argues that shifting the conversation from telling people not to sext to teaching people how to sext consensually and respectfully, will result in a decrease in nonconsensual pornography.

Summary. The results of this dissertation indicate that not only can the lifestyle routine activities framework be applied to explain nonconsensual pornography victimization, but it may prove useful in providing insight into prevention measures as well. Education on healthy

relationships and sexting may be the most successful avenue to pursue in order to prevent future victimization. However, this dissertation does have a number of limitations, discussed in the following section.

Limitations

Although this dissertation expands the field of knowledge with respect to nonconsensual pornography victimization, these findings should be considered in light of several limitations. These limitations include: (1) response rate, (2) sample size, (3) cross sectional research design and temporal order, and (4) measures of lifestyle routine activities.

As discussed in Chapter 3, this study had a response rate of 40.63%. However, when taking into account missing data, the regression sizes ranged from 2844 to 3289 (28.44%-32.89% of those invited to participate). This is a well-documented limitation to online surveys. Missing data analysis, however, indicates that these smaller samples for the regressions are overall similar in key variables to the total sample. Therefore, the smaller samples should be representative of the overall larger sample, which was similar to the total population studied. Additionally, these sample sizes are still quite large in comparison to previous studies on nonconsensual pornography.

This study has a cross-sectional research design. One limitation of cross-sectional research is that it is difficult to determine temporal order. This means, when studying victimization, it is impossible to know if someone was victimized before or after other behaviors. For example, with respect to exposure, in the bivariate analysis, the individuals who spent the least amount of time on social networks were most at risk, contrary to the hypotheses. It is possible that individuals who become victims of nonconsensual pornography reduce their time

on social networks as an effect of the victimization. However, with this study design, it is difficult to know.

Finally, researchers have had difficulty conceptualizing certain aspects of the lifestyle routine activities framework, especially in applying it to an online world. For example, measures of exposure and proximity to motivated offenders have often been used interchangeably (e.g. Bossler, et al. (2012), Navarro and Jasinski (2013), and Reyns, (2010)). There are likely other measures not included in this study that could be used to conceptualize the different concepts of exposure, proximity, target attractiveness, and guardianship. For example, this research did not include any measures of personal guardianship, such as computer skill level or knowledge. Past research applying LRAT to online crimes have found a relationship between personal guardianship and victimization (Bossler, et al. (2012), Reyns (2015)).

Future Research Directions

This study represents a logical step in understanding the phenomenon of nonconsensual pornography victimization. It is the first study to attempt to test a theoretical framework on nonconsensual pornography victimization, using a large sample size of college students. However, there is still a great deal of research to be done in order to fully understand and address nonconsensual pornography victimization.

First, additional and larger studies should be conducted to attempt to replicate these results. This study indicates moderate support for applying a lifestyle routine activities framework to explain nonconsensual pornography victimization. However, more studies are needed to confirm these findings. If additional studies also find support for this framework, these results can be used to inform prevention practices. These studies should also seek to add

additional measures, such as the measures discussed earlier in this chapter (e.g. sexting frequency, personal guardianship, etc.).

Future research should also explore temporal order by utilizing longitudinal study designs. Some of the bivariate results (i.e. exposure and proximity) from this dissertation suggest that victims may take various steps to limit their exposure and proximity after victimization. Longitudinal research may shed light on whether that explains the findings of this dissertation that are seemingly contradictory to the hypotheses.

Additionally, more research should be conducted into perpetration of nonconsensual pornography. This research could provide valuable insight into correlates and predictors of perpetration. This information, in turn, could be used to inform prevention.

Another avenue of study and prevention is to focus on bystander behaviors. The current research indicates that almost 11% of college students say at least half of their peers engage in sexting. Since past research indicates that most nonconsensual pornography victimization originates from sexting, targeting peers as bystanders may be an effective way of preventing victimization.

Additionally, these instances of NCP should be explored more in-depth by future research. It is possible that LRAT applies best to certain instances of NCP (e.g. hacking by strangers or acquaintances versus the nonconsensual sharing of a previous consensual sext by a partner). Those instances of NCP that begin as consensual sexting may be better explained by a different framework or theory. Chapter 1 of this dissertation briefly discussed other frameworks that may be useful in explaining NCP, although these are not without their weaknesses. Additional potential avenues for future research would be viewing NCP as an extension of

intimate partner violence (IPV) and to apply sexual scripts and feminist theory to understanding and explaining NCP.

An interesting line of research may be to explore whether perpetrators of NCP are more likely to engage in other types of IPV and whether victims of NCP are more likely to experience additional types of IPV. Marganski and Melander (2018) found that most individuals who experienced other types of IPV also experienced cyber IPV, indicating that NCP committed by romantic partners may be an extension of traditional IPV. If this is the case, theories used to examine traditional forms of IPV may also be useful in explaining NCP by intimate partners. Ursula (2011) provides a good overview of theories of IPV, as well as their potential weaknesses. Many of these theories may also be applied to NCP as an online version of IPV. For example, Social Learning Theory has been applied to IPV, arguing that abusive behaviors are learned during childhood and throughout life through imitation and differential association, and as children grow these behaviors are reinforced by society or by rewards of the behaviors themselves (differential reinforcement). Perpetrators then come to believe this behavior is normal and acceptable (definitions). Disregard for consent, which is central to committing NCP, could very well be a learned behavior, and may be reinforced directly or indirectly throughout life, leading to NCP perpetration. Curry and Zavala (2020) also found support for applying Social Learning theory to victimization. In this case, victims of IPV associated with other victims (differential association), coming to believe that IPV is normal and appropriate (definitions), and even coming to believe the behavior can be rewarding (differential reinforcement). This could be extended to victims of NCP, who, by associating the other victims of NCP, view NCP as normal.

Curry and Zavala (2020) also examined two additional traditional theories of crime, as applied to IPV victimization. The first, Agnew's General Strain Theory, had some support in the

study. This theory posits that strain (through failing to achieve a positively valued goal, losing a positively valued stimulus or experiencing a noxious stimulus) causes crime. This applies to victimization through the victim/offender overlap. This could be extending to NCP by viewing strains, such as failure to achieve a marriage (positively valued goal), losing a valued relationship (positively valued stimulus) or rejection (noxious stimulus) as the cause of committing NCP. For victimization, the link between NCP victimization and perpetration would also need to be explored more deeply.

Finally, Curry and Zavala (2020) attempted to apply Gottfredson and Hirschi's General Theory of Crime to IPV victimization. The General Theory of Crime states that crime is caused by low self-control. Specifically, offenders are more likely to be attracted to risky behaviors and less likely to consider consequences. The same idea can be applied to victimization – those who have low self-control are more likely to engage in risky behaviors without considering consequences, putting them more at risk of victimization. This could be applied to NCP by looking at risky behaviors such as sexting. However, Curry and Zavala (2020) did not find support for applying this theory to IPV.

There has also been limited attempts to apply the idea of sexual scripts to NCP (Ruvalcaba and Eaton, 2020). Sexual scripts are based in traditional gender norms and are learned guidelines for sexual interactions. This research indicates that women are more likely to be victims of NCP, and generally have worse outcomes (e.g., anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, etc.) than male victims. Males were overwhelmingly more likely to be perpetrators, which fits into the sexual script of males being more sexually aggressive. This framework has some shortcomings, as discussed in Ursula (2011). First, the vast majority of males do not engage in NCP, even if they adhere to traditional gender norms and sexual scripts. Additionally,

the majority of females are not victims of NCP, so this framework may not explain well why some women may become victims, while others do not.

Conclusion

Nonconsensual pornography victimization can have devastating and even fatal consequences. Despite these tragic consequences, very little is empirically known about this phenomenon. This dissertation seeks to further the field of knowledge on nonconsensual pornography, in the hopes of ultimately preventing future nonconsensual pornography victimization and tragedies.

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Appendix 1

Web-Based Survey Consent Form

Thank you for your interest in our survey!

WEB-BASED SURVEY CONSENT FORM

Who is doing this research study?

The person in charge of this research study is Professor Bonnie Fisher of the University of Cincinnati (UC) School of Criminal Justice.

What is the purpose of this research study?

This is a study looking at the prevention of dating violence and sexual violence. We are interested in knowing more about how to prevent dating violence and sexual violence on college campuses. Some questions may make you upset or feel uncomfortable and you may choose not to answer them. If some questions do upset you, at the end of the survey we will provide information for you including people who may be able to help you with these feelings and resources on campus and in your community.

Who will be in this research study?

About 5000 randomly selected undergraduate UC students will be selected to take part in this study. Students at other college campuses across the United States may also be participating in this study.

Are there any benefits from being in this research study?

Although you may not personally benefit from taking part in this research, your responses may help us understand more about college students' response rates to online surveys about dating and sexual violence on your campus.

Are there any risks to being in this research study?

There is no physical health risk to study participation.

What will you be asked to do in this research study, and how long will it take?

You have a choice to complete the web-based questionnaire. If you do participate, you are free to skip any questions or discontinue at any time.

The survey takes about 20-30 minutes to answer all questions. Please find a time to complete this survey when you are alone. Thank you for participating!

How will your research information be kept confidential?

Your response to the survey will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by law. This study is protected by a Certificate of Confidentiality, which means that the researchers can refuse to disclose identifying information in any civil, criminal, or other proceeding, whether at the federal, state, or local level. Your responses will be kept in a database at UC on Professor Fisher's secured password-protected computer in her locked office for the duration of the project. After that, it will be de-identified and securely stored on Professor Fisher's computer.

The UC Institutional Review Board reviews all research projects that involve human participants to be sure the rights and welfare of participants are protected. If you have questions about your rights as a participant or complaints about the study, you may contact Professor Fisher at (513) 556-5828 or Preventsv@gmail.com or the Chairperson of the UC IRB at (513) 558-5259. Or, you may call the UC Research Compliance Hotline at (800) 889-1547, or write to the IRB, 300 University Hall, ML 0567, 51 Goodman Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0567, or email the IRB office atirb@ucmail.uc.edu.

Will you have to pay anything to be in this research study?

No.

What will you get because of being in this research study?

Payment for your time in the form of $5.00 Amazon gift card will be sent to you via email after you participate in survey.

What are your legal rights in this research study?

Nothing in this consent form waives any legal rights you may have. This consent form also does not release the investigator, the institution, or its agents from liability for negligence.

Do you HAVE to take part in this research study?

By taking part in the web-based survey, you indicate your consent for your responses to be used in this study.

PLEASE KEEP THIS INFORMATION SHEET FOR YOUR REFERENCE.

Thank you for participating!

Appendix 2

Initial Follow-up Email

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO Complete UC survey and receive a $5 Amazon.com Gift Card

Date

Greeting [MAIL MERGE STUDENT's FIRST NAME]:

I sent an email a few days ago asking you to participate in a study examining students' responses to an online survey about dating and sexual violence. As you may recall, researchers at the University of Cincinnati are conducting this study. We are interested in knowing more about students' participation in online surveys about dating and sexual violence on campuses so to inform their prevention.
You have been randomly selected to participate in a web-based survey. Of course, you have a choice about whether or not to complete the survey. If you do participate, you are free to skip any questions or discontinue at any time. The survey takes about 20 minutes to complete. Your responses will be kept completely confidential.

As a token of our appreciation, you will receive a $5.00 Amazon gift card via email once you participate in the survey. Please find a time to complete this survey when you are alone.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (513) 556-5828 or Preventsv@gmail.com. Should you not want to participate in this study, you can email me at Preventsv@gmail.com and I will take you off the mailing list.

When you are ready to begin the survey, click on the link below:

[LINK]

Please complete this survey as soon as possible.

Thank you for participating! I really appreciate it!

Sincerely,

Professor Bonnie S. Fisher
School of Criminal Justice

Appendix 3

Subsequent Follow-up Email

SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP TO Complete UC survey and receive a $5 Amazon.com Gift Card

Date

Greeting [MAIL MERGE STUDENT's FIRST NAME]:

This is a follow up to the communications you received from me asking you to participate in a study. As you may recall, researchers at the University of Cincinnati are conducting this study. We are interested in knowing more about students' participation in online surveys about dating and sexual violence on campuses so to inform their prevention.

You have been randomly selected to participate in a web-based survey. Of course, you have a choice about whether or not to complete the survey. If you do participate, you are free to skip any questions or discontinue at any time. The survey takes about 20 minutes to complete. Your responses will be kept completely confidential.

As a token of our appreciation, you will receive a $5.00 Amazon gift card via email once you participate in the survey. Please find a time to complete this survey when you are alone.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (513) 556-5828 or Preventsv@gmail.com. Should you not want to participate in this study, you can email me at Preventsv@gmail.com and I will take you off the mailing list.

When you are ready to begin the survey, click on the link below:

[LINK]

Please complete this survey as soon as possible.

Thank you for participating! I really appreciate it!

Sincerely,

Professor Bonnie S. Fisher
School of Criminal Justice

Appendix 4

Final Follow-up Email

SUBJECT: FOLLOWUP TO $5 AMAZON GIFT CARD: PLEASE COMPLETE UC SURVEY

Date

Greeting [MAIL MERGE STUDENT's FIRST NAME]:

About two weeks I sent a letter asking you to participate in a study examining students' responses to an online survey about dating and sexual violence. I know you are very busy this time of the year, but I would really appreciate your responses to this survey. As a token of my appreciation, I enclosed two dollars in the letter you received.

I am trying to determine the extent and correlates of dating and sexual violence among UC students so to inform their prevention. I need a representative sample to do this so your responses are very important to the integrity of study's results.

You were randomly selected to participate in a web-based survey. Of course, you have a choice about whether or not to complete the survey. If you do participate, you are free to skip any questions or discontinue at any time. The survey takes about 20 minutes to complete. Your responses will be kept completely confidential. Please find a time to complete this survey when you are alone.

As a token of our appreciation, you will receive a $5.00 Amazon gift card via email once you participate in the survey. Please find a time to complete this survey when you are alone.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (513) 556-5828 or Preventsv@gmail.com. Should you not want to participate in this study, you can email me at Preventsv@gmail.com and I will take you off the mailing list.

When you are ready to begin the survey, click on the link below:

[LINK]

Please complete this survey as soon as possible.

Thank you for participating! I really appreciate it!

Sincerely,

Professor Bonnie S. Fisher
School of Criminal Justice

Appendix 5

Survey Document



***Do you want to complete the survey now?** Q1

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

***How old are you?** Q2

- ◯ 17 or younger
- ◯ 18
- ◯ 19
- ◯ 20
- ◯ 21
- ◯ 22
- ◯ 23
- ◯ 24
- ◯ 25 or older

What is your year in school? Q3

- ◯ Freshman
- ◯ Sophomore
- ◯ Junior
- ◯ Senior
- ◯ Other, please specify Q3_Other

What is your sex? Q4

- ◯ Male
- ◯ Female

How would you describe yourself? Check all that apply.

- ☐ American Indian or Alaska Native Q5_Indian
- ☐ Asian Q5_Asian
- ☐ Black or African American Q5_Black
- ☐ Hispanic or Latino/Latina Q5_Hispanic
- ☐ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander Q5_Pacific
- ☐ White Q5_White
- ☐ Other, please specify Q5_Other

Q5_OtherB

What is the highest level of schooling your mother has completed? Q6

- ◯ Some elementary, middle, or high school
- ◯ High school graduate
- ◯ GED
- ◯ Vocational school
- ◯ Some college
- ◯ College graduate
- ◯ Master's degree
- ◯ Doctorate
- ◯ Professional degree such as MD or JD

What is the highest level of schooling your father has completed? Q7

- ◯ Some elementary, middle, or high school
- ◯ High school graduate
- ◯ GED
- ◯ Vocational school
- ◯ Some college
- ◯ College graduate
- ◯ Master's degree
- ◯ Doctorate
- ◯ Professional degree such as MD or JD

People are different in their sexual attraction to other people. Which best describes you? Q8

- ◯ Only attracted to females
- ◯ Mostly attracted to females
- ◯ Equally attracted to females and males
- ◯ Mostly attracted to males
- ◯ Only attracted to males
- ◯ Not sure

***Which of the following best describes your dating status? By "dating", we mean anything from a casual to a committed relationship, including all of the following: Hooking up with someone, doing something sexual with someone, having an open relationship in which you are also dating other people, going out on dates with someone, being in a committed relationship with a boyfriend or girlfriend, living with a boyfriend or girlfriend.**

Q9

- ◯ Casual dating, not in a committed relationship
- ◯ Doing something sexual with someone, not in a committed relationship
- ◯ Not currently dating, but I have dated since the beginning of the Fall 2014 semester
- ◯ Not currently dating, but I have in the past (before the beginning of the Fall 2014 semester)
- ◯ I am in a committed relationship with my boyfriend or girlfriend, not living together
- ◯ Living with my boyfriend or girlfriend, or married
- ◯ None of the above

Have you ever been pregnant or gotten someone pregnant?

Q10

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No
- ◯ I don't know

These next questions are about things that may have happened to you. Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times were you afraid for your personal safety because the following situations happened?

***Someone showed up where you live, work or go to school when you did not want them to.**

Q11

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Who did this?

Q12

- ◯ Current partner
- ◯ Previous partner
- ◯ Friend
- ◯ Acquaintance
- ◯ Stranger



***You received unwanted phone calls, emails, text or instant messages, or comments/pictures posted on social networking sites (for example, Facebook or Twitter), or unwanted gifts.** Q13

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Who did this? Q14

- ○ Current partner
- ○ Previous partner
- ○ Friend
- ○ Acquaintance
- ○ Stranger
- ○ I don't know who did this.

***Someone posted mean, insulting, or humiliating comments about you either online (for example, Facebook page or blog) or in emails, text or instant messages, or voicemails.** Q15

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Who did this? Q16

- ○ Current partner
- ○ Previous partner
- ○ Friend
- ○ Acquaintance
- ○ Stranger
- ○ I don't know who did this.

These next questions are about things that may have happened to you. Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times were you afraid for your personal safety because the following situations happened?

***Someone showed up where you live, work or go to school when you did not want them to.** Q17

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Who did this?

Q18

- ◯ Current partner
- ◯ Previous partner
- ◯ Friend
- ◯ Acquaintance
- ◯ Stranger

***You received unwanted phone calls, emails, text or instant messages, or comments/pictures posted on social networking sites (for example, Facebook or Twitter), or unwanted gifts.** Q19

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Who did this?

Q20

- ◯ Current partner
- ◯ Previous partner
- ◯ Friend
- ◯ Acquaintance
- ◯ Stranger
- ◯ I don't know who did this.

***Someone posted mean, insulting, or humiliating comments about me either online (for example, Facebook page or blog) or in emails, text or instant messages, or voicemails.**

Q21

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Who did this?

Q22

- ◯ Current partner
- ◯ Previous partner
- ◯ Friend
- ◯ Acquaintance
- ◯ Stranger
- ◯ I don't know who did this.

Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term how many times have these things happened with a current or previous partner? By partner, we mean any current or former spouse, boyfriend, girlfriend, or dating partner or any person with whom you have ever been romantically or sexually involved.



*My partner shouted, yelled, insulted or swore at me.

Q23

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

*My partner posted mean, insulting, or humiliating comments about me either online (for example, Facebook page or blog) or in emails, text or instant messages, or voicemails.

Q24A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

*My partner threatened to hit, throw something at, or otherwise physically hurt me.

Q25 A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

*My partner destroyed something that belonged to me on purpose.

Q26A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

*My partner tried to control me by always checking up on me, telling me who I could be friends with or telling me what I could do and when.

Q27 A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

*My partner pushed or shoved me.

Q28A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

*My partner threw something at me that could hurt.

Q29 A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

*My partner punched or beat me up.

Q30 A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○



***My partner used a knife, gun or something that could hurt me.**

Q31A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

My partner posted mean, insulting, or humiliating comments about me either online (for example, Facebook page or blog) or in emails, text or instant messages, or voicemails.

Q24B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

My partner threatened to hit, throw something at, or otherwise physically hurt me.

Q25B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

My partner destroyed something that belonged to me on purpose.

Q26B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

My partner tried to control me by always checking up on me, telling me who I could be friends with or telling me what I could do and when.

Q27B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

My partner pushed or shoved me.

Q28B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

My partner threw something at me that could hurt.

Q29B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

My partner punched or beat me up.

Q30B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

My partner used a knife, gun or something that could hurt me.

Q31B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Have you ever been physically hurt or injured by a partner?

Q32

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Was being physically hurt or injured by your partner so frightening, horrible or upsetting you:

Had nightmares about it or thought about it when you did not want to?

Q33

- ○ No
- ○ Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ○ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

Tried hard not to think about it or went out of your way to avoid situations that reminded you of it?

Q34

- ○ No
- ○ Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ○ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

Were constantly on guard, watchful, or easily startled?

Q35

- ○ No
- ○ Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ○ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

Felt numb or detached from others, activities, or your surroundings?

Q36

- ○ No
- ○ Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ○ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term:

Have you talked to a friend, family member, or counselor, called a hotline, gone online, sought medical care or called police as a result of being physically hurt or injured by your partner?

	No	Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
Talked with a friend Q37_Friend	○	○	○
Talked with a family member Q37_Family	○	○	○
Talked with a Resident Advisor (RA) for my dorm Q37_RA	○	○	○
Talked with a victim advocate Q37_VA	○	○	○
Talked with a counselor, therapist or other mental health provider Q37_Counselor	○	○	○
Contacted the Women's Center at UC Q37_UCWomen	○	○	○
Gone online to get help Q37_Online	○	○	○
Contacted UC Health Services Q37_UCHealth	○	○	○
Contacted Counseling Center at UC Q37_UCCounseling	○	○	○
Sought medical care off-campus Q37_Medical	○	○	○
Called a hotline Q37_Hotline	○	○	○
Called police Q37_Police	○	○	○

Have you missed classes or work because your partner physically hurt or injured you? Q38

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Have you turned in assignments or taken exams late, or were you unable to complete assignments or take exams, because your partner physically hurt or injured you? Q39

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Have your grades gotten worse because your partner physically hurt or injured you? Q40

○ Yes

○ No

Have you thought about leaving this university because your partner physically hurt or injured you?

Q41

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

My partner hid, damaged or threw away my birth control method to prevent me from using it.

Q42

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Not applicable	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

My partner refused to use a condom or other protection when I wanted him or her to.

Q43

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

My partner said to me, "You want us to use birth control, condoms, or other protection so you can sleep around with other people" or something similar.

Q44

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

My partner said to me, "If we have a baby, you will never have to worry about me leaving you. I will always be around" or something similar.

Q45

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Not applicable	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

My partner made me have sex without using birth control, condoms or other protection so you would get pregnant.

Q46

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

My partner told me not to use any birth control (like the pill, shot, ring, etc);

Q47

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Not applicable	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

If not applicable, please leave this page blank.

Please describe more about what happened when your partner wouldn't let you use birth control, condoms or other protection when you wanted to or made other statements about wanting to have a baby with you. Q48

As a result of the things your partner did/said about birth control and/or condoms, did you have sex that made you afraid of getting pregnant when you didn't want to or getting a sexually transmitted infection? Q49

Did you stop using birth control or condoms because of what your partner wanted? Q50

Were you afraid of what your partner might do if you didn't do what he or she wanted? Q51

If your partner said "If we have a baby, you will never have to worry about me leaving you. I will always be around" or something similar, what did you think he or she meant by that? Q52

Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times did someone:

Make gestures, rude remarks or use sexual body language to embarrass or upset you? Q53

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Keep asking you out on a date or asking you to hookup even though you said "No"? Q54

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

***Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, have you ever sent a nude, nearly nude or sexually explicit photograph or video of yourself to someone?** Q55

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ Choose not to answer

***Were you asked by someone known (e.g., intimate partner, date, acquaintance, hookup) or a stranger to send the photo or video?**

- ◯ Someone known Q56
- ◯ Stranger
- ◯ No, not asked by anyone
- ◯ Choose not to answer

As a result of sending the photo or video, did any of the following occur (check all that apply):

- ☐ Felt existing relationship improved Q57_Improved
- ☐ Felt upset Q57_Upset
- ☐ Felt embarrassed Q57_Embarrassed
- ☐ Felt afraid Q57_Afraid
- ☐ Received positive attention from someone else/other people Q57_Pos
- ☐ Received negative attention from someone else/other people Q57_Neg
- ☐ It was shared with others Q57_Shared
- ☐ None of the above Q57_None

Other (please specify) Q57_Other

***Were you asked by someone known (e.g., intimate partner, date, acquaintance, hookup) or a stranger to send the photo or video?**

- ◯ Someone known Q58
- ◯ Stranger
- ◯ No, not asked by anyone
- ◯ Choose not to answer

How much were you bothered by being asked?

- ◯ Not at all Q59
- ◯ A little
- ◯ A lot
- ◯ A great deal

Since the beginning of Fall term, have you distributed nude, mostly nude or sexually explicit photographs or videos of another person without their permission?

- ◯ No Q60
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Choose not to answer

How did you distribute these photographs or videos? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Text message Q61_Text
- ☐ Email message Q61_Email
- ☐ Posted online Q61_Online
- ☐ Physical photograph or video Q61_Physical
- ☐ Other Q61_Other

Other (please specify) Q61_OtherT

What relationship did you have with the subject of these photographs or videos?

- ◯ Current partner Q62
- ◯ Previous partner
- ◯ Friend
- ◯ Acquaintance
- ◯ Stranger

Did you distribute these photographs/videos to get back at the person?

- ◯ No Q63
- ◯ Yes

Did you have other reasons to distribute these photographs/videos? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Humiliate Q64_Humiliate
- ☐ Control Q64_Control
- ☐ Boast/Brag Q64_Boast
- ☐ Gain respect from others Q64_Respect
- ☐ Scare Q64_Scare
- ☐ Get money Q64_Money
- ☐ I don't know Q64_Unsure
- ☐ Other Q64_Other

Other (please specify) Q64_OtherT

***Since the beginning of the 2014 Fall term, have you ever received a nude, nearly nude or sexually explicit photograph or video of someone?**

- ◯ Yes Q65
- ◯ No
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Did you ask the person who sent the photo or video to send it?

- ◯ Yes Q66
- ◯ No

Was the photo or video of the person who sent it?

- ◯ Yes Q67
- ◯ No
- ◯ Unsure

As a result of receiving the photo or video, did any of the following occur (check all that apply):

- ☐ Felt existing relationship improved Q68_Improved
- ☐ Felt upset Q68_Upset
- ☐ Felt embarrassed Q68_Embarrassed
- ☐ Felt afraid Q68_Afraid
- ☐ Received positive attention from someone else/other people Q68_Pos
- ☐ Received negative attention from someone else/other people Q68_Neg
- ☐ It was shared with others Q68_Shared
- ☐ None of the above Q68_None

Other (please specify) Q68_Other

How much were you bothered by receiving it?

- ◯ Not at all Q69
- ◯ A little
- ◯ A lot
- ◯ A great deal

How many times has anyone photographed or filmed you nude or mostly nude?

- ◯ 0 times Q70
- ◯ 1 time
- ◯ 2 times
- ◯ 3-5 times
- ◯ 6-9 times
- ◯ 10 or more times
- ◯ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Who did this?

- ☐ Current partner Q71_Current
- ☐ Previous partner Q71_Previous
- ☐ Friend Q71_Friend
- ☐ Acquaintance Q71_Acquaintance
- ☐ Stranger Q71_Stranger
- ☐ I don't know who did this Q71_Unsure

Since the beginning of Fall term, has anyone distributed nude, mostly nude or sexually suggestive photographs or videos of you without your permission?

- ◯ No Q72
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Choose not to answer

How were these photographs or videos distributed? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Text message Q73_Text
- ☐ Email message Q73_Email
- ☐ Posted online Q73_Online
- ☐ Physical photograph or video Q73_Physical
- ☐ Other Q73_Other

Who distributed these photographs or videos?

- ◯ Current partner Q14
- ◯ Previous partner
- ◯ Friend
- ◯ Acquaintance
- ◯ Stranger
- ◯ I don't know who did this

Did this person distribute these photographs/videos to get back at you?

- ◯ No Q15
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Are there other reasons this person distributed these photographs/videos? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Humiliate Q16_Humiliate
- ☐ Control Q16_Control
- ☐ Boast/Brag Q16_Boast
- ☐ Gain respect from others Q16_Respect
- ☐ Scare Q16_Scare
- ☐ Get money Q16_Money
- ☐ I don't know Q16_Unsure
- ☐ Other Q16_Other

Other (please specify) Q16_OtherS

These next questions are about unwanted or nonconsensual sexual activity you may have experienced. Unwanted sexual activity means someone sexually touching private areas of your body, or sexual penetration by a penis, fingers or object inside your vagina or anus, or oral sex when someone's mouth or tongue contact your genitals . The person could be someone you know or don't know. Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times have you:

***Had unwanted sexual activities with someone because they threatened to end your relationship if you didn't, or you felt pressured by someone's arguments or begging or someone promised to reward you?**

Q77

- ◯ 0 times
- ◯ 1 time
- ◯ 2 times
- ◯ 3-5 times
- ◯ 6-9 times
- ◯ 10 or more times
- ◯ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Who did this?

Q79

- ◯ Current partner
- ◯ Previous partner
- ◯ Friend
- ◯ Faculty or instructor
- ◯ Acquaintance
- ◯ Stranger

Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times have you:

***Had unwanted sexual activities with someone because you were passed out, asleep, or too drunk or high on drugs to consent or stop what was happening?**

Q79A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Who did this?

Q80A

- ◯ Current partner
- ◯ Previous partner
- ◯ Friend
- ◯ Acquaintance
- ◯ Stranger

Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times have you:



***Had unwanted sexual activities because someone threatened to use or used physical force (twisting your arm, holding you down, etc.)?**

Q81A

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Who did this?

Q82A

- ○ Current partner
- ○ Previous partner
- ○ Friend
- ○ Acquaintance
- ○ Stranger

Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times have you:

***Had unwanted sexual activities with someone because you were passed out, asleep, or too drunk or high on drugs to consent or stop what was happening?**

Q79B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Who did this?

Q80B

- ○ Current partner
- ○ Previous partner
- ○ Friend
- ○ Acquaintance
- ○ Stranger

Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times have you:

***Had unwanted sexual activities because someone threatened to use or used physical force (twisting your arm, holding you down, etc)?**

Q81B

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Who did this? Q82

- ◯ Current partner
- ◯ Previous partner
- ◯ Friend
- ◯ Acquaintance
- ◯ Stranger

***Have you been hurt as a result of unwanted sexual activities?** Q83

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Please tell us how you were hurt by unwanted sexual activity.

- ◯ I was physically hurt Q84
- ◯ I was emotionally hurt
- ◯ Other, please specify Q84_Other

Was the unwanted sexual activity so frightening, horrible or upsetting you:

Had nightmares about it or thought about it when you did not want to? Q85

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ◯ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

Tried hard not to think about it or went out of your way to avoid situations that reminded you of it? Q86

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ◯ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

Were constantly on guard, watchful, or easily startled? Q87

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ◯ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

Felt numb or detached from others, activities, or your surroundings?

- ◯ No Q88
- ◯ Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- ◯ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

Have you talked to a friend, family member, or counselor, called a hotline, gone online, sought medical care or called police as a result of unwanted sexual activities?

	No	Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
Talked with a friend Q89_Friend	◯	◯	◯
Talked with a family member Q89_Family	◯	◯	◯
Talked with a Resident Advisor (RA) for my dorm Q89_RA	◯	◯	◯
Talked with a victim advocate Q89_VA	◯	◯	◯
Talked with a counselor, therapist or other mental health provider Q89_Counselor	◯	◯	◯
Contacted the Women's Center at UC Q89_UCWomen's	◯	◯	◯
Gone online to get help Q89_Online	◯	◯	◯
Contacted UC Health Services Q89_UCHealth	◯	◯	◯
Contacted Counseling Center at UC Q89_UCCounseling	◯	◯	◯
Sought medical care off-campus Q89_Medical	◯	◯	◯
Called a hotline Q89_Hotline	◯	◯	◯
Called police Q89_Police	◯	◯	◯

Have you missed classes or work as a result of unwanted sexual activities?

Q90

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Have you turned in assignments or taken exams late, or were you unable to complete assignments or take exams, because of unwanted sexual activities?

Q91

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Have your grades gotten worse as a result of unwanted sexual activities?

◯ Yes Q92

◯ No

Have you thought about leaving this university as a result of unwanted sexual activities?

◯ Yes Q93

◯ No

While you were growing up, during your first 18 years of life:

Did a parent or other adult in the household often or very often swear at you, insult you, put you down, or humiliate you?

◯ No Q94

◯ Yes

Did a parent or other adult in the household often or very often act in a way that made you afraid that you might be physically hurt?

◯ No Q95

◯ Yes

Did a parent or other adult in the household often or very often push, grab, slap, or throw something at you?

◯ No Q96

◯ Yes

Did a parent or other adult in the household often or very often ever hit you so hard that you had marks or were injured?

◯ No Q97

◯ Yes

Did an adult or person at least 5 years older than you ever touch or fondle you or have you touch their body in a sexual way?

◯ No Q98

◯ Yes

Did an adult or person at least 5 years older than you ever attempt or actually have oral, anal, or vaginal intercourse with you?

◯ No Q99

◯ Yes

Did you often or very often feel that no one in your family loved you or thought you were important or special?

◯ No Q100

◯ Yes

Did you often or very often feel that your family didn't look out for each other, feel close to each other, or support each other?

◯ No Q101

◯ Yes

Did you often or very often feel that you didn't have enough to eat, had to wear dirty clothes, and had no one to protect you?

◯ No Q102

◯ Yes

Did you often or very often feel that your parents were too drunk or high to take care of you or take you to the doctor if you needed it?

◯ No Q103

◯ Yes

Were your parents ever separated or divorced?

◯ No Q104

◯ Yes

Was your mother or stepmother often or very often pushed, grabbed, slapped, or had something thrown at her?

◯ No Q105

◯ Yes

Was your mother or stepmother sometimes, often, or very often kicked, bitten, hit with a fist, or hit with something hard?

◯ No Q106

◯ Yes

Was your mother or stepmother ever repeatedly hit at least a few minutes or threatened with a gun or knife?

◯ No Q107

◯ Yes

Did you live with anyone who was a problem drinker or alcoholic or who used street drugs?

◯ No Q108

◯ Yes

Was a household member depressed or mentally ill, or did a household member attempt suicide?

◯ No Q109

◯ Yes

Did a household member go to prison?

◯ No Q110

◯ Yes

Since the beginning of Fall 2014 term how many times have you experienced any of the following behaviors online?

	0 Times	1 Time	2 Times	3 - 5 Times	6 - 9 Times	10 or More Times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
Harassment Q111_Harassment	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Unwanted sexual advances Q111_USA	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Threats of physical harm Q111_Threats	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Identity or financial information stolen Q111_Id	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Online program hacked (e.g., social network, email, etc.) Q111_Hacked	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Receive a virus, malware, or spyware Q111_Virus	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Since the beginning of Fall 2014 term how many times has anyone used or attempted to use any of the following without your permission?

	0 Times	1 Time	2 Times	3 - 5 Times	6 - 9 Times	10 or More Times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
Credit Card Information Q112_CC	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Bank Account Information Q112_Bank	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Other Personal Information (e.g. Social Security #) Q112_Other	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Did you report this experience to law enforcement (e.g., municipal police, campus police)?

Q113

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Not applicable (N/A)

Did this experience cause you to worry about your personal safety?

Q114

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Not applicable (N/A)

Do you consider these experiences to be cyberstalking?

Q115

- ◯ No
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Not applicable (N/A)

When you were in high school or middle school, did you hear a talk or attend a training about preventing dating violence or sexual violence?

Q116

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

***While a student at UC, have you heard a Green Dot talk or speech?**

Q117

- ◯ Yes, one time
- ◯ Yes, two times
- ◯ Yes, more than two times
- ◯ No
- ◯ Choose not to answer

This section asks your opinion about sexual violence and dating violence. Thinking about your own feelings and beliefs, please indicate how much you personally agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong responses.

I have the skills to help prevent dating violence and sexual violence on my campus.

Q118

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
◯	◯	◯	◯

I believe my peers will listen to me if I speak out against dating violence and sexual violence.

Q119

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
◯	◯	◯	◯

I believe that dating violence and sexual violence on my campus can be prevented.

Q120

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
◯	◯	◯	◯

I feel that my personal efforts can make a difference in reducing dating violence and sexual violence. Q121

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
○	○	○	○

I have personally been affected by dating violence or sexual violence, because it happened to me or someone I know. Q122

Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
○	○	○	○

The following is a list of things you may have done to help another student or friend who has experienced unwanted online behaviors such as harassment, threats, or sexual solicitations. Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times have YOU done the following:

Helped or got help for someone who:

	No opportunity/Have not faced such a situation to speak up	0 Times	1 Time	2 Times	3 - 5 Times	6 - 9 Times	10 or More Times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
Received unwanted texts, instant messages, emails, or other online communications Q123_Unwanted	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Received mean, insulting, or humiliating comments online, or in texts, instant messages, emails, or other online communications Q123_Mean	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Received unwanted sexual materials online, or in texts, instant messages, emails, or other online communications Q123_Sexual	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Was harassed or threatened online, or in a text, email, or instant message Q123_Harassed	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Had nude, mostly nude or sexually explicit photos or videos of them posted online or sent to others without their permission Q123_Photo	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Discussed the possible dangers of:

	No opportunity/Have not faced such a situation to speak up	0 Times	1 Time	2 Times	3 - 5 Times	6 - 9 Times	10 or More Times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
Communicating with strangers online Q124_Strangers	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Revealing personal information online Q124_Personal	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Sexting (sending nude or semi-nude pictures of oneself through text messages or other electronic methods) Q124_Sexting	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○



Spoke up when I heard someone had:

	No opportunity/Have not faced such a situation to speak up	0 Times	1 Time	2 Times	3 - 5 Times	6 - 9 Times	10 or More Times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
Repeatedly sent unwanted texts, instant messages, emails or other electronic communications Q125_Unwanted	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Posted mean, insulting, or humiliating comments about someone online, or in texts, instant messages, emails, or other online communications Q125_Mean	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Sent someone unwanted sexual materials online, or in texts, instant messages, emails, or other online communications Q125_Sexual	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Harassed or threatened someone online, or in a text, email, or instant message Q125_Harassed	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Posted nude, mostly nude or sexually explicit photos or videos of someone online or sent to others without their permission Q125_Photo	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

On a scale from 0 (Not Likely at All) to 10 (Very Likely), how likely do you think it is that you will experience the following in the next year online?

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Harassment Q126_Harassment	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Unwanted sexual advances Q126_USA	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Threats of physical harm Q126_Physical	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Identity or financial information stolen Q126_Id	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Online program hacked (e.g., social network, email, etc.) Q126_Hacked	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Receive a virus, malware, or spyware Q126_Virus	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

On a scale from 0 (Not Afraid at All) to 10 (Very Afraid), how afraid are you that you will experience the following in the next year online?

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Harassment Q127_Harassment	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Unwanted sexual advances Q127_USA	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Threats of physical harm Q127_Physical	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Identity or financial information stolen Q127_Id	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Online program hacked (e.g., social network, email, etc.) Q127_Hacked	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Receive a virus, malware, or spyware Q127_Virus	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

How much control do you feel you have over these things?

	1 (No Control)	2	3	4 (Total Control)
Significant others Q127- SO	◯	◯	◯	◯
School Q128- School	◯	◯	◯	◯
Job Q128- Job	◯	◯	◯	◯
Recreation Q129- Recreation	◯	◯	◯	◯
Society Q128- Society	◯	◯	◯	◯
Other People Q121-Other	◯	◯	◯	◯

How much control do you feel these things have over you?

	1 (No Control)	2	3	4 (Total Control)
Significant others Q129- SO	◯	◯	◯	◯
School Q129 - School	◯	◯	◯	◯
Job Q129- Job	◯	◯	◯	◯
Recreation Q129- Recreation	◯	◯	◯	◯
Society Q129- Society	◯	◯	◯	◯
Other People Q129- Other	◯	◯	◯	◯

Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
I often act on the spur of the moment without stopping to think Q130_Spur	◯	◯	◯	◯
I don't devote much thought and effort to thinking about the future Q130_Future	◯	◯	◯	◯
I often do whatever brings me pleasure here and now, even at the cost of some distant goal Q130_Pleasure	◯	◯	◯	◯
I'm more concerned with what happens to me in the short run than in the long run Q130_Short	◯	◯	◯	◯
I frequently try to avoid projects that I know will be difficult Q130_Difficult	◯	◯	◯	◯
When things get complicated, I tend to quit or withdraw Q130_Quit	◯	◯	◯	◯
The things in life that are the easiest to do bring me the most pleasure Q130_Easy	◯	◯	◯	◯
I dislike really hard tasks that stretch my abilities to the limit Q130_Hard	◯	◯	◯	◯
I like to test myself now and then by doing something a little risky Q130_Risky	◯	◯	◯	◯
Sometimes I will take a risk just for the fun of it Q130_Fun	◯	◯	◯	◯
I sometimes find it exciting to do things for which I might get in trouble Q130_Trouble	◯	◯	◯	◯
Excitement and adventure are more important to me than security Q130_Security	◯	◯	◯	◯
If I had a choice, I would almost always rather do something physical than something mental Q130_Physical	◯	◯	◯	◯
I almost always feel better when I am on the move than when I am sitting and thinking Q130_Move	◉	◯	◯	◯
I like to get out and do things more than I like to read or contemplate ideas Q130_DoThings	◯	◯	◯	◯
I seem to have more energy and a greater need for activity than most other people my age Q130_Activity	◯	◯	◯	◯
I try to look out for myself first, even if it means making things difficult for other people Q130_Myself	◉	◯	◯	◯
I'm not very sympathetic to other people when they are having problems Q130_Sympathetic	◯	◯	◯	◯
If things I do upset people, it's their problem not mine Q130_Upset	◯	◯	◯	◯
I will try to get things I want even when I know it's causing problems for other people Q130_Want	◉	◯	◯	◯
I lose my temper pretty easy Q130_Temper	◯	◯	◯	◯
Often, when I'm angry at people, I feel more like hurting them than talking to them about why I am angry Q130_Hurting	◯	◯	◯	◯
When I'm really angry, other people should stay away from me Q130_Angry	◯	◯	◯	◯
When I have a serious disagreement with someone, it's usually hard for me to talk calmly about it without getting upset Q130_Disagreement	◯	◯	◯	◯

The next question is in regard to the way you may have felt about things.

Have you ever felt so sad or hopeless almost every day for 2 weeks or more in a row that you stopped doing some usual activities?

◯ No Q131

◯ Yes, since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

◯ Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

The next questions are about drinking alcohol (this includes beer, wine, wine coolers, and liquor such as rum, vodka, bourbon or whiskey). Drinking alcohol does not include drinking a few sips of wine for religious reasons.

***In the past month, on how many days did you have 5 or more drinks of alcohol in a row (within a couple of hours)?**

- ◯ I never drink Q132
- ◯ 0 days
- ◯ 1-2 days
- ◯ 3-9 days
- ◯ 10-19 days
- ◯ 20-31 days
- ◯ Choose not to answer

During the past month, where have you typically been drinking alcohol?

- ◯ At my home Q133
- ◯ At someone else's home
- ◯ At a dorm
- ◯ At a fraternity or sorority
- ◯ At restaurants/bars near campus

Other (please specify) Q133_Other

During the past month, when you have been drinking alcohol, about how many people were you with?

- ◯ I was by myself Q134
- ◯ 1
- ◯ 2-5
- ◯ 6-20
- ◯ 21-50
- ◯ 51-100
- ◯ 101+

On average, approximately how many of the people who were there did you know?

- ◯ No one Q135
- ◯ A few of them
- ◯ About half
- ◯ Most of them
- ◯ Everyone

During the past month, have you:

Been unable to remember things that happened while you were drinking alcohol? (things you would normally remember)

- ◯ No, never Q136
- ◯ Yes, in the past month
- ◯ Not in the past month, but in the past year

Done things when drinking alcohol that you normally would not do and you now regret doing? Q137

- ◯ No, never
- ◯ Yes, in the past month
- ◯ Not in the past month, but in the past year

The next question is about drug use, by this we mean both illegal and prescription drugs.

In the past month have you used drugs other than those required for medical reasons?

- ◯ No, never Q138
- ◯ Yes, in the past month
- ◯ Not in the past month, but in the past year

These questions are about you, where you live, and how you spend your time..

Are you a full-time or part-time student?

- ◯ Full-time Q139
- ◯ Part-time
- ◯ Other, please specify Q139_Other

Are you on an athletic team?

- ◯ Yes Q140
- ◯ No

Are you... Q141

- ◯ In a Greek fraternity
- ◯ In a Greek sorority
- ◯ Neither

Where do you currently live?

- ◯ On-campus dorm, apartment or house Q142
- ◯ On-campus fraternity or sorority house
- ◯ Off-campus fraternity or sorority house
- ◯ Off-campus

With whom do you live?

- ◯ Live alone Q143
- ◯ With my parents or other adult relatives
- ◯ With a roommate/roommates (not a romantic partner)
- ◯ With my husband/wife, boyfriend/girlfriend or other romantic partner

The next series of questions will ask you about your activity or experience online or using electronic devices.

In an average day, how many hours do you spend online doing the following activities?

	0 Hours	1 Hour	2 Hours	3 - 5 Hours	6 - 9 Hours	10 or More Hours
Sending and/or responding to email Q144_Email	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Social networking (on website such as Facebook and Twitter) Q144Social Network	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Communicating with someone through instant messaging Q144_Instant Message	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Video chatting (e.g. Skype) Q144Skype	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Blogging (reading or writing) Q144 _Blogging	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Downloading music, films, or podcasts Q144 _Music	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Participating in chat rooms or other forums Q144_Chat	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Watching TV, YouTube videos, or listening to the radio Q144_TV	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Participating in class discussions (e.g. on Blackboard) Q144_Class	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Visiting pornographic websites Q144_Porn	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

How often do you send and receive text messages?

Q145

- ◯ Never
- ◯ Less than once a week
- ◯ At least once a week
- ◯ At least once a day
- ◯ Several times a day

How often do you send and receive text messages from friends?

Q146

- ◯ Never
- ◯ Less than once a week
- ◯ At least once a week
- ◯ At least once a day
- ◯ Several times a day

How often do you send and receive text messages from a boyfriend/girlfriend/partner?

Q147

- ◯ Never
- ◯ Less than once a week
- ◯ At least once a week
- ◯ At least once a day
- ◯ Several times a day

How often do you send and receive text messages from family?

Q148

- ◯ Never
- ◯ Less than once a week
- ◯ At least once a week
- ◯ At least once a day
- ◯ Several times a day

How often do you send and receive text messages from strangers or people you have not met?

Q149

- ◯ Never
- ◯ Less than once a week
- ◯ At least once a week
- ◯ At least once a day
- ◯ Several times a day

How often do you use your phone to send or receive emails?

Q150

- ◯ Never
- ◯ Less than once a week
- ◯ At least once a week
- ◯ At least once a day
- ◯ Several times a day

How many individuals do you talk to online who you have not met in real life?

Q151

- ◯ 0 people
- ◯ 1 person
- ◯ 2 people
- ◯ 3-5 people
- ◯ 6-9 people
- ◯ 10+ people
- ◯ Choose not to answer

What percentage of your friends do you know post mean, insulting, or humiliating comments about others either online (for example, Facebook page or blog) or in emails, text or instant messages, or voicemails?

Q152

- ◯ 0%-25%
- ◯ 26%-50%
- ◯ 51%-75%
- ◯ 76%-100%

What percentage of your friends do you know have sent any nude, nearly nude or sexually explicit photographs or videos of themselves to someone?

Q153

- ◯ 0%-25%
- ◯ 26%-50%
- ◯ 51%-75%
- ◯ 76%-100%

How many friends do you have on your social networks?

Q154

- ◯ Under 100
- ◯ 100-500
- ◯ 500-1000
- ◯ Over 1000

How many of these friends do you talk to on a weekly basis?

- ◯ 0%-25% Q155
- ◯ 26%-50%
- ◯ 51%-75%
- ◯ 76%-100%

What, if any, personal information do you post online? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Full name Q156_Name
- ☐ Phone number Q156_Number
- ☐ Email Q156_Email
- ☐ Address Q156_Address
- ☐ Work/School Q156_Work
- ☐ Relationship status Q156_Relationship
- ☐ Sexual orientation Q156_SexualOrientation
- ☐ Addresses for other social network/blog sites Q156_SocialNetwork
- ☐ Interests/Activities Q156_Interests
- ☐ Photos of myself Q156_Photos
- ☐ Videos of myself Q156_Videos
- ☐ I do not post personal information online Q156_None

What, if any, personal information do you share with people you meet online? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ Full name Q157_Name
- ☐ Phone number Q157_Number
- ☐ Email Q157_Email
- ☐ Address Q157_Address
- ☐ Work/School Q157_Work
- ☐ Relationship status Q157_RelationshipStatus
- ☐ Sexual orientation Q157_SexualOrientation
- ☐ Addresses for other social network/blog sites Q157_SocialNetwork
- ☐ Interests/Activities Q157_Interests
- ☐ Photos of myself Q157_Photos
- ☐ Videos of myself Q157_Videos
- ☐ I do not share personal information online Q157_None

How often do you update your social network accounts?

- ◯ Less than once a month Q158
- ◯ Once a month
- ◯ Once a week
- ◯ A few times a week
- ◯ Everyday
- ◯ Multiple times a day
- ◯ Other

What protection settings do you use on your social media accounts? (Check all that apply)

- ☐ My account is public Q159. Public
- ☐ Only friends and friends of friends can view my account Q159. Friends of Friends
- ☐ Only friends can view my account Q159. Friends
- ☐ I have to give permission before anything is posted to my account Q159. Permission
- ☐ Other Q159. Other

Is your computer password protected?

- ◯ No Q160
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Does anyone else know your computer password?

- ◯ No Q161
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Does your computer have antivirus software installed?

- ◯ No Q162
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Is your phone password/passcode protected?

- ◯ No Q163
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Does anyone else know your password for your phone?

- ◯ No Q164
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Does anyone else know your password for email or social media accounts?

- ◯ No Q165
- ◯ Yes
- ◯ Choose not to answer

Since the beginning of Fall term, how many times has someone used or copied your social media accounts without your permission?

Q166

0 times	1 time	2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10 or more times	Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term	Choose not to answer
◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Who used or copied your social media accounts without permission?

- ☐ Current partner Q167_Current
- ☐ Previous partner Q167_Previous
- ☐ Friend Q167_Friend
- ☐ Acquaintance Q167_Acquaintance
- ☐ Stranger Q167_Stranger
- ☐ I don't know who did this Q167_Unsure

Why did this person use or copy your social media accounts?

- ☐ As a joke Q169_Joke
- ☐ To post rude, humiliating or threatening comments, photographs or videos Q169_Rude
- ☐ To check up on me Q169_Check
- ☐ I don't know why they did this Q169_Unsure
- ☐ Other Q169_Other

On a scale from 0 (Not Likely at All) to 10 (Very Likely), how likely do you think it is that you will experience any of the following next year?

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Physical harm by another person Q169_Harm	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Inappropriate sexual touching, forced kissing, forced oral sex, or forced sexual intercourse Q169_Sex	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Repeated unwanted contact, following, receiving unwanted gifts or attention from the same person Q169_Stalk	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Verbal threats of physical harm Q169_Threat	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

On a scale from 0 (Not Likely at All) to 10 (Very Likely), how afraid are you that you may experience any of the following next year?

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Physical harm by another person Q170_Harm	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Inappropriate sexual touching, forced kissing, forced oral sex, or forced sexual intercourse Q170_Sex	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Repeated unwanted contact, following, receiving unwanted gifts or attention from the same person Q170_Stalk	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Verbal threats of physical harm Q170_Threat	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

***Since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term, how many times do you suspect or know that someone put a drug into your drink WITHOUT your knowledge?**

- ☐ 0 times Q171
- ☐ 1 time
- ☐ 2 times
- ☐ 3-5 times
- ☐ 6 or more times
- ☐ This happened, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term

***Have you or someone you know put drugs in someone else's drink without their knowledge?** Q172

- [ ] 0 times
- [ ] 1 time
- [ ] 2 times
- [ ] 3-5 times
- [ ] 6-9 times
- [ ] 10 or more times
- [ ] Yes, but not since the beginning of the Fall 2014 term
- [ ] Choose not to answer

We would like to update our records for future surveys. Please provide us with the email address that you regularly use. Q173

We sometimes conduct other studies related to this one. Can we contact you by email and invite you to participate in another study? Please note that other studies may or may not have an incentive and that your answer will not affect your receiving the incentive for this study. Q174

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Appendix 6

Overall Study Sample Compared to Analytic Samples

Overall Study Sample Compared to Exposure Regression Sample

Variable	*Total Sample N (4063)*	*Total Sample %*	*Analytic Sample N (3319)*	*Analytic Sample %*	*z-score*	*Significance*
Texting Frequency						
Never	59	1.7	54	1.6	0.04	0.97
Less than once a day	105	3.0	93	2.8	0.08	0.93
At least once a day	3382	95.4	3172	95.6	-0.39	0.70
Texting Friends Frequency						
Never	63	1.8	59	1.8	0.00	1.00
Less than once a day	276	7.8	254	7.7	0.04	0.97
At least once a day	3197	90.4	3006	90.6	-0.27	0.79
Texting Significant Others Frequency						
Never	1253	35.6	1175	35.4	0.10	0.92
Less than once a day	209	5.9	196	5.9	0.00	1.00
At least once a day	2059	58.5	1948	58.7	-0.13	0.90
Texting Family Frequency						
Never	77	2.2	73	2.2	0.00	1.00
Less than once a day	1358	38.3	1269	38.2	0.05	0.96
At least once a day	2110	59.5	1977	59.6	-0.07	0.95
Texting Strangers Frequency						
Never	2452	69.1	2287	68.9	0.15	0.88
Less than once a day	1006	28.3	944	28.4	-0.05	0.96
At least once a day	93	2.6	88	2.7	-0.04	0.97
Time Spent in Risky Activities						
0 Hours	879	24.7	814	24.5	0.10	0.92
1 Hour	737	20.7	684	20.6	0.05	0.96
2 Hours	616	17.3	578	17.4	-0.05	0.96
3+ Hours	1333	37.4	1243	37.5	-0.05	0.96
Time Spent in School Activities						
0 Hours	483	13.6	452	13.6	0.00	1.00
1 Hour	1209	33.9	1124	33.9	0.00	1.00
2 Hours	960	26.9	896	27.0	-0.50	0.96
3+ Hours	912	25.6	847	25.5	0.05	0.96
Time Spent in Social Activities						
0 Hours	792	19.5	269	8.1	4.34	0.00*

1 Hour	716	17.6	660	19.9	-1.09	0.27
2 Hours	797	19.6	754	22.7	-1.50	0.14
3+ Hours	1758	43.3	1636	49.3	-3.50	0.00*
Gender						
Male	1665	42.6	1428	43.0	-0.22	0.82
Female	2243	57.4	1891	57.0	0.26	0.80
Year in School						
First Year	1069	27.3	891	26.8	0.25	0.80
Second Year	939	24.0	791	23.8	0.10	0.92
Third Year	977	25.0	830	25.0	0.00	1.00
Fourth+ Year	930	23.8	807	24.3	-0.24	0.81
Relationship Status						
Not in a committed relationship	2162	55.1	1822	54.9	0.13	0.90
In a committed relationship	1762	44.9	1497	45.1	-0.11	0.91
Sexual Orientation						
Heterosexual	3285	85.2	2824	85.1	0.11	0.91
Nonheterosexual	571	14.8	495	14.9	-0.05	0.96
Race/Ethnicity						
White	3148	81.3	2721	82.0	-0.69	0.49
African American	202	5.2	158	4.8	0.17	0.86
Asian	234	6.0	186	5.6	0.17	0.86
Hispanic	80	2.1	70	2.1	0.00	1.00
American Indian/Alaska Native	12	0.3	11	0.3	0.00	1.00
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	6	0.2	6	0.2	0.00	1.00
Multi	192	5.0	167	5.0	0.00	1.00

Overall Study Sample Compared to Proximity Regression Sample

Variable	*Total Sample N*	*Total Sample %*	*Analytic Sample N (3305)*	*Analytic Sample %*	*z-score*	*Significance*
Number of Friends Online						
500 or Fewer	2088	59.0	1940	58.7	0.19	0.85
More than 500	1449	41.0	1365	41.3	-0.16	0.87
How many friends online do you talk to in real life?						
Half or fewer	3362	94.8	3135	94.9	-0.18	0.86
More than half	186	5.2	170	5.1	0.04	0.97
How many strangers do you talk to online?						
None	2589	74.2	2455	74.3	-0.08	0.94
1-5	664	19.0	629	19.0	0.00	1.00
6+	237	6.8	221	6.7	0.04	0.97
Peer Online Deviance						
Half or less	3496	98.7	3265	98.8	-0.37	0.71
More than Half	45	1.3	40	1.2	0.04	0.97
Peer Sexting						
Half or less	3166	89.3	2955	89.4	-0.13	0.90
More than Half	379	10.7	350	10.6	0.04	0.97
Gender						
Male	1665	42.6	1405	42.5	0.06	0.96
Female	2243	57.4	1900	57.5	-0.06	0.95
Year in School						
First Year	1069	27.3	893	27.0	0.15	0.88
Second Year	939	24.0	781	23.6	0.19	0.85
Third Year	977	25.0	828	25.1	-0.05	0.96
Fourth+ Year	930	23.8	803	24.3	-0.24	0.81
Relationship Status						
Not in a committed relationship	2162	55.1	1798	54.4	0.44	0.66
In a committed relationship	1762	44.9	1507	45.6	-0.40	0.69
Sexual Orientation						
Heterosexual	3285	85.2	2828	85.6	-0.44	0.66
Nonheterosexual	571	14.8	477	14.4	0.18	0.86
Race/Ethnicity						
White	3148	81.3	2720	82.3	-0.99	0.32
African American	202	5.2	150	4.5	0.30	0.76
Asian	234	6.0	183	5.5	0.22	0.83
Hispanic	80	2.1	71	2.1	0.00	1.00
American Indian/Alaska Native	12	0.3	11	0.3	0.00	1.00
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	6	0.2	6	0.2	0.00	1.00
Multi	192	5.0	164	5.0	0.00	1.00

Overall Study Sample Compared to Target Attractiveness Regression Sample

Variable	*Total Sample N*	*Total Sample %*	*Analytic Sample N (2856)*	*Analytic Sample %*	*z-score*	*Significance*
Personal Info Posted						
0 Items	820	20.2	182	6.4	4.41	0.00*
1 Item	607	14.9	494	17.3	-1.08	0.28
2 Items	914	22.5	772	27.0	-2.14	0.03*
3 Items	872	21.5	705	24.7	-1.05	0.13
4 Items	850	20.9	703	24.6	-1.74	0.08
Contact Info Posted						
0 Items	1172	28.8	269	16.4	4.16	0.00*
1 Item	1298	31.9	1083	37.9	-3.06	0.00*
2 Items	1045	25.7	852	29.8	-1.99	0.05*
3 Items	457	11.2	380	13.3	-0.93	0.36
4 Items	91	2.2	72	2.5	-0.13	0.90
Media Posted						
0 Items	1048	25.8	357	12.5	3.20	0.00*
1 Item	1835	45.2	1529	53.5	-4.80	0.00*
2 Items	906	22.3	747	26.2	-1.85	0.06
3 Items	274	6.7	223	7.8	-0.47	0.64
Personal Info Shared						
0 Items	2206	54.3	1339	46.9	4.27	0.00*
1 Item	702	17.3	576	20.2	-1.55	0.12
2 Items	451	11.1	364	12.7	-0.70	0.48
3 Items	376	9.3	310	10.9	-0.69	0.49
4 Items	328	8.1	267	9.3	-0.52	0.60
Contact Info Shared						
0 Items	2684	66.1	1725	60.4	3.85	0.00*
1 Item	728	17.9	601	21.0	-1.43	0.15
2 Items	463	11.4	376	13.2	-0.79	0.43
3 Items	162	4.0	132	4.6	-0.25	0.80
4 Items	26	0.6	22	0.8	-0.27	0.79
Media Shared						
0 Items	2962	72.9	1964	68.8	3.11	0.00*
1 Item	737	18.1	600	21.0	-1.33	0.18
2 Items	275	6.8	221	7.7	-0.39	0.70
3 Items	89	2.2	71	2.5	-0.12	0.90
How often update social media?						
Once a month or less	1899	55.9	1605	56.2	-0.18	0.86
Less than once a day but more than once a month	1150	33.9	978	34.2	-0.15	0.88
At least once a day	348	10.2	273	9.6	0.25	0.80
Engaged in sexting						
No	2233	60.0	1867	65.4	-3.56	0.00*
Yes	1488	40.0	989	34.6	2.71	0.01*
Ever filmed nude?						

No	3182	84.7	2450	85.8	-1.75	0.25
Yes	573	15.3	406	14.2	0.48	0.63
NCP Perpetrator						
No	3202	92.3	2648	92.7	-0.58	0.56
Yes	267	7.7	208	7.3	0.16	0.87
Gender						
Male	1665	42.6	1207	42.3	0.16	0.87
Female	2243	57.4	1649	57.7	-0.19	0.85
Year in School						
First Year	1069	27.3	773	27.1	0.10	0.92
Second Year	939	24.0	655	22.9	0.51	0.61
Third Year	977	25.0	735	25.7	-0.33	0.74
Fourth+ Year	930	23.8	693	24.3	-0.23	0.82
Relationship Status						
Not in a committed relationship	2162	55.1	1632	57.1	-1.23	0.22
In a committed relationship	1762	44.9	1224	42.9	1.08	0.28
Sexual Orientation						
Heterosexual	3285	85.2	2459	86.1	-0.96	0.34
Nonheterosexual	571	14.8	397	13.9	0.39	0.70
Race/Ethnicity						
White	3148	81.3	2341	82.0	-0.66	0.51
African American	202	5.2	131	4.6	0.25	0.81
Asian	234	6.0	160	5.6	0.17	0.87
Hispanic	80	2.1	62	2.2	-0.04	0.97
American Indian/Alaska Native	12	0.3	9	0.3	0.00	1.00
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	6	0.2	4	0.1	0.04	0.97
Multi	192	5.0	149	5.2	-0.08	0.93

Overall Study Sample Compared to Guardianship Regression Sample

Variable	*Total Sample N*	*Total Sample %*	*Analytic Sample N (3101)*	*Analytic Sample %*	*z-score*	*Significance*
Private Computer Password						
Not Private	1551	45.0	1395	45.0	0.00	1.00
Private	1895	55.0	1706	55.0	0.00	1.00
Antivirus Installed						
No	483	14.1	422	13.6	0.22	0.83
Yes	2951	85.9	2679	86.4	-0.54	0.59
Private Phone Password						
Not Private	2417	69.8	2181	70.3	-0.37	0.71
Private	1046	30.2	920	29.7	0.24	0.81
Private Email/SN Password						
Not Private	2853	82.2	2560	82.6	-0.39	0.70
Private	612	17.8	541	17.4	0.18	0.86
SN Privacy Settings						
Permission Only	615	18.1	565	18.2	-0.04	0.96
Friends Only	1440	42.4	1325	42.7	-0.16	0.87
Friends of Friends	699	20.6	640	20.6	0.00	1.00
Public	639	18.8	571	18.4	0.18	0.86
Where live?						
On Campus	1241	34.7	1094	35.3	-0.30	0.76
Off Campus	2202	61.5	1888	60.9	0.39	0.70
Fraternity/Sorority	137	3.8	119	3.8	0.00	1.00
Who live with?						
Parents/Adult Family	452	12.5	371	12.0	0.22	0.83
Romantic Partner	205	5.7	174	5.6	0.04	0.97
Roommate	2636	73.1	2306	74.4	-1.04	0.30
Alone	311	8.6	250	8.1	0.21	0.83
Gender						
Male	1665	42.6	1297	41.8	0.44	0.66
Female	2243	57.4	1804	58.2	-0.51	0.61
Year in School						
First Year	1069	27.3	846	27.3	0.00	1.00
Second Year	939	24.0	736	23.7	0.14	0.89
Third Year	977	25.0	772	24.9	0.05	0.96
Fourth+ Year	930	23.8	747	24.1	-0.14	0.89
Relationship Status						
Not in a committed relationship	2162	55.1	1687	54.4	0.43	0.67
In a committed relationship	1762	44.9	1414	45.6	-0.39	0.69
Sexual Orientation						
Heterosexual	3285	85.2	2646	85.3	-0.11	0.9
Nonheterosexual	571	14.8	455	14.7	0.04	0.96
Race/Ethnicity						
White	3148	81.3	2552	82.3	-0.97	0.33
African American	202	5.2	142	4.6	0.25	0.80

Asian	234	6.0	165	5.3	0.30	0.77
Hispanic	80	2.1	66	2.1	0.00	1.00
American Indian/Alaska Native	12	0.3	11	0.4	-0.04	0.97
Hawaiian/Pacific Islander	6	0.2	6	0.2	0.00	1.00
Multi	192	5.0	159	5.1	-0.04	0.97