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I, Khadija M Monk , hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminal Justice.

It is entitled:

**How Central Business Districts Manage Crime and Disorder:
A Case Study in the Processes of Place Management in Downtown Cincinnati**

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How Central Business Districts Manage Crime and Disorder: A Case Study in the Processes of Place Management in Downtown Cincinnati

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by

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ABSTRACT

Though there has been considerable research into urban crime, there is little criminological research and theoretical development on central business districts despite the fact these areas are critical in the functioning of cities. In fact, studies often exclude them because of the lack of residential population from which to draw statistical inferences. As a result, theories of urban neighborhoods may have little applicability to central business districts; therefore, little is known about the processes used to control crime and disorder in central business district neighborhoods.

The purpose of this study is to address the gap in the crime literature by developing a framework, based in environmental criminology, that will enable researchers to examine central business district crime control processes. The central business district of Cincinnati is used as a single-site case study to determine the framework's ability to identify those crime control processes most likely to work in central business districts and to identify those that do not. Data are drawn from official crime statistics for the City of Cincinnati, other official documentations, direct observations, and interviews with central business district business owners and residents. Findings suggest this framework is appropriate for identifying crime control processes within central business districts. The results of this study will advance our knowledge of effective crime prevention strategies in areas where issues of ownership and crime control are less clear-cut.

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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

Research on crime and disorder has identified a number of social control processes possibly responsible for the development of crime in urban residential neighborhoods, as well as processes that may reduce crime in these communities. However, little research has examined social control processes in non-residential urban central business districts. This gap in our understanding is unfortunate because central business districts are important, if not critical, areas within cities, providing much-needed tax revenue, jobs, gathering places, and entertainment districts. Preservation of central business districts is important for the preservations of cities, and crime is inextricably linked to the preservation of central business districts.

This study begins to fill this gap by identifying processes for crime control in city centers and articulating a framework in which these processes work and do not work. In doing so, this study extends the concept of place management by examining the networks of super controllers that influence central business district place managers to better control crime and disorder in and around their places.

Overview of Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Following this overview, Chapter 2 gives a theoretical and methodological explanation of why little is known about crime and disorder in central business districts. Neighborhood crime theory and methods are reliant on the assumption that an urban area has a substantial residential population. The area may have businesses and other facilities, but their importance is very much subsidiary to

the behavior of people and groups who live in the neighborhood. Theories of neighborhoods and crime describe little else but the nature of the residential population. Methods for testing these theories are largely dependent on measuring characteristics of residential populations, either through surveys, or more commonly, through the use of census data. In the absence of a residential population, neither theory nor methods are applicable. This is the difficulty faced when we want to understand crime prevalence and incidence in central business districts. Chapter 2 concludes with the suggestion that we need a theoretical framework not reliant on the individual or collective actions of residents, and methods that are compatible with such a framework that incorporates ambient or transient populations that travel to central business districts for work, entertainment, and so on.

Chapter 3 proposes that the logical foundations for such a theory lie in recent elaborated versions of routine activity theory, specifically, the relationship articulated by Sampson, Eck, and Dunham (2010) between super controllers and place managers. In this chapter, I explain why business improvement districts (BIDs), a method of urban revitalization, may serve as super controllers that influence central business district place managers to control crime and disorder. There are three reasons BIDs make appropriate super controllers for place managers. First, the purpose of BIDs is to revitalize business centers, and crime prevention is usually one of the goals of BIDs (see Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010; Mitchell, 2008). Second, BIDs are formalized networks of place managers and downtown stakeholders who can provide services and resources to those place managers. Third, a BID also has the legal authority to assess place managers fees for the provision of special services within the central business district it serves, and

some of the most important services may have direct and indirect impacts on crime and disorder.

Chapter 4 describes the research methods I use to identify social control processes that influence place managers to prevent crime within central business district settings. Since the goal of this study is to identify processes, not to test hypotheses or predict relationships, this chapter will focus on methodological issues associated with exploratory research.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 apply the framework in Chapter 3 to the data from Chapter 4, using case studies to determine whether crime control processes can be identified, and whether those processes involve super controllers. Chapter 5 is a case study in panhandling in the central business district. It will describe the problem of panhandling and how DCI acted as a super controller to potentially reduce the amount of panhandling. This chapter will also examine the role of other super controllers and their influence on panhandling. A summary of which super controller was most influential in addressing this problem will conclude the chapter.

Chapter 6 will examines the problem of juvenile disorder within the central business district. Again, the role of DCI as a super controller will be examined and evaluated. Additionally, other super controllers that may have influenced place managers in controlling juvenile disorder where it occurred most.

Chapter 7 examines two problem places within the central business district. First the chapter will examine a convenience store and second, a Section-8 high-rise apartment building in the middle of the entertainment district of the central business district. DCI's role as a super controller will once again be examined in comparison to other super

controllers who may have influenced place managers to control crime and disorder at their places.

Chapter 8 will summarize DCI's role as a super controller across all three case studies. It will discuss in which case study DCI had the most influence on place managers or problems. Next, the chapter will examine other super controllers that influenced place managers to see if those super controllers also influenced the problems presented in each case study. A discussion about how super controllers may work to influence place managers and ultimately influence crime will follow. An evaluation of whether super controllers, working independently or as a network, are the crime control processes that influence crime in central business districts will also be discussed. Finally, policy implications and the direction of future research will be addressed.

CHAPTER 2. TOWARD A THEORY OF CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICTS AND CRIME

Research since the 19th century establishes that crime concentrates in urban areas compared to rural or suburban areas (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993; Weisburd, Bernasco, & Bruinsma, 2009). As I will later demonstrate, there is considerable research on crime in urban residential and mixed residential–commercial neighborhoods. However, characteristics of crime and disorder within central business districts are largely unknown. Little is known about crime and disorder in central business districts for two reasons: One reason deals with theory while the other concerns methods. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate these two reasons and to suggest a better theoretical framework with which to study central business districts.

Theory

Theories examining crime in urban neighborhoods come from the social disorganization tradition of the Chicago School. These theories describe why some neighborhoods have higher delinquency or crime rates compared to other neighborhoods. Theories incorporating contextual and compositional features of neighborhoods also examine how residents of high crime neighborhoods behave. In doing so, these theories focus on urban neighborhoods and explain how the social (social control processes) and physical (structural antecedents) environments create the conditions for social disorganization, which then influences neighborhood delinquency or crime rates (see Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Park & Burgess, 1925; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Social disorganization theory and its derivatives suggest structural characteristics of residential

neighborhoods (e.g., racial heterogeneity, residential mobility, low socio-economic status, and incivilities such as litter and graffiti) influence social processes (such as sparse friendship networks, unsupervised teens, low organizational participation or friendship and kinship ties) that can affect crime, disorder, and delinquency (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Sampson, 2006; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1942; Skogan, 1990; Taylor, 2001). The most important concept introduced by these theories is the notion that formal and informal social networks mediate the influence of community context of crime and disorder. If structural factors are supportive (e.g., racial and ethnic homogeneity, more homeowners as compared to transient renters, and fewer female-headed households), then the formal and informal social control networks should be effective in controlling criminal and deviant behavior within the neighborhood (Warner & Wilcox Rountree, 1997; Wilcox Rountree & Warner, 1999).

Regarding informal social control and its ability to control crime, Hunter (1985) described three levels of informal social control: private, parochial, and public. Private informal social control is based on intimate primary groups that control the actions of others through criticism or ostracism from the group. This type of informal social control may be most effective in neighborhoods where neighbors are likely to work together (see discussion of collective efficacy below). Next, parochial informal social control is related to broader interpersonal networks and local institutions such as schools, businesses, and other community organizations. Finally, public informal social control is related to the community's ability to obtain goods and services, such as the ability of a community to get after-school programs run by police personnel, for example (see also Bursik &

Grasmick, 1993). It is the last two types of informal social control that are most relevant to the study of central business districts.

In addition, Wilson and Kelling's (1982) broken windows thesis suggests that communities with high levels of incivilities such as trash, graffiti, and other unrepaired physical deterioration could diminish informal social control. Resultantly, residents stop participating in maintaining their neighborhood and fear sets in. The absence of residents then sends a message to offenders that "nobody cares" about the neighborhood and more serious crime increases as a result (Taylor, 2001; Taylor & Harrell, 1996; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). To illustrate, Skogan's (1990) empirical examination of the broken windows thesis examined how incivilities were related to robbery and the decisions of residents to move out of their neighborhoods. Skogan found that structural conditions gave rise to incivility that, in turn, increased robbery victimization. More robberies increased the likelihood that residents would leave their neighborhoods. In central business districts, it could be surmised that more incivilities could potentially increase the likelihood that visitors would avoid certain locations.

Another version of informal social control research at the neighborhood-level comes from Sampson and colleagues (1997), who coined the term *collective efficacy* to explain how residents prevent crime. Collective efficacy refers to the "social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good" (p. 918). The willingness to intervene is, in fact, crucial to collective efficacy.

A third strain of social disorganization theory focuses on concentrated disadvantage in urban residential neighborhoods. Structural factors such as female-headed households, density, percentage Black, and poverty have been shown to have a

positive and direct impact on neighborhood-level crime rates (see Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Warner & Pierce, 1993; Wilson, 1987).

Collective efficacy and concentrated disadvantage appear to be related. Research by Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush (2001) demonstrated that concentrated disadvantage and low collective efficacy were associated with increased homicide rates in urban residential neighborhoods in Chicago. Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz (2004) also examined collective efficacy and social networks/exchanges and their interactions with violence in urban neighborhoods. Browning et al. found that those neighborhoods characterized by high levels of network interaction and reciprocated exchange had reduced effects of regulatory collective efficacy on violence, indicating that collective efficacy's ability to control crime is reduced as informal network interaction increases.

In the discussion above, the research on informal social control is related to residential neighborhoods. In the present study, the focus will be on informal and formal social controls as they relate to central business districts where there are few residents, many businesses, and visitors.

Methods

The second reason our understanding of crime in central business districts is limited is due to the methods used to study crime in neighborhoods: criminologist's dependence on census information for measuring their independent and dependent variables. Criminologists use census information to describe characteristics of neighborhoods that may be causally connected to crime. They also use census counts of residential population to standardize crime, converting it from count data to rates of crime per

thousand residents (Andresen, 2006; Boggs, 1965; Clarke & Weisburd, 1994; Gibbs & Erickson, 1976; Harries, 1991).

When few people live in an area and there are many other activities in the area, such as in central business districts, census data become highly problematic. These data can neither describe important independent variables, nor can they help standardize crime figures. Just as we need a new theoretical perspective to describe crime control in central business districts, we need alternative methods for testing such theories. I will outline an alternative theoretical perspective next. Chapter 4 will examine alternative methods that can be applied studying social control processes of central business districts.

An Alternative Theoretical Framework for Central Business Districts

Because central business districts are distinct from other neighborhoods, the theories that have been developed to explain neighborhood crime and the methods used to test these theories cannot be used. Another approach needs to be taken; one that does not rely on a stable residential population. I suggest that recently augmented routine activity theory is a particularly useful theoretical framework for this purpose. This theory identifies the necessary elements of criminal events (i.e., targets/victims, offenders and places) and their relationship with three points of intervention (i.e., guardians, handlers, and managers).

Modern Routine Activity Theory

Routine activity theory has gone through several updates. Nevertheless, at its core, the main concepts of this theory remain: Criminal acts occur when offenders and suitable

targets meet at the same time and place, in the absence of capable controllers (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2002). The major changes have been to generalize from guardians to controllers through the introduction of handlers and managers (Felson, 1986; Eck, 1994). In short, modern routine activity theory involves more than just guardians protecting targets against proximate motivated offenders.

Two major contributions have advanced routine activity theory research. First, Felson's (1986) introduction of "handlers" for offenders merged social control theory with routine activity theory and introduced informal social control as a mechanism that influenced offenders' decision making. Handlers try to keep potential offenders from offending. Though this indirectly protects targets, the handler's interest applies directly to the offender, while the guardian's interest applies directly to the target. Though originally proposed to describe how parents and others emotionally close to offenders could prevent them from offending, Tillyer (2008) shows how the concept of handlers can be expanded to include other offenders and can be used to help curb serious violence (see also Tillyer & Eck, 2010).

Second, Eck (1994) introduced the "manager." Managers are controllers who have interests in the functioning of places, and may have only indirect concern with offenders and targets. Place managers (described further in Chapter 3) are owners of property and the employees of these owners (Eck, 1994). Evaluations of interventions designed to examine place management have shown that place management not only exists, but that it can be mobilized to reduce crime (Braga & Weisburd, 2010; Eck, 2002; Welsh & Farrington, 2009). So modern routine activity theory contains three distinct

controllers—guardians, handlers, and managers—rather than the single controller of the original routine activity theory (Eck & Weisburd, 1995).

In summary, modern routine activity theory now explains criminal opportunity through the interaction of six elements: targets/victims, guardians, offenders, handlers, places, and managers (Eck, 2001). The crime analysis triangle, now depicted as a double-layered triangle (see Figure 2.1) is used to apply the theory to specific problems (Eck, 2003). This version of the crime analysis triangle adds an outer triangle of “controllers” for each element, such as handlers for offenders (Felson, 1986), management for places (Eck, 1994; Eck & Clarke 2003; Felson, 1995), and guardians for targets/victims (Cohen & Felson, 1979). These controllers, when present and capable, can prevent crime from occurring at that specific time and place (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 1995). In sum, modern routine activity theory links specific controllers to necessary elements via social control processes.

Managers are of particular importance for crime control in central business districts. Why is this? The answer is that in a neighborhood where there are few residents but many transients, there are not many alternatives. A transient work force and the recreational users may have a stake in the area compared to property owners. For example, based on studies of urban residential communities, transiency or residential mobility are found to prevent the development of a community’s ability to develop informal social control (networks), which further inhibits the community’s ability to prevent or control crime (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Shaw & McKay, 1942). From this argument, it could be suggested that the mobility of transient users in a central business district also prevents the development of informal social controls from developing. This

also could apply to business owners. If they are all focused on their individual goals of profitability, they may be less inclined to develop informal social controls that could prevent crime in their business neighborhoods. If there are no informal networks created by either the neighborhood's business owners or its users, then formal social controls such as law enforcement are the main response to the development and control of crime. As a result, in central business districts, the two controllers who have a vested stake in order in the downtown are the police and the owners of property. As previously mentioned, if property owners do not take ownership of crime then crime control becomes the burden solely of the police. The police are few and it seems unlikely that they can exert sufficient control over downtown spaces in the absence of important allies. Therefore, it seems appropriate to focus on property owners and their employees: place managers, and getting them engaged in crime prevention efforts.

Places Are Important in Understanding Crime

Places have become increasingly important to understanding and controlling crime over the last 20 years. Research finds crime is concentrated at some places and not others (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991; Eck, 1994). Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1989), for instance, extended Cohen and Felson's (1979) routine activity theory to examine the distribution of crime to places. The authors found substantial concentrations of police calls for service, especially for predatory crime, in relatively few places in their study in the City of Minneapolis. Just over half (50.4%) of all calls to the Minneapolis police went to only 3.3% of all addresses and intersections included in their study. The predatory crime of robbery was even more concentrated (2.2% of the places included in their study).



Figure 2.1. Crime Analysis Triangle (Eck, 2003).

The variety of places within a central business district in close proximity to each other is also important from a criminological point of view. The mix of places with different operating hours and clientele can influence the spatial and temporal patterns of crime in central business districts. Entertainment districts, shopping areas, and mass transit stations, which are frequently found in central business districts, bring offenders into contact with unguarded targets, which increases criminal opportunities. These places are also known as “crime generators.” Crime generators are locations to which large numbers of people (both victims and offenders) are attracted for reasons unrelated to crime or illegal activity. Crime attractors are places that offenders specifically target because of their criminal opportunities, such as specific alleyways or bars (Brantingham & Brantingham,

1995, 1999). The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that place has become an important component of crime research.

Place Management Is Important

The concept of place management was articulated by Eck's (1994) study of illicit drug markets in San Diego, California, in which he found that drug dealing occurred in those places with weak place management (also see Eck, 1995). First, a place manager is defined as, "a person, group, or organization who has legal authority to control how the site is used. This entity may be a corporation, a partnership, a governmental jurisdiction, a private non-profit group, a family, or an individual" (Eck, 1994, p. 12). For example, there may be several place managers for one clothing store in a central business district: The store's owner, the store's manager, and employees who are responsible for the store during their shift.

Place management can become extremely complicated in central business districts. To illustrate, think of a typical city skyscraper. This building may be owned by a combination of owners: an insurance company, a finance company, and part of the building may even be owned by the city. Who controls crime on this property? More than likely there will be a security company. However, within the skyscraper there may be a hundred individual public and private businesses such as a convenience store, doctor's offices, and more. Each of these businesses may have several place managers responsible for controlling crime in their immediate place. As a result, coordination of safety and crime prevention among all the place managers of each business within a large

building, each with different hours of operation, rules, and regulations, may be difficult to manage.

Three advances in place management research followed Eck's (1994) original work. First, with regard to place management, Felson (1995) suggested that the ability to discourage crime at a place would depend on a person's level of attachment to a place (or "primacy of responsibility"). Felson suggested that the person with the most responsibility for controlling crime and maintaining property would be someone who either owns the property or is intimately connected to the owner (e.g., a relative). Felson (1995) referred to this level as a "personal" level of responsibility (see Table 2.1). From there, the level of crime prevention responsibility diminishes. This means the less investment a person has in the ownership of a place, the less likely he or she is to feel responsible for crime control. For instance, Felson (1995) suggests that those place managers with the next level of responsibility, the "assigned" level, will be less likely to exert control over behavior than those with personal levels of responsibility.

Second, Madensen (2007) describes the processes used by place managers. She describes place management as a set of four interrelated processes used by place managers to control crime: (1) physical space organization, (2) regulation of conduct, (3) access control, and (4) resource allocation (p. 19). In the next chapter, these processes will become important for demonstrating why some place managers can control crime and disorder, while others cannot.

Level of Responsibility	MANAGERS (Monitoring Amenable Places)
1. <i>Personal</i> (Owners, family, friends)	Homeowner monitors near home
2. <i>Assigned</i> (Employees with specific assignment)	Doorman protects building
3. <i>Diffuse</i> (Employees with general assignment)	Hotel maid impairs trespasser
4. <i>General</i> (Strangers, other citizens)	Customer in parking structure

Table 2.1. Level of Place Management Responsibility. Adapted from Felson’s (1995) Four-by-Three Table of Crime Discouragement.

Third, places do not operate in a vacuum. Rather, external pressures influence how well a place manager can implement the processes articulated by Madensen (2007). Sampson, Eck, and Dunham (2010) suggest that all controllers, but particularly place managers, are themselves controlled. They call these controllers “super controllers.” Super controllers are vital to understanding central business district crime control, particularly because business improvement districts (BIDs) can be viewed as a form of super controller. Both BIDs and super controllers will be examined further in the next chapter.

Conclusion

In summary, existing theories and methods for investigating neighborhood crime are unsuitable for the study of central business districts because these areas have small

residential populations relative to temporary users. The routines of everyday life influence all neighborhoods, but they are most dramatic in central business districts: These are filled to bursting during weekdays, but virtually devoid of population weeknights; recreation areas within the downtown area (e.g., clusters of theaters or bars) create spikes of visitors; and special events create surges of visitors for short time periods. In short, the routines of downtown users create a very different environment than we find in residential neighborhoods. Consequently, this requires researchers to study central business districts with theories and methods that depart from the theories and methods they use in other parts of cities. I suggest that the logical foundations for such a theory are place managers and super controllers.

Chapter 3 describes the relationship between super controllers and place managers within central business districts. In particular, I show why business improvement districts, a commonly used legal and financial device cities use to revitalize and maintain their commercial cores, are a form of super controller.

CHAPTER 3. CRIME AND DISORDER CONTROL PROCESS OF CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICTS

The previous chapter explained why existing theories and methods for investigating neighborhood crime and disorder are unsuitable for the study of central business districts. One reason is that the routines of downtown users create a very different environment than is found in residential urban neighborhoods. This requires us to study central business districts with theories and methods departing substantially from those used in other parts of the city.

The purpose of this chapter is to suggest a foundation for studying crime in central business districts. This chapter will illustrate how super controllers (Sampson et al., 2010) and their relationship to place managers (Eck, 1994) are vital in understanding central business district crime control. To understand why place managers and super controllers (described later) form the foundation for the study of central business district crime and disorder control, it is important to understand the characteristics of business improvement districts (BIDs). In addition to being a form of super controller, a BID can also be seen as a process that formalizes the place management–super controller relationship within a central business district.

First, place management is important because places are important to central business districts, and places are important because they are where crime events are concentrated (Eck, 1994; Sherman et al., 1989). Central business districts (CBDs) have small residential populations but they have many place owners. Networks of place managers in the CBD provide resources and information to its members. The network

also helps exert control over how managers run their places, and this control can help mobilize crime prevention within central business districts.

Business Improvement Districts (BIDs)

What Is a BID?

BIDs are legal entities that provide goods and services to geographically defined locations (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010; Hoyt, 2003; Mitchell, 2008). There is no standard definition for BIDs despite their presence in many major U.S. cities as well as in other countries (Hoyt, 2003; Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007). The definition and characteristics of each BID will depend on the state in which the BID legislation is drafted. A state's statutes provide BIDs their legal authority. Statutes dictate how each BID will be created, how it will acquire funds to pay for services, and what entities are included in this process.

Each city has its own service agreement based on state legislation but modified to account for city legal codes and problems unique to central business districts (Mitchell, 2008). The legal authority underlying the creation of BIDs is important in understanding the function of BIDs as super controllers, because BID legislation contractually binds place managers and BIDs.

Though there is no standard definition for BIDs, there are two definitions that are useful. Hoyt's (2003) definition of a BID is as a "publically sanctioned, yet privately directed organization that supplements public services to improve shared, geographically defined, outdoor public spaces" (p. 8). Mitchell (2008) defines a BID as "a professionally managed organization whose purpose is to improve a locale using funds

from mandatory special taxes or fees paid by the property and/or business owners in a designated area” (p. 4). There are two important points in these definitions. First, both indicate that there is an organization providing services to a specific geographic location. Second, these definitions indicate that resources for these services come from an additional fee sanctioned by the public or assessed to property owners. The creation and organization of improvement districts in the State of Ohio is best described using Mitchell’s definition, and, therefore, Mitchell’s (2008) definition will be used to describe the BID used in this study.

The purpose of a BID is to improve economic and social conditions in a geographic location, in this case, central business districts¹. BIDs accomplish this goal by (1) establishing the location of the BID, (2) obtaining the approval of property owners within the BID location to sign a petition agreeing to participate in the BID, (3) developing a service plan and assessment schedule (which must be developed, in part, by property owners and approved by property owners), and (4) creating a managing agency that uses the funds accumulated by property owner assessments for goods and services (Mitchell, 1999, 2008). However, before these methods are discussed further, a brief history of BIDs is provided next.

How Did BIDs Arise?

BIDs grew from the post–World War II out-migration of residents from central cities. The abundance of cheap automobiles coupled with a newly developed highway

¹ There are BIDs in locations other than central business districts (see Brooks, 2006; MacDonald et al., 2009), but the focus of this study is on central business districts, so I will restrict the discussion of BIDs to the central business district.

system facilitated movement from cities to the suburbs (Mitchell, 2008; Putnam, 2000). This movement affected central business districts by removing those residents and visitors who provided a flow of income to the district, and relocating resources to suburban shopping malls and business complexes. BIDs became one of the many responses from the central business district community toward suburban flight by providing similar services found in suburban locations to consumers, and providing resources to businesses within the central business district to attract consumers.

The first BID was created by a group of businessmen in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, in 1970. In the United States, the first BID established was the New Orleans Downtown Development District, created in 1974 (Hoyt, 2006; Mitchell, 2008). The boom in BIDs occurred during the 1980s and 1990s at a time when the Reagan administration cut many social service and other programs to urban locations (Davies, 1997; Mitchell, 2008). This left a gap in the availability of resources to maintain inner cities, and BIDs became a viable solution to provide essential resources and services to inner cities. Since then, BIDs have spread throughout the United States to provide services to communities where public or private entities fall short (Hoyt, 2006; Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007). The City of Cincinnati, for example, took advantage of Ohio's legislation and established a BID in the central business district in 1994 (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 1995).

All 50 states have BID legislation². The number of BIDs within the United States is estimated to range from 1,500 to 10,000 depending on the BID definition used (Mitchell, 2008). Further complicating matters is the inconsistent naming scheme used to identify these improvement districts. Each state refers to its improvement district legislature with

² Mitchell (2008) states that 48 states have BID legislation. I discovered that since his report, the two missing states have passed BID legislation.

a different name. For example, in the State of Ohio, they are called Special Improvement Districts or SIDs (Ohio Revised Code, 2010). In other states, they are referred to as Public Improvement Districts (PIDs), Neighborhood Improvement Districts (NIDs), and Municipal Improvement Districts (MIDs) to name a few (Hoyt, 2003). Other countries employing business improvement districts use names such as Town Centre Management schemes (TCM) in the United Kingdom, and Business Improvement Areas (BIAs) in Canada (Hoyt, 2003). For the ease and purposes of this proposal, the general term Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) will be used to refer to these improvement districts.

There are five basic decisions in the creation of BIDs: the establishment of state legislation permitting BIDs; the creation of the BID boundaries; the establishment of the BID through a petition process; the development of an assessment and service plan; and the creation of a managing agency (Mitchell, 2008). Yet because each state's legislation creating a BID is different, each improvement district will vary on characteristics specific to how they are set up: the type of agency (public, private, nonprofit), the types of services provided, the responsibility of the governing board, the managing director, and how fees will be assessed. Although each BID is different, the goal is the same: to revitalize central business districts.

BIDs and Place Managers

BIDs influence place managers because there is a legal obligation to do so based on each state's BID legislation. First, BIDs have authority over the place managers within their boundaries, creating an area where BIDs have legal authority. Second, BIDs

provide services to the place managers within their areas. I will examine each of these powers separately.

BID Geographic Boundaries

Legislation authorizing a BID specifies which physical property and property owners are part of the improvement district and which ones are not. Therefore, business improvement districts must first be defined geographically (MacDonald et al., 2009; Mallett, 1994; Mitchell, 2001, 2008). BIDs can encompass very small areas, from a few properties or blocks, to several miles of a designated area, encompassing hundreds of structures. Further, these geographic boundaries can use existing jurisdictional boundaries such as political or administrative boundaries, or they can develop their own boundaries (Mitchell, 2008). Once these boundaries are established, a petition is signed by those who own property within the designated boundaries. This petition binds the property owners to the BID and embeds them in a network of property owners, service providers, and other entities that work together collaboratively to improve community-level issues (MacDonald et al., 2009; Mitchell, 2008; Sampson et al., 2010). These networks can operate both formally (e.g., through written contracts) and informally (e.g., by meeting face to face).

For example, using the geographic boundary requirements from the Ohio Revised Code, these improvement districts, “can be created within the boundaries of any one municipal corporation, township, or any combination of contiguous municipal corporations and townships” (Ohio Revised Code 1710.02A). Figure 3.1 displays the actual boundaries of the BID within Cincinnati’s central business district. According to

the description in Cincinnati BID's service agreement (described later), the district includes:

all property within the boundaries of Eggleston Avenue on the east, Central Parkway on the north, Central Avenue on the west (including the Centennial buildings), and the river on the south (excluding the two stadiums). (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010, p. 2)

BIDs as Service Providers

BID legislation also creates an agency responsible for the administration of goods and services. This agency uses assessed funds paid by BID property owners. Mitchell (2008) refers to these BID managing agencies as the "bureaucratic process for providing services" portion that constitutes a BID (p. 4). There are three types of managing agencies, and each one requires a managing director to ensure services are properly administered. Both the managing agency and the manager of that agency contribute to the overall success or failure of a BID.

Managing agencies are necessary because they centralize BIDs' service delivery for place managers within their boundaries. BID property owners have a one-stop shop to get information, resources, and services. This makes it easier for property managers to maintain their properties and for BIDs to provide services quickly and efficiently to a wide variety of places.

For example, place managers could independently contact various public agencies to obtain lighting and street cleaning services (outside of normal city services) and various private enterprises for services such as security and signage. But the time and effort spent by the place manager to connect to the right individual or organization may



Figure 3.1. Boundaries of Cincinnati’s Downtown Business Improvement District (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010, p. 2).

prohibit that place manager from doing so. Using the City of Cincinnati as an example, if a place manager could simply contact Cincinnati’s central business district managing agency, Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated (DCI) (described later), the place manager could present several requests at once to DCI and have each issue addressed in one place, rather than contacting individual services and agencies.

Figure 3.2 gives a general schematic showing how this works. In situational crime prevention terms, centralizing processes for place managers may remove excuses from place managers who might otherwise avoid seeking assistance (see Cornish & Clarke, 2003). Figure 3.2 also shows that a BID could assist several places at once,

speeding up the process of providing resources to place managers and thereby improving overall efficiency. The speed of this process would increase because a BID would use the network of organizations and institutions the agency has established to make sure the right place manager receives the right service. The managing director of DCI described Cincinnati's managing agency as a "funnel, where any concerns about downtown are poured into the funnel . . . [and] we gather information from various sources that help us develop solutions alternatively. We are able to come to a multilayered solution for place managers" (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, March 19, 2009).




Figure 3.2. General schematic of how a BID is networked to place managers and city agencies, social services, and so on, to provide services to place managers.

Service delivery itself is easier to manage when centralized. This is evident by the success of shopping malls and office parks in suburban settings. As an example, if there was a safety concern, shopping centers and office parks have protocols in place for

conveying information to employees and customers. Coordinating services and information dissemination is more difficult to do in central business districts where ownership of property is divided among hundreds of individuals and corporations, and even within a specific business or place there may be several place managers throughout the day. Coordination is therefore essential in central business districts (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010). This complexity of ownership within central business districts can create service delivery and information problems. Consequently, according to Mitchell (2008), the goal of most BIDs is to “put public places within cities on the same footing as the private places outside them—shopping centers and strip malls” (p. 5). In other words, the managing agencies responsible for providing services should act similarly to those of a shopping mall management organization. Consumers of these places will benefit from the streamlined coordination. For example, districts can work together to provide street maps and ambassador services (described below) to assist patrons with directions or advice.

Managing agencies are necessary also because BIDs have considerable autonomy. BIDs are primarily responsive to the needs of property owners within their boundaries and only indirectly to those of government (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007; Mitchell, 2008).

MacDonald (1996) suggests this autonomy is the key to BIDs’ successes:

The key to BIDs’ accomplishments lies in their dissimilarity to big city government. They operate without civil service rules and red tape; most important, they negotiate labor contracts from a clean slate. They can hire and fire employees based on performance, not civil service status or other government mandates. (p. 1)

The level of BIDs’ autonomy will depend, in part, on the type of managing agency that is authorized by state legislature. There are three kinds of managing

agencies: nonprofit, public or quasi-public, and public–private agencies (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007; Mitchell, 1999, 2008). Non-profit agencies make up the largest percentage of management agencies for BIDs. One study found 61% of the BID managing agencies were designated as non-profit ($n = 264$) (Mitchell, 1999). Because these agencies are non-profit, they receive the majority of their funds from property owners and have the most autonomous relationship from local governments and private enterprises. Rather, the role of local governments and private enterprises is the role of partner or contractor of services (Mitchell, 2008). For example, Ohio’s improvement district legislation specifically requires that the managing agency of a BID is run by a non-profit. DCI, as the managing agency for Cincinnati’s improvement district, is a non-profit organization (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010; Ohio Revised Code 1710.10).

The next type of agency is the hybrid public–private, also known as a public–nonprofit partnership (Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007; Mitchell, 2008). According to Mitchell’s (1999) study, this is the second most common partnership, with 26% of the managing agencies using this type of partnership. Either the managing agency is affiliated with a government agency or it receives a proportion of its fees from government agencies. Lastly, public agencies represented 13% of the sample in Mitchell’s study. These agencies rely on government funds more than the other types of agencies do. Public or government agencies are associated with smaller communities with few business owners compared to larger cities that have a larger share of property owners to assess. This may explain why larger cities use non-profit managing agencies (Hoyt, 2006; Mitchell, 2008). Regardless of the type of agency, each BID is required to

have a managing director to oversee the day-to-day operation of the managing agency and the property owners within the BID boundaries.

BID Services

Property owners participating in BIDs must determine what services are needed within the BID area. According to Mitchell's (1999) mail survey of 264 BID managers, service delivery included consumer marketing, economic development, public advocacy, maintenance, security, social services, space regulation, parking, and transportation. Research indicates that not all BIDs perform such a broad range of services and that this range may depend on the size of the BID (see Gross, 2005; Hoyt & Gopal-Agge, 2007). Hoyt et al. examined small, mid-sized, and large BIDs and found that smaller BIDs focused on physical maintenance, mid-sized BIDs focused on promotional activities, and larger BIDs focused on the broad range of services previously mentioned.

In addition, some researchers find that larger BIDs establish partnerships with local governments and become involved in policy issues (Morçöl & Patrick, 2006). To illustrate, the BID legislation in the State of Ohio does not specify the exact services to be rendered, but they must benefit the district (Ohio Revised Code 1710.02, 2010). These services are provided not by the BIDs themselves, but by the managing agencies that handle the assessments. To illustrate the scope of services BIDs can supply, I will use Cincinnati's BID as an example.

Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated (DCI), the BID's managing agency in Cincinnati, provides services to property owners that fall under three general categories: Sanitation and safety (i.e., "safe and clean" services), marketing and communications,

and stakeholder services. According to the managing director of DCI, safe and clean services are services that remove trash and litter and handle crime and disorder problems, and are the most important function of DCI (DCI Managing Director, personal correspondence, March 19, 2009). Under the safe and clean services, there are three goals: to improve safety and the perception of safety in Cincinnati's central business district; to keep up appearances of streets, sidewalks, and public spaces; and finally, to foster pride within the central business district neighborhood (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010).

Safe and clean services attempt to improve the perception of safety within the central business district by working with the Cincinnati Police, the Downtown Residents Council, and highly visible DCI "Ambassador" services, which DCI contracts from another agency. In sum, an ambassador program provides employees to 32 business improvement districts across the United States to assist in safety and sanitation issues (Director of Ambassador Services, personal communication, March 4, 2010). These services benefit place managers. For example, Ambassador services provide additional litter control and graffiti removal to maintain the cleanliness within Cincinnati's central business district. In addition, Ambassadors look for disorderly conduct, communicate with property owners and the Cincinnati Police Department about problems they see, and assist pedestrians with directions and information (Director of Ambassador Services, personal communication, March 4, 2010). For example, DCI's Ambassadors will work with property owners to assist them in keeping their storefronts clean and well maintained, and will help property owners with lighting, greenery, and signage issues.

Marketing and communication services include the promotion of positive attributes of Cincinnati's central business district through a communication program. These services seek to increase the public use of the central business district via marketing programs. For instance, in order for DCI to promote the central business district through communications programs, the organization meets regularly with members of various media outlets to establish relationships. DCI maintains a website, produces annual reports on the state of downtown, and works with ethnic media outlets such as newspapers and radio programs to reach a broader audience (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010). Incentives for place managers can come in the form of public recognition through this service. Those place managers that implement safety improvements may receive a spot on the local news, blog, or newsletter.

There are three types of stakeholder services: providing business support for current and potential businesses; promoting downtown living, and ensuring that downtown place managers have timely and relevant information. DCI's services agreement stipulates that it will contact each business on an annual basis. DCI promotes living in the central business district through special events like an annual "Tour of Living" as well as other events to bring prospective residents to the area. DCI also works with current residents and real estate developers to promote downtown as a viable place to live because the city offers a diverse array of options and services customers seek (e.g., farmers' markets, public transportation, work close to home) (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010).

BID Assessments

The services mentioned previously are paid from an assessment collected from property owners within the boundaries of a BID. BIDs can receive funds for services from property owners, government grants, and voluntary donations from various sources, but the majority of funds come from compulsory assessments of property owners (Hoyt, 2003, 2006; Mitchell, 1999). Each state's BID legislation dictates how assessments will be collected, managed, and dispersed. These issues will be discussed next.

There are a variety of methods for collecting assessments. These assessments come from fees ranging from 1% to 3% paid by place managers (Mitchell, 1999). However, the two most common methods of determining how much each property owner will be assessed are the assessed valuation and square footage methods (Mitchell, 2008). The assessed valuation method involves including an additional payment on top of the property owner's current property taxes. Those properties that pay the most property taxes will pay the most assessment fees, but, in return, will receive the most services, such as extra security and trash removal as described previously. This is the simpler of the two methods.

Second, and most common, is the square footage method. This method is more complicated, but viewed as more fair in that all properties are assessed an equitable portion of the assessment fee. DCI uses this method to assess fees to property owners. First, DCI's calculation of the fee is based 75% on the assessed value of the property and 25% on the front footage of the property (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010). Next, DCI uses the definition from the Ohio Revised Code 1710.01 to determine which property owners will pay this assessment:

owners of at least sixty percent of the front footage of all real property located in the proposed district that abuts upon any street, alley, public road, place, boulevard, parkway, park entrance, easement, or other existing public improvement within the proposed district, excluding church property or property owned by the state, county, township, municipal, or federal government, unless a church, county, township, or municipal corporation has specifically requested in writing that the property be included in the district. (para. E)

DCI's 2010–2013 service agreement states that if owners signed the petition for the BID and have property representing 60% of front footage in the district, then they are included in the district and, as such, will be assessed the fee annually (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010). As previously mentioned, in general, BID boundaries can dictate which property owners are included in the assessment and which are not included. However, even within that definition, there is some wiggle room. Very small businesses that may not have enough square footage may not be included in the BID as well as some religious and governmental agencies. Ultimately, the power given to BIDs to assess property owners links owners to BIDs in a fiduciary relationship, a resource relationship, and ultimately embeds place managers in a network of other agencies ready to assist them in securing their places.

Why Are BIDs Super Controllers?

I contend that BIDs are a form of super controller. The concept of super controller is an expansion on routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979). As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are six elements responsible for criminal opportunity (Eck, 2001): offenders and handlers; targets and guardians; and places and managers. The

element–controller relationship most important for this discussion is places and managers.

Sampson et al. (2010) were interested in why, if there were controllers for the necessary conditions for crime, crime still occurs. Clearly the controllers must be failing in places where crime is persistent. What might cause this? They conjectured that controllers—guardians, handlers, and managers—are in part responsive to other controllers, “super controllers.” This suggests that failure is due to the super controllers and that mobilizing super controllers could improve controlling and thus reduce crime. The authors define super controllers as “people, organizations and institutions that create the incentives for controllers to prevent or facilitate crime . . . super controllers control the controllers” (p. 40). Figure 3.3 depicts how super controllers fit in the modern routine activity crime triangle. Since BIDs have the capability to provide incentives for controllers, BIDs are a form of super controller that has influence over place managers in CBDs.

Sampson and colleagues (2010) describe 10 types of super controllers, divided among three groups: formal, diffuse, and informal. The first group, *formal super controllers*, consists of contractual, financial, regulatory, organizational, and courts super controllers. This group uses their respective institutional settings to influence controller behavior. Each super controller will be described briefly below. Table 3.1 shows how BIDs use multiple forms of influence on controllers using DCI as an example.

Contractual super controllers use formal arrangements, such as written contracts between entities, to influence the behavior of people and organizations (Sampson et al., 2010). These super controllers consist of people and organizations, meaning one group

of people and organizations can control another group of people and organizations. An example of a contractual super controller would be the written agreement (e.g., a written contract) between a sports venue and the security firm it hires to control crime and disorder (Madensen & Eck, 2008; Sampson et al., 2010).

Regulatory super controllers consist of federal, state, local, and private agencies (Sampson et al., 2010). These agencies can require controllers to comply with their rules and regulations in order to conduct their business. At the state level, for example, state health departments can prohibit entertainment venues such as restaurant and bars from




Figure 3.3. Updated Crime Analysis Triangle. Super controllers are on the outermost triangle. They have an indirect relationship with the three necessary elements for crime. They have a direct impact on controllers. The focus of this study is on super controllers who influence place managers, who in return can control crime at the place level (Eck, 2003; Sampson et al., 2010).

allowing their patrons to smoke inside their establishments. Another example of a regulatory super controller is police agencies at the local level, where police enforce laws on people and organizations.

Organizational super controllers influence controllers within their organization, in a parent company–franchisee relationship, by developing rules and procedures for those controllers to follow. For example, a national bank can have many branch offices throughout the United States and can control the policies and procedures of each branch.

Financial super controllers are able to influence controllers because of their fiduciary relationship. Sampson et al. (2010) use the example of an insurance company's relationship with a rental car company. The insurance company can pressure the rental car company with increased insurance rates if the car company does not reduce thefts of rental vehicles.

Courts or the threat of court action (both civil and criminal) can motivate controllers to take preventive actions or face possible fines or other sanctions (Sampson et al., 2010). Municipal code violations are a method to get business owners to address problems on their property (e.g., removal of litter and trash). If they do not take care of the problem specified in the violation within a specified time period, business owners could risk heavy court fines or other judgments that could negatively affect their business.

Political, markets, and media collectives make up the diffuse group of super controllers (Sampson et al., 2010). This group can influence a wide variety of controllers without knowing specifically who they influence. For example, political super controllers can influence controllers' crime prevention behavior by creating rules and

regulations, and providing political pressure. For example, city governments can block proposed projects from development until identified problems are resolved (Sampson et al., 2010).

Markets act as super controllers when they influence controllers by providing information to market consumers, who in turn make decisions based on this information. The market can then put pressure on the controller to conform to market standards or risk losing market share. To illustrate, retail outlets that provide services, such as secure parking and free gift wrapping, may have a larger market share than those retailers that cannot provide such services. Retailers that do not provide these services may then feel pressure to provide them or risk losing more market share. Inherent in this example is the idea that consumers will then seek out retailers offering these desirable amenities.

Media act as a super controller by using publicity. Publicity positively and negatively influences controllers (Sampson et al., 2010). Positive publicity can inspire controllers to continue or enhance crime prevention measures, while negative publicity can motivate controllers to improve their crime prevention practices. Though related to market processes, publicity—good or bad—can motivate place managers for other reasons than simply sales. Positive publicity can make owners feel better about their organization and negative publicity can have the opposite effect

Finally, informal super controllers make up the last group and consist of groups and families. These super controllers influence controllers through their intimate or peer connections (Sampson et al., 2010). Unlike diffuse super controllers (above), these super controllers should have direct contact with their controllers.

Group super controllers influence controllers to adopt better prevention practices through informal peer group pressure at both the individual and organizational levels (Sampson et al., 2010). For example, place managers can influence other place managers to adopt better crime prevention methods. Sampson et al. use the example of companies banding together to create social responsibility standards regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages.

Family super controllers consist of family members who can influence each other or other organizations to adopt better crime prevention practices (Sampson et al., 2010). For example, grandparents can influence how parents raise their children. Family super controllers may be of limited effectiveness (Sampson et al., 2010), and probably are irrelevant for central business district crime control.

How can BIDs invoke these various forms of super controlling? Though not all forms apply, most do. First, BIDs act as formal super controllers to place managers, specifically in the form of contractual and financial super controllers. Legally, service agreements connect BIDs to place managers. For example, The ambassador program described previously is a service provided to place managers by DCI to assist place managers in controlling crime and disorder, such as graffiti removal, on their properties.

In principle, BIDs may act as financial super controllers. They have the authority to assess fees to property owners, thus giving BIDs a financial stake in their businesses. However, the ability to collect fees may not provide much tangible power to get place managers to behave in other desirable ways. So it is unclear how effective this form of super controlling may be.

BIDs can also act as diffuse super controllers, particularly through their marketing and communications functions. BIDs were created to compete directly with suburban shopping districts (Mitchell, 2008). As such, by providing information about central business district (CBD) businesses to consumers, BIDs attempt to gain that share of the market that would otherwise shop in the suburbs. This promotion of businesses can put pressure on central business district place managers to conform to BID standards regarding safety and cleanliness.

In order to promote businesses within the central business districts, BIDs use multiple media outlets to communicate with consumers and place managers. For example, Cincinnati's BID, DCI, has a website and also sends text messages about safety issues and events downtown. In addition, this website highlights specific downtown businesses to potential consumers and can stimulate proactive prevention by those businesses.

Finally, BIDs can act as informal super controllers, specifically through influencing peer groups. For example, Cincinnati's BID, DCI, has monthly Safe and Clean Committee meetings. These meetings serve two purposes. First, DCI can communicate information to place managers. Second, place managers can convey information to other place managers as well as to DCI. Though these are the overt processes of coordinating behavior, group meetings and between meeting contacts also can create peer pressure that can persuade recalcitrant businesses to comply with group norms. In short, DCI may set norms and communicate them among downtown property owners, thus getting them to control more criminal opportunities than they would otherwise do if operating singly.

Table 3.1 describes how DCI can behave as a super controller. The first column lists the types of super controllers and the second column describes each type. The third column describes features and activities of DCI that apply to each type. As can be readily seen, DCI may use most types of super controlling.

Table 3.1. BIDS as Super Controllers		
Type of Super Controller	Description	DCI Examples
Contractual	Formal arrangements made between entities. A way for people and organizations to control other people and organizations.	Legal authority connects DCI to place managers. DCI also contracts with service providers. Agreement with Block by Block organization to provide ambassador services to place managers.
Regulatory	Federal, state, local, and private agencies can require some controllers to comply with rules and regulations in order to conduct business.	Does not apply, though DCI can work with regulators.
Organizational	Parent company–franchisee relationship. Organizations influence controllers within their organization by developing rules and procedures for controllers to follow.	N/A
Financial	Fiduciary relationship between institutions and controllers. For example, insurance companies and the car rental companies that they insure.	Assessments of property owners BIDs.
Courts	Civil and criminal courts can motivate controllers to adopt crime prevention methods or face possible fines or other sanctions.	Does not apply. However, courts can enforce legally binding contracts with DCI and fee payments by place managers.
Political	Mobilized political support. Influence the crime prevention behavior of controllers by	DCI can meet informally with elected officials and act as a lobbyist for downtown.

	creating rules and regulations, and providing political pressure.	
Markets	Markets influence controllers by providing information to market consumers, who in turn make decisions based on this information. The market can then put pressure on the controller to conform to market standards or risk losing market share.	DCI uses marketing to sell CBDs as destinations for shoppers.
Media	Publicity influences controllers. Positive publicity can inspire controllers to continue or enhance crime prevention measures, while negative publicity can motivate controllers to improve their crime prevention practices.	DCI produces media and works with other media outlets to promote CBD businesses.
Groups	Groups can use informal peer group pressure on controllers at the individual and organizational levels.	DCI's meetings can create informal norms and expectations and thus exert peer pressure on downtown establishments.
Family	Family members can influence each other to adopt stronger crime prevention practices. Families can also band together to pressure controllers.	N/A

Table 3.1 adapted from Sampson et al. (2010).

Conclusion

This chapter discussed three main reasons why BIDs are important in the study of central business district crime control. First, BIDs are a tool for revitalizing central business districts. This means that there is already a framework in existence in which to study central business district crime control. Second, they make excellent super controllers for

central business district place managers because of their features: petition of place managers, assessments, and service provisions for place managers. Place managers enter into an agreement with BIDs when they sign a petition. This petition allows BIDs to have a fiduciary relationship with place managers by assessing a fee, usually accompanying annual property taxes. Next, services, paid for by place managers, are provided through the managing agency for a BID; this relationship is based on the dissemination of resources and information. Place managers are encouraged to use these services since they have paid for these services. Third and finally, place managers become embedded in a network created by BIDs to effectively provide resources and information to each place. In sum, BIDs have the ability to influence place managers to prevent crime at a place, and therefore, are considered super controllers to central business district place managers. In the chapter that follows, I will provide a methodological framework to assist researchers in empirically examining crime in central business districts.

CHAPTER 4. METHODS FOR THE STUDY OF CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT CRIME AND DISORDER CONTROL PROCESSES

In the previous chapters, I described the goals of the study, the theories I will apply, and the setting within which the study will take place. In this chapter, I describe the methods I will use. I will not be testing a theory. Instead I will be using a case study mixed methods approach (Gerring, 2007) to describe how place management and super controllers influence crime in central business districts, using Cincinnati's business improvement district and central business district as a single case.

In particular, I will use modern routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Eck, 2001; Felson, 1995; Sampson et al., 2010) for a theoretically driven mixed methods strategy to provide reasonable answers to the following two questions:

1. What are the processes used to control crime and disorder in central business districts?
2. How do these processes work for different problems such as panhandling, juvenile disorder, and problem places?

These questions will be addressed using data from downtown Cincinnati. This chapter has three parts. This introduction is the first. The second and longest section describes the data sources I will use and how each helps answer the questions. The third section gives an overview of what the final dissertation looks like.

Research Methods

This study is an outgrowth of my work with the Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated (DCI) Safe and Clean Committee. Many of my original ideas about how downtowns might control crime came from observing how the members of this committee interacted. This led me to investigate theories that might help understand crime control in downtown areas. My participation in these meetings also provided me with access to qualitative and quantitative data that could help systematically describe downtown crime management. This section describes these data sources and why they are useful.

I will examine five forms of data: participant observations of DCI; site observations of downtown Cincinnati; written documents describing downtown and the functioning of DCI; interviews of people engaged in the control of crime in the downtown area; and official crime data from the Cincinnati police. The following is a description of these methods.

Participant Observations

As noted earlier, I attended approximately 18 monthly Safe and Clean Committee meetings between 2006 and 2010. I became involved in these meetings to assist John Eck, Ph.D., who is a member of the committee as a representative of the School of Criminal Justice, University of Cincinnati. Our role was to provide advice on how crime and disorder problems might be handled.

The purpose of these meetings is “to enhance the safe, clean, beautiful and welcoming environment downtown” (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010, p. 4). During these Safe and Clean Committee meetings, I took detailed notes on the interaction

between participants during problem-solving discussions. These problem-solving discussions began with a place manager, law enforcement officer, community member, or DCI member presenting problems related to crime and disorder within Cincinnati's central business district. Other participants then would provide suggestions, possible scenarios, or discuss similar problems. Documents such as crime summary statistics provided by the Cincinnati Police Department, usage statistics provided by DCI stakeholders, or other data from social service agencies would be distributed at these meetings in order to support the existence of a problem or the decrease/increase of the problem.

These data helped me understand the decision-making process that occurs when problems are presented to DCI. Additionally, these data helped me observe networking as a tool that is used to solve problems by directly observing which place manager is introduced to which service provider.

Limitations to participant observations were that any processes, decisions, or problems identified outside of these meetings could not be directly observed. Also, solutions suggested from issues discussed at previous meetings might not be discussed because of time constraints or lack of interest to the committee. Therefore, tracking specific problems was difficult on some occasions. In addition, because I was a participant in this process by providing advice during meetings, and the interviewer of DCI members, I am part of the process that I am studying.

Site Observations

My site observations consisted of field notes and photographs I took between June 2006 and September 2006; June 2007 and October 2007; May 2008 and October 2008; and finally, May 2009 and October 2009. The majority of field notes were taken on Friday evenings between 8 p.m. and 12 a.m. during ride-alongs with the Downtown Services Unit (DSU) of the Cincinnati Police Department. During these police ride-alongs, I discussed with police problems they encountered and how they addressed them. For example, officers pointed out the places frequented by drunk and disorderly college-age pedestrians, prostitutes, and panhandlers. Photographs were not permitted during police ride-alongs, but I would often revisit (during weekday business hours) locations seen during ride-alongs and take photographs and field notes. These photographs included images of trash, panhandling, or juvenile disorder in known problem locations (identified during Safe and Clean Committee meetings) such as alleyways, the main bus terminal, and other popular public spaces for panhandlers to hang out.

These data will be used to document the physical and social characteristics of the locations visited within the central business district. The photographs capture the physical context, such as the location of litter in an alley or near a parking garage, while the field notes describe the activities that take place at or near the location.

There are two limitations of these data. First, for site observations during the day, I was the only observer; and second, I rode with the same police officer for all of my nighttime ride-along observations. Because I was the only observer the statements, field notes, and photographs are from only one source and viewpoint, mine. Next, the information and opinions about crime and disorder in the central business district came

from one officer. These shortcomings could introduce bias into any conclusions drawn from these observations. For example, because I was the only observer creating the data above I may have introduced what Trochim (2001) refers to as mono-method bias. This bias develops when there are single or limited versions of measures such as interviews, notes and photographs taken from my viewpoint. The danger with this bias is that information could be missed that also explains the phenomenon when there is only one data collector. This is closely related to a second bias, mono-operation bias (Trochim, 2001). Because I am the only data collector in this process there is only a single point of view, as previously mentioned. This type of bias is usually solved by having multiple interviewers, more than one officer to ride along with, or multiple locations (e.g., other central business districts) in which to collect data so that additional information is not missed.

Written Documentation

Written documentation consists of Business Improvement District legislation for the State of Ohio, materials produced by DCI, and news articles from the *Cincinnati Enquirer* (both print and electronic editions) collected between 2006 and 2009. Documentation from DCI included the service agreement between DCI and place managers. This document serves as the foundation for DCI actions. In addition, I used media produced by DCI, such as marketing materials advertising sales and social activities and annual reports regarding business improvements within the central business district. I obtained additional media produced by independent news sources such as local

newspapers and news channel websites regarding crime and disorder problems within the central business district.

These data helped describe the relationship between DCI and place managers. The business improvement district legislation and the service agreements between DCI and various place managers within the central business district will clarify the fiduciary and other contractual agreements between DCI (the super controller) and place managers (the controller). Media data related to DCI and improvement projects helped me understand whether the improvements occurring within the central business district are influencing crime and the perception of crime and disorder.

There are, of course, limitations to these data. The written documentation describes intentions and frameworks for action, but does not describe actual actions in detail. Newspaper reports are often stimulated by the actions of the police or DCI and are not completely independent perspectives.

Interviews

Similar to Hoyt (2003), I conducted 15 face-to-face and telephone interviews between 2006 and 2010 with DCI members and Cincinnati police officers, including the Chief of Police (see Appendix B). I interviewed several place managers within the central business district, including a manager of a hotel, and the downtown library security and management staff. Also, I interviewed staff from a retail establishment, and a commercial building manager. The questions asked during these interviews were generally unscripted and open-ended to enable the participants to describe problems

within the central business district in their own terms. Each response was typed or handwritten but never recorded via audio and video.

Questions asked of place managers and police were related to their relationship with DCI. For example, how DCI worked with various businesses in solving crime and disorder problems. Place manager participants were asked about the steps they went through when a problem arose; for instance, would they deal with the problem themselves, call the police, or call DCI first? Police officers were asked how they addressed problems with and without the help of DCI. DCI employees were asked how they would assist place managers with problems and what some of the typical problems were that they dealt with. Also, questions were asked about the follow-up process once a problem was identified in a meeting (or outside of a meeting). Finally, DCI employees were asked how they matched the right sources to the right place manager (networking).

These data will help show the decision-making processes of super controllers (i.e., DCI, and those agencies networked with DCI to provide services such as law enforcement and city services) to place managers.

The main limitation with using face-to-face interviews for this study was obtaining consistent answers across respondents (see Trochim, 2001). Each interview was unique and the responses were difficult to summarize across participants. One reason for this difficulty was that each place manager interviewed had problems related to the type of establishment, the location of the establishment (e.g., a library in the center of the city vs. a run-down convenience store in a residential section of the city), or the clientele in or around each place. Therefore, each problem a place manager was asked about was specific to his or her place and might not be shared by other place managers.

Official Crime Data

I obtained official crime data from the Cincinnati Police Department's crime analyst for the years 1999 through 2009. These data, sent in electronic format, include all Part I and Part II crime incidents and calls for service for the central business district and the immediate surrounding area.

These data will help show the concentration of crime and disorder within the central business district. The benefit of using these data is the ability to document the spatial and temporal patterns of crime and disorder. In addition, problem places can be identified with these data. By problem places, I am referring to those places that have frequent calls for service or incidents over time, (i.e., hot spots).

The principal limitations of these data are that they report on events brought to police attention through their dispatch center. Therefore, problems occurring within the central business district that were not reported or observed are excluded. The data also exclude reports of events to the police through informal channels that the DCI facilitates. Police officials and DCI members at Safe and Clean Committee meetings routinely referred to reports of crime that did not go through the police communications channels, and police officials routinely made sure DCI members had the ability to contact key police personnel whenever they needed assistance.

Conclusion

I will use these data sources to describe the processes for crime and disorder control in downtown Cincinnati. In particular, I will apply modern routine activity theory (Eck,

1994; Felson, 1986), described earlier, to the data presented in this chapter to three case studies (mentioned in Chapter 1) in downtown Cincinnati. These case studies illustrate how place management influences crime and disorder in downtown Cincinnati, and how DCI, acting in one or more ways as a super controller, has attempted to influence those place managers to reduce a particular form of crime or disorder. Chapter 5 will examine how DCI addresses the problem of panhandling within the central business district.

CHAPTER 5. PANHANDLING

In the following chapters I will describe how DCI acts as a super controller for handling three specific problems: panhandling, juvenile disorder, and problem places. As a super controller in this context, DCI's role should be to influence place managers, but what of problems that are not strongly place-based? In this chapter, however, I look at such a problem—panhandling in the central business district—to understand whether DCI's role in handling such problems is markedly different from its handling of place-based problems.

This chapter explores four topics. I begin by describing the panhandling problem in Cincinnati's central business district. Second, I examine how DCI acted as a super controller in addressing central business district panhandling. Third, I look at the role of other stakeholders as super controllers for this problem. And fourth, I examine how various super controllers affected panhandling downtown.

Panhandling in Cincinnati's Central Business District

Panhandling has become a major concern of the central business district since its rejuvenation following the April 2001 downtown riots. Simply put, panhandling is asking for money from strangers in public locations: What used to be called begging. It comes in two forms: aggressive or passive. *Aggressive panhandling* includes using actual, implied, menacing, or other coercive actions when soliciting. *Passive panhandling* constitutes soliciting without using threat or menace. Often the panhandler

may have a sign or have a container nearby for depositing money (Scott, 2002). This increased concern over panhandling is exemplified in the recent history of City of Cincinnati panhandling ordinances passed by the city council between 2000 and 2010.

In 2003, the city council passed an ordinance requiring panhandlers to register with the City. The purpose was to be able to easily monitor and arrest aggressive panhandlers. Next, the council passed an ordinance prohibiting panhandling near ATMs and crosswalks. Then in late 2010 and early 2011, the council passed several ordinances. The first ordinance prohibited panhandlers from soliciting money near outdoor eating establishments, parking lots, garages, and meters (Hanselman, 2010). Finally, in early 2011 an ordinance prohibiting panhandling near hotel entrances was passed. As of May 10, 2011, panhandlers are no longer allowed to sit or lie on the sidewalks downtown, according to Cincinnati Municipal Code 723-76 (Lt. A, personal communication, May 10, 2011).

To better understand the true amount of panhandling in the central business district, the Cincinnati Police Department began in 2006 to keep separate counts of panhandling complaints by creating a special code so they could closely track acts of panhandling downtown. Figure 5.1 shows data on panhandling calls for the four years the data are available. The increase in the number of calls for service regarding panhandling in 2009 coincides with DCI's increased efforts (discussed below) beginning in 2009 to address the problem (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, April 21, 2011). It is impossible to determine whether DCI caused this increase by promoting reporting of panhandling—other factors may have contributed to the increase—but the data are consistent with this hypothesis.




Figure 5.1. Cincinnati Police Department panhandling calls for service 2006–2009.

Super Controllers and Panhandlers

Because panhandling was perceived as a deterrent to public use of the downtown, DCI and others have focused considerable attention on this problem. I examine these responses in this section.

Who Mobilized DCI?

The short answer is that DCI mobilized itself. This is not surprising, as DCI has many characteristics of a membership organization, and numerous member business owners perceived that they were losing revenue because shoppers and other visitors who might spend money in the central business district were not doing so because they felt threatened by panhandlers. As a consequence, beginning in 2002, DCI changed its focus from primarily stakeholder services such as parking incentives for shoppers, to clean and

safe initiatives, such as reducing the amount of panhandling at busy downtown locations, which increased their budget by almost half in 2010 (Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated, 2010).

DCI and Panhandling

DCI responded to the problem of panhandling in three distinct ways. First, DCI hired a social service advocate. Second, they worked with other organizations to develop a strategic plan for addressing the most problematic panhandlers within the central business district. Finally, DCI created an educational campaign directed at business owners and visitors. I explain each response next, showing how DCI acts as different types of super controller: contractual, group, and media.

A central part of DCI's strategy to address panhandling downtown was to create a mechanism to deflect panhandlers, often by connecting panhandlers to social services that could help these individuals with their special needs, but also by making it more difficult for individuals to solicit donations in high pedestrian areas. DCI entered into a contractual arrangement with Block by Block Services (2010) to provide Ambassadors and a social service outreach coordinator to assist homeless people and panhandlers within the central business district.

Block by Block is a private organization based in Louisville, Kentucky, that provides services to more than 33 improvement districts throughout the United States. These services include supplying personnel to assist in the general BID mission of providing a safe and clean environment (Block by Block Services, 2011). This organization contracts Ambassadors and social service outreach coordinators to BIDs in numerous cities across the United States, and Cincinnati is one of those cities. See

Chapter 3 for my discussion of the Ambassadors service program. Here I focus on the outreach coordinator. This coordinator made it his business to identify and meet with every known panhandler in the central business district, and any new panhandlers who might appear. The coordinator tries to determine where the panhandlers regularly hang out, the way they solicit, and their backgrounds. Understanding the background of each panhandler is important for identifying social services that may be of use. For example, a panhandler who is a veteran may be eligible for veterans' services. A panhandler who has already made contact with mental health services, but has failed to keep in contact, can be reconnected with these services. So the outreach coordinator works with various social service agencies and panhandlers to determine which social services are most appropriate for each panhandler. After connecting a panhandler with relevant services, the outreach coordinator then makes sure the panhandler makes it to his or her necessary appointments. The coordinator does this with "relentless follow-ups" where he walks the central business district multiple times a day and checks the locations of known panhandlers (Block by Block outreach coordinator, personal communication, May 2, 2011).

The outreach coordinator provides a report to DCI on the status of every panhandler assisted. For example, the Block by Block outreach coordinator keeps data on the number of daily contacts with panhandlers. These contacts include the number of new engagements (new people with whom he comes into contact), successes, aggressive panhandlers, situations needing a police response, and panhandlers with current case management contacts (Block by Block outreach coordinator, personal communication, May 2, 2011). DCI can then determine exactly how many panhandlers received services

by the data the outreach worker keeps. In addition to the demographics kept on clients, the outreach worker reports the number of panhandlers referred to services. In 2008 the outreach worker referred 233 individuals, in 2009 he referred 140, and in 2010 he referred 76 individuals for services (Block by Block outreach coordinator, personal communication, May 2, 2011). The ultimate goal is to keep panhandlers off the streets and engaged in services. Because the outreach coordinator works for Block by Block, DCI is acting as a contractual super controller in this instance. However, DCI also acted as a group super controller for managing panhandling. Chapter 3 described group super controllers as informal super controllers who influence controllers through their intimate or peer connections (Sampson et al., 2010). In this case, DCI provided a neutral location for other super controllers (peer connections) such as the Cincinnati Police Department, the Cincinnati City Council, the Downtown Residents Council, the Hamilton County Mental Health and Recovery Services Board, and other business owners within the central business district to meet and discuss solutions for assisting panhandlers and potentially reducing the number of panhandlers within the central business district.

Finally, DCI acted as a media super controller by distributing brochures in 2009 to educate business owners and visitors to downtown about the proper way to assist panhandlers without encouraging them to solicit money (see Appendix B). These brochures were distributed to business owners throughout the BID (to post and provide to visitors). In addition, the brochures were handed out by Ambassadors and made available on various BID business websites. They were also handed out at major events (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, April 21, 2011).

Other Super Controllers Involved in Addressing Panhandling

Other super controllers were involved in controlling panhandling. These included regulatory, organizational, courts, political, media, and group super controllers. Many of these super controllers were most effective when working with other super controllers. For example, the Cincinnati Police Department (a regulatory super controller) was able to enforce and arrest aggressive panhandlers in high-traffic areas because of the ordinances passed most recently by the Cincinnati City Council (a political super controller). Panhandlers are further monitored in the central business district by the Hamilton County Mental Health and Recovery Services Board (organizational super controller) and DCI's outreach coordinator. Also, the Downtown Residents Council is very active in reporting panhandling to DCI, the police, or a nearby Ambassador, who can also reduce the chances of a panhandler remaining on the streets either by asking the panhandler to move or directly contacting the police or outreach coordinator. The mental health board also acts as a super controller. Through its agreement with DCI, it can influence its own caseworkers (controllers for panhandlers) to give top priority to those panhandlers in the central business district.

Further, the Hamilton Court judges (court super controllers) work with both DCI and the Cincinnati Police Department to hold, for up to 3 hours, those individuals brought in for panhandling. This will give other super controllers such as DCI or the mental health board a chance to make sure the panhandler receives appropriate services.

Finally, the standard news outlets—newspapers and television—have acted as super controllers through their coverage of City Council's panhandling ordinances along with information on DCI's initiative to reduce panhandling in the central business

district. This potentially positive media attention may alter the perceptions of visitors who once felt downtown was unsafe and that there were too many panhandlers about. For example, this comment left by a DCI perception survey participant reiterates the negative perception of panhandling in the central business district:

Over the past 15 years downtown experiences [of] the panhandling has been a problem for me. It is the main reason I do not go downtown. In the past I have witnessed panhandlers screaming & cursing & even damaging parked cars when money is denied.
(2007 DCI Perception Survey Participant), (2007 DCI Perception Survey Participant)

What Happened?

When examined overall, the managing of the panhandling can be summarized as follows. The city council's panhandling ordinances made it easier for police to arrest panhandlers when they solicited money in high traffic places such as hotel entrances and outdoor eating venues (Cincinnati Municipal Code 910-13, 2011). Next, when panhandlers were arrested, judges agreed to hold them for up to 3 hours, which allowed DCI's outreach coordinator and other social services to make sure the panhandler received services and was not placed back on the street to continue soliciting (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, April 21, 2011). Finally, these changes brought media attention to downtown and DCI and how they are addressing panhandling. Overall, the feeling is that DCI, along with its partners and stakeholders, is really addressing the problem of panhandling downtown (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, April 21, 2011). The project focusing on panhandling was projected to end July 1, 2011, at which time CPD/DCI would do an assessment to see if there had

Table 5.1. Super Controllers Mobilized for the Problem of Panhandling

Type of Super Controller	DCI as Super Controller	Other Super Controller Mobilized
Contractual	Agreement with Block by Block organization to provide social service coordinator	N/A
Regulatory	N/A	Cincinnati Police Department
Organizational	N/A	Hamilton County Mental Health and Recovery Services Board
Financial	N/A	N/A
Courts	N/A	Hamilton County Courts
Political	N/A	Cincinnati City Council
Markets	N/A	N/A
Media	DCI educational campaign	News outlets (<i>Cincinnati Enquirer</i>)
Groups	Informal peer pressure at the individual and organizational levels used during monthly meetings	Downtown Residents Council
Family	N/A	N/A

been a true decrease in panhandling in the central business district (Lt. A., personal communication, May 10, 2011).




Figure 5.2. This updated crime analysis triangle demonstrates the super controller relationship between panhandling and that of DCI (Eck, 2003; Sampson et al., 2010).

Conclusion

In summary, DCI acted as three types of super controller in addressing the problem of panhandling downtown. First as a contractual super controller, next as a group super controller, and finally as a media super controller. But perhaps its largest role was in a network of super controllers. Table 5.1 shows DCI's role as a super controller as well as the roles of other super controllers. Though it is tempting to cast DCI in the central role in this network, I do not have sufficient evidence to make that claim. Though DCI may have been the super controller that mattered most for addressing panhandling, conservatively I can only claim it was one of several super controllers that worked together on panhandling. In the next chapter, I examine whether DCI and other

stakeholders act as super controllers by influencing place management practices at a central business district library plagued by juvenile disorder.

CHAPTER 6. JUVENILE DISORDER

In 2006, an increase in juvenile disorder at the downtown Cincinnati library became a major concern for business owners near the library and those who used the library. For example, nearby business owners complained to the library of loud music, rowdy teens crowding the sidewalk and harassing customers leaving or entering their business establishments (Director of Facilities and Security for Cincinnati Public Libraries, personal communication, March 1, 2006). In addition, as Figure 6.2 demonstrates, calls for service for juvenile disorder increased between 2004 and 2007. DCI became involved in handling this problem, and the way DCI handled it illustrates the relationships between place managers, crime, and super controllers. In this case study I will show how the management of a place—the main branch of the Cincinnati–Hamilton County Library system—was central to the problem and how DCI and other stakeholders became super controllers that directly influenced the library’s place management practices related to this problem. I will start by showing how juvenile disorder became a problem at the library. I will then address place management at the library. Then I will examine super controlling: first by DCI and then by others. The penultimate section discusses the outcome of efforts to reduce the disorder. In the final section I draw lessons from this case study.

The Origins of the Problem

Juvenile disorder was not always a problem at the library. This problem came about because of some other changes in the downtown, principally the renovation of two important places within the central business district, Government Square and Fountain Square.

When the Southwest Regional Transit Authority (S.O.R.T.A.) shut the main bus terminal in July 2005 for renovation, they re-routed many of the bus routes along Vine Street, where the downtown library was located. Vine Street is a major arterial road leading north out of the central business district (see Figure 6.1), and the flow of traffic is heavy during business hours. This additional detour added to the congestion, especially at the bus stops. Consequently, the bus stop in front of the library soon overflowed with youth transferring between buses and pedestrians waiting for buses and walking to and from the library or businesses nearby.

During one of several DCI meetings focusing on the disorder in front of the library, downtown business stakeholders, the library security, and representatives from the Cincinnati Public School system identified the bus terminal as the reason for so many unsupervised teens in the central business district. It was revealed that the Cincinnati Public School District (including various charter schools) does not have a busing system and that the majority of unsupervised juveniles downtown are students (and typically not delinquents). As a result, students who do not have their own transportation must use public buses to get to and from school. This busing scheme results in large numbers of unsupervised juveniles in and around the central business district during commuting times. Groups of juveniles hanging out during commuting times were manageable

because youth were spread between two places (Fountain Square and Government Square) in close proximity to each other.

Next, the temporary closure of Fountain Square in October of 2005 left the central business district without a centralized gathering space. In the past, this public space was used by central business district employees to eat lunch and socialize, for tourists to mingle with locals, and for civic events like holiday festivals. Unfortunately, according to Cincinnati police, after the April 2001 downtown riots, Fountain Square was mostly known as a place where juveniles, panhandlers, and the homeless loitered (Captain A., personal communication, March 10, 2006). The redevelopment of Fountain Square was part of a larger plan to reclaim that space for its original purpose as a gathering place and attract more business and residents to the central business district. Yet, this closure alone does not explain why juveniles would choose the library as a place to loiter instead of Fountain Square. According to Cincinnati police officers interviewed, there were two features that made Fountain Square a desirable place for juveniles: lack of supervision and proximity to the main bus terminal (see Figure 6.1).

Police felt juveniles loitered at Fountain Square because of a lack of supervision. Scott (2001) suggests youth like to hang out at locations with little adult supervision because these places provide them with a sense of independence and anonymity. Fountain Square lacked the type of supervision that prevents youth from misbehaving: intimate handlers. Consequently, Fountain Square became an ideal location for youth to congregate until its closure. Research on handlers, those individuals with intimate knowledge of an individual that allows them to exert control over that individual




Figure 6.1. This map shows the location of the Government Center bus Terminal and Fountain Square (to its right) in the red circle. The black circle indicates the location of the downtown public library.

(e.g., parents, siblings, and teachers), shows they can effectively control misbehavior (Felson, 1986). For example, Tillyer (2008) demonstrates how engaging handlers can reduce violence by gang members.

The structural changes mentioned above produced the conditions for the problem of juvenile disorder at the public library. This is because when both places closed for renovation there was no suitable substitute place for youth to congregate, and this is how the problem at the library began. However, the problem was not that there simply were too many juveniles congregating; in fact, libraries typically try to attract youth to their services. Rather, there were far more juveniles and no additional supervision. Consequently, rowdy behavior went unchecked. I observed the following behaviors in

the spring of 2006 during several site visits: fighting, intimidating other library users, shouting or screaming, playing loud music, and blocking the sidewalk making it difficult for pedestrians and staff to enter or leave the library. In addition, interviews with library security and staff revealed problems such as excessive noise, litter left in and outside of the library, truancy, and assaults seemed to increase immediately after the buses were routed in front of the library. As a consequence, the renovations and subsequent changes in bus routes downtown transformed the library into a crime generator (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995).




Figure 6.2. Cincinnati Police Department number of calls for service 1999–2009 for the Cincinnati Public Library at 800 Vine St.

Place Management and the Problem of Juvenile Disorder

Although the closures of Fountain Square and Government Square and the rerouting of buses to a stop in front of the library played a vital role in the increase of disorder, the

reason the problem escalated was poor place management practices by the library. I next describe how and why poor place management contributed to the problem.

Based on my direct observations in 2006 of juveniles using the library, the organization of physical space influenced behavior both outside and inside the library, and contributed to the problem of juvenile disorder.

Structural features outside the library and in front of the bus stop may have encouraged loitering. S.O.R.T.A. was unwilling to move the bus stop or add additional seating at the stop because the rerouting was temporary. However, the bus stop in front of the main entrance to the library is very small and seating is limited. As an alternative, the steps and a long brick wall surrounding the front entrance of the library provide plenty of space for groups of youth to sit and play. For instance, juveniles often sit on this wall extending from the bus stop to the main entrance of the library and, according to library security (Downtown Cincinnati Library Security Manager, personal communication, March 1, 2006), intimidate passers-by. In one instance, a group of female youth assaulted a male pedestrian navigating his way through the crowds of juveniles (DCI Safe and Clean Meeting, 2006). The wall is close enough to the bus stop so that juveniles can quickly catch their bus and long enough for large crowds of youth to gather as each bus deposits more passengers. Further, the open space between the bus stop and the steps and wall act like a mall “where teens come together for ‘chilling’” (Arnold, 2006; see also Figure 6.3). From a management perspective, there are too many kids loitering on the wall and steps of the library and too few security guards—usually three or four security guards on duty at any given time.



Figure 6.3. The picture on the left shows the bus stop and the wall and seating area directly across from it. The picture on the right show juveniles congregating farther away from the bus stop but close to the library entrance, which is located in the lower right-hand corner of the image (but not included in the image). Library surveillance cameras took both images, October 2007.

The physical organization of the library made it easy for juveniles to misbehave and escape punishment inside the library. For example, the inside of the library has a large open floor plan that allows juveniles to see if authority figures or rivals from other schools are heading in their direction, and in some sections of the library, the floors above and below are also visible. Different sections of the library (e.g., youth section, computer section, literature) are divided by rows of bookcases. In addition, juveniles could hide in various sections of the building, either behind numerous bookcases, in stairwells, or in the bathrooms.

Further, youth seek out places with food, entertainment, and protection from the weather and from “rivals” (in this case rivals could be any authority figure or students from rival schools) (Scott, 2001). The inside of the library not only has all of these desirable amenities, but the inability of library management to regulate conduct played a role in facilitating juvenile disorder inside and outside the library.

For example, juveniles used the library as a place to play video games on the Internet beyond the time limit established by the library. Patrons would complain to the staff about the juveniles on the computers, but librarians would not put a stop to the

excessive use. One rationale given to me during an interview is that some library staff ride the same buses home as some of the juveniles and reported feeling helpless in controlling the youth at the library because of fear of retaliation on the bus. Library staff also reported that they felt the juveniles would challenge their authority, or believed that discipline is the responsibility of the security staff alone. This comment is not surprising. Literature on library management indicates the library community is typically more focused on keeping an “open and accessible environment” than on security issues (Thompson, 1997).

Library staff stated that in addition to juveniles’ unruly behavior inside the library, they also left the library’s interior in disarray, scattering chairs, moving tables, and leaving trash (often from the café) throughout the library. The trash and the disorderly youth gave a sense that the library was “out of control” and an unsafe place to be. The fear felt by library staff coupled with their feelings that discipline was the job of security are examples of poor regulation of conduct because the management staff took a reactive stance against regulating behavior within the library.

One reason the regulation of conduct outside was difficult for the library to manage was the boundary separating public and private space. As previously mentioned, the bus stop was located on public property while the wall on which juveniles and other pedestrians gathered was located on the library’s property. Library management felt the problems created outside of the library were a direct result of additional bus routes redirected to the stop in front of the library. As a result, library management felt juvenile disorder outside the library should be dealt with by local police. Local police were ill equipped to handle the number of teens congregating in front of the library and needed

assistance from library management. Library management could address only the youth loitering on library property. Finally, juveniles knew library security could not enforce codes of conduct on them while hanging out near the bus stop. The tension between local police, library management, and the juveniles helped create a media frenzy regarding the inability of local police and the library to regulate the conduct of rowdy youth at the library.

The library was reluctant to control access to the facility because its management felt the wrong message would be sent. The library had trouble maintaining the balance between the rights of the youth to use the public place and the safety concerns of patrons and visitors, and the economic concerns of various businesses near the library (Scott, 2001). Consequently, the library management's hands-off approach to controlling access did not address the problem of rowdy youth and it angered both nearby businesses and patrons.

Lastly, the library acquired several key pieces of equipment, including state-of-the-art video cameras, signage, and classical music piped outside. However, those resources were not effective because staff were not trained to take preventative action. For example, more video cameras assisted library security staff to find disorderly juveniles on the property, but without the power to eject unruly individuals from the premises, the video cameras themselves offered limited additional capabilities. Also, when youth became unruly, rather than taking control of the situation by enforcing library conduct policies, the library staff would simply call library security (Library Security Staff, personal communication, March 1, 2006). Without proper training of library staff, signs regarding conduct were ignored by the loiterers. In sum, the library did acquire

resources, but the acquisition of resources was in itself not effective in preventing juvenile disorder at the library because the training and follow-through actions needed to use those resources effectively were not present.

Super Controllers and Library Management

It is clear, from the examples above, that poor place management at the library contributed to the juvenile disorder problem. As mentioned in Chapter 3, poor place management can be the result of absent or ineffective super controllers (Sampson et al., 2010). Therefore, I will describe the types of super controllers involved in addressing this problem and demonstrate why they were or were not effective. First, it is important to understand who mobilized DCI and how DCI responded before I discuss DCI's role as a super controller in this case study.

Who Mobilized DCI?

Although DCI received complaints from multiple business owners near the library, it was the persistent complaints by the owner of a hotel across the street from the library that mobilized DCI (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, March 19, 2009). When the disorder problem began in the fall of 2005, the hotel owner contacted both the library and the Cincinnati Police Department. When the problem persisted, he began taking pictures of the disorder at the library and sending them to the managing director of DCI on a daily basis (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, March 19, 2009). In an interview with this owner (Hotel owner, personal communication, March 21, 2006), he stated that the black youth hanging out at all hours of the day and night were scaring his customers. He said he received numerous

complaints from hotel guests about the noise. He also expressed concern because he was not able to get satisfactory responses from the local police or the library itself.

How Did DCI Respond?

The managing director of DCI visited the library to observe the disorder and in the process he met with library management and with the owner of the hotel. He invited both to sit down together at a Safe and Clean Committee meeting to discuss the issue further (discussed later in this chapter).

DCI as Super Controllers

DCI acted as two types of super controller in this case study (see Table 6.2 below). As contractual super controllers, DCI deployed Ambassadors to the library. These Ambassadors assisted with the clean-up of litter by the bus stop and reported misconduct to the police or library security via two-way radios. Most importantly, however, DCI acted as a group super controller. It was during several monthly Safe and Clean Committee meetings that solutions to the disorder problem were discussed. Below is a description of one of these meetings that illustrates how various central business district place managers and other stakeholders can influence the behavior of a problem place manager (the library).

DCI Safe and Clean Committee Meetings

Between March and September 2006 there were approximately five meetings focusing on juvenile disorder issues at the library. A typical meeting at this time (in 2006) would include staff from DCI (the managing director, support staff, the Ambassadors) and property managers representing various businesses across the central business district, including the library and those managers whose businesses were affected by the disorder at the library. In addition, a Cincinnati police captain and lieutenant, University of Cincinnati Criminal Justice researchers (I and Dr. John Eck), representatives from S.O.R.T.A., Cincinnati Public Schools, and youth organizations, and members of the residence council were also present.

At the beginning of these meetings an agenda with topics scheduled for discussion was passed around. For the topic of juvenile disorder at the library, the library security staff would discuss their concerns and some projects they were working on to improve the situation. Problems were then presented to the group, by anyone with a concern, and strategies such as deploying additional Ambassadors and deploying truancy officers to the library were made collaboratively. Stakeholders and place managers on all sides of the issue would meet face to face and a consensus would be reached. The idea, according to the managing director of DCI, was mutuality of respect and dynamic problem solving (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, March 19, 2009).

Table 6.1. Super Controllers Mobilized for the Problem of Juvenile Disorder		
Type of Super Controller	DCI as Super Controller	Other Super Controller Mobilized
Contractual	Agreement with Block by Block organization to provide Ambassadors to assist library.	N/A
Regulatory	N/A	Law enforcement (Cincinnati Police Department and Hamilton County Sheriff's Department)
Organizational	N/A	Hamilton County Library Management Board
Financial	N/A	N/A
Courts	N/A	N/A
Political	N/A	N/A
Markets	N/A	N/A
Media	N/A	News outlets (<i>Cincinnati Enquirer</i>) wrote stories about disorder at the library
Groups	Informal peer pressure at the individual and organizational levels used during monthly meetings.	Residents, businesses nearby
Family	N/A	N/A




Figure 6.4. This updated crime analysis crime triangle demonstrates the super controller relationship between juvenile disorder and that of DCI (Eck, 2003; Sampson et al., 2010).

Other Super Controllers Involved in the Problem

Other super controllers, independent of DCI, were involved in the process of developing solutions to or bringing attention to the library's juvenile disorder problem. These included regulatory super controllers, the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department, organizational super controllers, and the Hamilton County Library Management Board that oversees the management at the downtown library. Also, media super controllers, the local news outlets and group super controllers, residents, and nearby business owners.

For example, the Hamilton County Sheriff's Department began patrolling inside the library and assisting library management with unruly juveniles on the library's property. Next, the Hamilton County Library Management Board worked with the

downtown library branch regarding the best policies and practices for dealing with the juvenile disorder. News outlets, the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, and news channel websites published several pieces regarding teens hanging out at the downtown library in January and February of 2006. These articles put the library management in a negative light, suggesting that they could not handle the disorderly teens. At the end of each article, representatives from the library stated they were working on correcting the problems. In this case, negative publicity did work to motivate the library to improve its crime prevention practices.

The library, aside from the residents and other groups, also met at DCI meetings with individual patrons, residents, and business owners nearby who expressed concern for their safety and profits if the library did not address the disorder. The combination of DCI acting as a group super controller, along with the pressure from individual business owners may have influenced the library's management enough that it did take action and advice from DCI

What Happened?

In March of 2006 I was asked by the managing director of DCI to assemble a list of recommendations based on my observations and communication with various property managers and present them during a Safe and Clean Committee meeting. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 briefly describe my recommendations.

Table 6.2. Short-Term Goals: Discourage Crowds From Gathering

Contributes to Problem	Why	Possible Intervention
Vending machines	Juveniles hang out outside of library, then go inside to use vending machines for food and drink	Restricting the use of vending machines may make hanging out around library less desirable
Curved wall by Vine Street entrance	Juveniles use wall to sit and congregate	Make wall uncomfortable to sit on by installing thorny bushes or plants that overhang to prevent sitting or leaning
Enforcement of rules	No visible rules of conduct are present, making it difficult for security to enforce rules	Post rules of conduct outside, enabling security to enforce those rules
Second floor ramp inside	Juveniles hang out in this inside area to observe what is happening both outside (through a large window) and inside	Block opportunity to see out onto Vine Street with a screen. This may reduce overall traffic/loitering inside at this location

Table 6.3 Mid-Range/Long-Term Goals: Attack/Reduce Opportunity for Misconduct

These issues may require the library to work in conjunction with other agencies in order to reduce conduct problems in and around the library.

Contributes to Problem	Why	Possible Intervention
Lack of enforcement	Security indicate they have no authority when it comes to removing juveniles from the site	Hiring a full-time police officer who can ask for ID and enforce truancy laws. In addition, there would be a better relationship between the Cincinnati Police Department and the library
Lack of control of space	Non-security library staff takes hands-off approach when it comes to managing misbehavior in their assigned areas	Training staff to take more ownership of their immediate area will reduce misbehavior

Based on the document in Appendix C, the library did place signage outside regarding conduct in March 2006. As previously mentioned, library administration contracted off-duty deputies in the Hamilton County Sheriff's office beginning in August

of 2006. The library was already in the process of retraining its staff to take more ownership of their areas. This training, called “Not in our Library,” began as of February 2006 (see Appendix C). Finally, the library continued to work with the Ambassador services and DCI for assistance with litter control and additional “eyes and ears” around the library.

It is not possible to determine whether these changes were effective at reducing juvenile disorder at the library because in August 2006 the main bus terminal reopened and many of the buses were re-routed back to Government Square.

Conclusion

The disorder at the library did subside in 2007 (see Table 6.1); however, it cannot be determined whether a specific intervention was responsible for the decrease. This case study is meant primarily to demonstrate that poor place management on the part of the downtown public library required the assistance of a super controller. I suggest that DCI did act as a super controller in two ways: as a contractual super controller and a group super controller. The fact that the library played an integral role in the discussions at DCI’s Safe and Clean Committee meetings and acknowledged that it needed assistance suggests DCI became a super controller that directly influenced the library’s place management practices related to this problem.

Second, from DCI’s perspective, the type of super controller most influential on library place management for reducing this problem may be DCI’s ability, as a group super controller, to bring key players in a problem together and to discuss solutions in a dynamic manner. Media super controller types may have an influence as well by

providing negative publicity about the library. Although the news articles previously mentioned suggest the library planned to take action, it is hard to determine if they took action because of negative publicity or the library's interaction with DCI.

The case study in Chapter 7 will examine two problem places. The first is a residential apartment complex in the middle of a revitalized part of the central business district, and the second is a small corner market with a history of problem owners and clientele. I will examine which super controller types were involved in these two problem places and which types may be effective.

CHAPTER 7. PROBLEM PLACES

In the previous chapters I showed how the general problem of panhandling was dealt with in the central business district by DCI and other stakeholders acting as super controllers. Next, I described how these super controllers addressed the problem of juvenile disorder at the downtown library. In this chapter I will show how two places became problems because of their poor place management practices and how super controllers were involved in addressing those practices. The first case study deals with a corner grocery store and the second case study deals with an old hotel turned into a Section-8 apartment complex. After describing both cases, I will summarize the basic lessons these cases illustrate regarding place management and super controllers.

Convenience Store Case Study

The convenience store is located on the first floor of a building on the corner of Elm Street and 9th Street in a residential section of the central business district. The building itself has been a blight for years, but was not singled out as a problem location because it blended into the rest of the neighborhood at the time (see Figure 7.1). It was not until the neighborhood became revitalized with new condominiums, new stakeholders, and a school that the building and the convenience store became a problem place where vagrants and panhandlers would congregate (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011).



Figure 7.1. The Convenience store. Photo courtesy of the Hamilton County Auditors Website: <http://www.hamiltoncountyauditor.org>




Figure 7.2. Number of violent calls for service to the convenience store for the years 1999–2009 (Cincinnati Police Department).

Figure 7.2 shows the increase in violent calls for service between 2002 and 2007. In addition to the increase in calls for service to the police there were three events that demonstrated the convenience store was a problem place: food stamp fraud, a shooting of a robber by the owner, and then the eventual stabbing (and death) of the owner by a patron. These events are discussed below.

First, an investigation conducted from April 2007 to April 2008 by the Ohio Department of Public Safety Investigative Unit and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) revealed that the convenience store owner allowed the purchase of improper items using food stamps (Ohio Department of Commerce, 2008, see Appendix C). These items included alcoholic beverages and cigarettes. Such sales occurred at least 18 times during the USDA's investigation (see Appendix C).

As a result of these investigations and because of written complaints from the Downtown Residents Council, the Cincinnati Police Department, and the Cincinnati City Council, the Ohio Department of Commerce's Division of Liquor Control denied the convenience store's liquor license renewal.

The second incident occurred in 2007. The convenience store owner chased a robbery suspect out of the store and fired several shots at him, but missed him. This event occurred in the street of a residential neighborhood, and brought more negative media attention to the store and the neighborhood.

Finally, on March 2, 2009, in the middle of the afternoon, a disgruntled patron beat, stabbed, and killed the 62-year-old convenience store owner (Wells, 2009). Once again, the store and the neighborhood were in the media spotlight, which further angered the Downtown Residents Council. The store closed briefly after the owner's death and was reopened by relatives in 2010, who sold the store later that year.

Convenience Store Place Management Problems

Poor place management became apparent, not only with the owners of the building itself, but with the convenience store owner who leased retail space on the ground floor. For example, the owners of the building did not invest in their building, keep up with repairs, or improve its appearance while the rest of the neighborhood underwent reconstruction. In fact, the owners placed the building for sale. The convenience store owner mirrored the building owner's habits and did not invest in maintenance inside or outside of the store or change his products to match the new clientele moving into the neighborhood.

As the neighborhood context changed, the misbehavior of the convenience store owner became more apparent. The activities of the convenience store's owner encouraged misconduct in and around the premises rather than regulated conduct. By allowing customers to illegally purchase alcohol and cigarettes with food stamps, for example, it could be hypothesized that the owner sent a message to his customers that illegal activity was acceptable in and around his establishment. In addition, this convenience store was often where panhandlers would congregate (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011).

Poor place management practices such as the lack of access control and the inability to acquire resources to improve security could have contributed to the robbery

event in 2007 and the subsequent death of the store owner in 2009. For example, although there were robbery attempts in the past, an incident of shoplifting, and the subsequent murder of the store's owner, there was no mention by police, or information in the subsequent media surrounding these incidents, about security features installed to prevent undesirable customers from entering the store. In April 2009 I went into the convenience store and did not observe any security features such as cameras, security to protect the cashier such as Plexiglas, or signs regarding conduct while in the store. Finally, because the owner of the building did not invest in the property and the convenience store itself had financial troubles because of the removal of its liquor license and food stamp sales and the death of the owner, the ability to acquire additional resources to improve the property did not exist.

In sum, the actions of the convenience store owner and the owners of the building resulted in poor place management practices. As the area surrounding the convenience store improved, the building and store declined because of neglect. The actions of the convenience store's owner made the convenience store a crime enabler, where poor place management practices allow crime to occur; and a crime generator, where crime occurs because of the opportunities presented (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995; Clarke & Eck, 2003).

Super Controllers and Problem Places: Convenience Store

Similar to the library case study in Chapter 5, poor place management practices contributed to criminal activity at the convenience store. Next, I will demonstrate the types of super controllers involved in addressing these problems and demonstrate

whether they were influential in the resolution of the problem. First, it is important to understand how DCI was mobilized and how DCI responded to each problem place.

Convenience Store: Who Mobilized DCI?

Although various stakeholders such as the Cincinnati Police and representatives from the Downtown Residents Council would discuss the ongoing problems during DCI's monthly Safe and Clean meetings there was no distinct individual or organization that brought this problem to DCI's attention. Also, the managing director of DCI made direct observations of the conditions of the convenience store during his regular walking tours of the BID.

Convenience Store: How DCI Responded

Because the managing director made it a point to visit the convenience store during his walking tours, he extended several invitations to the owner to attend monthly Safe and Clean meetings or some of the smaller neighborhood sector meetings with some of his neighbors, but the owner attended only one of these meetings. These neighborhood sector meetings are usually held once a month and the leaders from those sector meetings report issues/concerns during the larger monthly Safe and Clean meetings (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, March 19, 2009). When the owner was killed in 2009, the managing director reached out to his family, who still operated the business, but they did not attend any meetings or ask for assistance. In 2010 the family sold the store to a new owner.

Convenience Store: DCI as Super Controllers

DCI acted as two types of super controller in this case study, contractual and group super controllers (see Table 7.1). As contractual super controllers, DCI deployed Ambassadors to the convenience store to help the owner in maintaining and cleaning the exterior storefront (per the BID agreement discussed in Chapter 3). In addition, the Ambassadors would contact the correct authorities if they witnessed issues beyond their control, for example, building code violations or disorderly or suspicious behavior requiring police intervention. In this case, DCI was most influential as a group super controller, specifically after the convenience store was sold to a new owner in 2010. As of January 2011, DCI encouraged a “good neighbor” agreement between the new owner of the convenience store and another stakeholder against the convenience store—the Downtown Residents Council. In this agreement, the owner would agree not to sell liquor and the area residents would agree to shop there. The managing director of DCI stated that even if a good outcome is unlikely, DCI must make an effort to resolve problems between the parties. Even though DCI cannot make any one party *do* anything, they can provide a place for the opposing parties to convene and connect, and can help facilitate problems. “The strength of DCI is in its ability to bring opposing groups together and facilitate discussions that will lead to solving problems” (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, February 22, 2011).

Convenience Store: Other Super Controllers Involved in the Problem

Other super controllers aside from DCI were involved in the problem-solving process. These included regulatory, political, media, and group super controllers. First,

regulatory super controllers—the Cincinnati Police Department, the Ohio Department of Commerce, and the Division of Liquor Control—were able to alter the behavior of the convenience store. For example, beyond responding to calls for service and making arrests at the convenience store, the Cincinnati Police Department provided the necessary crime statistics to the City of Cincinnati in order to formally object to the sale of alcohol by the convenience store (see Appendix C). Further, the Ohio Department of Commerce, Division of Liquor Control directly affected the convenience store’s problem behavior by denying the convenience store’s 2008–2009 liquor license renewal (see Appendix C).

The regulatory super controllers were influenced by political super controllers, specifically, the Cincinnati City Council. On April 16, 2008, the Council submitted to the Director of the Ohio Department of Liquor Control, a legislative resolution objecting to the liquor license renewal application by the convenience store (see Appendix C). This resolution led to the eventual denial, by the State of Ohio to the convenience store, of the store’s liquor license.

Next, media super controllers most likely influenced other place managers and super controllers to take action against the convenience store. Events such as the convenience store owner’s attempted shooting of a robbery suspect and the owner’s tragic death made sensational headlines. For example, when the owner chased and shot at a robbery suspect as the suspect fled his store in November 2007, the headline of a local media website read, “‘I meant to Kill Him,’ Shopkeeper says” (WLWT Staff, 2007). This negative portrayal may have led to other place managers and super controllers, such as the Downtown Residents Council, to take action against the

convenience store. This leads to the last super controllers to put pressure on the convenience store, the Downtown Residents Council.

Beyond DCI, there was another group super controller, the Downtown Residents Council. They operate much like DCI by providing a place for residents to meet, exchange ideas, and meet with civic leaders to express their concerns (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011). They put pressure on other super controllers, DCI, Cincinnati police, and Cincinnati City Council to address the problems created in their neighborhood by the convenience store. Specifically, representatives of the Downtown Residents Council met with city officials to object to the liquor license renewal for the previous owner. When the owner of the convenience store died and the family sold the business shortly thereafter, the Downtown Residents Council also protested the application for a liquor license by the new owner of the convenience store. Even though the new owner had nothing to do with the history of the convenience store or the previous owners, the Council is opposed to the possibility of liquor being sold at that location (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, February 22, 2011).

Convenience Store: What Happened?

The convenience store continued to go into decline after the death of the owner. The sons of the owner then sold the convenience store to a new owner in 2010, as previously mentioned. In conclusion, no solution has been reached thus far, and no major incidents have occurred under the new ownership. DCI continues to work with the new owner of the convenience store to get him involved with the rest of the BID community.

Metropole Case Study

The Metropole was originally built in 1905 as a luxury hotel in the heart of Cincinnati's central business district (Hamilton County Auditor, 2011). The Metropole was sold to a private company based in Columbus, Ohio, and turned into Section-8 apartments. Over the years the Metropole suffered from the same ills that many Section-8 housing suffers (i.e., drug sales, prostitution, vagrancy). "In 1994, the Metropole fit in with the area . . . there was a crummy old bar (The Subway Bar) with crummy patrons" (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011).

In 1995 the Aronoff Center for the Arts opened across the street from the Metropole and by the end of the 2000s, the area surrounding the apartments became the epicenter for arts and entertainment in the central business district. Unfortunately, both the management of the Metropole and its tenants got worse (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011). According to the police, nearly half (47%) of the crimes committed in the area can be connected to the Metropole. "Either the offenders use this (the Metropole) as an address or the crimes occur at the location"

Table 7.1. Super Controllers Mobilized for the Convenience Store

Contractual	Agreement with Block by Block organization to provide Ambassadors to keep the outside of the convenience store clean and to report any problems to DCI	N/A
Regulatory	N/A	Cincinnati Police Department; The Ohio Department of Commerce

Organizational	N/A	N/A
Financial	N/A	N/A
Courts	N/A	N/A
Political	N/A	Cincinnati City Council
Markets	N/A	N/A
Media	N/A	News outlets (<i>Cincinnati Enquirer</i>) wrote stories about the convenience store's owner
Groups	Informal peer pressure at the individual and organizational levels used during monthly meetings	Residents Council
Family	N/A	N/A




Figure 7.3. Google map showing location of the Metropole Apartment Complex in the City of Cincinnati.




Figure 7.4. Number of violent calls for service to the Metropole for the years 1999–2009.



Figure 7.5. Violent crime (including murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) at and near the Metropole Apartments for the years 2004–2009.

(Cincinnati Police Chief, personal communication, March 11, 2010). For instance, crimes such as theft from autos from several blocks away could be traced to offenders living at the Metropole. The 10-story building provided an ample view of the streets below, and “they (offenders) could watch people getting out of their cars a block away, take the elevator down to the lobby, exit the building and go directly to that car and break in” (Cincinnati Police Chief, personal communication, March 11, 2010).

In addition to crimes committed in the area by Metropole residents, there were problems occurring both inside and immediately outside the building. In July 2006, after a 2-month police investigation, the Cincinnati Police Department conducted a raid on the apartment complex that resulted in the arrest of nine offenders for drug sales and possession of firearms (Cincinnati Police Chief, personal communication, March 11, 2010). Four of the offenders were arrested outside for selling drugs when the police arrived (WLWT Staff, 2006). Other behaviors by the residents included aggressive panhandling, drunk and disorderly behavior, and menacing, some of which took place right outside the Metropole where residents would sit and harass passers-by. These problems were brought up by nearby business owners during a Safe and Clean Committee meeting in August 2006.

Finally, Figure 7.4 shows that since 1999 there has been a steady increase in calls for service to the Metropole apartments, with an exception of a brief decline after the 2006 raid. Figure 7.5 shows that violent crime for the years 2004–2009 are clustered at the Metropole and along the blocks surrounding the apartment complex. In sum, this

building and its tenants had been a problem for the Cincinnati police, nearby businesses and patrons for many years. One explanation for the crime generated at this location is poor place management, discussed next.

Metropole Place Management Problems

Poor place management practices were responsible for much of the crime and disorder at the Metropole. First, the physical space was conducive to crime. When the Metropole was converted from a hotel into Section-8 housing the layout fostered criminal opportunity because none of the 230 apartments had their own bathroom. Shared bathrooms on each floor potentially contributed to drug sales and prostitution between residents and visitors on each floor. In addition, there was a thrift store located on the premises that could have provided a means by which to dispose of stolen goods. Finally, there was a bar on the premises that provided easy access to alcohol. These features, taken in total, created several opportunities for crimes of prostitution, panhandling (to buy things at the thrift store or to buy alcohol), and assaults.

The property owners of the building were located in Columbus, Ohio. Because they were not directly involved in the day-to-day management of the property, there were problems regulating conduct on the premises. For example, many residents would sit on milk crates and other make-shift seats in front of the Metropole and would panhandle or harass passers-by (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011; Cincinnati Police Chief, March 11, 2010). A second place management issue stemming from absentee landlords, coupled with the fact that the Metropole was a Section-8 property, meant that very little investment or the minimal amount of investment went back into the property. The end result is that poor place management practices and the

subsequent criminal activity of some of the residents made the Metropole a problem place.

Super Controllers and Problem Places

Similar to the convenience store case study, poor place management practices contributed to criminal activity at the Metropole. Next, I will demonstrate the types of super controllers involved in addressing these problems and demonstrate whether they were influential in the resolution of the problem. First, it is important to understand how DCI was mobilized and how DCI responded to each problem place.

The Metropole Apartments: Who Mobilized DCI?

Like the convenience store case study, there was not one specific individual or organization to mobilize DCI to take action against some of the problems generated by the Metropole. Rather, various stakeholders such as business owners near the Metropole, the Cincinnati Police Department, and private developers expressed concern regarding criminal activity in and around the Metropole.

The Metropole Apartments: How DCI Responded

Much of what DCI could do occurred after the sale of the Metropole (described in the next section). DCI did three things to help Cincinnati City Development Corporation (3CDC) with the Metropole apartments. First, DCI's Ambassadors were deployed to the Metropole to assist with trash removal. This is an activity DCI has engaged in with the Metropole since Ambassador services became available. Second, DCI worked with 3CDC and other property owners near the central business district to assist in the

relocation of the residents of the Metropole due to the sale of the building (see next section). Third and relatedly, DCI assisted businesses attached to the Metropole property with legal paperwork and relocation (within the central business district) services. The main role of DCI regarding the Metropole Apartments case study was one of advocacy (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011).

The Metropole Apartments: DCI as Super Controllers

Again, similar to the convenience store case study, DCI acted as two types of super controller in this case study (see Table 7.2). First, as a contractual super controller, deploying Ambassadors to the Metropole Apartments to remove trash around the property. Second, as a group super controller, acting as an advocate between the private corporation, 3CDC, and the various private and public organizations involved in controlling crime and disorder and facilitating the renovation of the Metropole Apartments when the building was sold the development corporation in November 2009.

The Metropole Apartments: Other Super Controllers Involved in the Problem

Other regulatory, political, media, and group super controllers were involved in influencing the Metropole's place management practices. The Cincinnati Police Department, the regulatory super controller involved, influenced place management practices that led to crime and disorder at the Metropole in 2006. Over the years, the Cincinnati Police Department was often called to the Metropole for various reasons, but the problem of crime and disorder continued. However, after a 2-month investigation by the department, a police raid on the Metropole Apartments resulted in the arrests

described earlier (Cincinnati Police Chief, personal communication, March 11, 2010; WLWT Staff, 2006). This raid was successful in that it ultimately influenced how the place managers addressed safety issues on their property. This influence or pressure put on the place managers of the Metropole was successful, in part, because of two other super controllers working cooperatively with the Cincinnati Police Department: the Office of the Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney (political super controller), and the media.

First, the political super controller, the Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, filed a civil nuisance action against the owners of the Metropole. This action resulted in a consent decree between the two parties that forced the owners to improve security measures at the apartment building. The revised security plan included:

- Renovations to the building, including the lobby
- Installing security cameras
- Restricting access to the building
- Evicting criminal/problem tenants (Office of the Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, 2006)




Figure 7.6. Signs at the entrance of the Metropole Apartment building restrict access to building for minors and at certain hours.

Next, media super controllers worked with both the Cincinnati Police Department and the Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office to highly publicize the police raid on the Metropole and the subsequent action taken by the prosecutor's office. It was the combined effort of regulatory, political, and media super controllers that had the most impact on changing the behavior of the Metropole place management.

Although calls for service were reduced after the 2006 police raid at the Metropole, other groups began placing pressure on the place managers to sell the property. The purpose of the property (housing low-income individuals) no longer fit in with the burgeoning arts and entertainment district. Specifically, private developers and other stakeholders near the Metropole put pressure on the Metropole to sell the property so that the space could be utilized. One private corporation, the Cincinnati City Development Corporation (3CDC) took the lead in negotiating with the owners of Metropole to purchase the problem property and renovate the building to something more consistent with the arts and entertainment district in which the building was located.

The Metropole Apartments: What Happened?

For years the Metropole was a problem apartment complex. Attempts to get the absentee property owner to participate in improving the safety of their building were mostly unsuccessful. Only after the July 2006 police raid, subsequent media attention, and a consent decree between the Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office and the owners of the Metropole to address safety issues in the building, did the owners finally make

security improvements (Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office Press Release, September 7, 2006). Although the number of calls for service at that location decreased since the 2006 raid, the Metropole continued to be a problem place because its residents did not fit in with the upscale renovations nearby. Also, because the Metropole was Section-8 housing and provided housing to low-income or disabled individuals and individuals with substance abuse problems, it could not simply raise rents to pay for improvements. In November 2009, 3CDC bought the property from the owners with the intention to renovate the property into an upscale hotel. In this case study, the resolution to the problem place was simply to get rid of the place.

Table 7.2. Super Controllers Mobilized for The Metropole		
Type of Super Controller	DCI as Super Controller	Other Super Controller Mobilized
Contractual	Agreement with Block by Block organization to provide Ambassadors to assist in trash removal	N/A
Regulatory	N/A	Cincinnati Police Department
Organizational	Block by Block outreach coordinator assisted residents with relocation	N/A
Financial	N/A	N/A
Courts	N/A	N/A
Political	N/A	Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (enforcement of civil nuisance statute)
Markets	N/A	N/A

Media	N/A	News Outlets (<i>Cincinnati Enquirer</i>) wrote about the 2006 police raid and also the news regarding the sale of the Metropole
Groups	Informal peer pressure at the individual and organizational levels used during monthly meetings	Residents, coalition for the homeless, businesses nearby, potential private investors
Family	N/A	N/A




Figure 7.7. This updated crime analysis triangle demonstrates the super controller relationship between the problem places and that of DCI (Eck, 2003; Sampson et al., 2010).

Conclusion

Both the convenience store and the Metropole apartments suffered from poor place management practices that played a role in creating or sustaining criminal activity at those locations. These case studies show that DCI did have some super controller capabilities, like the ability to assist place managers in maintaining the external appearance of their properties through the use of Ambassador services and second, by facilitating communication between problem places and concerned stakeholders. In the latter instance, stakeholders could use DCI as an advocate or mediator (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, April 16, 2009). As in Chapter 5, DCI was most influential as a contractual and group super controller.

Additionally, other super controllers were influential in both cases. In regard to the convenience store, the loss of its liquor license and its ability to accept food stamps proved to be an important event in the store's viability within its own neighborhood. It could be argued that most of the store's profits came from liquor and food stamp sales and residents living in the renovated condominiums nearby had little use for this type of corner store (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011). The Downtown Residents Council proved to be an important super controller in this instance by influencing other super controllers (e.g., state regulatory agency) to take action against the convenience store (see Sampson et al., 2010). Although the convenience store was still in operation under new management as of March 2011, the Downtown Residents Council is opposing the new owner's liquor license application (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2010).

Regarding The Metropole Apartments, the 2006 raid on the apartment complex by Cincinnati police could be seen as a pivotal moment. Although there were several changes by the owners shortly thereafter, the Section-8 housing and its residents appeared increasingly out of place as the neighborhood improved. The new stakeholders in this area were interested in maintaining the viability of this entertainment district and were able to put more pressure on the owners than in previous years (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011). In this case, stakeholders, place managers of other properties nearby, were acting as super controllers of the Metropole. As a result, one of the stakeholders, 3CDC, was able to purchase the property in 2009 and relocate its residents to housing in other locations in preparation for turning the Metropole into an upscale hotel (Prendergast, 2010). In both cases, the property was eventually sold with the result that determining the true extent to which any of the super controllers truly influenced place management directly or the problems experienced at each place indirectly cannot be determined with certainty. The lesson learned here, is that super controllers appear to have at least some impact on an issue when they work in conjunction with other super controllers rather than on their own.

CHAPTER 8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter I will summarize the roles of DCI and other stakeholder's as super controllers across the three case studies presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. In doing so, I will discuss which cases were most influenced by DCI in the role of a super controller and which cases were least influenced. Next, this chapter will examine other super controllers that may have influenced these cases. I will then revisit the questions presented in Chapter 4 to see if these case studies provided plausible answers. Finally, future research and policy implications will be discussed.

Table 8.1. DCI as a Super Controller Across Three Case Studies			
Type of Super Controller	Case Study 1: Panhandling	Case Study 2: Juvenile Disorder	Case Study 3: Problem Place
Contractual	Agreement with Block by Block organization to provide social service coordinator	Agreement with Block by Block organization to provide Ambassadors to assist library	Agreement with Block by Block organization to provide Ambassadors to keep the outside of the convenience store clean and to report to DCI any problems. Also assisted with trash removal at the Metropole.
Regulatory	N/A	N/A	N/A
Organizational	N/A	N/A	Block by Block outreach coordinator assisted residents with

			relocation for the Metropole Apartments
Financial	N/A	N/A	N/A
Courts	N/A	N/A	N/A
Political	N/A	N/A	N/A
Markets	N/A	N/A	N/A
Media	DCI educational campaign	N/A	N/A
Groups	Informal peer pressure at the individual and organizational levels used during monthly meetings.	Informal peer pressure individual and organizational levels used during monthly meetings	Informal peer pressure at the individual and organizational levels used during monthly meetings for both the convenience store and the Metropole Apartments
Family	N/A	N/A	N/A

DCI's Role as a Super Controller Across Three Case Studies

Table 8.1 shows DCI's super controller type across the three case studies presented in this dissertation. First, this table shows DCI acted as a contractual super controller in all three case studies. There are two ways in which DCI acted as a contractual super controller: at the immediate organizational level and, more broadly, to the stakeholders within the BID. First, as described in Chapter 3, contractual super controllers use formal, written arrangements between entities to influence the behavior of organizations and

individuals (Sampson et al., 2010). In each case, DCI acts as a contractual super controller to place managers because DCI contracts services to help place managers maintain their properties through the organization Block by Block. These services have been in the form of Ambassadors assisting place managers to maintain the exterior of their buildings, as in the example the convenience store and the Metropole apartment complex in the third case study, or cleaning the front entrance of the library because of the juvenile disorder in the second case study. This service also includes the use of a social services outreach worker whose talents were used in the first case study to assist panhandlers with connecting to social services to keep them off the street. DCI's outreach worker has been so successful there is an unintended consequence: Individuals from other parts of the city in need of services travel to the central business district because the word on the street is that DCI helps people connect with social services (DCI Managing Director, personal communications, April 20, 2011). Also, this same outreach worker helped in the relocation of individuals displaced after the sale of the Metropole apartment complex in the third case study.

Second, I suggested DCI's contractual super controller role is broader regarding the stakeholders within the BID. The rationale for this statement is that DCI contracts with Block by Block in the first place because DCI is contractually obligated through BID legislation discussed in Chapter 3 to assist place managers. In all three cases, Ambassadors were deployed to assist place managers clean up trash, report problem patrons (e.g., panhandlers, drunks), and help with storefront issues (e.g., broken lighting fixtures, tree and plant maintenance, signage). However, not all place managers took advantage of DCI's services or the services ultimately did not help the problem location.

This example is most apparent in the problem places case study. No matter how much assistance Ambassadors provided to these locations, the problems generated by each location were beyond the help of simply maintaining the front of the store or apartment complex. Although DCI acts as a contractual super controller in all three cases, the Ambassador and outreach services were most effective in the first two cases.

Next, DCI attempted to influence place management practices in the first case study. For example, DCI launched its own media campaign to educate business owners and visitors about how to properly assist panhandlers (see “DCI’s 2009 Educational Campaign” in Appendix B). This campaign began with a discussion during several DCI Safe and Clean meetings about what stakeholders should do when they encounter aggressive panhandlers and also what they should tell their customers to do in the same situation. These stakeholders were told to either report panhandling to the nearest Ambassador or police officer or to call a special hotline specifically to address panhandling. This media campaign may also have contributed to the unintended consequence of individuals seeking out DCI for social services.

Finally, DCI acted as a group super controller in all three case studies. As Chapter 3 discusses, group super controllers influence controllers to adopt better prevention practices through informal peer group pressure—or informal social control (Sampson et al., 2010). DCI uses its institutional setting as a neutral location to bring together place managers and other stakeholders involved or affected by specific problems. As previously mentioned, DCI cannot make any one side do anything, even though DCI has a contractual obligation to assist its stakeholders. However, DCI can act as a mediator between stakeholders. Sometimes this is effective, such as in the case

study on panhandling. DCI provided a neutral place for multiple agencies (the other super controllers) to come together and work on the common goal of reducing panhandling in the central business district. This may work because once in a neutral location, the pressure is on each stakeholder to develop solutions to problems in front of other stakeholders. DCI also follows up with each stakeholder to see if they need additional assistance once a solution is reached. In other cases, DCI's group informal pressure may not work, as in the case of the convenience store. If place managers are unwilling to cooperate, then DCI cannot force them to work with other stakeholders. In the case of the convenience store, group informal pressure from the Downtown Residents Council turned out to be more effective than DCI's group informal pressure.

What does this mean regarding DCI and the case study in which it was most effective as a super controller? I would suggest DCI was most effective as a super controller in the panhandling case study because of its contractual use of the outreach worker to get the right social services to panhandlers in the central business district. Also, DCI's ability to create its own media campaign seemed to help draw attention to the problem of panhandling in the central business district. This campaign aimed specifically at removed excuses for stakeholders and visitors in the central business district to give money to panhandlers by publicizing alternative methods of contributing money and how to report problem panhandlers. Also, the ability to use informal social control in mobilizing other stakeholders and turning them into super controllers—such as the Cincinnati Police Department, the Hamilton County Mental Health and Recovery Services Board, the Hamilton County Courts, the Downtown Residents Council, and the Cincinnati City Council—to collectively take action in controlling panhandling is another

reason I believe DCI was successful in this particular case study. The case study where DCI was least effective appeared to be the third case study, involving problem places. Again, this could be because of the contractual obligation that DCI has to each stakeholder, in that it may not be able to become legally involved in certain issues when stakeholders are pitted against each other. But it could also be that place managers who are not effective at controlling crime at their location may simply not want help regardless of the form in which it is offered to them. According to the managing director of DCI, place managers like these are less active in the downtown community and tend to receive more complaints about the way they run their establishment (DCI Managing Director, personal communication, January 20, 2011).

The question then becomes one of how to engage those place managers who do not want to participate in the downtown community, but simply want to run their business? Madensen's (2007) study of bar place managers may provide an answer to this question. First, Madensen's (2007) study suggests bar place management responses to problems are associated with management networks (knowing other managers with particular solutions) and regulatory inspections. As stated previously, DCI has the capability to connect property owners with resources as well as with each other through informal meetings. DCI also has the ability, along with other organizations (e.g., Downtown Residents Council), to request regulatory action on place managers that do not take care of problems in and around their property. One suggestion is to make access to the network as effortless as possible for the place manager. Proactive managers attended DCI meetings regularly. Those that could benefit from BID services and are part of the BID but do not attend meetings may do better with regularly scheduled face-

to-face meetings at their locations rather than leaving their places. Although the managing director of DCI does this somewhat regularly, it may need to be incorporated into a daily task, just as the Block by Block outreach services coordinator must relentlessly check on the status of his frequent panhandlers. Other place managers may simply not understand the benefits of working with DCI, especially if there are multiple place managers or turnover is a problem. In this case, these managers may not know about DCI because the information has not made it through the establishment's chain of command. The bottom line is to make access to information and network resources as easy for place managers as possible. The more steps place managers have to take to work with a network, even if that network can provide resources, the less likely they are to use those resources.

Table 8.2. Other Super Controllers Across Three Case Studies			
Type of Super Controller	Case Study 1: Panhandling	Case Study 2: Juvenile Disorder	Case Study 3: Problem Place
Contractual	N/A	N/A	N/A
Regulatory	Cincinnati Police Department	Law Enforcement (Cincinnati Police Department and Hamilton County Sheriff's Department)	Cincinnati Police Department for both problem places. The Ohio Department of Commerce for the convenience store
Organizational	Hamilton County Mental Health and Recovery Services Board	Hamilton County Library Management Board	N/A
Financial	N/A	N/A	N/A
Courts	Hamilton County Courts	N/A	N/A

Political	Cincinnati City Council	N/A	Cincinnati City Council for the convenience store and the Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office for the Metropole
Markets	N/A	N/A	N/A
Media	News Outlets (<i>Cincinnati Enquirer</i>)	News Outlets (<i>Cincinnati Enquirer</i>) stories about disorder at the library	News Outlets (<i>Cincinnati Enquirer</i>) wrote stories about both places
Groups	Downtown Residents Council	Residents, businesses nearby	The Downtown Residents Council put pressure on both place managers. Local businesses and potential investors put pressure on the Metropole place managers
Family	N/A	N/A	N/A

Other Super Controllers and Their Roles Across Three Case Studies

Table 8.2 is similar to Table 8.1 except that it shows other roles of other super controllers involved in each case study (generally). Although there are many types of super controllers that were able to directly and indirectly influence place managers, the most effective super controllers discussed here are regulatory, courts, and political. Across all three case studies, regulatory super controllers were able to directly influence a problem (panhandling) or specific place (the library, convenience store, Metropole apartments).

In all three cases, police were called as the most common type of regulatory super controller. Calls for service were the main example in each case study. However, their effects are often temporary. Once police leave, panhandlers were free to solicit (if they had not been arrested), juveniles were free to misbehave, and criminal activity continued at the Metropole. Those regulatory agencies that could directly influence place managers or panhandling were able to do so effectively by working in conjunction with other regulatory, political, or court super controllers. In each case, various agencies needed to collect enough documentation on a problem in order for a regulatory agency to take action. For example, with the first case study, on panhandling, the Cincinnati Police Department was able to enforce and arrest aggressive panhandlers because of the ordinances passed by the Cincinnati City Council (political super controllers). Court super controllers were also involved because they agreed to work with other stakeholders by allowing the panhandlers to be held for up to 3 hours once arrested, which gave social service agencies and DCI's outreach worker enough time to find appropriate services for the individuals. In the third case study, regarding the convenience store, an investigation conducted by the Ohio Department of Public Safety Investigative Unit and the United States Department of Agriculture found evidence of food stamp fraud. In addition, written complaints from the Downtown Residents Council, the Cincinnati Police Department and the Cincinnati City Council, and the Ohio Department of Commerce's Division of Liquor Control all resulted in the denial of the convenience store's liquor license. In sum, these super controllers working together were effective in the case of panhandling in the central business district because there is now a mechanism by which to effectively monitor panhandlers rather than simply arrest them. Other super

controllers were also instrumental in removing the liquor license from the convenience store and ultimately assisting with the sale of a problem building—the Metropole.

Revisiting Questions From Chapter 4

Two questions were presented in Chapter 4:

1. What are the processes used to control crime and disorder in central business districts?
2. How do these processes work for different problems, such as panhandling, juvenile disorder, and problem places?

Regarding the first question, initially I suggested the processes used to control crime and disorder in central business districts were in the BIDS (and their managing agencies like DCI), which would act as a form of super controller by directly influencing place managers to control crime. This idea came from the concept that BIDs are created to improve economic and social conditions in central business districts so that they can compete with the amenities of suburban locales. Also, because of the contractual agreement between BIDs and stakeholders, there would be a formalized network already in place to provide place managers with resources, similar to a homeowner's association or mall management corporation that provides seamless services to its tenants. However, upon further examination of the case studies, DCI (acting on behalf of the BID) was not able to directly influence place managers to control crime—an important feature of super controllers. So the processes used to control crime and disorder in central business districts may not be DCI acting as a super controller exclusively, but I do believe that other super controllers do play a role in controlling crime in central business districts.

The second question has been discussed at the beginning of this chapter to some degree: How do these processes work for different problems such as panhandling, juvenile disorder, and problem places? It turns out that some super controllers have more of a role depending on the problem. But most important is the concept of super controllers working together to address a specific problem. When combined, multiple super controllers can attack a problem from several different angles, as in the example of panhandling in the first case study. This brings the discussion back to networks and ultimately parochial informal social control (informal social control among local institutions and broader interpersonal networks), briefly discussed in Chapter 2.

Sampson et al. (2010) mention that controllers and super controllers are embedded in a network of relationships with each other (along with targets, offenders, and places). In this sense, controllers can influence super controllers. This was evident in some of the DCI meetings where place managers, such as the manager of a hotel across from the public library, could influence super controllers such as police, DCI, and other stakeholders in the second case study. Super controllers could also influence each other; for example, the Cincinnati Police Department could influence the City Council to pass an ordinance to ban panhandling by hotel entrance ways. The controllers that come into contact with super controllers in Cincinnati may do so via DCI, and together this network may be able to address a problem more systematically compared to an individual super controller addressing a problem.

Future Research and Policy Implications

How often these super controllers meet, when they decide to work together, and how they decide to divvy up tasks are all questions for future research. This could tell us the

strength of the network and its ability to solve more serious crimes as well. In addition, future research should examine these relationships empirically, triangulating data from law enforcement agencies (probation and parole for follow-up), social service agencies, community agencies, business improvement agencies, and independent data sources such as surveys conducted by universities.

The goal of this dissertation was to identify processes and to pose the question of which processes control crime in central business districts as opposed to residential neighborhoods. The next step would be to examine those processes empirically (e.g., super controllers). Social network analysis used in Figure 3.2 (see Wasserman & Faust, 1994) may make an empirical examination of the relationships between organizations easier.

As previously mentioned, there is a body of research that suggests informal social control processes may reduce crime in communities; however, much of this research focuses on individual or private, informal social control in residential neighborhoods. A policy implication and future research direction would be to focus on those informal processes in central business districts. Further, focusing on local institutions such as businesses, schools, and private corporations in central business districts and how they work together to solve problems is at the heart of this dissertation due to the central business district focus. It may be advantageous to determine whether these other institutions do act as super controllers and if they can influence place managers to control crime. In addition, it would be advantageous to see if they could do so without the existence of a BID. It may be that there are cities where parochial informal social control

works well without the binding agreement of BIDs because these organizations may be more embedded in communities.

In conclusion, although DCI was not the super controller envisioned at the beginning of this dissertation as the primary crime control process in the central business district, the concept of super controllers is a useful theoretical framework in understanding the process by which central business districts control crime. It may be that some stakeholders take a lead role depending on the immediate problem. But it may also be more important that each stakeholder that takes a role as a super controller is networked in with other super controllers. This brings up the importance of parochial informal social control in mobilizing these super controllers. In central business districts, where issues of ownership and crime control are less clear-cut, it would seem appropriate that local or community institutions networked together and focused on solving specific problems would be a plausible crime control process.

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APPENDIX A

DCI FORMS



2010 - 2013 Services Plan and Budget

Petition to Property Owners



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CREATING A SAFE, CLEAN, WELCOMING ENVIRONMENT DOWNTOWN: The Role a Property Owner Plays

This brochure is designed to answer your questions about the Downtown Cincinnati Improvement District, and the new Services Plan and Budget for 2010-13.

The District includes all property within the boundaries of Eggleston Avenue on the east, Central Parkway on the north, Central Avenue on the west (including the Centennial buildings), and the river on the south (excluding the two stadiums).

State statute requires signatures from property owners representing 60% of the front footage inside the District for the Services Plan to be renewed.

Should you have questions unanswered by this brochure, contact one of the officers of the District Board of Directors listed on the next page.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a Special Improvement District?

Special improvement districts are designated zones within which services can be provided above and beyond the level currently offered by local government. Through the mechanism of an independent assessment district, property owners can decide what kind and what level of downtown management services they need and exert direct control over the delivery of the services.

What is a Services Plan?

The Downtown Services Plan outlines the services and activities to be funded by the assessment paid by the property owners in the District. The first Services Plan was approved in 1997 by a majority of owners and outlined the activities funded from 1998-2001. The Special Improvement District has since been renewed twice for the years 2002-2005 and 2006-2009. The Services Plan must be renewed at the end of each term. Owners may revise the services and increase or decrease the budget to meet changing needs.

Why does downtown need coordinated management and marketing services?

Suburban properties, including office parks and shopping malls are developed, managed and marketed by a single ownership group or management company. By contrast, ownership of downtown buildings and land is divided among 600+ individuals and companies with no coordinated management to advocate their interests, provide common services or promote the downtown product. This situation makes it difficult to accomplish such tasks as providing enhanced safety patrols, training and dispatching greeters, promoting downtown as a destination, and gathering and disseminating pertinent data on downtown's progress. Such obstacles can easily be overcome by property owners working together and collaborating on initiatives for mutual benefit.

How much will the services cost me?

By state statute, the special improvement district assessment must be apportioned equitably among all property owners within the service delivery area. Seventy-five percent of the cost is based upon the assessed value of your property, and 25% according to its front footage. Front footage, as defined by Ohio Revised Code 1710.01, is all real property located in the District that abuts upon any street, alley, public road, place, boulevard, parkway, park entrance, easement, or other existing public improvement within the District. The formula distributes the burden among large and small properties.

How will I pay the assessment?

District assessments will continue to be collected by the Hamilton County Auditor's Office. Notification that your assessment is due will appear as part of your semi-annual property tax bill.

Does everyone in the District have to pay the assessment?

If the owners representing 60% of the front footage in the District sign the enclosed petition, then everyone in the District will receive an assessment for their required portion.

What safeguards exist to ensure property owners benefit from the services?

The district is governed by its own board of directors, who own property or represent property owners within the District. Elections are held every four years to coincide with the start of a new Service Plan. The next election is in October 2009. Another safeguard is the assessment term of four years. Its renewal is determined by the property owners. State statute also provides a mechanism for the District to be terminated at any time if a majority of property owners believes it is not providing sufficient benefit.

Downtown Cincinnati Improvement District Board of Directors

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Partner
NorthPointe Group
513.579.1850

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513.621.0620

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Residential Property Owner
513.233.5560

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County Administrator
Hamilton County
513.946.4420

2010 – 2013 Downtown Services Plan

SAFE & CLEAN

<p>Objective: Enhance the safe, clean, beautiful and welcoming environment downtown</p> <p>Impact Measures: Perception, litter index, crime statistics and usage of downtown</p> <p>Capacity Measures: Civic engagement, leveraged partnership, productivity</p>	
	
<p>Improve Safety and the Perception of Safety Downtown</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide highly visible street presence throughout the District by delivering DCI Ambassador services. Support DCI Ambassador program and Cincinnati Police (Downtown Services Unit) by facilitating Sector Groups, Virtual Blockwatch, partnership with Downtown Residents Council and other programs. Deliver social service outreach coordination to help control panhandling, vagrancy etc. Address issues such as lighting, blighted buildings, etc. through partnerships with the City of Cincinnati, Hamilton County, 3CDC and others. 	<p>Key Measures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Services delivered Number of stakeholders engaged Crime statistics Number of contacts made
<p>Enhance Appearance of Streets, Sidewalks and Public Spaces</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deliver DCI Ambassador Services to maintain and enhance the appearance of sidewalks, curbs and right-of-way via litter patrols, power washing and detailed cleaning, e.g. weed and graffiti removal. Partner with city staff in Public Services coordinate and leverage sanitation/cleaning services provided by the City in effective and efficient manner. Work closely with property owners and other partners to ensure a clean, healthy and litter-free environment. Proactively work with City and County on built-environment issues including news racks, sidewalks, benches, bike ways, etc. 	<p>Key Measures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Services delivered Perception surveys Litter index
<p>Encourage Pride in Location and Space</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate partnerships among retailers, restaurants and property owners to enhance and optimize storefronts, lighting and maintenance. Identify, address, and help develop solutions for issues of accessibility and parking downtown, e.g. maintain parking data, way-finding systems, etc. Lead beautification efforts in collaboration with Keep Cincinnati Beautiful, Park Board, Urban Forestry and others to increase tree canopy, flower planting, sidewalk repair and bus shelter maintenance, etc. Help improve front-line hospitality through briefings and other information on features and benefits of downtown for visitors and residents. 	

2010 – 2013 Downtown Services Plan

MARKETING & COMMUNICATIONS



Objective:

Maintain and enhance the image, awareness and thus the usage of downtown as a vibrant hub of regional activity where people eat, shop, stay and play

Impact Measures:

Usage trends, e.g., sales, traffic, perception surveys

Capacity Measures:

Productivity, partnerships

Promote Positive Attributes of Downtown through Communication Program

- Generate positive, accurate media coverage through strategic media relations.
- Monitor all media coverage to ensure positive and accurate coverage of downtown.
- Meet regularly with members of media to establish relationships.
- Leverage resources and coordinate messages through partnerships with the City, County, and key civic organizations including CVB, RTN, 3CDC, Chamber(s), e.g. Communications Alliance.

Increase Downtown Usage through Basic Marketing Program

- Provide, enhance and maintain primary state-of-the-art downtown website – downtowncincinnati.com
- Produce and distribute annual Downtown Cincinnati Guide plus supplemental holiday guide.
- Produce annual holiday retail promotions, e.g. Downtown Dazzle
- Implement sustainable retail support initiatives, e.g. Downtown Gift Card, Tourist in Your Own Town promotions.
- Inform key stakeholders through regular communication in meetings, annual reports and email.
- Support Fountain Square Management Group and 3CDC by positioning and promoting Fountain Square programming.

Further Increase Downtown Usage through Enhanced Marketing Program

- Improve attitudes and perceptions of downtown Cincinnati leading to increase in visitation by number, duration and per-capita spending.
- Encourage a broader market to visit a transformed downtown via promotional resources including newspaper, magazine, radio, billboard, direct mail and available internet media outlets such as You Tube, Twitter and Facebook.
- Multicultural outreach to include ethnic radio and newspaper with relevant message.
- Restaurants, retailers, attractions and events mentioned by name in every media vehicle.

Key Measures

- Research and Surveys
- Media Placement
- Message Reach
- Website Visits
- Gift Card Sales
- Sales and Attendance Figures
- Parking Usage
- Perception Surveys

2010 – 2013 Downtown Services Plan

STAKEHOLDER SERVICES

Objective:	Support business and residential retention and growth in downtown
Impact Measures:	Number of stakeholders assisted (and effectiveness), DCI viewed as “one stop” source for downtown data/information
Capacity Measures:	Requests for services and quality of information provided; number and quality of partnerships



Provide Business Support for Current and Potential Downtown Businesses

- Address issues/concerns of businesses currently located in the CBD through proactively contacting businesses on an annual basis
- Leverage partnerships with civic partners and business support agencies to identify growth and location opportunities for businesses in the CBD, including small businesses, minority-owned businesses and women-owned businesses
- Proactively work with and exchange information with primary recruitment leaders/building owners in an effort to assist with businesses in the CBD (including expansions, relocations, and retention)
- Work in Partnership with public partners, BOMA, commercial real estate professionals, and Banks developers to address issues of office dissolution

Key Measures

- Number of potential new businesses contacted
- Number of current businesses contacted that plan to remain downtown
- Number of business issues/concerns addressed and resolved
- Requests for information fulfilled

Promote Downtown Residential Living

- Raise awareness and interest in downtown living through relevant events such as the annual Downtown Tour of Living
- Leverage networks and proactively exchange information with real estate practitioners, developers, current downtown residents and other residential recruitment/retention leaders
- Assist residents, residential prospects, developers and others to facilitate downtown residential growth and development

Key Measures

- Attendance at events, such as Downtown Tour of Living
- Requests for information fulfilled

Meet Information Needs of Downtown Stakeholders and Other Partners

- Deliver a comprehensive profile of all aspects of downtown through compilation and publication of information, including but not limited to
 - Annual State of Downtown Reports
 - Semi-Annual State of Downtown Updates
 - Quarterly Parking Surveys (including projections)
 - Pedestrian Count Studies
- Serve as a “one-stop” resource for information pertaining to downtown for current and perspective business owners, property owners, residents, developers and other stakeholders

Key Measures

- Feedback on and number of requests for DCI publications/information
- Turnaround time for fulfillment of requests for information

2010 -2013 Downtown Services Plan

SERVICES PLAN BUDGET

The Services Plan for 2010-2013 leverages resources, creates and sustains partnerships, and provides services fundamental to a vibrant, vital core of the city and the region. These services fall into three categories: Safe & Clean; Communications & Marketing; and Stakeholder Services. This combination of services and activities help maintain and enhance property owners' investment in future growth and development of "everybody's neighborhood"—downtown Cincinnati!

The total assessment of \$2,251,000 per year in 2010 and 2011, and \$2,393,000 per year in 2012 and 2013 is comprised of contributions from both private and public property owners. Individual and commercial owners make up about 78% of the total assessments while the City of Cincinnati and Hamilton County contribute approximately 22%.

Property assessments will be enhanced with cash, goods and services, sponsorships and contracts for service. DCI has been able to add an average of \$500,000-\$600,000 per year in revenue, plus in-kind contributions to support overall efforts. The total annual budget to provide the services as outlined in the proposed Plan is \$2,914,000 per year for the first two years and \$3,056,000 per year in the second two years. The allocation of these resources, by service area, subject to annual review and adjustment by the DCID Board, is currently projected as follows:

BUDGET		2010 – 2011			2012 – 2013		
	DCID	DCI	TOTAL	DCID	DCI	TOTAL	
Revenue							
Special Improvement District Assessment	\$2,251,000		\$2,251,000	\$2,393,000		\$2,393,000	
Sponsorships, Membership, Cleaning Contracts		\$663,000	\$663,000		\$663,000	\$663,000	
Total	\$2,251,000	\$663,000	\$2,914,000	\$2,393,000	\$663,000	\$3,056,000	
Expenses							
Safe & Clean Services (45%)	\$1,015,000	\$450,840	\$1,465,840	\$1,076,850	\$450,840	\$1,527,690	
Communications & Marketing (35%)	\$786,000	\$165,750	\$951,750	\$837,550	\$165,750	\$1,003,300	
Stakeholder Services (13%)	\$300,000	\$26,520	\$326,520	\$311,090	\$26,520	\$337,610	
Special Improvement District Legal, Insurance, Collection Fees (4%)	\$90,000		\$90,000	\$95,720		\$95,720	
Reserve (3%)	\$60,000	\$19,890	\$79,890	\$71,790	\$19,890	\$91,680	
Total	\$2,251,000	\$663,000	\$2,914,000	\$2,393,000	\$663,000	\$3,056,000	

Property Owner Assessed Value

Total District Assessed Value

X

Total District Budget

X

75%

=

Assessed Value Charge to Property Owner

Property Owner Front Footage

Total District Front Footage

X

Total District Budget

X

25%


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Front Footage Charge to Property Owner

Total Charge to Property Owner



DCID
P.O. Box 2565
Cincinnati, OH 45201
513.421.4440



List of Property Owners

Within Cincinnati's BID

Owner	Tax Mailing
105 EAST FOURTH STREET HOLDINGS LLC	105 EAST FOURTH STREET HOLDINGS LLC
11-15 8TH LLC	11-15 8TH LLC ATTN DAN H McKINNEY
11-15 8TH LLC	11-15 8TH ST LLC ATTN DAN H. McKINNEY
120 EAST EIGHTH STREET PARTNERS LLC	120 E EIGHTH ST PARTNERS
ONE TWENTY FIVE EAST COURT STREET LIMITED	125 EAST COURT STREET LIMITED
125 WEST FOURTH STREET LLC	125 WEST FOURTH STREET WADE WERNER THOMPSON & CO
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE WEST 4TH PTNSHP	133 W 4TH PARTNERSHIP
209 EAST COURT LLC	209 EAST COURT LLC
209 EAST COURT LLC	209 EAST COURT LLC 4TH FLOOR
225 MCFARLAND STREET LTD	225 MCFARLAND STREET LTD
TERRAPARK II L P	2L2 U
300 MAIN LTD	300 MAIN LTD
305-309 W FIFTH STREET LL	305-309 W FIFTH STREET LL
307 SYCAMORE HOLDING COMPANY LLC	307 SYCAMORE HOLDING
307 SYCAMORE HOLDING COMPANY LLC	307 SYCAMORE HOLDING CO L
321 RACE LLC	321 RACE LLC
324 E FOURTH STREET LLC	324 E FOURTH STREET LLC
325 WEST FIFTH STREET LLC	325 WEST FIFTH STREET LLC
353 WEST FOURTH STREET LL	353 WEST FOURTH STREET LL
417 E 7TH STREET LLC	417 E 7TH STREET LLC
4TH & RACE ST INVESTMENTS LLC	4TH & RACE ST INVESTMENTSIRWIN I ROTH INC
4TH & RACE ST DEVELOPMENT CO LLC@2	4TH & RACE ST INVESTMENTSIRWIN I ROTH INC
500 EGGLESTON LTD	500 EGGLESTON LTD
525 VINE STREET LLC	525 VINE STREET LLC
537 ASSOCIATES LLC	537 ASSOCIATES LLC
625 MAIN STREET LLC	625 MAIN STREET LLC
627 MAIN STREET INVESTMENTS LLC	635 MAIN LLC INVESTMENTS LLC
639 BUILDING ON MAIN LLC THE	639 BUILDING ON MAIN LLC THE
639 WALNUT LLC	639 WALNUT LLC
641 WALNUT LLC	641 WALNUT LLC
654 MAIN LLC	654 MAIN LLC
700 BROADWAY PARTNERS LLC	700 BROADWAY PARTNERS LLC
801 RIVERVIEW LLC	801 RIVERVIEW LLC
805 RACE STREET LLC	805 RACE STREET LLC C/O CARLA STEINBRINK
810 SYCAMORE PARTNERS LLC	810 SYCAMORE PARTNERS LLCKELLY FARRISH

817 MAIN STREET LTD	817 MAIN STREET LTD
8TH & BROADWAY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY	8TH & BROADWAY LLC
907 RACE LLC	907 RACE LLC
917 PARTNERS LLC	917 PARTNERS LLC
9487 DRY FORK ROAD LLC	9487 DRY FORK ROAD LLC
AAA CINCINNATI	AAA CINCINNATI
ABSHER SARAH N	ABSHER SARAH N
ADVENT MEDIA GROUP LLC	ADVENT MEDIA GROUP LLC
AILDASANI JOHNNY V	AILDASANI JOHNNY V
ONE LYTTLE PLACE APARTMENTS PARTNER	AIMCO/TTA MS 235
ALAMIN FAMILY PTNSHP	ALAMIN FAMILY PARTNERSHIP
ALEA GROUP LTD	ALEA GROUP LTD
ALEXANDER MORIO	ALEXANDER MORIO
REINZAN-LAPILLE DEANNE R	ALLRIGHT CORP
AMERICAN RED CROSS THE	AMERICAN RED CROSS THE
APPETIZER LLC	APPETIZER LLC
AQUINO NESTOR A TR & ALTHEA L TR	AQUINO NESTOR A TR & ALTHEA L TR
ARENA MANAGEMENT HOLDINGSLLC	ARENA MANAGEMENT HOLDINGSLLC
ARINGTON W LAURA	ARINGTON W LAURA
ARNOLDS SOUTH SEAS HOLDIN	ARNOLDS BAR & GRILLE LTD
SARUM RACE STREET LLC	ARUM RACE STREET LLC
ASSET OHIO FOURTH STREET LLC	ASSET OHIO FOURTH ST LLC CONVERGYS
ASSET OHIO FOURTH STREET LLC	ASSET OHIO FOURTH ST LLC CONVERGYS CORP
ASSET OHIO FOURTH STREET LLC	ASSET OHIO FOURTH ST LLC CONVERGYS CORPORATION
ASSET OHIO FOURTH STREET LLC	ASSET OHIO FOURTH STREET CONVERGYS CORPORATION
ASSET OHIO FOURTH STREET LLC	ASSETT OHIO FOURTH STREETLLC
AURORA TOWNHOUSE LLC	AURORA TOWNHOUSE LLC
AVILA SARAH W	AVILA SARAH W
AZEOTROPIC PARTNERS LLC	AZEOTROPIC PARTNERS LLC
B W TALGOOD REALTY CO LTD	B W TALGOOD REALTY CO LTD
KIGGINS PATRICK J JR	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
DUNKLEY GREG	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
AGENMONMEN UWA	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
DUNN ALEX C	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
GUIDRY GEORGE MICHAEL	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
HACKER KEVIN S	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
WOLTERMAN ERIC E	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
PENSACK PATRICIA N	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
FRIEDRICHSMEYER ERHARD & SARA	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
SCHUERMANN ERIC CHARLES	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
MYERS DAVID & LINDA	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
CINCINNATI CITY OF	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT

BERRIOS JULIO A & LEON JAKOVICS	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
HUEY KEVIN	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
BAKES KATI A	BAC TAX SERVICES CORP TAX DEPT
BACKSTAGE DEV LTD LIABILITY CO	BACKSTAGE DEV LTD LIABILITY CO
BAGSIT GERALDINE	BAGSIT GERALDINE
BAILEY BERNICE F	BAILEY BERNICE F
BARNES JOHN E TR	BARNES JOHN E TR
BCN HOLDINGS LLC	BCN HOLDINGS LLC
BEACHLER CRAIG R	BEACHLER CRAIG R
BEAVERS CONDY	BEAVER CONDY D
BEAVERS CONDY D	BEAVER CONDY D
BEAVERS CONDY D & LESLIE J ARONOFF	BEAVER CONDY D
BECKER DONNA E	BECKER DONNA E
BEDELL JULIA	BEDELL JULIE Y
BEIDERMAN PROPERTIES LLC	BEIDERMAN PROPERTIES LLC
COURT STREET CENTER LLC	BELLWETHER REAL ESTATE AT
200 W COURT LLC	BELLWETHER REAL ESTATE AT
CINCINNATI CITY OF	BELLWETHER REAL ESTATE AT
BG 708 PROPERTIES LLC	BG 708 PROPERTIES LLC
BIANCO ANTHONY A & NICHOLAS A	BIANCO ANTHONY A & NICHOLAS A
BJ REAL ESTATE LLC	BJ REAL ESTATE LLC
BLACK BARBARA J	BLACK BARBARA J
BLEH PATRICIA L	BLEH BRENT
BLEH LEONARD A	BLEH LEONARD A
BLEH PATRICIA L	BLEH PATRICIA L
BLESSING WILLIAM H TR	BLESSING WILLIAM
BLUE GRASS DEVELOPMENT OF OHIO LLC	BLUE GRASS DEVELOPMENT OF OHIO
BOLTON DAMIAN@3	BOLTON DAMIAN@3
BORCHER THOMAS A JR	BORCHER THOMAS A JR
CINCINNATI CITY OF	BORTZ ARN GROTON LOSPS LLC
BRANNEN JOSEPH P & DAVID E FOOTE	BRANNEN JOSEPH P & DAVID E FOOTE
BRICKER DAN A ET AL	BRICKER DAN A ET AL
BRINKMAN GEORGE & KATHLEEN M	BRINKMAN GEORGE & KATHLEEN M
BROADWAY BLDG INVESTORS	BROADWAY INVESTORS C/O ROOKWOOD PROP II
BROOKS RANDOLPH NEAL	BROOKS RANDOLPH NEAL
GROSSMAN JOANNE B TR	BROSSMAN JOANNE B TR
BROTHERS CINCINNATIAN CORPORATION	BROTHERS CINCINNATIAN CORPORATION
BROWN ERIK T & MEREDITH L	BROWN ERIK T & MEREDITH L
FOURTH NATIONAL REALTY LLC	BROWN FAMILY LIMITED PTSROBERT S BROWN
BROWN ROBERT S	BROWN ROBERT S
BUDIG GEORGE J TR	BUDIG GEORGE J TR
BUDIG REALTY LLC	BUDIG REALTY LLC
ONE EAST FOURTH INC	BUILDING MANAGEMENT CO
THREE EAST FOURTH INC	BUILDING MANAGEMENT CO

DIXIE TERMINAL CORPORATIO	BUILDING MANAGEMENT CO
DIXIE TERMINAL CORP	BUILDING MANAGEMENT CO
AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORP	BUILDING MANAGEMENT CO P BROWNP
THIRD STREET ASSOCIATES	BUSINESS INFO STORAGE INC
CALLAWAY GLENN N	CALLAWAY GLENN N
CALTON SHAWN	CALTON SHAWN
CAMINS HARVEY D	CAMINS HARVEY D
CAMPANELLO DANIEL E & GWEN	CAMPANELLO DANIEL E & GWEN
CAPCO REAL ESTATE LLC	CAPCO REAL ESTATE LLC
CAPPEL REALTY CO	CAPPEL REALTY CO
CAMEL PROPERTIES LLC % JEFF MAKOF	CAMEL PROPERTIES LLC
CARELL OHIO LLC	CARELL FAMILY LLC ATTN ED
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CARELL FAMILY LLC ATTN ED
EMERY REALTY INC	CAREW REALTY INC
CARR JEFFREY A & JOHN E DANNER	CARR JEFFREY A & JOHN E DANNER
CASKEY JAMES B	CASKEY JAMES B
AJ&S LIMITED PARTNERSHIP	CATS MANAGEMENT LLC
CBD HOLDINGS INC	CBD HOLDINGS INC
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CBP INVESTMENTS PTRNSHP
CENTRAL CLINIC	CENTRAL CLINIC
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CENTRAL PARKING CORP C/O TAX DEPT.
MCA CENTER LLC	CF3 REAL ESTATE LTD & DLF
CFL-SIX LLC	CFL-SIX LLC
CHAI WEST NINTH STREET LL	CHAI WEST NINTH STREET LL
CHAN JIMMY S TR	CHAN JIMMY S TR
ARCHBISHOP OF CINCINNATI	CHANCERY THE
CHAULEY NAVINDER S & JOAN H LIM	CHAULEY NAVINDER S & JOAN LIM
COURT & ELM STREET	CHAVEZ ROBERT
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF OHIO	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF OHIO
ROBINSON LEE G TR	CINCINNATI APARTMENTS
CINCINNATI ASSOCIATION FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS	CINCINNATI ASSOCIATION FOR THE PERFORMING ARTS
CINCINNATI ATHLETIC CLUB THE	CINCINNATI ATHLETIC CLUB
CINCINNATI ATHLETIC CLUB	CINCINNATI ATHLETIC CLUB
CINCINNATI AUTOMOBILE CLUB	CINCINNATI AUTOMOBILE CLUB ATTN: KIM KNOCHELMAN
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION THE	CINCINNATI BAR ASSN
CINCINNATI & SUBURBAN BEL	CINCINNATI BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CINCINNATI CITY OF
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CINCINNATI CITY OF CITY HALL ROOM 122
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CINCINNATI CITY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CINCINNATI CITY OF ENGINEERING
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CINCINNATI CITY OF GENERAL SERVICES
CINCINNATI CITY OF JOHN WALSH	CINCINNATI CITY OF GENERAL SERVICES
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CINCINNATI CITY OF SAFETY

CINCINNATI CITY OF JOHN WALSH	CINCINNATI CITY OF THE
CINCINNATI CITY OF THE	CINCINNATI CITY OF THE
CINCINNATI CITY OF	CINCINNATI CITY OF THE
CINCINNATI FIRE MUSEUM ASSOCIATION	CINCINNATI FIRE MUSEUM ASSOCIATION
CINCINNATI FREIE PRESSE L	CINCINNATI FREIE PRESSE L
CINCINNATI HILLS CHRISTIAACADEMY INC	CINCINNATI HILLS CHRISTIAACADEMY INC
CINCINNATI HILLS CHRISTIAN ACADEMY I	CINCINNATI HILLS CHRISTIAN ACADEMY
CINCINNATI HILLS CHRISTIAN ACADEMY I	CINCINNATI HILLS CHRISTIAN ACADEMY INC
CINCINNATI SI CO	CINCINNATI SI COMPANY MARVIN F POER & COMPANY
CINCINNATI S I CO	CINCINNATI SI COMPANY MARVIN F POER & COMPANY
QUALLS ROXANNE	CINCO FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
CITY VIEW EQUITIES INC	CITYVIEW EQUITIES INC
CLAYTON JONNA RUTH	CLAYTON JONNA RUTH
CLEMENS GARY L & ANN BARNUM	CLEMENS GARY L & ANN BARNUM
CLINE WILLIAM	CLINE WILLIAM
COLLINS JOHN B & SYLVIA H	COLLINS JOHN B
COLUMBIA MOTOR SALES CO	COLUMBIA OLDSMOBILE
COLUMBIA OLDSMOBILE COMPA	COLUMBIA OLDSMOBILE
COMMUNITY LAW CENTER REALESTATE COMPANY	COMMUNITY LAW CENTER REALESTATE COMPA
CONLON ROBERT J TR	CONLON ROBERT J & CARLA
CONTEMPORARY ARTS CENTER THE	CONTEMPORARY ARTS CENTER THE
COOK DAVID A	COOK DAVID A
MOORE THOMAS W & DOLLIE	CORELOGIC
SHARON HOWARD	CORELOGIC
VANDEUSEN DEREK D	CORELOGIC
LAWSON HILARY@3	CORELOGIC
WOODS ALLICA S	CORELOGIC
MURPHY CHRISTOPHER R	CORELOGIC
STRAUSS JEROME J	CORELOGIC
PARK CHARLES	CORELOGIC
BESMEN ERICH D	CORELOGIC
BATES ALAN W	CORELOGIC
DAY EARL B	CORELOGIC
DYE JENNIFER M & FLOYD D	CORELOGIC
VARJAVANDI NAVID J	CORELOGIC
REYNOLDS CHAD A	CORELOGIC
SABLOSKY KEVIN D	CORELOGIC
MOORE STEVEN P	CORELOGIC
PIATT PARK COMMUNITY URBAN REDEV C	CORELOGIC
MAKEPEACE RUSSELL W & JANET F	CORELOGIC
MECONI MEGAN L	CORELOGIC
BISHOP NATHAN & DANA	CORELOGIC

JANUSZEK JEFFREY M	CORELOGIC
BUCKLEY KEVIN T	CORELOGIC
COLLINS DAVID S & SARAH A RICE-COLLIN	CORELOGIC
HERTZ CENTER AT 600 VINE LLC	CORELOGIC
DP 12 LLC	CORELOGIC
MCALLEESE PAUL	CORELOGIC
SAROW MIKE	CORELOGIC
HEUSER JOSH & NICK GRAMMAS	CORELOGIC
SETHI JAY	CORELOGIC
SHAH NIKHIL N	CORELOGIC
DEVITO DANIEL J & JESSICA R YERDON	CORELOGIC
HERR JOSEPH R	CORELOGIC
MCKENNA KRISTY S	CORELOGIC
MATHEWS JAMES & EMILY	CORELOGIC
ZELL JENNIFER E	CORELOGIC
BARTELS BETINA L	CORELOGIC
MOORE MATTHEW J	CORELOGIC
BLUM BRENT R TR	CORELOGIC
REGINA ALEXANDRE S	CORELOGIC
NEWMARK SUSAN W	CORELOGIC
JOHNSON CARVER L & ALGERNON V	CORELOGIC
TREBES THOMAS D & SHERRY L	CORELOGIC
GREER DONALD	CORELOGIC
URS TOWER LLC	CORELOGIC
BARAN PAUL	CORELOGIC
BLACKBURN ERIC	CORELOGIC
HELZERMAN RYAN A	CORELOGIC
ATHOTA KRISHNA P	CORELOGIC
COLUMBIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION	CORELOGIC
LEE LISA V	CORELOGIC
EAST 7 LTD	CORELOGIC
CENTRAL TRUST TOWER ASSOCIATES	CORELOGIC
312 WALNUT LIMITED PTNSHP	CORELOGIC
BUSH JEFFRY ALAN & KYLE LEE MERRITT	CORELOGIC
MILLER THOMAS H & CAROLYN	CORELOGIC
BOGGS PAULA Y	CORELOGIC
MUSILLO CHRISTOPHER T & KENDRA M CAMERON	CORELOGIC
ROLLER MICHAEL J @3	CORELOGIC
WRIGHT FRANKLIN D JR TR	CORELOGIC
RECKER FRANK R	CORELOGIC
GLUCKSMANN MATTHEW R	CORELOGIC
CASEY J ERIC	CORELOGIC
CINCY CONDOS LLC	CORELOGIC

SHAWVER ROBERT W & BRENDA J	CORELOGIC
COYLE SETH & NATALIE DESANTIS	CORELOGIC
OWENS EDWARD III & KATHLEEN I HUNGLI	CORELOGIC
255 FIFTH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP	CORELOGIC
IONNA THOMAS & MARY A	CORELOGIC
CARTY JAMES B	CORELOGIC
SCALLON DAMIAN G & ROBIN M	CORELOGIC
LENNARD SUSAN	CORELOGIC
REID PAUL S & MARITZA P	CORELOGIC
MALONE NANCY M	CORELOGIC
MAHAN MARK DANIEL JR & GRETCHEN EL	CORELOGIC
BECKMEYER DOUGLAS J & MARCIA P	CORELOGIC
FRYE M CAMILLE	CORELOGIC
TAYLOR SCOTT A & CHARLES R NIELSON	CORELOGIC
PRUITT DAVID W	CORELOGIC
THOMAS STEVEN M	CORELOGIC
SMITH ANDRE D JR	CORELOGIC
HOLLIDAY DAVID G & BETSY A LEIGH	CORELOGIC
MCCALLUM PHYLLIS L TR & STEVEN W JEMISON TR	CORELOGIC
HARDY WILLIAM N	CORELOGIC
NOSTRAND KRISTEN M	CORELOGIC
BLOOM ROBERT F & ALISON H KAMINE	CORELOGIC
FOSTER MARTA B TR	CORELOGIC
BURNS PATRICK D	CORELOGIC
SANDS KATHLEEN	CORELOGIC
MOSER STEPHEN JOHN & HEIDE HEHMANN MOSER	CORELOGIC
HAMMEL BARBARA JANE & SANDRA GAIL SMITH	CORELOGIC
BOHACHE BENJAMIN & ARUNA DAROLIA BOHACHE	CORELOGIC
GOOKIN CLIFFORD D JR TR	CORELOGIC
GAY NANCY TR	CORELOGIC
BABCOCK GLEN A & DEBRA L	CORELOGIC
FLIMAN HENRY J TR & VIVIAN P TR	CORELOGIC
SEVERIN KIMBERLY S	CORELOGIC
EVANS THOMAS DAVID JR & VICKY LYNN PATTON	CORELOGIC
DAY JENNIFER L	CORELOGIC
ANDERSON JANE E	CORELOGIC
ROTHRING ROBERT G TR	CORELOGIC
MATTEUCCI CARLA B TR & ROBERT S TR	CORELOGIC
EVERHART JOSEPH L & EVELYN M	CORELOGIC
BERNHARDT MARK WILLIAM	CORELOGIC

HUDSON CHARLES CRAIG & MARY P	CORELOGIC
321 W FOURTH PROJECT PTNSHP	CORELOGIC
RAIT OLD TOWN LLC	CORELOGIC
ELM 411 LLC	CORELOGIC
HERTZ TEXTILE BUILDING LL	CORELOGIC
WEST FOURTH LLC	CORELOGIC
YESSIN JON P	CORELOGIC
EDMISTON MARGARET A	CORELOGIC
KLEINHUIZEN KURT	CORELOGIC
DECOURSEY GARY D & CHERYL M	CORELOGIC
ENG KATIE M	CORELOGIC
DOLLARD KARL M	CORELOGIC
WOLF MARGARET M	CORELOGIC
MEINERS DAVID S	CORELOGIC
HOLDEN AVERY B & JARROD M COOPER	CORELOGIC
WHITE MICHAEL & RACHEL ROTHENBACH WHITE	CORELOGIC
KOHLHEPP AARON C	CORELOGIC
SMITH ERIC M	CORELOGIC
MARTINI APRIL LYNNE	CORELOGIC
GORYL KEVIN W & SARA E CRIDLEBAUGH	CORELOGIC
HEINDL KELLY & SPENCER	CORELOGIC
ROBERTS STEVEN & MELLISA	CORELOGIC
HELLE CAROL	CORELOGIC
CORMAN ROBERT P	CORMAN ROBERT P
CORONEL MICHELLE B TR	CORONEL MICHELLE B TR ONE LYTTLE PLACE #12
COURT COLLEAGUES II LLC	COURT COLLEAGUES II LLC
COURT COLLEAGUES LLC	COURT COLLEAGUES LLC
COURT JOHN C TR	COURT GEORGIA TR
COURT STREET LOFTS LLC	COURT STREET LOFTS LLC
COURT VIEW BUILDING LLC	COURT VIEW BUILDING LLC
CP-327 W COURT LLC	CP-327 W COURT LLC
CP-908 PLUM STREET LLC	CP-908 PLUM STREET LLC
CPC REALTY LLC	CPC REALTY LLC
CPC REALTY LLC	CPC REALTY LLC CENTRAL PARKING CORPORAT
CP-COURT & PLUM LTD PRT	CP-COURT & PLUM LTD PTSHP
CRABLE ANN	CRABLE ANN
CRALL FREDERICK V JR & M KATHERINE	CRALL FREDERICK V JR
CRAWFORD TERRENCE M	CRAWFORD TERRENCE
D R M & ACCOCIATES	D R M & ASSOCIATES
DAGIAU D M	DA GIOU D M
DANNER DAVID A & ROSEMARY	DANNER DAVID A
DAROLIA ARUNA	DAROLIA ARUNA
DAVIS RUSSELL E	DAVIS RUSSELL E

DAWSON REALTY LTD	DAWSON REALTY LTD
DCFF LLC	DCFF LLC
OTR	DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP CARLSBAD BILL PROCI
DENNIS PROPERITES LLC	DENNIS PROPERITES LLC
DIAMOND MERCANTILE CO	DIAMOND MERCANTILE CO
D P 8 LLC	DIAMOND PROPERTIES LLC
DIAZDEPREGO MARIA RAQUEL & LUIS A PF	DIAZ DE PREGO, MARIA RAQU
DICK SCOTT M	DICK SCOTT
DICKENS & CRUMPET LLC	DICKENS & CRUMPET LLC
DIERINGER RICHARD E	DIERINGER RICHARD E
DIMARCO TERESA @2	DIMARCO TERESA @2
SHV NORTH AMERICA CORP	DJJ HOLDING CORP
SHV OIL AND GAS HOLDING COMPANY	DJJ REAL ESTATE
DOBBS JUSTIN T & BRANDON R	DOBBS JUSTIN T & BRANDON R
DONOVAN SEAN	DONOVAN SEAN
DONOVAN SEAN D & MARY J	DONOVAN SEAN D & MARY J
DORIS EDWARD D	DORIS EDWARD D
DOWNTOWN HILLS LLC	DOWNTOWN HILLS LLC
DRURY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION	DRURY DEVELOPMENT CORP
DTK NINTH & MAIN LLC	DTK NINTH & MAIN LLC
DUKE DAVID	DUKE DAVID
DUKE ENERGY OHIO INC C/O TAX DEPARTM	DUKE ENERGY OHIO INC C/O TAX DEPARTMENT
UNITED DEPARTMENT STORES CO NO 1	DUKE REALTY CORP
CINCINNATI CITY OF	E PROPERTY TAX DEPT 206
RACE STREET DEVELOPMENT LTD	EAGLE REALTY GROUP ATTN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
PORT OF GREATER CINCINNATDEVELOPMEN AUTHORITY	EAGLE REALTY GROUP ATTN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
WESTERN & SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY	EAGLE REALTY GROUP ATTN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
WESTERN AND SOUTHERN LIFEINSURANCE COMPANY THE	EAGLE REALTY GROUP ATTN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
WESTERN SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY	EAGLE REALTY GROUP ATTN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
506 PHELPS HOLDINGS LLC	EAGLE REALTY GROUP ATTN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
CINCINNATI CITY OF	EAGLE REALTY GROUP ATTN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
HAAS LAURENCE OLIVER	EAGLE SAVINGS BANK
EAST 8 LTD	EAST 8 LTD
EBBS MICHAEL	EBBS MICHAEL C
HILCH PARTNERS LLC	EDGEWOOD INVESTMENT LLC
ELKA REAL ESTATE CO LTD	ELKA REAL ESTATE CO C/O C
ELLIOTT DAVID PARTNERS	ELLIOTT DAVID PARTNERS
ENZWEILER GARY J	ENZWEILER GARY J
FANNIN REX G	FANNIN REX G WELLS FARGO

BETTMAN MARIANNA BROWN	FARETS
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGEASSOCIAT	FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
FIFTH THIRD COMPANY THE	FIFTH THIRD BANK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
FIFTH THIRD BANK	FIFTH THIRD BANK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
FIFTH THIRD BANK TR	FIFTH THIRD BANK TRUST DEPT
FIFTY-ONE COMPANY LTD	FIFTY-ONE COMPANY LTD
KEENE JAMES & TAMARA L FINE	FINE RAYMOND B
FINE PHYLLIS G	FINE RAYMOND B
FINE TAMMY L	FINE RAYMOND B & TAMMY L
FINE TAMMY L	FINE TAMMY L
KNECHT CHRISTOPHER D	FIRST AMERICAN TAX SERVIC
ALFRED CARRINGTON INC	FORT WASHINGTON
FORT WASHINGTON LEASING L	FORT WASHINGTON LEASING LATTN GREG MOREHEAD
FOSTER TY L TR	FOSTER TY L TR
FOURTH AND CENTRAL PROPERTIES INCORPORATED	FOURTH AND CENTRAL PROPERTIES
FOURTH AND RACE TOWER LTD	FOURTH AND RACE TOWER LTD
FOURTH STREET DEVELOPMENTPARTNERS	FOURTH STREET DEVELOPMENTPARTNERS LLC
FUGAZZI STEVE	FUGAZZI STEVE
FULLER DONALD E	FULLER DONALD E
GABBARD EVANGELISTIC ASSOCIATION IN	GABBARD EVANGELISTIC
GAFFIN VICTOR L	GAFFIN VICTOR L
GARFIELD HOUSE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP T	GARFIELD HOUSE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP THE
GARIS DUSTIN	GARIS DUSTIN
GASPARE LLC	GASPARE LLC
GAUNA ALEJANDRO	GAUNA ALEJANDRO COUNTRYWIDE
GEARHART WILLIAM M & JOSETTE L	GEARHART WILLIAM M & JOSETTE L
GEORGES PETER C	GEORGES PETER C
GERNER MAUREEN A	GERNER MAUREEN A
GLS PROPERTIES 8 LLC	GLS PROPERTIES 8 LLC
GOODALL PROPERTIES LTD	GOODALL PROPERTIES LTD
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO	GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COREIMBURSEMENT D/824
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO	GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COREIMBURSEMENT D/824
CRE CORP	GRANDBRIDGE REAL EST CAPICASEY WILLIAMS
GRAY GILBERT L	GRAY GILBERT L
GRAY STANLEY J TR	GRAY STANLEY J TR
JACOBSEN ERLEND	GREAT AMERICAN LIFE INSURC/O MS PHYLISS BROWN
GARFIELD ASSOCIATES LLC	GREAT LAKES FINANCIAL GRO
GREATER CINCINNATI FOUNDATION THE	GREATER CINCINNATI FOUNDATION THE
GRIFFIOEN JOHANNES R & CATHERINE C	GRIFFIOEN JOHANNES R & CATHERINE C
GROSSMANN DAVID E @2	GROSSMANN DAVID E @2

GRUBER NANCY K	GRUBER NANCY K
GRUNN ROBERT L	GRUNN ROBERT L
GUTIERREZ CARLOS E	GUTIERREZ CARLOS E
GWYNNE BUILDING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY	GWYNNE BUILDING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPAN
LAST CITADEL LLC THE	HAAS HERBERT J @ (4)
LAST CITADEL LLC THE	HAAS HERBERT J @(4)
HALL DAVID N TR	HALL DAVID N TR
HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMRS	HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD COMMISSIONERS
HAMILTON COUNTY COMMRS BOARD OF	HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD COMMISSIONERS
CINCINNATI CITY OF	HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD COMMISSIONERS
HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMRS	HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMRS
HAMILTON COUNTY COMMRS	HAMILTON COUNTY COMMRS
HAMILTON COUNTY COMMRS BOARD OF	HAMILTON COUNTY COMMRS BOARD OF
HAN OH HYUN & KUI RYE HAN	HAN DAVID
HAN OH HYUN & KUI RYE	HAN OH HYUN & KUI RYE
HANNERS SUZANNE L & PATRICIA B FAHEY	HANNERS SUZANNE L & PATRICIA B FAHEY
HANSER TRAVIS	HANSER TRAVIS
HARTMANN WILLIAM P JR & LINDA E	HARTMANN WILLIAM P JR & LINDA E
HARTSOCK MARCIA LINDA	HARTSOCK MARCIA LINDA
HEARTHSTONE CO	HEARTHSTONE CO
HEIS FOREST & DANIEL J WENSTRUP	HEIS FOREST & DANIEL J WENSTRUP
HILL BRIAN P & GRACE A	HILL BRIAN P & GRACE A
HILLARD KARLEE L	HILLARD KARLEE L PNC MORTGAGE
HJH REALTY CORP	HJH REALTY CORPORATION
HOFFMAN PETER REED TR	HOFFMAN PETER REED TR c/o BO ENTERPRISES
330 WEST FOURTH STREET PARTNERSHIP	HOFMEYER PAUL
HOLLAND PEN BUILDING CO LTD	HOLLAND PEN BUILDING CO LTD
HOLWADEL KATHRYN J & MICHELE ALONZO	HOLWADEL KATHRYN J & MICHELE ALONZO
HOMAN CLARA & FRANCES	HOMAN CLARA & FRANCES
HOPKINS JOHN M & JEFFREY R WESTERMEYER	HOPKINS JOHN M & JEFFREY R WESTERMEYER
HOUDINI PROPERTIES LLC	HOUDINI PROPERTIES LLC
BEEM JASON C	HUMBERT MORTGAGE
IACONO MICHAEL J & TOBI A	IACONO PRODUCTION SERVICE
INGALLS BUILDING CO LTD	INGALLS BUILDING CO LTD
IRONWORKS APARTMENTS LLC	IRONWORKS APARTMENTS LLC
COURT STREET EAST LTD	IRWIN I ROTH INC
ISMAIL BASHEER H	ISMAIL BASHEER H
ITTNER MARY C	ITTNER MARY C
JACOBS LYNN PATTERSON	JACOBS DON
WISEMAN JAMES M & NEWTON LATONDR	JAMES WISEMAN
JEHN JANET B	JEHN JANET B
JIMENEZ A DAVID & CAROLYN M	JIMENEZ A DAVID & CAROLYN
JJW INVESTMENTS LTD	JJW INVESTMENTS LTD

JOHNSON HERBERT	JOHNSON HERBERT
JONES MELINDA R	JONES MELINDA R
JONES RUTH J	JONES RUTH J
RC LOFT PROPERTY LLC	JPMORGAN CHASE BANK WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK
JULIUS J RIGACCI BOX CO LLC	JULIUS J RIGACCI BOX CO LLC
K & S LTD	K & S LTD
KABG PROPERTIES LLC	KABG PROPERTIES LLC
KAISER GROUP LLC	KAISER GROUP LLC
KAMINSKI GERALD F & GERALDINE M	KAMINSKI GERALD F & GERALDINE M
KANU INVESTMENTS	KANU INVESTMENTS
KANU INVESTMENTS LLC	KANU INVESTMENTS LLC
KAUPER RONALD C & RICHARD MAYER	KAUPER RONALD & MAYER RICHARD
KEEN INVESTMENT INC	KEEN INVESTMENT INC
KEENE JAMES @3	KEENE EDNA & JAMES
KIM CHONG NUNG & KIL JIN KIM	KIM CHONG NUNG & KIL JIN
KIRSCHNER YOLANDA D	KIRSCHNER YOLANDA D
KOCH BUILDINGS INC	KOCH BUILDINGS INC
KOOP CLARENCE E	KOOP CLARENCE E
JAMIESON DOROTHY E TR & PATRICK M K	KORB PATRICK
KORB PATRICK M	KORB PATRICK M
KOTSOVOS CHRIS	KOTSOVOS CHRIS
KRELLER GROUP INC	KRELLER GROUP INC
KRIENIK MICHAEL L	KRIENIK DENISE M & MICHAEL
KROGER CO THE	KROGER COMPANY THE ATTN G
KUEHN GEOFFREY H & SARA T	KUEHN GEOFFREY H & SARA T
LANCASTER BUILDING LLC	LANCASTER BUILDING LLC
LANDMARK PHOENIX LLC	LANDMARK PHOENIX LLC
LANE FREDERICK G	LANE FREDERICK G
KORNHAUSER EDEK & ERNA	LAW OFFICE OF SAMUEL KORNHAUSER
LAZ ENTERPRISES LTD	LAZ ENTERPRISES LTD
LAZAROVSKI FRANK	LAZAROVSKI FRANK
LEE SOONCHA A TR	LEE SOONCHA A TR
700 WALNUT LLC	LERETA LLC
LEZAM INC	LEZAM INC
LI THOMAS ZOUN LIN	LI THOMAS ZOUN LIN
LINKLETTER JOAN H	LINKLETTER JOAN H
LITERARY CLUB THE	LITERARYCLUB o/o WILLIAM T SENA TREASU
LOFLAND DAVID R JR	LOFLAND DAVID
LOFTS AT FOUNTAIN SQUARE LLC	LOFTS AT FOUNTAIN SQUARE ROGER THESING
LOMBARDY INVESTMENTS LTD	LOMBARDY INVESTMENTS LTD
LOPEZ JANINE P	LOPEZ JANINE P
LPK GARFIELD LLC	LPK GARFIELD LLC
BACKUS TRUDY K	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE

ESTE INVESTORS LTD	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
BURGESS AARON L & DOROTA ALEKSIEJUK BURGE	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
IMWALLE DAVID O	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
DEBLASIO ANTHONY L & KATHRYN A HOLLSTEGGE	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
HECKARD JOAN E	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
FENDRICH MARY JILL	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
GROTE SHIRI A	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
MCCARTHY TERENCE P	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
HESLER DAMIEN R	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
FOX JONATHON BLAKE	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
SCHARF JAMES I JR	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
CAMPBELL JOHN A & MARY JO	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
613 RACE LLC	LSI TAX SERVICE AKA FIDELITY TAX SERVICE
LUSAIN HOLDING LLC	LUSAIN HOLDING LLC
LUSAIN HOLDINGS 2 LLC	LUSAIN HOLDINGS 2 LLC
LUSCORP LLC	LUSCORP LLC
LY PHU	LY PHU
M/R REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS LLC	M/R REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS LLC
TRI-NET INVESTMENT II	MACY'S ATTN PROPERTY/REAL
SEVEN WEST SEVENTH INC	MACY'S ATTN PROPERTY/REAL
MAGEE MICHAEL R	MAGEE MICHAEL R
MAIN AUCTION GALLERIES INC	MAIN AUCTION GALLERIES
MANDELL PHILLIP TR & RHEA SUE TR	MANDELL PHILLIP
MARINAKIS STEFANOS & PANAGIOTA	MARINAKIS STEFANOS & PANA
MATRE JAMES A TR	MATRE JAMES A TR
ROLLMAN SUSAN M & FRANCES R KATZ	MAURICE RICHMAN CPA
MAYER KATE L	MAYER KATE L
MCFARLAND LOFTS LLC	MC FARLAND LOFTS LLC CONRAD OPPT
MEGSU PROPERTIES LTD	MEGSU PROPERTIES LTD
MEISS NANCY	MEISS NANCY
MERGARDS DOWNTOWN BOWLINGLANES I	MERGARD ENTERPRISES
MERZ RICHARD J JR & LORI DEE	MERZ RICHARD J JR & LORI D
MERZ RICHARD J II & LORI D	MERZ RICHARD J JR & LORI D
MERZ RICHARD J II & LORI D	MERZ RICHARD J JR & LORI D
MESSER EARL K & DONNA S	MESSER EARL K & DONNA
MEYER JILL P	MEYER JILL P
MIDDLE EARTH 327 WEST FOURTH STREET	MIDDLE EARTH 327 WEST FOURTH STREET LLC
MIDDLE EARTH 617 VINE STREET LLC	MIDDLE EARTH 617 VINE STREET LLC
MIDDLE EARTH TWENTY SIX EAST SIXTH STREET LLC	MIDDLE EARTH DEVELOPERS I
MIDDLE EARTH 327 WEST FOURTH LLC	MIDDLE EARTH DEVELOPERS I
MIDDLE EARTH TWENTY SIX EAST SIXTH STREET LLC	MIDDLE EARTH TWENTY SIX EAST SIXTH STREET

MIDWEST ENTERPRISES INC	MIDWEST ENTERPRISES INC
MILL END SHOPS OF CINCINNATI INC	MILL END SHOPS
MITCHELL PATRICK J & BRENDA M KLOOS	MITCHELL PATRICK J & BRENDA M KLOOS
MMV PROPERTIES LLC	MMV PROPERTIES LLC
GLASS PATRICIA A	MOEGGENBERG PATRICIA GLAS
LAH STEVEN E	MONROE MUFFLER & BRAKE SERVICE SOLUTION LLC
MONTAGUE WILLIAM L & KELLY L WITTICH	MONTAGUE WILLIAM L & KELLY L WITTICH
MONTGOMERY INN INC	MONTGOMERY INN OFFICE
MOROSKI LAWANA JEAN	MOROSKI LAWANA JEAN
MOTL GERALD & ROXANNE	MOTL GERALD & ROXANNE
MURIEL JESSICA H	MURIEL JESSICA H
MURPHY ANASTASIA EILEEN & JOHN J	MURPHY ANASTASIA EILEEN & JOHN J
MURPHY TERRENCE P & CHARLOTTE C	MURPHY TERRENCE P & CHARLOTTE C
MURPHY THOMAS E & JANET D	MURPHY THOMAS E & JANET D
MY 3 SONS REALTY LLC	MY 3 SONS REALTY LLC
NAP WILLIAMS OFFICE BUILDING LLC	NAP WILLIAMS OFFICE BUILDING LLC
NATIONAL UNDERGROUND RAILROAD FREEDOM CENTER	NATIONAL UNDERGROUND RAILROAD FREEDOM CENTER
NAVARRO CARLOS	NAVARRO CARLOS
NAVARRO PHOTOGRAPHY LLC	NAVARRO PHOTOGRAPHY LLC
NEW BOSTON CENTENNIAL LLC	NEW BOSTON CITIMARK DOUG LANCE GM
NEYER HOLDINGS F LLC	NEYER HOLDINGS F LLC
NIEMAN INVESTORS LTD	NIEMAN INVESTORS LTD
NINTH & RACE ASSOCIATES	NINTH & RACE ASSOCIATES
NLW PROPERTIES LLC	NLW PROPERTIES LLC THREE CENTENIAL PLAZA
NLW PROPERTIES LLC	NLW PROPERTIES THREE CENTENNIAL PLAZA
NORTH AVENUE TRADE PARTNERS LLC	NORTH AVENUE TRADE PARTNERS LLC
OBX PROPERTIES LLC	OBX PROPERTIES LLC
OHIO BOOK STORE INC	OHIO BOOK STORE INC
OLJ LLC	OLJ LLC
ONE LYTLE PLACE APARTMENTPARTNERS	ONE LYTLE PLACE APT PTNRSAIMCO DELOITTE I DEPT 2
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OPPORTUNITIES TO SUCCESS LLC	OPPORTUNITIES TO SUCCESS LLC
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PARK PLACE AT LYTLE INVESTMENTS LTD	PARK PLACE AT LYTLE INVESTMENTS LTD
PARKER JUSTIN	PARKER JUSTIN
PASCAL GEORGE J TRS & BETSY TRS	PASCAL GEORGE & BETSY
PASKAL KALI	PASKAL KALI ET AL
PASKAL PETE TR & TARY TR	PASKAL PETE & TARY
PENICK AMANDA J & DAVID CRANE	PENICK AMANDA J & DAVID CRANE
PERRY STREET REAL ESTATE LLC	PERRY STREET REAL ESTATE LLC
PETERSON RANDY J	PETERSON RANDY J

PHILLIPS LINDA J	PHILLIPS LINDA J
PHILLIPS M KAY TR & LAWRENCE D TR	PHILLIPS M KAY TR & LAWRENCE D TR
PHILLIPS M KAY TRS & LAWRENCE D TRS	PHILLIPS M KAY TRS & LAWRENCE D TRS
PHOTODESIGN INC	PHOTODESIGN INC
PLUM STREET INVESTMENTS L	PLUM STREET INVESTMENTS L
LLOYD LIBRARY & MUSEUM THE	PNC BANK
PNC CENTER ASSOCIATES LLC	PNC CENTER ASSOCIATES LL
KELLEHER T WILLIAM TR	PNC REALTY SERVICES TAX D
POGUES GARAGE LLC & POWELHOLDINGS	POGUES GARAGE LLC & POWELL T HOLDINGS LI
CINCINNATI CITY OF	POGUES GARAGE LLC C/O NESDC
PORT OF GREATER CINCINNATDEVELOPME AUTHORITY	PORT OF GREATER CINCINNAT
POWER BUILDING ASSOCIATESLTD	POWER BUILDING ASSOCIATES
POWER BUILDING ASSOCIATESLTD	POWER BUILDING ASSOCIATESLTD
POWERS LOWELL G JR TR	POWERS LOWELL G JR TR
PREECE GREG	PREECE GREG
PREM LEE JONES	PREM LEE JONES
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PRESIDENTIAL PLAZA ASSOCIATES LIMITE PTNSHP	PRESIDENTIAL PLAZA ASSOCIATES LIMITED PTN
PRINCETON PROPERTIES INC	PRINCETON PROPERTIES INC
PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY THE	PROCTER & GAMBLE CO ATTN TAX DIVISION
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PROVISIONAL PROPERTIES LL	PROVISIONAL PROPERTIES
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PUGA ALVARO	PUGA ALVARO
QC PROPERTIES LTD	Q C PROPERTIES LTD
RANDALL LAURA S	RANDALL LAURA S
RAYDAR RENTS LTD	RAYDAR RENTS LTD
DUKE REALTY OHIO	REAL ESTATE TAX ADVISORS
BERGMAN HARVEY TRS	REAL ESTATE TAX ADVISORS
BERGMAN HARVEY TRS & MILTON TRS	REAL ESTATE TAX ADVISORS
DUKE REALTY LIMITED PARTN	REAL ESTATE TAX ADVISORS
DUKE REALTY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP	REAL ESTATE TAX ADVISORS
REBHUN ANDY	REBHUN ANDY
WALNUT TOWERS LTD	RED MORTGAGE CAPITAL INC ATTN: LOAN SERVICING
REDDY DEVAL M & LIKITH V	REDDY DEVAL & LIKITH
REILLY TIMOTHY P & PATRICIA H	REILLY TIMOTHY P & PATRICIA H
RHODES IRWIN LAWRENCE	RHODES I LAWRENCE
RICHTER & PHILLIPS COMPAN	RICHTER & PHILLIPS CO
RICHTER & PHILLIPS COMPAN	RICHTER & PHILLIPS COMPAN
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RIVERBANKS RENAISSANCE PHASE I-A OWNER LLC	RIVERBANKS RENAISSANCE PHASE I-A OWNER LLC
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RIVERBANKS RENAISSANCE PHASE I-B OWNER LLC	RIVERBANKS RENAISSANCE PHASE I-B OWNER LLC
RIVERBANKS RENAISSANCE PHASE I-A OWNER LLC	RIVERSBANK RENAISSANCE
ROELLER ROBERT K	ROELLER & ROELLER LLC
RKR COMMUNITIES LTD	ROELLER & ROELLER LLC
RKR COMMUNITIES LTD	ROELLER & ROELLER LLC
RON HAMILTON PHOTO LIMITED	RON HAMILTON PHOTO LIMITED
NIEMAN INVESTORS LTD	ROOKWOOD PROPERTIES INC
LYTLE TOWER INVESTORS	ROOKWOOD PROPERTIES INC
ROSSELOTT MILLARD C III	ROSSELOTT MILLARD C III
ROTHENBERG EDWARD TR	ROTHENBERG EDWARD TR
RUDD O PIERCE SR TR	RUDD O PIERCE SR TR
S B G PROPERTIES LTD	S B G PROPERTIES
S E A L PROPERTIES LLC	S E A L PROPERTIES LLC
SACKETT MARK B & KATHRYNE D	SACKETT MARK B & KATHRYNE D
CINCINNATI CITY OF	SAKS INC. ATTN: PROPERTY TAXES
SAMSAR HOLDINGS LLC	SAMSAR HOLDINGS LLC
SANZERE MICHAEL J	SANZERE MICHAEL J
SASSER WILLIAM M TR	SASSER WILLIAM M TR
SCHAEPERKLAUS UNA & RAE SKIRVIN LAR	SCHAEPERKLAUS UNA
SCHNEIDER ROBERT A	SCHNEIDER ROBERT A
SCHOONOVER CHRISTINE M & GEORGE H VERKAMP	SCHOONOVER CHRISTINE M & GEORGE H VERKAMP
SCHUMACHER LUCILLE TR	SCHUMACHER LUCILLE TR HUNTINGTON BANK-HARTM
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SDM PROPERTIES LLC	SDM PROPERTIES LLC
WETHERELL RAYMOND C	SEIBEL KENNETH
SHETTY M V	SHETTY M V
SHROPSHIRE ROBERT III & DEBORRAH A	SHROPSHIRE ROBERT III & DEBORRAH A
SHV NORTH AMERICA CORP	SHV REAL ESTATE INC
SIEGEL JEROME J & ANN C	SIEGEL JEROME J & ANN C
SKIRVIN RAE	SKIRVIN RAE

SKY LOFTS LLC	SKY LOFTS LLC
ARCHBISHOP OF CINCINNATI	ST LOUIS CHURCH
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ST XAVIER HIGH SCHOOL INC	ST XAVIER HIGH SCHOOL
STAGGS MARILYN V	STAGGS MARILYN V
STAGNARO EUGENE J JR	STAGNARO EUGENE J
STAHL MARK F TR	STAHL MARK F TR
STARK ANDREW H & KIMBERLEE W	STARK ANDREW H & KIMBERLEE W
STARNBACH NANCY E & HOWARD K	STARNBACH NANCY E & HOWARD K
STERLING PHOENIX DEVELOPMENT VI LLC	STERLING PHOENIX DEVELOPMENT MC/O ERIC GOERIN
STETSON ANDREW H	STETSON ANDREW H
SWITZER JAY	SWITZER JAY
SYCAMORE & THIRD REALTY LLC	SYCAMORE & THIRD REALTY LLC
SYSTEM PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY INC	SYSTEM PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY INC
TAFT MUSEUM OF ART	TAFT MUSEUM OF ART
TAGLIARENI JAMES & PAMELA	TAGLIARENI JAMES & PAMELA
TBMG PROPERTIES LLC	TBMG PROPERTIES LLC
TCMH HOLDINGS LLC	TCMH HOLDINGS
TERRACE HOTEL LLC	TERRACE HOTEL LLC
TERRITORY PROPERTIES MIDWEST LLC	TERRITORY PROPERTIES MIDWEST LLC
JULIUS J RIGACCI BOX COMPANY LLC THE	THE JULIUS J RIGACCI BOX COMPANY
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THESING ROGER F	THESING ROGER F
CONVERSA LANGUAGE CENTER INC	THIEMANN GERRY & CARMEN
THIRD AND MAIN GROUP LLC	THIRD AND MAIN GROUP LLC
DEMARCO PAUL MICHAEL & KAREN ANNE SMITH	THIRD FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN OF CLEVELAND
580 INVESTORS LLC	THOMSON REUTERS - TAX & A
MMF REALTY LLC	THOMSON REUTERS - TAX & A
4J REDEVELOPMENT LLC	THOMSON REUTERS - TAX & A
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TISCH PROPERTIES LLC	TISCH PROPERTIES LLC
TJD PROPERTIES LLC	TJD PROPERTIES LLC
TOLLBRIDGE DEVELOPER LTD	TOLLBRIDGE DEVELOPER LTD
ALBI CHRISTINE M	TOWN AND COUNTRY
CINCINNATI CITY OF	TOWNE MANAGEMENT LTD
CINCINNATI CITY OF	TOWNE PROPERTIES
TRI-STATE EQUITIES LLC	TRI-STATE EQUITIES LLC C/O ARTEK REALTY
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URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENTINC	URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT INC
URBAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENTINC	URBAN PROPERTY MGMT
URBAN SITES LIMITED LIABILITY COMPAN	URBAN SITES LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
EAGLES WAY LLC	USAEAGLES WAY LLC
TERRACE OFFICE LLC	USATERRACE OFFICE LLC
TERRACE RETAIL LLC	USATERRACE RETAIL LLC
ELM-4 ASSOCIATES LTD	USELM-4 ASSOCIATES LTD
TORRENCE INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD	USTORRENCE INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD
VINE STREET INTERESTS LLC	VINE STREET INTERESTS LLC
VULCAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENCO	VULCAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENCO
TERRAPARK IV LP	W 2L2 TERRAPARK IV LP
WALDECK RUTH A	WALDECK RUTH A
WATSON ENTERPRISES INC	WATSON ENTERPRISES INC
WEBSTER VICKI J	WEBSTER VICKI J
WEEKS ADAM R & AMBER E	WEEKS ADAM R & AMBER E
WEITZMAN BETTY JANE TR	WEITZMAN BETTY JANE TR
ROSACK MARY KATHERINE	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
LAABS NADIA	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
SPURGEON JASON S	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
BUSTERNA JOSEPH C	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
REIK PATRICIA R	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
STURGEON DONNA J & CHRIS S STERWERF	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
CONKLIN JOSEPH T	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
MEYER SHERYL LYNN MORRIS RICHARD MARTIN MEYER	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
MILLER MATTHEW C	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
WHITE JOSEPH G & CHRISTOPHER CHILDE	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
STEED MARSHA H	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
WEST RAYMOND	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
PELLETIER NATHAN	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
RICHARDSON DARIAN J	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
BROWN LEROY JR	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
DUARTE JESSICA M	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
DONAHUE MATTHEW D & MARK R	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
NICASTRO NICK	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
MICHELL JOHN C & SHERRY L	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
KUBALA JOEL L	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
ZIMMERMAN JEFFREY J & CAROL A	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
KHATTAK PATRICK & SAMANTHA	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
MASTERS BRIAN	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A

WHITE KEVIN M & ABIGAIL L BROOKSHIRE	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
LOVELADY LAUREN	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
MILLER KENNETH S & CARRIE	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
HARRIS DEREK C & JILL M	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
LEE SPENCER S & CARA Y	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
RADLEY JAMES W	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
KAIT RICHARD E	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
RELTHFORD MARCUS D & AMY W EDDY	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
MCMILLAN TERRY & MELISSA SCHMIDT	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
WESTON MARSHA K & EDWARD J FELSON	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
XIA YING	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
BOSWELL EMILY C	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
MESSER RYAN L	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
UTENDORF SHARON A	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
FLYNN KEVIN R TR	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
JENNEWEIN WILLIAM L & CAROL L	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
COUSER JENNIFER LYNN	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
CARPENTER PETER J & CAROLYN D	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
BUSCHLE LOUIS C & HELEN P	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
LAWSON JOSHUA N	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
HADDAD SHADIA G	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
SERVIS JUSTIN A	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
SHROUT TOM R & SORA RHEE	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
SHARMA RUPA	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
HOLLSTEGGE LEAH M	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
VOLLMAN CARL W II	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
BLAIR GLENN	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
JONES JOEL	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
BERGER MATTHEW A & LAUREN B OSBORN	WELLS FARGO REAL ESTATE-A
WESTERN & SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY	WESTERN & SOUTHERN LIFE INSURANCE COMPA
QUEEN CITY CLUB	WESTERN SOUTHERN LIFE INSMTG LOAN SERVIC MS 37
WESTFALL JAMES M & CHERYL A	WESTFALL JAMES M COUNTRYWIDE MTG
WFJ BROADWAY LLC	WFJ BROADWAY LLC
WHITE OAK PROPERTIES #5 L	WHITE OAK PROPERTIES #5 L
WIEDEMAN CHRISTOPHER M & REBECCA NICOLE	WIEDEMAN CHRISTOPHER M & REBECCA NICOLE
WILDER F D JR & POLLY	WILDER F D JR & POLLY
WISSMAN ROBERT & CAROLE	WISSMAN ROBERT & CAROLE
WIT ENTERPRISES LLC	WIT ENTERPRISES LLC
WKEM LLC	WKEM LLC
WOLFF CHARLES M & MARY LYNN	WOLFF CHARLES M & MARY LYNN
WOLFF CHARLES M & MARY LYNN	WOLFF CHARLES M & MARY LYNN
WOODS REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS LLC	WOODS REAL ESTATE INV LLC

WWWT LLC	WWWT LLC C/O MARTIN WADE
XANDERS ANN L	XANDERS ANN L
YOUNG ROLAND F	YOUNG ROLAND F
ZAMICHIEI PROPERTIES LLC	ZAMICHIEI PROPERTIES LLC
ZAUN GREGORY O & JAMIE L THIBERT	ZAUN GREGORY O & THIBERT JAMIE L

SAFE AND CLEAN COMMITTEE MEETING AGENDA



John Luken, Co-Chair

Phone: 513.977.8323
Email: jluken@dinslaw.com

Marvin Blade, Co-Chair

Phone: 513.419.5108
Email: marvin.blade@duke-energy.com

David Ginsburg

Phone: 513.562.8727
Email: david@downtowncincinnati.com

Arlene Koth

Phone: 513.421.4440
Email: arlene@downtowncincinnati.com

Safe/Clean Committee

Agenda
Thursday, August 19, 2010
2:00pm – 3:30pm

Welcome	John Luken / Marvin Blade
Sector Updates	Sector Leaders
Homeless/Panhandling Update	Capt. Wiesman / David Ginsburg
Mobile Food Carts Update	David Ginsburg
Bike Friendly Downtown	David Ginsburg
Ambassador Services Update	John Baker/Chico Lockhart
Police Report	Captain Wiesman / Lieutenant Neudigate

APPENDIX B

CASE STUDY: PANHANDLING

Collaboration with Cincinnati Police Department (CPD), Downtown Cincinnati Inc. (DCI), and Hamilton County Mental Health and Recovery Services Board (HCMHRSB): Summary of Project that began Implementation October 1, 2010

12-17-10

Overview

There is a collaborative effort between Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) District I, Downtown Services Unit, Hamilton County Mental Health and Recovery Services Board (HCMHRSB) and Downtown Cincinnati Inc. (DCI) to develop creative solutions to meet individual mental health (mh) and/or alcohol and drug (aod) needs of persons who frequent downtown and have significant arrest histories and/or contacts with police. The effort was planned at the end of the summer and implemented October 1, 2010. It quickly expanded to include relevant players such as Pretrial Services (PTS) and Mobile Crisis Team (MCT).

Population and Process

The Downtown CPD identified 15 individuals for this project who frequent downtown and have a significant arrest history and/or contacts with police. Seven of the 15 individuals were identified as having a Severe Mental Illness and connected to a mental health agency for case management services. The pilot project required a specific response from the CPD and the mental health system when one of the 15 individuals was encountered. The following reflect some of the responses:

- CPD officers indicated on the arrest record if a mental health assessment or drug and alcohol assessment was needed. If the person was not connected to services, the jail staff arranged for Mental Health Access Point (MHAP) and/or Recovery Health Access Center (RHAC) to complete assessment(s) while the person was in jail
- Timely response of case manager when indicated
- Mobile Crisis contacted for after-hours for assistance.

A collaborative team met bi-weekly to review each case and develop creative interventions. The collaboration exemplified the significance of systems working together to develop creative solutions that are based on the individual needs of the person. Within the first six weeks, 4 of the 7 individuals identified with severe mental illness and connected to case management services made significant improvement.

Case Examples

For one individual, police contacts decreased so significantly that he was eliminated from the top 15. Another individual who is connected to case management, has income and housing, but often refuses to stay at his apartment and sleeps in the skywalks. He is frequently disruptive to area businesses and has been arrested multiple times. Through our mutual sharing of information, the police now have this individual's address and are willing to transport him home if they find him sleeping on the sidewalk etc. To date the individual has increased his time at his apartment, sleeping there approximately 2–3 times per week. Three of the 7 continue to be a focus of innovative strategies.

Strengths of the project

- Identified key contacts at CPD, DCI, MHR SB, pretrial, with team being comprised of individuals from key programs/agencies
- A release of information for police was secured prior to the project implementation which improved communication and relationship building with key individuals
- Individual attention to each case; asking what does this individual need, use of creative planning, setting realistic goals for the individual to obtain.
- CPD identifies on the arrest record if a mh or aod assessment may be needed and the jail arranges for the assessment to occur
- RHAC and MHAP complete assessments at the jail. RHAC is the front door to alcohol and drug services and MHAP is the front door for mental health services
- Desire for all systems identified to work together, including the city prosecutor
- Many of the case managers have welcomed the collaborative partnership and the ability to share information freely with all partners.
- On-going education between systems
- Ability for case management team to respond quickly to CPD as needed
- Willingness of CPD to transport clients to their home when address is known.

Areas that need Improvement

- Response from case management agencies varies
- Clarification of role and expectations of Alcohol and Drug system

Recommendations

- The team will continue to meet biweekly to focus on District 1's fifteen identified high risk individuals and evaluate again in June 2011
- Continue to strengthen collaborative partnerships to effectively coordinate interventions based on individual needs, strengths and personal goals with a focus on small successes are big successes
- By July 2011 develop recommendations as to protocols five districts could use to identify their own top 10–15 high risk individuals
- Explore having a point person at each CPD district that can develop a working relationship with those mental health and drug and alcohol agencies in their district. Explore utilizing the Neighborhood Liaison Unit.
- Explore with Mental Health of America (MHA) that Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training for CPD officers provide updates on this collaborative effort, exemplifying the effectiveness of systems/agencies working together
- Recommend case management agencies secure release of information for police for those individuals connected to community mental health and interface with police regularly

Members of this collaborative effort include Lt. Marilee Neudigate (CPD), Chico Lockhart (DCI), Sara Dooley (MHR SB-MH), Linda Gallagher (MHR SB-AOD), Tom Sauer (Pretrial Services), and Janie Mynatt (Mobile Crisis Team). The team also received valuable input from Melanie Reising, City Prosecutor.

Downtown Cincinnati Inc.'s social service outreach coordinator, through efforts to connect individuals with the assistance they need to make their way off the streets, works with many organizations in our community each and every day. **Please consider giving to these organizations that are devoted to making a true, sustainable difference in the lives of those less fortunate.**

The information within this handout is intended to educate you, the public, and to offer suggestions of how to get involved in making a lasting difference.

KNOW THE FACTS

In summary, it is legal to panhandle except:

- Within 20 feet of an automatic teller machine or entrance to a bank
- When the person being solicited is:
 - At a bus stop
 - Within 20 feet of any crosswalk
 - Standing in line waiting to be admitted to a commercial establishment
- From any operator or occupant of a motor vehicle
- On private property without permission from the owner
- In any public transportation vehicle
- ANY verbal panhandling from 8pm to 7am (during Daylight Savings Time) and 7pm to 7am (when Daylight Savings Time is not in effect)

* Reference: City of Cincinnati Municipal Code, Sec. 910-12

Aggressive panhandling is illegal.

It involves:

- Soliciting with the intent to intimidate another person into giving money or valuables
- Soliciting in a manner that impedes access to a destination, is threatening, involves physical contact or abusive language, or is nonstop

Know Your Resources:

- Call 911 if you feel threatened.
- If you feel you have been aggressively panhandled, **contact the City of Cincinnati Police immediately (513-765-1212).**
- If you need assistance, seek out a downtown safety ambassador by calling (513) 623-3429, the DCI Ambassador Hotline; or (513) 765-1212 Cincinnati Police Department.

You Can Help Through...


THE GIFT OF TIME: Take advantage of rewarding volunteer opportunities at a local service provider.

THE GIFT OF CASH: Make tax-deductible donations directly to the non-profit agencies that are devoted to making a real difference in the lives of those who are struggling.

To learn more about services or volunteer opportunities, dial 2-1-1 or visit uwgc.org/211.



DCI's 2009 Educational Campaign Brochure (front of brochure)



NOT ALL
PANHANDLERS
ARE HOMELESS...
NOT ALL
HOMELESS ARE
PANHANDLERS

Many of us want to help those less fortunate, especially when asked directly by someone for money.

everybody
wants to
HELP
Here's how...

DCI's 2009 Educational Campaign Brochure (back of brochure)

APPENDIX C

CASE STUDY: PROBLEM PLACES

CONVENIENCE STORE DOCUMENTATION

FOOD STAMP FRAUD INVESTIGATION



Ohio Department of Commerce

Division of Liquor Control

6606 Tussing Road · P.O. Box 4005

Reynoldsburg, OH 43068-9005

Legal Section

(614) 644-2489 FAX (614) 644-3740

<http://www.com.state.oh.us>

Ted Strickland
Governor

Kimberly A. Zurz
Director

200801167

ORDER

Mailed: September 22, 2008

VIA CERTIFIED AND FIRST CLASS MAIL

ARTICLE #7180 9171 9113 2001 3820 and #7180 9171 9113 2001 3837

Wade M. Nassar, President
N & M Mini-Mart & Beer & Wine, Inc.
823 Elm Street
Cincinnati, OH 45202

RE: 2008-2009 Renewal Application
Permit #6277277, Class C-1-2
N & M Mini-Mart & Beer & Wine, Inc.
823 Elm Street, 1st Floor Only
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

2008 SEP 23 PM 1:09
CITY OF CINCINNATI
CLERK OF COUNCIL

Dear Mr. Nassar:

The Division of Liquor Control has carefully considered your 2008-2009 renewal application for a Class C-1-2 liquor permit. The Cincinnati City Council objected to the renewal of this permit. The Division held a hearing on July 28, 2008, to determine whether the renewal should be denied for any of the reasons contained in division (A) of Section 4303.292 of the Revised Code. An investigation was conducted which included a review of the renewal application, the evidence submitted at the objection hearing, and information gathered from various documents and reports.

The Division denies and rejects the 2008-2009 renewal of the C-1-2 permit based upon the following grounds and facts:

- 1) The liquor permit holder and Wade M. Nassar, President and sole shareholder of N & M Mini-Mart & Beer & Wine, Inc., have operated the business and liquor permit business and would continue to operate the business and liquor permit business in a manner that demonstrates a disregard for the laws, regulations, or local ordinances of this State. R.C. §§4303.292(A)(1)(b), 4303.11, 4303.12, and 4303.27.

Wade M. Nassar is President and sole shareholder in N & M Mini-Mart & Beer & Wine, Inc.

Testimony at the July 28, 2008 hearing revealed that the Ohio Department of Public Safety, Investigative Unit, and The United States Department of Agriculture conducted an extensive investigation and undercover operation from April of 2007 through April of 2008. During the course of this investigation, undercover officers and confidential informants were able to purchase improper items utilizing food stamps; the items sold included alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, cigars, and cleaning products. All of these sales were made by Wade M. Nassar. On April 2, 2008, Wade M. Nassar was charged with the following: 1) Illegal Use of Food Stamps or WIC Program Benefits, a Felony of the 4th Degree, Ohio Revised Code §2913.46(B); and 2) Telecommunications Fraud, a Felony of the 5th Degree, Ohio Revised Code §2913.05. On April 2, 2008 N & M Mini-Mart & Beer & Wine, Inc. was charged with the following: 1) Illegal Use of Food Stamps, a Felony of the 4th Degree, Ohio Revised Code §2913.46(C)(1); and 2) Telecommunications Fraud, a Felony of the 5th Degree, Ohio Revised Code §2913.05. These matters are currently pending in the Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County.

The following citations are pending before the Ohio Liquor Control Commission:

DATE	VIOLATION	DISPOSITION
April 2, 2008	Open Container in Permit Premises or Public Place, Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps	Pending.
April 2, 2008	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above, Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps	Pending.
October 3, 2007	Improper Conduct not covered by Above, Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps	Pending.
August 16, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above, Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps	Pending.
December 4, 2007	Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps, Improper Conduct not covered by Above	Pending.

DATE	VIOLATION	DISPOSITION, cont'd.:
October 3, 2007	Improper Conduct not covered by Above, Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps	Pending.
October 12, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above, Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps	Pending.
September 7, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above; Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps	Pending.
December 17, 2007	Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps, Improper Conduct not Covered by Above	Pending.
December 17, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above – Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps	Pending.
August 1, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above	Pending.
November 5, 2007	Improper Conduct – Illegal Trafficking in Food Stamps, Improper Conduct not Covered by Above	Pending.
June 15, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above	Pending.
June 4, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above	Pending.
August 16, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above	Pending.

DATE	VIOLATION	DISPOSITION, cont'd.:
September 7, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above	Pending.
July 19, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above	Pending.
August 16, 2007	Improper Conduct not Covered by Above	Pending.

- 2) The Division also denies and rejects the 2008-2009 renewal application for good cause. R.C. §§4303.271(A), 4301.10(A)(2), and O.A.C. §4301:1-1-12(B).


The pleading and facts recited in number one (1) above is restated as if fully rewritten herein.

You are entitled to appeal this Order to the Ohio Liquor Control Commission. If you want to appeal this Order, you must file an appeal within 30 days of the mailing date of this Order with the:

Liquor Control Commission
77 South High Street, 18th Floor
Columbus, Ohio 43215-0565
(614) 466-3132

The notice of appeal should contain a statement of your reasons for appeal. Please attach a copy of this Order with your appeal.

Sincerely,



Terry Poole
Superintendent

/gap

cc: **Certified and First Class Mail**
Wade M. Nassar
3989 Brandychase Way, Apt. 215
Cincinnati, OH 45245-4117

Barbara Wiethe
Attorney at Law
4430 Carver Woods Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45242

Keith C. Forman, Esq.
Assistant Prosecutor Attorney
801 Plum Street, Suite 226
Cincinnati, OH 45202

Melissa Autry, Clerk
Cincinnati City Council
801 Plum Street, Room 308
Cincinnati, OH 45202

Thomas H. Streicher, Jr., Chief
Cincinnati Police Department
P.O. Box 141257
Cincinnati, OH 45250

CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT

AND

**THE CITY OF CINCINNATI COMPLAINT AGAINST THE
CONVENIENCE STORE**

City of Cincinnati



Interdepartmental
Correspondence Sheet

April 15, 2008

TO: Councilmember Y. Laketa Cole, Chair, Vibrant Neighborhoods, Recreation and Public Services Committee

FROM: Milton Dohoney, Jr., City Manager

200800446

SUBJECT: N & M Mini Mart & Beer & Wine, Inc., dba N & M Mini Mart
Liquor License Annual Renewal

OBJECTION: Cincinnati Police Department, District One, and Downtown Residents Council.

This is a report on a communication from the State of Ohio, Division of Liquor Control, advising of the annual permit renewal for the following:

ESTABLISHMENT:

APPLICATION: 6277277
PERMIT TYPE: Annual Renewal
CLASS: C1, C2
NAME: N & M Mini Mart & Beer & Wine, Inc.
DBA: N & M Mini Mart
823 Elm Street

NEIGHBORHOOD: Downtown

REPORT: The City of Cincinnati Police Department, District One, objects to the renewal of the above-referenced liquor permit. The liquor permit premises has been operated in a manner that demonstrates a disregard for the laws, regulations, or local ordinances of this state. Evidence in support of the aforementioned accusation will be presented at a hearing on this matter.

RECOMMENDATION: The Downtown Residents Council objects to the renewal of this liquor permit in support of the Cincinnati Police Department.

c: Colonel Thomas H. Streicher, Jr., Chief of Police

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW LISTS

OBSERVATION FORMS

Name	Title	Date(s) of Interview	Method(s) of Interview	Interview Topic	Total Number of Interviews
David Ginsburg	DCI Managing Director	October, 24, 2008; March 19, 2009; April 16, 2009; June 9, 2010; January, 20, 2011; February 22, 2011; April 21, 2011	Face-to-face and telephone	Library disorder; DCI operations; progress of CBD; panhandling; The Metropole Apartments, the convenience store.	7
Ray Hills	Director, Facilities and Security Services at the Cincinnati Public Library (all branches)	March 1, 2006	Face-to-face	Library disorder	1
Greg Edwards	Downtown Cincinnati Library Services Manager	March 1, 2006	Face-to-face	Library disorder	1
David Takach	Downtown Cincinnati Library Security Manager	March 1, 2006	Face-to-face	Library disorder	1
Steve B.	Downtown Library Security Officer	March 4, 2006	Face-to-face	Library disorder	1
Gary	Downtown Library Security Officer	March 4, 2006	Face-to-face	Library disorder	1
Captain Ken Jones	District 1: Downtown Services Unit Captain A	March 10, 2006	Face-to-face	Library disorder	1
Gary Wachs	Manager for the Garfield Suites Hotel (across from the library)	March 21, 2006	Face-to-face	Library disorder	1
Jeannie Bechtold	Property Manager of business & residential	June 18, 2010	Face-to-face	Relationship with DCI	1

	property in CBD				
Eric Schneider	Store Manager for TJ Maxx in C	May 17, 2010	Face-to-face	Relationship to DCI	1
Lieutenant Marilee Neudigate	Lieutenant A. for District 1: Downtown Services Unit	May 10, 2011	Telephone, email	Panhandling	2
Chico Lockhart	Block by Block Outreach Coordinator	May 2, 2011	Telephone, email	Panhandling	2
Chief Thomas Streicher	Chief of Police, Cincinnati	March 11, 2010	Face-to-face, telephone	General relationship between CPD & DCI; the Metropole Apartments	2
Captain Mike Neville	Captain, Cincinnati Police Lieutenant B. with District 1: Downtown Services Unit	May–October, 2009	Face-to-face (ride-alongs)	General disorder within the central business district	5
John Baker	Block by Block Ambassador Services Director	March 4, 2010	Face to Face	Ambassador Services	1

FIELD NOTES

**Dissertation Observation Form for Cincinnati Police Ride-alongs Within
Central Business District**

Date:

Shift:

Officer:

of crimes observed: _____

Type of crimes:

Location of crimes:

Type of disorder:

Location of disorder incident:

Notes:

Direct Observation Field Notes

of crimes observed: _____

Type of crimes:

Location of crimes:

Type of disorder:

Location of disorder:

Notes:
