Environmental Corrections:
Making Offender Supervision Work

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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER 1

WHY OFFENDER SUPERVISION DOES NOT WORK

Over the past four decades, mass incarceration has been the elephant in the room of corrections. During this period, state and federal prison populations increased dramatically, from under 200,000 to over 1.5 million. When jail populations are included, the daily count of incarcerated Americans reaches about 2.3 million – or 1 in every 100 adults in the nation (Pew Center on the States, 2008; West, Sabol, & Greenman, 2010). Understandably, a rich body of work has arisen to account for this seemingly intractable willingness to place fellow citizens behind bars (see, for example, Garland, 2001; Pratt, 2009; Tonry, 2004).

Another critical correctional development, however, has been overshadowed by this concentrated focus on mass imprisonment: the rise of mass community supervision of offenders. Thus, in 1980, about 1.34 million offenders were on probation (1.1 million) or parole (220,438). By 2010, this figure had ballooned to almost 5 million Americans. The probation population had increased by almost 3 million offenders to 4,055,500, whereas the parole population had increased by over 620,000 offenders to 840,700. In concrete terms, this means that on any given day, 1 in every 48 adults in the U.S. is under some form of community supervision (Glaze & Bonczar, 2011).

The question that arises is whether supervision matters – that is, in the parlance of the day, whether it “works” to reduce recidivism. This issue matters because of the sheer number of offenders whose lives will be touched by correctional control, and whose criminal habits can be affected by this system. Further, due to the ongoing financial crisis, states are looking for opportunities to trim their budgets. Criminal justice expenditures have not been immune, and
state prison populations declined for the first time in 38 years in 2009 (Pew Center on the States, 2010). With limited resources available, state officials are now looking to probation and parole to supervise offenders either diverted or released early from prison. In short, the policy and practical salience of community corrections is likely to rise in the time ahead.

Some evidence exists that in terms of recidivism, probation is as effective as a custodial sanction (Cullen, Jonson, and Nagin, 2011; Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson, 2009). Although not plentiful, other research finds that compared to being free in the community, probation supervision diminishes criminal participation (MacKenzie, Browning, Skroban, and Smith, 1999). Even so, there is little evidence that beyond the mere fact of being on probation, specific supervision strategies or styles regularly produce lower recidivism rates.

In traditional discussions, it is proposed that officers perform two functions – the delivery of treatment and the exercise of control – either of which might be used to reduce offender recidivism. There is increasing knowledge about “what works” when it comes to offender treatment (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). The challenge for corrections is implementing such evidence-based practice in the field and, in particular, how to use probation and parole supervision as a conduit for treatment delivery.

This dissertation’s concern, however, is with the control side of offender supervision. In this role, officers are expected to exercise what amounts to a policing function. Their job is to watch offenders and, if they break prescribed rules – whether criminal laws or conditions of supervision – to revoke their community status and send the wayward to prison. The policing or control function works best when the mere threat of punishment evokes compliance. It is based on the notion of specific deterrence: that threats or the application of sanctions scares offenders straight, either in the short term or, after a stay in prison, in the long term. This policing is
supposed to be most effective when it is intensive, when officers have small caseloads and can apply close surveillance to offenders. Unfortunately, deterrence-oriented, intensive supervision does not work (see, e.g., Cullen, Wright, & Applegate, 1996; MacKenzie, 2006; Petersilia & Turner, 1993).

Given this stubborn reality, what might officers do differently? Answering this question – how to prevent recidivism among supervisees – leads us to consider why criminal acts occur. The simple but revealing answer is that two conditions must be present: An individual must have the propensity to offend and must have the opportunity to offend. The factors that underlie the propensity to recidivate have been researched (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Gendreau Little, & Goggin, 1996). These risk factors, sometimes called “criminogenic needs,” are what should be targeted for treatment intervention. Thus, one answer to what we should do differently is to use evidence-based treatment to reduce propensity. We have a good idea of how to do this, even if we often do not.

By contrast, relatively little is known about what officers might do to knife off the crime opportunities of probationers and parolees (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002). Nonetheless, there is an extensive body of theory and research, drawn from the field of “environmental criminology” (sometimes called “crime science”) regarding opportunity reduction. This at times falls under the umbrella of “situational crime prevention.” Importantly, this perspective eschews legal deterrence, whose application is often uncertain and occurs far after a crime might be committed, in favor of strategies that steer offenders away from criminal opportunities or that block them availing themselves of opportunities that might exist.

Thus, a second answer to what we should do differently is to use the insights of environmental criminology to create a supervision style that seeks to reduce offenders’ access to
opportunities needed to engage in crime. Importantly, this approach is not anti-propensity or anti-treatment. Propensity matters, and efforts should be made to use treatment programs to blunt it. But simultaneously, probation and parole officers should be equipped with the conceptual knowledge and practical technology to work with offenders to reduce their access to crime opportunities. In this sense, the control function of supervision should be transformed from a deterrence orientation to an opportunity reduction orientation. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore how this might be accomplished.

In so doing, the following roadmap is taken. This chapter reviews four topics. First, a brief discussion is provided of the invention of probation and parole, with a special interest in the treatment and control functions of the officers’ role. This discussion will include an assessment of the role of current-day officers. Second, evidence is presented on the limited effectiveness of offender supervision. This will focus on rates of recidivism and technical violations. Third, the analysis will consider the effectiveness of offender treatment. A case will be made that much supervision either brokers inappropriate services or provides no services whatsoever. By way of contrast, an effort will be made to outline what effective offender supervision should involve. This analysis will be based on the principles of effective correctional intervention. Fourth, research will be reviewed that demonstrates the ineffectiveness of deterrence-oriented offender supervision. In particular, evaluations of control-based intensive supervision programs will be examined. This discussion will furnish a rationale for moving away from this approach toward supervision that is focused on opportunity reduction.

In this regard, the remainder of this dissertation articulates what such a paradigm shift in offender supervision would entail. Thus, Chapter 2 introduces the field of environmental criminology and how it leads to practical programs to reduce crime. Chapter 3 uses this
information to outline a new strategy for supervising offenders that is based on opportunity reduction. Chapter 4 seeks to present assessment technology that can be used by probation and parole officers to discern where, when, and with whom offenders commit crimes and to use this information to target opportunity reduction intervention. Chapter 5 argues that the line between treatment and control may be largely artificial, asserting that cognitive-behavioral therapy can be expanded to develop opportunity reduction elements. Chapter 6 explores how probation and parole can rely on the police to further limit supervisees’ crime opportunities. Finally, Chapter 7 makes a broader case for moving beyond current, failed methods of supervising offenders and embracing a new vision to assist offenders resist the seductions of crime.

THE INVENTION OF PROBATION AND PAROLE: TREATMENT AND CONTROL

From their inception, probation and parole supervisors have faced the challenge of competing goals. Often cited as the father of probation, John Augustus encountered this frustration, struggling to reconcile the prospect of individual change with a known history of offending. As is still common today, Augustus selected individuals whom he believed would be amenable to rehabilitation, and would require little in the way of crime prevention (Dressler, 1962). Through the mid-1800s, Augustus earned bail (probationary release) for nearly 2,000 offenders and was held accountable by the court for their outcomes. Upon advising the judge of the offenders’ progress, Augustus was required to demonstrate that the offenders had earned their freedom and did not require a prison sentence; this was achieved by showcasing the positive changes the offenders had undergone (such as gaining employment or reducing antisocial influences), and the diminished threat to public safety born from scrupulous supervision (Augustus, 1852/1972).
The emergence of parole experienced similar strains, having to balance conflicting ideas of what produces desistance. Observed in Alexander Maconochie’s experiment with a mark system on Norfolk Island, as well as with Sir Walter Crofton’s Irish ticket of leave system, offenders could progressively lease their liberty (Barnes & Teeters, 1959; Erikkson, 1976; Hughes, 1987). Provided their behavioral history, offenders were subjected to rigorous discipline in an effort to suppress further criminal acts. Yet, to prepare the offenders for an unsupervised life, treatment was required, and the gradual return to society included prosocial activities expected of an upstanding citizen. As seen in the Elmira Reformatory system, discretionary release from prison (under an indeterminate sentence) resulted from prosocial institutional behavior, instigated by individualized remedies and corporal punishment for misbehavior (Brockway, 1926; Pisciotta, 1994; Wines, 1919).

Following the dawn of the Classical School of criminology (corresponding with the Age of Enlightenment), the growth of offender supervision mirrored efforts to alter the intent of punishment, from retribution to deterrence. According to this utilitarian framework, humans operate according to a rational consideration of the potential costs and benefits of a potential action; the outcome of this hedonistic calculus can be influenced by the threat of punishment, particularly when such pains are certain, swift, and severe. This was countered, however, by the introduction of the Positivist School of criminological theory, whereby various biological, psychological, and sociological factors are identified as the origination of criminal behavior. These two dominant approaches to understanding (and thus controlling) criminality are inherently at odds; one fixates on threats of punishment, while the other mandates a reversal of criminogenic variables. Hindsight reveals that the pendulum of correctional theory has swung
from conservative to liberal orientations, guided by cultural contexts (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982; Cullen & Jonson, 2012; Rothman, 1980; Taxman, Henderson, & Lerch, 2010).

For generations, the progressives’ promotion of individualized intervention dominated correctional theory. Treatments sought to distinguish those factors that promoted crime within each offender, and then present reform tailored to the individual (Rothman, 1980). Yet the use of indeterminate sentences fell prey to two flaws. First, a medical model is reliable only insofar as expertise is available and utilized, which correctional interventions were lacking. Next, the assumption that practitioners would employ their newfound discretion toward the goals of reformation was shortsighted. The discovery of these shortcomings brought ideological challenges from contrasting political interests (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982), which influence the crisis in correctional philosophies seen still today. The correctional revolution of the 1970s was greatly influenced by the surrounding social turmoil, as a public atmosphere of distrust caused most to scrutinize the ability of the state to manage offenders (Rothman, 1980). As if almost historically fated, Martinson’s (1974) scathing critique of rehabilitative programming provided the necessary ammunition for both political parties to confirm what they had already believed. Despite the methodological flaws within his study (and later contradictory findings), his mantra of “nothing works” was propelled into public rhetoric.

Though there was unity in the demand for reform, conservative and liberal representatives diverged on why reorganization was needed, and how best to achieve change (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982). As a result of this disagreement, offender supervision practices still suffer from ideological and practical schisms. The social chaos present within the 1960s led conservatives to demand “law and order.” Many believed that claims of rehabilitation were an insincere charade by which offenders would be coddled, and this lenient handling of dangerous
offenders was jeopardizing public safety. To remedy this dilemma, they called for an increase in sanction certainty (determinate sentences) and severity (tough-on-crime initiatives) to deter offenders. Contrarily, the liberal-minded believed that rehabilitation promoted injustice, insofar as the state could not be trusted to employ its discretion responsibly. In their calls for reform, liberals maintained their promotion of offender treatment, but through the safeguard of determinate sentencing (with shorter terms and additional legal protections). If rehabilitation was to be embraced, it must be through the medical model’s adage: Above all, do no harm.

These two directions created a virtual impasse. The resulting crisis in corrections, coupled with increasing offender populations and associated costs, required a solution. As with the attack on rehabilitation (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982), support from opposing political parties birthed dramatic and swift change (Cullen & Jonson, 2012). Conservatives desired punitive programs that spared expenses, while liberals aspired to divert offenders from the evils of incarceration (Cullen, Wright, & Applegate, 1996). Consequently, the 1980s experienced a surge in a reliance on community-based punishments. Community control programs were campaigned as commonsensical (Cullen, Blevins, Trager, & Gendreau, 2005), meeting the desires of each political party. These sanctions were intertwined with two competing value systems: an increase in monitoring and control (combined with the threat of imprisonment for failure to comply), coupled with atheoretical and undamaging treatment.

Whether either of these strategies are capable of independently decreasing reoffending is debatable (MacKenzie, 2006), as discussed in the subsequent section. In any event, it is important to note that these two conflicting tactics have produced significant role strain for offender supervisors. Probation and parole officers have long embodied different styles of supervision, producing a number of role typologies. Of principle concern are the punitive or law
enforcement officer and the welfare or therapeutic officer (Ohlin, Piven, & Pappenfront, 1956; Allen, Carlson, & Parks, 1979). The embodiment of one of these frameworks (to the logical sacrifice of the other) may be the consequence of officer personality, the clientele being supervised, the political culture, or the aims of the organizing agency (Bonta, Rugge, Scott, Bourgon, & Yessine, 2008). Over the past few decades, an important shift has occurred, in which these two incongruous functions have melded together (Feeley & Simon, 1992). Contemporarily, the dominant supervision style is the synthetic or combined model, in which surveillance and social services are at play simultaneously (Klockars, 1972; McCleary, 1978).

Unfortunately, this role conflict may not easily be resolved. Many passionate arguments have been forwarded in favor of sacrificing one goal of supervision to save the other (Taxman, Henderson, & Lerch, 2010). That is, the treatment model should be sacrificed to focus on control (Barkdull, 1976), or the law enforcement stance should be eliminated to emphasize rehabilitation (Stanley, 1976). Regardless, the task of supervising offenders under community corrections requires completion, whether under strain or not. Caseload management (especially meticulous recordkeeping) is a bureaucratic necessity. Particularly in an era of increased populations with decreased resources, probation and parole officers are required to be efficient as opposed to effective (Feeley & Simon, 1992).

Consequently, offender supervision has reached a period of stagnation. Officers must balance two seemingly incompatible goals – treatment and control – often forcing them to choose one to the detriment of the other. Furthermore, the day-to-day functions of the organizing agency leave officers in the position of passive brokers simply trying to supply the overwhelming demand (Solomon, Waul, Van Ness, & Travis, 2004; Turner, 2010). These factors undoubtedly influence the efficacy of offender supervision. The persistent juggle of
rehabilitation, social service brokerage, enforcement, and case management encountered by probation and parole officers has produced an atmosphere of atheoretical community corrections. As a result of trying to be everything to everyone, it is of little surprise that current eclectic models of offender supervision are ineffective.

THE LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFENDER SUPERVISION

Though offender supervision was not previously perfected, there is little doubt that the addition of 3.5 million community corrections clients over the last 30 years has hampered efforts to effectively supervise offenders in the community (Glaze & Bonczar, 2011). As Feeley and Simon’s (1992) classic piece on the new penology has demonstrated, population growth has contributed to pivotal changes in correctional rhetoric, goals, and strategies. Former expressions of clinical diagnosis and retributive justice have been substituted by the more cold, calculating idioms of probability and risk. This has resulted in deemphasizing individualized approaches to offender monitoring and welfare. In essence, previous objectives of management and rehabilitation have been replaced by a systemic requirement: efficient control. In an attempt to balance competing approaches, offender supervisors have largely regressed into bureaucrats – hardly the stance required in community corrections interventions.

Official statistics demonstrate the unacceptable product of such a stalemate in correctional philosophies (see Glaze & Bonczar, 2011). In 2010, 65% of probationers were recorded as successfully having completed their term of supervision. Among parolees, only half were successfully discharged, with 33% being reincarcerated while under community supervision. Within three years of release from prison, two-thirds of parolees are rearrested for a new offense, with more than half of these returning to prison due to a technical violation of the
conditions of their supervision (Langan & Levin, 2002). The rearrest rate for property offenders is particularly telling, with about three-quarters being arrested for a new offense. However, specializing (in which the individual is arrested while on supervision for the same offense they committed that placed them on supervision) among offenders is low; the versatility in criminogenic and concrete needs clearly contributes to the difficulty in monitoring and treating probationers and parolees. So much so, perhaps, that some studies have simply concluded that community supervision does not affect rearrest rates of offenders (Solomon, Kachnowski, & Bhati, 2005).

This is not to say that there are no benefits accrued from community corrections; yet, the central goal most highly demanded – unambiguous recidivism reduction – is not being achieved at an acceptable level (for a discussion of the difficulties in operationalizing recidivism, see Maltz, 1984). Despite variation in the motivation of such requests, whether practical or political, there is an expectation that offenders supervised in the community will desist, no matter the impetus (Boone & Fulton, 1996). There is certainly considerable controversy regarding how to meet this goal, often divided along party lines, which mimics the impasse in guiding strategies experienced by community corrections officers. In essence, the voracious debate surrounding whether public safety can be enhanced best by controlling offenders or by rehabilitating offenders seems inherent. Worse yet, it is often presented as intractable. Reasonable consideration births the realization that these two competing and “incompatible” demands are both necessary, but insufficient; the crime prevention strategies of surveillance and treatment cannot be sacrificed one for the other.

As street-level policy-makers (Lipsky, 1980), the actions taken by probation and parole officers in their routine work implicate certain correctional philosophies. Community
corrections can no longer tolerate practices in which the selected model of offender supervision is an afterthought, or purely incidental to decisions already made. The lack of a cohesive and directive theory of effective probation and parole is a disgrace. Community corrections officers are in a prime position to be agents of offender change, and while small discoveries of “best practices” in offender supervision are emerging, the absence of a guiding framework has undesirable consequences for offenders and their communities. Consequently, a paradigm shift in community corrections is required.

The “organized skepticism” generally observed in social science research and public policy (Cullen & Gendreau, 2001; Merton, 1973) is peculiarly absent from probation and parole practice. As empiricists, criminologists must scrutinize the validity of the available evidence, and should be particularly cynical when long-held maxims are replaced by sudden shifts in ideology. Yet after multiple generations of experimenting with deterrent and rehabilitative correctional philosophies, the evidence is conclusive: The current product, a hodgepodge of dispassionate and half-hearted exercises of control and treatment, does not work. The stronghold on correctional practice previously held by the rehabilitative ideal and the tough-on-crime movement have faded, making this the most ripe time for innovation. The unproductive standards in probation and parole have been allowed to dominate practice (and resulting outcomes) for too long – something new must be done.

The unconvinced and ideologically allegiant may point to the isolated and limited efforts in community corrections that have effected positive outcomes. Indeed, there is a growing base of knowledge, grounded in research evidence, which indicates that certain practices can reduce crime. But these are often aimless in their impact without an organizing theme to promote the use of the larger strategy in which the one effective practice ought to be embedded. More often,
techniques employed under the guise of deterrence or rehabilitation theories are awfully conceptualized, implemented, and exercised. Both control and treatment are necessary tactics for effective offender supervision, and must (and can) be used in conjunction with one another. Yet to complement one another, each must first be a worthy contributor to probation and parole practice. As it currently stands though, neither approach, alone or in combination with the other, is suited to significantly and consistently reduce recidivism.

**WHY TREATMENT DOES NOT WORK**

The fall and reemergence of the rehabilitative ideal is a curious story, with vivid implications for community corrections practices. The way in which the “nothing works” hysteria framed subsequent debates over the efficacy of rehabilitation has been largely unreasonable. For generations, scholars have unfairly categorized highly variant programs into one subsuming pigeon hole, measuring their success only by bottom-line, dichotomized measures of recidivism (Boone & Fulton, 1996). Despite these unproductive tendencies, limited treatment efforts persisted. Simultaneously, new analytic techniques made synthesis possible. Over the past two decades, several meta-analyses have indicated that, though many rehabilitative efforts were null to modest in impact, others showed promise that they could be highly effective. Across studies, a clear pattern emerged, demonstrating that “interventions that are based on social learning or behavioral principles, are structured rather than nondirective, seek to build human capital in offenders, and use more than one treatment modality to address the multiple problems that offenders may be experiencing” generate the most success at reducing recidivism (Cullen, 2002, p. 266). Given the heterogeneity observed in treatment effects, a new goal emerged, beyond ‘proving’ that rehabilitation didn’t work. Specifically, researchers sought to
unpack the black box of treatment, uncovering those variables that moderate the influence of programming on outcomes.

This alteration in the discipline’s tone led to the theory of effective correctional intervention, in which the factors known to provide effective treatment were identified (Andrews, 1995; Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Cullen, 2002; Gendreau, 1996). In particular, successful rehabilitation programs correspond with the risk, need, and responsivity principles. First, interventions ought to target high-risk offenders, which will be recognized through the use of standardized assessment instrumentation (as opposed to the less reliable clinical appraisals of risk). Next, treatment must evaluate the offender’s criminogenic needs. Empirical research must identify and interventions must address those dynamic risk factors that are presumed to contribute to criminality. Finally, the third principle demonstrates that only those approaches that are receptive to offenders and their risk factors ought to be used. As such, “treatment programs should be delivered in a manner that facilitates the learning of new prosocial skills by the offender” (Gendreau, 1996, p. 123), both generally (in terms of the treatment modality, with cognitive-behavioral techniques as the gold standard) and specifically (in reference to the capabilities of the individual).

As an increasing number of programs have begun to incorporate these principles, additional factors have demonstrated their influence on the effectiveness of treatment (Andrews, 1995). Specifically, a social psychological understanding of criminal conduct has revealed multiple treatment specifications that are in alignment with the contingencies of operant conditioning. Individualized treatment, therapeutic integrity, community settings, aftercare, social support, and quality program development and implementation will all be strongly related to successful programs. With an increase in the knowledge of effective correctional
interventions also comes information on what consistently will not work to reduce reoffending. As Andrews (1995) notes, criminal sanctioning without accompanying treatment cannot be expected to diminish criminal behavior. Gendreau (1996) elaborates, citing how efforts to “punish smarter” remain replete with failure. Simply, programs that emphasize punishment fail to alter those characteristics believed to birth criminal behavior, and are consequently doomed to be unsuccessful.

With reference to face validity alone, the theory of effective correctional intervention can logically reduce recidivism. Rather than relying upon an implicit theory that has no criminological underpinnings, the theory advanced in the coming chapters attempts to redress the known factors that sustain criminal conduct. Those programs that conform to the risk, need, and responsivity principles consistently achieve reductions in recidivism of around 25% to 50% (possibly higher, depending on the control group; Lipsey, 1999; Cullen, 2002; Cullen & Gendreau, 2000). Given this noteworthy accomplishment (and the unfortunate number of programs that do not subscribe to the principles of effective correctional intervention), future efforts must work toward technology transfer and theory fidelity. Future ‘professional ideologies’ ought to allow evidence-based corrections to provide information on how best to combat recidivism, striving for program integrity and motivated application. Provided the strong impact rehabilitation can have on reducing reoffending, failure to incorporate these principles ought to be considered professional malpractice (Cullen, Myer, & Latessa, 2009; Latessa, Cullen, & Gendreau, 2002).

And indeed, that is precisely what is noted in contemporary probation and parole organizations. We do know what works, yet recidivism rates persist largely unaltered. Three prospective explanations for this exist. First, it is possible that policymakers and practitioners
are simply unaware of the principles and their corresponding techniques that are known to limit reoffending. Second, it is possible that relevant parties are aware, and choose to ignore them; reasons for this may relate to political pressure, tradition / professional pride, perceived resource limitations, disagreement over ideology, or anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Third, it is possible that probation and parole agencies are knowledgeable of the standards of effective intervention, but implement them poorly. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that with our burgeoning understanding of how to successfully treat offenders, the current way of doing business is intolerable.

In response to this charge, many would passionately insist that they do treat their offenders, but the desired results are not achieved. This is often blamed on the offender population, the lack of resources, and poor interagency cooperation. It is here that we arrive at the central shortcoming of existing treatment efforts in community corrections: These “treatment” attempts will not work if they are not in alignment with the principles of effective correctional intervention; that is, community corrections services being delivered without adherence to these principles cannot reduce recidivism (Andrews, Zinger, Hoge, Bonta, Gendreau, & Cullen, 1990; Gendreau, Cullen, & Bonta, 1994). Examining these principles in turn, it is clear where existing probation and parole treatment is bound to fail.

First, the risk principle maintains that treatment ought to be targeted at high-risk offenders. Clearly, offenders at greater susceptibility of recidivating require a more intensive intervention than those less likely to reoffend (Baird, 2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 1998). Furthermore, when low-risk offenders receive concentrated attention, rates of recidivism often increase (Latessa & Lowenkamp, 2006). This is due to three primary reasons: exposure to stable criminal associates (and the learning / reinforcement associated with these associations),
disruption of the prosocial factors that cause them to be low-risk, and risk of victimization by more predatory offenders (Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2004). Importantly, to faithfully abide by this principle, reasoned assessment and classification processes must be integrated. The assessment of risk must be systematized and actuarial in nature (Latessa & Holsinger, 1998; Bonta, Wallace-Capretta, & Rooney, 2000), and the classification of offenders must be generally allegiant to these risk determinations. Offenders’ level of risk should be determined prior to the delivery of services, and should be reassessed periodically to make reclassification decisions as necessary.

Within current probation and parole practices, a number of divergences from the implications of this principle are noted. Principally, offenders are often indiscriminately grouped together, with little (or no) regard to risk. Even aside from objective recidivism risk, approximations of risk (such as offense history, offense severity, and treatment / sanction history) are often likewise ignored in the allocation of caseloads and assignment to program participation (Petersilia, 2003). What little “treatment” programs are available, offenders are often equally enrolled, irrespective of the degree of intervention they actually require. The use of actuarial risk assessments is also problematic. A number of practitioners abide by the alleged infallibility of their clinical judgment, with little use of validated instruments (Latessa, 1999). And while many agencies utilize intake assessments, these often are unquantifiable, or target only concrete needs unrelated to criminogenic risk (Latessa & Holsinger, 1998). Further, in the rare organizations in which reoffending risk estimations are calculated, the information is often not properly employed (Burke, 2004). The distribution of cases to supervising officers can be determined by multiple characteristics (e.g., randomly, even number of cases among agents, by demographics or tangible needs unrelated to offending), though seldom is client allocation the result of risk assessments. Summarily, failing to assess offenders and then classify them by risk
will have deleterious consequences for desistance-related outcomes (Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006). To not follow appropriate assessment and classification processes is nothing short of “correctional quackery” (Latessa, Cullen, & Gendreau, 2002).

Next, the need principle establishes that if criminal recidivism is to be reduced, the instigators or contributors of criminality must first be reduced (Andrews, 1989). This logical assertion also implies that reduced criminogenic needs are a desirable intermediate goal; that is, continued criminality can only be prevented if the characteristics causing the individual’s offending are altered, making their periodic measurement worthwhile (Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990; Gendreau, 1996). The known causes of crime, consistently demonstrated by hundreds of empirical studies, include antisocial attitudes, antisocial associates, an antisocial personality pattern, and a history of antisocial behavior (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). If probation and parole authorities desire to reduce recidivism, then supervising officers must address these dynamic criminogenic needs in their clients; a failure to do so cannot practically limit reoffending (Bonta, Rugge, Scott, Bourgon, & Yessine, 2008; Dowden & Andrews, 1999). Notably, in order to target the causes of offending, agents must accurately assess the actual criminogenic needs of their clients. Moreover, there must be legitimate follow-through on the factors determined to contribute to recidivism risk. Contemporary fourth-generation assessments incorporate both risk and needs (Andrews & Bonta, 2010); by thoroughly investigating the criminogenic needs of offenders upon intake and periodically through their supervision, the level of risk can be measured and adjusted as needed.

Unfortunately, however, existing community corrections efforts frequently fail to assess and target *criminogenic* needs. As Harland asserts, “For a field that by almost anyone’s definition is so centrally involved in the management of risk and in responding to criminogenic
needs of offenders, the continuing neglect or inadequate appreciation of the importance of this area in so many correctional agencies is little short of astounding” (1996, p. xvi). Frankly, the majority of programs do not adequately assess offender risks and address criminogenic needs (Matthews, Jones Hubbard, & Latessa, 2001). When offender risks and needs are assessed, they often indicate static factors (those incapable of being changed), or indicate concrete needs that are, at best, indirectly related to offending. This is not to say that officers cannot use information about an individual’s history of victimization or current employment troubles, but this leaves unaddressed the underlying roots of criminality (Bonta, Rugge, Scott, Bourgon, & Yessine, 2008). Emphasizing service brokerage, or providing atheoretical nondirective treatment, is not good enough (Latessa, 1999). Indeed, probation and parole agencies often coordinate “treatment” for their clients, unrelated to criminological knowledge (notably dismal programs include pet therapy, cosmetic surgery, yoga/meditation, and control- or punishment-oriented interventions). The research is clear: When rehabilitative programming does not operate in accordance with the need principle (that is, the precise causes of offending being addressed), recidivism cannot be substantially affected (Andrews, Zinger, Hoge, Bonta, Gendreau, & Cullen, 1990; Antonowicz & Ross, 1994). So much so, in fact, that addressing an offender’s criminogenic needs is a necessary step toward safeguarding public safety (Crowe, 1998). The stark majority of community corrections programs do not explicitly measure and target for change those characteristics that cause the individual’s crime; as such, they are designed to fail (Cullen, 2002).

Third, the responsivity principle conveys that the mode of treatment delivery must be reflexive to the learning styles and abilities of the individual client and offenders in general. Once we attend to measuring risk and needs associated with recidivism risk, we are naturally led
to inquire about the techniques that can effect change (Gendreau, 1996). Overall, cognitive-behavioral techniques are the most conducive to enacting offender change (Cullen, 2002). Quality probation and parole officers will match offenders not only to program intensity by their level of assessed risk, and not only to the rehabilitative interventions aimed at altering their criminogenic needs, but will also match offenders to those services and supervisors that are most likely to produce modifications for that individual offender (Gendreau, 1996; Smith, Gendreau, & Swartz, 2009; Latessa, 1999). When possible, responsivity should be taken under consideration in the development of community corrections programs; if nothing else, referrals to services and treatments must be highly individualized, as a one-size-fits-all approach is bound to be ineffective (Cullen & Gendreau, 2000; Latessa & Holsinger, 1998). Identifying barriers to desistance can be achieved through thoughtful assessments, and referrals must be based upon the information gained therein (Van Voorhis, Braswell, & Lester, 2009).

Again, existing community supervision practices leave much to be desired in the address of offender responsivity. Sadly, the majority of probation and parole programs do not adequately assess the strengths and weaknesses of offenders that may facilitate or hamper prosocial change, they do not use effective treatment models, and staff are not trained in behavioral strategies (Matthews, Jones Hubbard, & Latessa, 2001). Too often, a blanket approach to offender treatment is considered acceptable, with little thought provided to whether the service or program is conducive to the offender’s personality or capabilities (DeMichele, 2007). Further, as offender motivation is a responsivity variable in correctional treatment (McMurran, 2009), probation and parole cases must be attentively allocated to officers, as opposed to undirected caseload assignment (Bonta, Wallace-Capretta, & Rooney, 2000; Taxman & Thanner, 2006). Given the incredible diversity observed in offender populations, it is foolish to assume that a generic
approach would be adequate. Simply, for treatment to be effective, it must be tailored to the offender, considering temperament, learning style, motivation, culture, and demographics (Clawson & Guevara, 2011; Harper & Chitty, 2005). Yet rarely do probation and parole offices customize an offender’s case plan that is reactive to risk, need, or responsivity considerations (Taxman, Yancy, & Bilanin, 2006).

Finally, there are a host of other guidelines that, when used in conjunction with the risk, need, and responsivity principles, produce reductions in recidivism that are genuinely astonishing. Primary examples include knowledgeable and accountable staff, the use of community aftercare, multimodal interventions, enhancing motivation for change, firm but fair program contingencies, interpersonally sensitive and constructive relations, and advocacy (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Cullen, & Gendreau, 2000; Gendreau, Cullen, & Bonta, 1994; MacKenzie, 2006; Taxman, 1999). Perhaps most importantly, quality probation and parole programs embodies the principles of core correctional practice: anti-criminal modeling, effective reinforcement and disapproval, problem-solving techniques, structured learning procedures for skill-building, effective use of authority, cognitive self-change, relationship practice, and motivational interviewing (Clawson & Guevara, 2011; Gendreau, Smith, & French, 2006). Of this litany of best practices, many can be achieved through the development of a multifaceted intervention built on a sound conceptual model, followed by quality implementation (integrity) and periodic evaluation / adjustment (Antonowicz & Ross, 1994; Latessa & Lowenkamp, 2006; Lipsey, 2009). Finally, the professional override principle indicates that, after considering the other principles, appropriate decisions are made under the given circumstances.

Not surprisingly, the majority of these supplemental principles are not followed in average probation and parole programs. Therapeutic integrity is often low, and the typical
emphasis on case management or law enforcement fails to promote (and sometimes discourages) long-term behavioral change (Taxman, 1999). Standard programs commit many of the same mistakes, producing unsavory outcomes for offenders and their communities (Latessa & Holsinger, 1998; Solomon, Kachnowski, & Bhati, 2005). Among these shortcomings include atheoretical strategies, the use of techniques not based on the “what works” research, interventions that are too short or do not occupy a significant percentage of offenders’ time in structured programs, poor staff outcomes (high turnover, improper training, poor clinical supervision, poor service delivery assessment), employing inappropriate performance measures, minimal evaluation, and too few rewards with too many punishers (and these sanctions are not used properly).

Consistently, the clinically relevant and psychologically informed principles of effective intervention yield the strongest reductions in recidivism (Dowden, Antonowicz, & Andrews, 2000). However, probation and parole strategies rarely implement or adhere to these evidence-based best practices due to a number of political and professional barriers (Gendreau, Goggin, & Fulton, 2000). The overwhelming majority of community corrections interventions rely on some form of so-called treatment; these strategies are more appropriately categorized as service brokerage, as they are passive methods of service referral, as opposed to a directive and salient intervention aimed at substantial cognitive and behavioral prosocial change (Solomon, Kachnowski, & Bhati, 2005; Solomon et al., 2008; Taxman, 1999). Rehabilitation is a necessary ingredient to recidivism reduction. Treatment within probation and parole supervision can be highly effective, though the way it is currently being executed requires substantial redesign.
WHY CONTROL DOES NOT WORK

Additionally, it is important to note that while quality community corrections programs require a strong rehabilitation component, it would be foolish to assume that the inclusion of treatment equates to the exclusion of control. As discussed previously, both are necessary for successful outcomes. Offenders, who have a demonstrable pattern of breaking the law, must be appropriately monitored to ensure that past actions do not all but guarantee similar future actions. Yet without an intervention that addresses the underlying causes of crime, it is unreasonable to believe that offending would cease. In the proceeding section, the reader will note that this balance of responsibilities is generally absent from control-oriented probation and parole strategies. Though they are compatible, there is a misconception that the law enforcement nature of much community corrections works makes treatment an impossibility. However, not only do these surveillance- or punitive-intensive programs fall short due to the omission of a behavioral intervention, but the actual way in which offender control is practiced is remiss.

To begin, effective probation and parole strategies must be based on a clear and valid criminological theory (Latessa, 1999; Latessa & Holsinger, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006; Moore, Gray, Roberts, Taylor, & Merrington, 2006). Whether the aim be early intervention, crime prevention, or crime reduction, it is illogical to anticipate that the desired goal could be met without a solid understanding of why people offend in the first place. Above all, then, accurate criminological theories are necessary. Though appearance ought not to take precedence over efficacy when enacting policy (Cullen, Myer, & Latessa, 2009), deterrence theory has received mainstay in criminal justice strategies given its inherently intuitive appeal (Cullen & Jonson, 2012). Simply, offenders act upon cost-benefit calculations of the outcomes associated with crime. When the estimated rewards are expected to outweigh the perceived risks, criminal
commission becomes likely. The key to crime prevention, according to those who ascribe to this
teach, is to decrease the benefits of crime while increasing its costs. Rational choice theory
underlies related policies, whereby sanction certainty, severity, and celerity ostensibly influence
criminal decision making.

These prospects alone sound reasonable on the surface, though suffer a few key
paralyzing shortcomings. Attacked upon the notion that reliable information is not usually
available, theorists have proposed that bounded rationality or bounded willpower remediate this
flaw (Jacobs & Wright, 2009; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998). However, even within these
limited, present-oriented cost-benefit ratios, offenders often still behave irrationally, (especially
according to those designing the crime prevention intervention). Manipulating the expected
utility of crime may therefore be in vain. That the effects of punishment on reoffending is
contingent upon numerous factors (beyond the two that rational choice theory would ascribe;
Sherman, 1993) demonstrates the need for a more dynamic correctional philosophy, reflective of
individual differences (Cullen & Jonson, 2012).

Further, though the contributions of deterrence theory in this form ought not to be
discounted, our ability to pragmatically or ethically apply it is questionable (Cullen, Pratt,
Miceli, & Moon, 2002). Principally, the criminal justice system cannot feasibly ensure that all
crimes will elicit detection, prosecution, and punishment. As the contingency of sanctions upon
offending weakens, crime involves less risk. Next, for humanitarian purposes, the severity of
punishments cannot be exercised far beyond current practices. Finally, constitutional rights
afforded to offenders guarantee due process, thereby diminishing the swiftness with which
sanctions are paired with crimes. Therefore, given the divergence between theory and
application, an appreciable deterrent effect can hardly be expected. This is especially evident
when criminal justice policies are aimed at increasing the costs associated with crime, rather than the rewards associated with conformity (Cullen, Pratt, Miceli, & Moon, 2002). As applied, control-oriented sanctions have had little influence in encouraging desistance, and have often worked in the opposite direction toward promoting recidivism (Taxman, 1999).

Yet this has not discouraged deterrence theory allegiants. How could an ineffective class of strategies become so popular? With the dust settling from the “nothing works” hysteria (Martinson, 1974), America required a new penal philosophy. A “crisis in corrections” was occurring, where two unrelenting forces demanded a new direction: an exponential increase in the prison population, and the rising costs associated with the imprisonment binge. As with the attack on rehabilitation, both political parties advocated dramatic change (Cullen & Gilbert, 1980; Cullen & Jonson, 2012). Conservatives wanted to save money while not sacrificing punition, and liberals sponsored community corrections as a lesser evil than prison (Cullen & Jonson, 2012; Cullen, Wright, & Applegate, 1996). The product was a host of intermediate punishments. Despite being founded on convictions of offender assistance and service brokerage, probation and parole quickly became synonymous with the micromanaging of offenders (Lindner, 1994). Community control programs (including intensive supervision, electronic monitoring and home confinement, drug testing, and boot camps or shock incarceration) were campaigned as commonsensical (Cullen, Blevins, Trager, & Gendreau, 2005), falling along the continuum of sanction severity between prison and standard, uninvolved probation (Morris & Tonry, 1990). These sanctions were intertwined with deterrence theory, suggesting that an increase in monitoring and control, combined with the threat of imprisonment for failure to comply, would decrease reoffending. Increased foresight would have prompted the realization that expenditures and offender harm would be spared only if probationers and
parolees were actually deterred; yet, emotionality and “commonsense” are allowed to reign over logic and evidence.

For this reason, it is difficult to determine whether the movement toward intermediate sanctions was purely symbolic. When analyzing the substantive contributions of community control programs, several research dilemmas make conclusive evidence rare (Cullen, Wright, & Applegate, 1996). First, evaluation studies rarely have experimental designs, making selection biases probable. Next, there are outcome measures beyond recidivism that may support the efficacy of a program, though these are frequently ignored. Finally, unsupportive results could be due to a lack of program integrity rather than a poorly specified logic model, given that researchers rarely measure what occurs inside the “black box” in their evaluations. Above all, however, assessment efforts indicate that an increase in control does not translate into lower recidivism rates. When the methodological uncertainties are resolved, the results remain unsupportive of a deterrent effect of control-centered offender supervision (MacKenzie, 2000).

In one particularly rigorous study, Petersilia and Turner (1993) concluded that an increase in surveillance did not diminish the frequency or severity of additional offenses among community corrections populations. As a result of intensive supervision, however, technical violations increased dramatically, often leading to revocation. Therefore, it seems that community control programs fail to resolve prison crowding, address fiscal concerns, or promote justice while preventing crime.

In the rare, successful offender control programs, the reduction in reoffending is attributable to the treatment-orientation of the sanction, rather than to the deterrence components (Cullen & Jonson, 2012). Control-intensive offender supervision has the prospect of efficacy, but this is only if probation and parole programs incentivized conformity as opposed to
punishing deviance. Frankly, an individual’s criminogenic risks do not remain at bay simply because the threat of punishment looms. Indeed, deterrence measures are among the weakest predictors of crime (Pratt & Cullen, 2005). If nothing else, the rationale – that if you watch offenders more closely you will observe them violating their supervision or breaking the law more often – is hard to deny. Offenders report that control-oriented programs are the most severe sanctions, not because of the decreased benefits of crime and the increased costs of crime, but because of the inconveniences resulting from having freedoms restricted (May & Wood, 2010); further, offenders are more likely to comply with deterrent strategies when justifications for the setup are provided (Wood & Kemshall, 2007). Especially when the level of control is indiscriminately applied, regardless of the risk level of offenders, the results will be unbecoming (Carter, 2003; Gendreau, Cullen, & Bonta, 1994). The conclusion is vividly stark: “For offenders who are already in the correctional system, there is just not much evidence that trying to punish them makes them less criminogenic” (Cullen & Jonson, 2012, p. 89). In fact, evidence indicates that offenders are more greatly deterred by informal social control (such as the pressure from family or the desire to keep a job) than by threats of severe, formal punishment (Piquero, 2003).

As correctional populations have continued to climb, and the country’s political culture has led to an unprecedented tough-on-crime movement, deterrence theory has lost face validity. Proponents argue that manipulating the environment so that the likelihood of detection is increased and pain is maximized will inhibit recidivism. This is all well and good: We demand that justice (retribution) be enacted for wrongdoing, and hopefully harsh punishments will protect public safety as crimes are prevented (deterrence). Yet while we like to apportion crime to personal responsibility (and offenders do have some degree of control over their destinies),
probation and parole outcomes are shaped by community corrections strategies (McCleary, 1978). Unfortunately, these control- or punishment-oriented philosophies promote reoffending, with harsher sentences and more scrupulous surveillance diminishing the likelihood of deterrence (MacKenzie, 2000; Pearson & Lipton, 1999; Solomon, Kachnowski, & Bhati, 2005). Deterrence theory as it is currently applied as a probation and parole strategy, is highly ineffective at reducing crime (Taxman, 1999). We require a new way of doing business, in which the goal of internal control (i.e., changing offender’s thought process so that the environmental cues are reinterpreted) supersedes that of external pressure of punishment (Gendreau, Cullen, & Bonta, 1994; Wood & Kemshall, 2007; Zimring & Hawkins, 1995). For community supervision to be effective, there must be a shift in collective thought, from the goal being to control offenders, to viewing probation and parole as a precise intervention, of which control is a necessary component (Burke, 2004; Dickey & Klingele, 2004; Fulton, Stichman, Travis, & Latessa, 1997).

CONCLUSION: A NEW PARADIGM FOR OFFENDER SUPERVISION

Despite these fairly consistent findings of what is known to work and what repeatedly fails, ineffective community corrections practices abound (Lipsey, 2009). In fact, offender supervision programs that have proven to be harmful have prospered. If nothing else, there is an ambivalence between offender care and control (Worrall & Hoy, 2005). Historical momentum, political popularity, and the alleged rationality of traditional probation and parole strategies have produced “a socially constructed reality that is resistant to falsification” (Cullen, Blevins, Trager, & Gendreau, 2005, p. 55). Boot camps and intensive supervision are prime evidence that officials rarely incorporate evidence-based criteria into their decision making. Rather than
investing correctional policy in common sense or political popularity (Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate, 2000), future efforts should seek to reverse the known conditions of crime causation.

This realization led to a proposed *environmental corrections*, in which probation and parole officers would aim to reduce the offender’s opportunities for crime (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002). Borrowing from the knowledge generated within environmental criminology, effective community supervision would seek to disrupt the routine activities that increase opportunities for offending, while substituting pro-social, structured activities. These efforts would produce the ideal, in which the control aspects of deterrence would successfully merge with treatment efforts. Effective probation and parole programs must emphasize a *comprehensive* approach to crime control, in which offender accountability is balanced with offender assistance toward gaining prosocial outcomes (Evans, 2001; Fulton, Latessa, Stichman, & Travis, 1997; MacKenzie, 2006). Simply, we require an extensive shift, from risk control to risk reduction (Pierce-Danford & Guevara, 2010). This can only be accomplished when the fanatical obsession with surveillance and behavioral control is substituted with behavioral change objectives (Taxman & Byrne, 2001; Taxman, Young, & Byrne, 2003).

As established, current probation and parole operations have been managing an irreconcilable predicament: Community corrections caseloads are rising, but resources are diminishing. This crisis undoubtedly influences the way we assess practices – yet this still misses the heart of the matter: effectiveness. As the research evidence displayed above indicates, it is clear that offenders are not supervised in the most efficacious manner possible. This current state of affairs has prompted the realization that “the current practice of community supervision could be improved, perhaps dramatically, by adopting a new paradigm – a new way of thinking – about how best to supervise offenders on probation and parole” (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002).
The “incompatible” goals of treatment and control have produced a period of stagnation in community corrections. Although somewhat discouraging, the promise of positive change is great; the lack of a clearly articulated goal provides policy-minded scholars to reinvent offender supervision. Accordingly, this dissertation proposes a modest though unique conceptual framework, with corresponding recommendations for intervention techniques that may improve existing probation and parole practices.

The main premise of this environmental corrections model of offender supervision is that effective interventions must be based on valid criminological theory and evidence-based best practices. Core insights from environmental criminology are borrowed, exploring the implications of opportunity reduction to probation and parole supervision. As the creators note, “The key aspect of environmental corrections is not its revolutionary character but its novel use of the insights of environmental criminology to illuminate how correctional supervision can lower recidivism by reducing offenders’ opportunities to offend” (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002, p. 30). The insights from practitioners will be integral to the redesign of community corrections. By transforming probation and parole officers into problem-solvers, sensitive to the context in which their clients’ crime occurs, the issue is more carefully defined, thereby birthing a specific intervention.

The two ingredients to address for successful crime prevention are propensity and opportunity. As described by the principles of effective correctional intervention, reoffending likelihoods can be significantly reduced when certain conditions are met. Specifically, the focus must be on higher-risk offenders, the known predictors of recidivism must be targeted for change, cognitive-behavioral interventions within the context of multimodal programs should be delivered, applying a sufficient dosage of treatment combined with the provision of appropriate
aftercare. As was also seen, the component of opportunity does not, and can not, work when supervision conditions are premised on general deterrence (vague restrictions and prescriptions), when the amount of (rather than the nature of) supervision is changed, or when crude criminological understandings do not change propensity or restructure offending opportunities. It is therefore the role of probation and parole officers to proactively intervene, determining how best to reduce their clients’ access to criminal opportunities.

This reconceptualization of offender supervision will require thorough assessment, involved work with probationers and parolees, the recruitment of informal social control, and the solicitation of community place managers. The model emphasizes how “opportunity will be curtailed not only by threats of formal punishment for non-compliance, but more importantly by problem-solving officers who seek to expand informal social control over offenders, to increase the effort offenders must exert to access crime opportunities, and to work with offenders to restructure and fill their lives with prosocial routines” (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002, p. 35). Practically, this new method of offender supervision identifies crime prevention options in the here and now, emphasizes the factors proximate and integral to offending, and ultimately identifies those elements amenable to manipulation. The following chapter explores in great detail precisely what environmental corrections is, describing how situational crime prevention and opportunity reduction can contribute to successful probation and parole outcomes.
CHAPTER 2
WHY OPPORTUNITY MATTERS

The research evidence is conclusive: Current probation and parole practices do not work. Criminogenic risks are not reduced, offenders are not regularly deterred, and public safety is not enhanced. Most agencies focus either on offender control or offender treatment (while ignoring the other). Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, neither is performed well. Clearly, then, a new organizing framework is needed to create effective supervision strategies. We require an innovation in community corrections; one that targets the known causes of crime, both internal and external to the individual offender.

Determining what causes a person to be a criminal is a difficult, often controversial task. The explanations are varied, but do share one thing in common: There is no easy fix. Whether we blame biology or parents or education or neighborhoods, the problems are deeply rooted and not easily reversed. If it is the job of a probation or parole officer to reduce an individual’s likelihood of committing crime (but they cannot readily change the offender’s biology or parents or education or neighborhood), then we may be foolish for expecting change at all.

However, more success might be gained if we change the way we look at the problem. Rather than looking at what makes a person an offender, we should ask what makes a crime occur. Granted, part of that equation is the makeup of the offender, but to ignore the other pieces of the puzzle is misguided. The present chapter proposes that by focusing on the precipitators of an offense (rather than an offender), we have a more manageable scenario. A precipitator is something that causes an event to happen, especially an event that happens suddenly. As will be seen in the discussion that follows, there are several crime precipitators that are known and can
be addressed. This dissertation proposes that if probation and parole authorities try to change these precipitators, offending among community supervised offenders will be reduced.

These precipitators, though stemming from different sources, can be characterized as crime opportunities. When community corrections efforts focus exclusively on criminal propensity, the results, at best, are slow to come. Yet when we focus on opportunity, the situation is malleable. There are two components to opportunity that fall under the purview of probation and parole authorities. First, officers can work with offenders and provide services that change the ways that offenders perceive criminal opportunities. Second, officers can restructure the environment to limit the real opportunities for offending that their clients are actually exposed to. By addressing legitimate crime opportunity while also adjusting an offender’s experience with those opportunities, the greatest impact will be achieved.

As presented in Figure 2.1, there are two specific crime precipitators: cognitions and situations. Cognitions refer to the choices that individuals make; in the case of offenders, the decision to commit a crime will be influenced by their thoughts and values. As will be discussed at length in Chapter 5, there are a number of evidence-based best practices that can influence the way that offenders think. Although part of offenders’ belief systems may be out of reach (due to long-lasting socialization or stable neurology, for instance), the principles used in cognitive-behavioral interventions can recondition the way they interpret their environment. By providing the appropriate reinforcers and punishers, probation and parole authorities can influence offenders to view crime opportunities as neutral stimuli.

The other part of the crime opportunity equation is the immediate situation. Community corrections agents can manipulate the offender’s surroundings to limit the opportunities that exist, or at least that their clients are exposed to. A wealth of research has uncovered the place-
based instigators of crime. By reducing the benefits of crime while also increasing the costs of crime, offenders are less likely to pursue the criminal opportunity. That is, when an individual has less to gain and more to lose, the decision to commit a crime becomes less likely.

As depicted in Figure 2.1, the offender’s cognitions and the situations in which they find themselves are reciprocating. Much of what the offender thinks (and thus, the decision that they make) is based on the environmental cues that the situation presents to them. For example, an offender may only think about robbing a passerby if it is night and there are no street lights around; otherwise, (if it were daytime or the street was well-lit), the offender would not begin to think about how they could easily get away with mugging someone. At the same time, the cognitions of offenders influence the situations they place themselves in. It is natural for individuals to create environments that allow them to express their beliefs. For instance, an offender who is anti-social tends to hang out with other individuals who are anti-social. Or, an individual who condones violence will be more inclined to venture into a rival gang’s territory. For this reason, it is absolutely necessary for community corrections solutions to address the whole problem - the internal and external causes of crime. We need to limit the crime opportunities that offenders encounter, but obviously we cannot eliminate them all; therefore, we must also work to change the way they think about the crime opportunities they do come into contact with.

The final component of Figure 2.1 is the combination of these two crime precipitators. When cognitions and situations repeatedly converge, a routine develops. These routines can be described as patterns in crime, both at the individual and the aggregate level. For individual offenders, their daily routines offer a point of influence for probation and parole authorities. By examining the routines of their clients, officers can tailor an intervention to the individual that
Figure 2.1: Crime Precipitators

Cognitions
The rational choice; an offender’s thoughts and values

Situations
The place, the available targets and potential guardians

Routines
The pattern created by the repeated combination of cognitions and situations
disrupts that pattern by adjusting crime opportunities. For probationers and parolees at large, these routines create crime “hot spots,” where opportunities for crime abound and are taken advantage of often. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the police are in a prime position to disrupt these crime patterns, which will have a direct impact on the routines of community supervised offenders.

To interrupt these routines, we must know a great deal about crime opportunities. Community corrections officers and their partners must understand what features of the physical environment make a crime more likely to occur, and how probationers and parolees interpret those cues. Fortunately, a framework for accomplishing this task exists, and has been demonstrated to be highly effective. The crime science model is a problem-oriented approach that identifies and alters the explicit causes of crime. Using scientific methodologies, the crime science model focuses on the offense rather than on offenders, with the exclusive goal of reducing opportunities for crime to occur. As will be explored in the following sections of this chapter, the solutions to crime problems proposed by crime science are fairly straightforward. This approach supposes that: 1) we can identify the exact circumstances that cause crime, 2) we can change those circumstances, and 3) this will remove the opportunity for crime to occur.

Probation and parole authorities are in a prime position to assess the circumstances that facilitate their supervisees’ offending, and have the resources and tools available to change them. Naturally then, by reducing the criminal opportunities of their clients, the reoffending rate of community supervised offenders should diminish.

The crime science model has three areas of exploit for crime reduction initiatives (taken from Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008), which each have clear applications to community corrections. First, criminal behavior is influenced by the immediate environment; rather than being a passive
backdrop, the offender’s surroundings can initiate and shape the course of crime. Second, crime is patterned according to criminogenic situations, concentrated around those environmental characteristics that facilitate offending. Third, targeting for change the criminogenic aspects of the environment will minimize the incidence of crime there.

Accordingly, the content of Chapter 2 is organized to highlight these different initiatives. First, the chapter begins with a thorough discussion of the precipitators of crime. Specifically, the contributions of crime science will be presented, exploring the ways in which this framework can effectively limit the opportunities to offend that probationers and parolees are exposed to. The way offenders interpret these opportunities (the first circle in Figure 2.1) will be the matter of Chapter 5. Chapter 2 next examines the specific interventions that are produced by the crime science model (the second circle in Figure 2.1). The majority of these applications have been performed by police agencies with an emphasis on deterring a specific kind of crime (e.g., fights at a particular bar or retaliatory shootings among rival gangs). While Chapter 6 discusses ways in which police can assist probation and parole agents, the current chapter examines how the innovations from these police interventions can be applied to community corrections. By examining the routines of probation and parole clients, recommendations are made for how to reduce the crime-conducive opportunities offenders encounter.

Readers should note that Chapter 3 will specifically apply the advancements of crime science to offender supervision, only after first outlining the theory and current applications of crime science in the present chapter. Although the thrust of this dissertation is on a novel practice of probation and parole, the relevance of opportunity reduction to offender supervision cannot fully be understood or appreciated without first outlining the evolution of the crime science model of crime prevention. As such, the discussion that follows traces the developments
in crime science, allowing the reader to see the logical progression of ideas and crime prevention practices. Only then can the dissertation plot out the exact way that this will change offender supervision practices.

THE EVOLUTION OF CRIME SCIENCE

Although crime science has only recently become a coherent framework, its roots can be seen in early sociological explanations of crime from two centuries ago. Officially termed environmental criminology by C. Ray Jeffery in 1971, the field creates theories to explain patterns of crime that are produced by influences external to the individual offender. Although many scholars point to the origins of social disorganization theory (Burgess, 1916; Park & Burgess, 1925; Shaw & McKay, 1942), environmental criminology actually has a much deeper history. To name but a few pioneers, Balbi and Guerry (1829), Quetelet (1842), and Glyde (1856) each analyzed crime statistics, producing graphical representations of the distribution of offenses. Importantly, these early empirical efforts demonstrated that crime does not occur at random. As popularly described by Harries (1974), macro-environments display that crime is higher in cities (and that offending is concentrated in the city center and radiates out toward the city suburbs), while micro-environments reveal that certain neighborhood characteristics are reliably associated with criminal acts.

Although this criminological “fact” seems to be a truism, early sociological theories of crime were a dramatic shift from the explanations for offending that had dominated the field for centuries. During the Enlightenment of the 18th century, humanitarians sought penal reform by emphasizing utilitarianism. Premised on the belief that humans have free will, reformers argued that man is a calculating animal. As a result, society can persuade a person’s choices by
manipulating the outcomes associated with his or her decision. Rational choice theory stipulates that an individual will act in his or her best interest, a combination of trying to minimize pain while maximizing pleasure. The component parts of this cost-benefit analysis, or hedonistic calculus, can be altered to prevent crime. Recognizing this influence, philosophers Cesare Beccaria (1764/1963) and Jeremy Bentham (1789/1948) argued that potential offenders can be dissuaded from committing crime by reducing the benefits and increasing the costs that may result from that act. Deterrence theory states that, in particular, when punishment is quick, certain, and severe, the individual will be less likely to make the decision to commit a crime.

These ideas founded the Classical School of criminology. At the center of Classical theories is the volition of the actor; simply, offenders choose to commit crime, because crime pays. Accordingly, preventing crime is a matter of adjusting the component parts of the criminal decision so that crime is not the most attractive choice (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). After generations of popular support, rational choice and deterrence theories were trumped by the Positivist School of criminology. In contrast to the Classical theories that explain crime through the offender’s will, Positivist theories argue that crime is caused and not chosen. Early Positivist explanations for crime were individual trait theories (focusing on biological deficiencies), while later theories emphasized sociological factors. Aside from the belief that crime is determined, Positivist theories are alike in their methods of investigation, preferring objective empiricism to armchair philosophizing. Following the industrial revolution and American urbanization at the turn of the 21st century, scholars tended to agree that social influences cause crime. Different theories emerged as researchers made their case as to which social factors were most likely to produce crime.
As theories from the Positivist School of criminology popularized, the Classical School ideas of rational choice and deterrence were largely dismissed by liberal academics. The perspective of the individual offender was lost among all the influences that were acting upon him. So much so, in fact, that when responsibility for crime was placed with the people committing those crimes, these policies were accused of blaming victims of circumstance; it seemed unreasonable and harsh, after all, to find fault with the offender when some external force “made him do it.” The majority of these explanations were sociological, and efforts to discover spatial crime patterns became the norm. The sociopolitical measures that were typically used as correlates of crime (such as poverty, demography and population mobility, or institutionalized racism) all ignored the role of the offender in the experience of a criminal act.

Moving beyond the loose association between place and crime, upcoming ecological theories required a “collective geographic imagination” in order to be taken seriously (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). By shifting analyses toward quantifying the influence of the physical world on the actions of the offender, environmental criminology became a field all its own. Rather than focusing on distant community characteristics seen in high-crime neighborhoods, environmental criminology explores the outcome of crime from the perspective of the offender. This is a faint yet vital distinction in the unit of analysis; environmental criminology began to remove itself from the social problems that impacted the individual, emphasizing instead the study of how the individual actively interacts with his or her environment. This important shift allowed environmental criminology to combine the best of two worlds: the incorporation of offender cognition from the Classical School and the reliance on empiricism in evaluating the influence of the situation from the Positivist School (see Figure 2.1).
In this new, merged perspective, the determinants of offending can still be located in the environment. After all, the stimuli that prompt a crime and the rewards / punishments that reinforce a crime are largely external to the individual (Cornish & Clarke, 2008); however, these same stimuli and reinforcement are the considerations that influence the rational choice (the weighing of costs and benefits) to commit the crime. Thus, environmental criminology is the ideal approach, given the significant association between the physical world and the offender’s decision-making processes. The individual’s relationship with his or her surroundings is substantially different than in previous schools of criminological thought. The individual is not entirely free willed or rational (Classical School) and the environment is no longer acting upon the offender (Positivist School); rather, the environment is interwoven into the trajectory of the individual’s choices. Predispositions are still important, but certain environments will be more or less favorable to their expression. As Felson observes, “People make choices, but they cannot choose the choices available to them” (1986, p. 119).

Thus, environmental criminology represents a pivotal movement away from solely rational choice or ecological explanations for crime, and toward the relevance of conducive criminal opportunity (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). The most vivid example of the importance of opportunity can be noted in Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory. The theory stipulates that crime will occur when three conditions are present: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the lack of a capable guardian. These three factors must converge in time and space. Importantly, the theory addresses how the activities of individuals will be more or less conducive to criminal opportunity. Moreover, the larger routines of society in general can influence the availability of crime opportunities as well.
First, there must be an individual motivated to commit a crime (or, as will be discussed later, there must be an individual who can become motivated when an opportunity for crime presents itself). Although it is unclear who is included in this categorization (e.g., Is motivation ubiquitous?), simply viewing offender motivation as unimportant has provided scholars a chance to focus their efforts on the lure of opportunity. If people are largely hedonistic (that is, everyone wants to maximize their pleasure and minimize their pain), then people will largely respond the same way to a criminal opportunity. If, on the other hand, an individual is not motivated to exploit a chance to commit crime, then they are not of concern for theorists or policymakers. At any rate, routine activity theory demonstrates that the motivated offender is a necessary ingredient to a crime event, but means nothing without opportunity. Even with a large group of offenders intent on committing a crime, without the chance to do so, there will be no crime.

Second, for a crime to occur, a suitable target must be present. Cohen and Felson (1979) cleverly spoke of an attractive target to convey that some crimes (such as theft or vandalism) do not require a human victim. The activities of offenders may allow them to come into a greater number of suitable targets. At a larger level, changes in technology have resulted in more portable, durable, and expensive goods, and a shifting workforce has meant more people out of the house at more times of the day. Thus, rates of theft and assault have increased across time, reflecting the changes in the routine activities of society.

Third, crime can occur when there is a lack of a capable guardian; stated differently, a crime cannot occur when there is someone or something to guard against it. Perhaps the most obvious guardian is the formal social control of police. More casually, family, friends, or neighborhood residents may prevent offenders from engaging in a crime. Beyond people, a
guardian can include a number of safety measures, like a lock on a safe or a guard dog or a security camera. As with offenders and targets, changes in the way social life is structured have produced changes in guardianship. And as will be seen in the sections that follow, a number of crime prevention responses have been developed.

Of import is that all three are needed for crime to occur. As such, an increase in suitable targets or a decrease in capable guardians can by themselves lead to more crime, without any change to the motivation of potential offenders. More optimistically, crime can be prevented by reducing access to targets or adding guardians, without needing to change an individual’s criminal propensity. This realization has allowed criminology to move beyond academia and distant social policy. The importance of opportunity has penetrated the study and practice of crime prevention, leading to a number of innovations that collectively form a solutions-oriented approach to deterring offending.

The reemergence of rational choice in criminology, as seen in the way motivation is influenced by opportunity, establishes offenders as active participants in the milieu of a criminal act. Rational choice matters to routine activity theory, because the offender’s interpretation of a criminal opportunity depends on his or her evaluation of the benefits (targets) and the costs (guardianship) associated with that act. As such, if we want to manipulate the benefits and costs of crime, we must do more than alter the physical places where crime is likely to occur (after all, we cannot objectively prevent 100% of crime through place-based crime prevention). Rather, more well-rounded approaches to crime prevention policy aim to change the physical environment so that offenders interpret the opportunity (the costs and the benefits) differently. The goal is to design spaces and control their use in such a way so that any person entering the space does not receive a cue that crime is possible, tolerated, or invited.
As further explained by routine activity theory, the convergence of these three elements in space and time is impacted by the way community life is organized. As research into crime opportunities progressed, new ideas were created to explain the routines that account for crime patterns. To better understand the interplay of the circumstances that are conducive to crime, the crime problem triangle (see Figure 2.2) was developed to portray the conditions that can encourage or stymie criminal opportunity. The innermost triangle, based on Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory, shows that crime will occur when an offender and a victim or target converge at a location. The addition of place has led to a number of problem-oriented crime prevention innovations (discussed in the following sections), which emphasize the role of opportunity in criminal events.

To enable the creation of solutions to recurring crime problems, Eck (2003) developed an external triangle (see Figure 2.2), with each side representing a “controller” that can influence one of the inner conditions. First, handlers are people who prevent an offender from committing crime. Second, guardians make targets less vulnerable to victimization. Third, managers influence the behavior of offenders and victims who occupy those spaces. Crime is more likely to occur when any of these controllers are absent or corrupt. Offender handlers, target guardians, and place managers each represent a point of exploit for preventing crime or addressing repeat crime problems. A number of interventions have been developed and tested, establishing the importance of each of these controllers. As will be discussed in the following chapters, probation and parole authorities can capitalize on the expertise and influence of these different controllers, preventing reoffending among their clients. Specifically, as Chapters 3 and 4 outline, probation and parole officers can manipulate each of these controllers to limit the
Figure 2.2: The Crime Problem Triangle
criminal opportunities that community supervised offenders are exposed to. And as Chapter 5 elaborates, police have remarkable influence over place managers, in particular.

Under an opportunity reduction supervision model, the role of the offender supervisor would be two-fold, because there are two primary contributions to a criminal act (see Figure 2.1). First, the probation or parole officer would uncover where the offender’s motivation comes from, and then implement ways to change the offender so that such propensity is reduced. Second, the probation or parole officer would determine what environmental cues the offender interprets as a criminal prospect, and then manipulate the environment (or the offender’s exposure to it) so that such opportunity is reduced. Chapter 3 outlines the organizational framework of agencies and the procedures used by agents according to an opportunity reduction model of probation and parole. The present chapter elaborates on the contributions of the crime science model. In order to establish what community corrections officers can do to reduce the opportunity to offend, it is important to first explore the innovations that have revealed why opportunity is important for crime prevention, how we can best determine what criminal opportunities exist, and how we can change those opportunities to reduce offending.

Innovations in Theory

A common observation in policing research is that the goals of law enforcement often have to be sacrificed for allegiance to the means of law enforcement (Scott, Eck, Knutsson, & Goldstein, 2008). Standard police procedures emphasize random patrols and responses to (and later investigations of) reported crime; these daily routines can perhaps be detrimental to some larger end, such as the proactive prevention of crime. With this in mind, Herman Goldstein (1979, 1990) developed a new approach to policing, relying on an orientation that views crime as
a problem in need of a solution. Problem-oriented policing addresses recurring crime problems as opposed to resolving individual crime incidents (Eck & Spelman, 1987a). By carefully examining a chronic crime place or population, the underlying conditions that give rise to the crime problem can be aptly determined, making way for the development of preventative solutions (Braga, 2002).

As an organizational framework, problem-oriented policing created a new way of thinking about crime. The police traditionally react to crime; by viewing crime as the product of an equation, each of the contributions to the final outcome has to be uncovered. This has repositioned criminal justice agencies from enforcing punishments for violations of the law, to preventing the law being broken in the first place (Eck & Spelman, 1987b). To reduce crime, the constituent parts must be understood. It would be unwise to devote crime prevention resources to anything that we do not believe is causing crime. To understand what causes crime, the problem of interest must be analyzed in depth, gathering information from a variety of sources (Clarke & Eck, 2005). By emphasizing a specific crime problem in need of an unambiguous solution, generic prescriptions for crime prevention fall way to specific actions that target the cause of the problem (Scott, Eck, Knuttson, & Goldstein, 2008).

As the following subsections discuss, problem-oriented policing has ushered in a new way of doing business. Crime is analyzed and responded to in novel ways under this framework. Yet it is important to note that this is more than a topical fad. The entire way crime is thought about has been revolutionized. As previously demonstrated, environmental criminology ushered in ideas about how the individual interacts with his or her surroundings to create a crime event. Although criminology concerns itself with abstract and distant concepts (e.g., how poverty is related to crime), crime science aims to identify and alter more concrete and local factors (e.g.,
how street lights or security cameras are related to a reduction in crime). The task, then, is to determine what features in an offender’s environment might cause crime. Though an innocuous stimuli might provide a “cue for crime” to a psychopathic predator, the current mission is to discover environmental characteristics that the average offender would see as an opportunity for crime. Put differently, uncovering the instigators of crime will here be an offense-centric (as opposed to offender-focused) approach.

Crime pattern theory argues that offenders, like all people, have relatively stable spatiotemporal movement patterns. That is, offenders generally have a routine which places them in certain places at certain times; hence, crime is most likely located around these normal activities. Crime data can be aggregated, and in many cases, clear patterns emerge. Brantingham and Brantingham (1993) defined an offender’s movement patterns as activity nodes (sites where crime are concentrated), pathways (the travelled area between the nodes), and edge effects (perceptual or physical boundaries that distinguish between places). If, when, and where crime occurs will be influenced by the environments encountered during this patterned activity (see Figure 2.1: situation precipitators). Notably, however, a triggering event must coincide with the individual’s decision-making process that produces the outcome of crime (see Figure 2.1: cognition precipitators; Brantingham & Brantingham, 2008). As this process stabilizes after repeat occurrences, the characteristics that encourage crime among particular offenders become more predictable (see Figure 2.1: routines).

Crime pattern theory has led to a number of specific crime prevention applications, discussed in the subsections that follow. By emphasizing the role of opportunity, particularly how opportunities are perceived and acted upon by potential offenders, crime science theory has set itself apart from mainstream criminological theories by being action-oriented. For academics
and practitioners alike, the logical consequence of crime science theories has been to identify the situational precipitators of crime. The approaches that have stemmed from these theoretical innovations have assumed a rational choice perspective, insofar as the decision to commit crime is a direct consequence of environmental cues. With previous theories, uncovering the circumstances that initiate a crime assumed that the process is involuntary, operating below consciousness for the offender. Although crime science acknowledges that offending is situation specific, the offender’s interpretation of the environment will vary. That is, crime prevention efforts must seek to alter situations that offenders encounter in their daily routines that they are likely to perceive as opportunities for crime (Wortley, 2008). Crime science theories have focused attention on the importance of criminal opportunity and the way these opportunities are routinely encountered (Clarke & Eck, 2005). As a result, the methods used to discover what these opportunities are and the interventions that have been used to reduce these opportunities have been radically altered.

**Innovations in Methods**

A prominent feature of crime science is the incorporation of scientific methods and practical responses to crime patterns. Rather than pursuing moralistic efforts that address the deficiencies of the offender, crime science views the offender’s surroundings as the important ingredient in need of attention. As Clarke notes, “crime is an act, not merely a propensity, and it can only be explained in terms of the interaction between the disposition…and the situation that provides the opportunity for crime to occur” (2008, p. 178). Agents responsible for preventing or reducing crime will often have little information available regarding the personal characteristics of offenders (such as their mental health or family background). In the rare
occasions when the factors causing a person’s offending are known, there is often nothing that can be done with the resources available (e.g., a police captain can increase patrol in a high-crime neighborhood, but cannot mandate cognitive-behavioral therapy for offenders who congregate there).

The need for practical solutions to ongoing crime problems has created a reliance on the scientific method. As concern for positive outcomes grew, tools that assist in observable crime reductions were enthusiastically embraced. The scientific method, guided by crime science theory, reshaped the way crime is understood and addressed, creating a problem-solving or intelligence-led approach. Viewing crime as a problem, the solution must address the cause; and to design and implement the solution, the cause must be accurately identified. The technological revolution of the 1990s accelerated the use of crime science tools. Rather than relying on the subjective reports of beat cops or neighborhood residents, computer programs made the synthesis and analysis of quantitative crime data possible.

Data-led crime analysis revealed the who, what, when, and where of a crime problem. With the advent of computer aided dispatch (CAD) and geographic information systems (GIS), the spatiotemporal dispersion of crime could be easily quantified, mapped out in black and white. Yet these empirical efforts were not without debate. Specifically, there has remained a divide concerning the cause of crime patterns revealed through these methods (Anselin, Griffiths, & Tita, 2008). Are these crime concentrations a result of broad social, economic, or political influences? Or have these hot spots emerged due to some feature of the environment that brings together the readily-motivated offender with an attractive target and no capable guardian? Though there is no easy answer in this debate, the query of concern is the why or the how of crime. It is not enough to demonstrate on a chart that crime is highest at a certain time of day
near a certain street intersection. Rather, as these analyses have become more commonplace, agencies began to explore the precise context that produces the observed offending pattern.

New technologies have revolutionized place-based criminology by providing updated research methods and analytic tools. Yet merely summarizing crime data provides minimal insight into the context that encourages a crime problem. To solve a crime problem, an iterative process is required, in which hypotheses are tested and retested, then modified and retested again (Weisel, 2003). An effective problem solving effort must have correctly appraised the cause of crime, and then implement an intervention that alters those same causes (Scott, 2006). The use of the scientific method demands this process, and is thus hailed as a supreme crime-fighting tool.

However, readers should be aware of the lure of the underserved “scientific aura” (Braga, 2002) often given to the methods used in crime reduction strategies; even the most advanced analytical capabilities have flaws (Harries, 1999). Our values must shift from the impression that our methodological and statistical techniques should be as complex as possible, to an insistence that our understanding of the crime problem be as thorough as possible (Townsley & Pease, 2003). More practically, an analysis of a crime problem will only be as accurate as the data collected (Maguire & Hopkins, 2003). In their classic article on law enforcement as problem solvers, Eck and Spelman (1987b) identify perhaps the largest issue with crime analysis: the results are used to allocate already existing policing resources. As such, “responses” to crime are determined before the problem is fully understood, and a blanket prescription for crime reduction is applied to substantially different problems. A successful intervention may not translate into further success across space or time (Ekblom, 1997). Indeed, as Braga describes, the tendency is for agencies to “blindly adopt these ‘proven’ responses rather than conducting the necessary
problem analysis to determine whether the program fits well with the nature of the crime problem as it manifests itself in the operational environments of their cities” (2002, p. 107).

This shortcoming can be avoided when conscientious analysts and intervention developers grasp the whole picture of a crime problem; one way of doing this is by gathering both qualitative and quantitative data (Scott, Eck, Knutsson, & Goldstein, 2008). Place-based crime prevention policies are based upon the analysis of data related to a highly specific crime problem. To change a crime problem, a thorough process is required that will uncover the actual circumstances that cause an offender to recognize and exploit a crime opportunity. Geographic profiling is a holistic process in which multiple sources of information are consulted to understand a local crime problem. Many advocate for intelligence-led policies, but intelligence does not have to come in the form of numbers or official reports. These sources of data are important, but fail to provide the whole picture. In gathering information about a crime problem, analysts are wise to incorporate a variety of data types (e.g., calls for service, interviews, officer reports) and sources (e.g., offenders, victims, neighborhood residents, patrol officers) in their assessment. As such, geographic profiling, which synthesizes qualitative and quantitative data, is a best practice in the methods of crime science.

Yet, best practices are not always followed, and even superior crime science methods have their flaws. As a result, a variety of applications result from the same theory; because there is diversity in the methods used, there is diversity in the speculated cause of crime, producing differences in crime interventions. One camp believes that broad social conditions (such as a lack of informal social control or neighborhood-wide legal cynicism) produce concentrations of crime in certain areas. Consequently, they advocate for programs that address the sociological features of a community that are conducive to crime. The other camp affirms that narrow
environmental factors (such as poor street lighting) lead to crime hot spots. Accordingly, they institute solutions that are more tightly focused on the explicit and malleable cause that was identified.

As conveyed in Figure 2.1 (and discussed at the top of the chapter), the best approach to crime reduction involves attention to the deep-seated characteristics of the offender and his or her community along with the immediate circumstances in which the offender finds himself. The methodological innovations of crime science, particularly through geographic profiling, provide a well-rounded picture of a crime problem. By gathering multiple sources of data, a truer understanding of crime opportunities is gained, leading to a more successful intervention.

**Innovations in Practice**

Changing the physical environment to prevent crime is nothing new. Place-based approaches to crime reduction have long tried to alter the benefits and costs (that is, the targets and guardians) at a specific location. Prior to the introduction of crime science theories and methods, however, the prescriptions for crime problems were generic. Early environmental criminologists attempted to pinpoint the community characteristics that are associated with increases in social disorder. Yet the “place” side of the crime triangle (see Figure 2.2) can be misconstrued as either too vague or too definitive, both at once. Community-oriented approaches to crime reduction widen the place-based idea to include the larger environment in which a crime problem takes place. Specifically, community-oriented policing aims to address how neighborhood structure impacts crime by focusing on the quality of life for residents therein (Reisig, 2010).
As an organizational strategy, community-oriented policing entirely redefines the function of law enforcement, suggesting new strategies altogether (Moore, 1992). There is no specific definition of community-oriented policing, with some scholars asserting that no such characterization can be made (Oliver & Bartgis, 1998). Yet while the practices under the umbrella of community-oriented policing are highly diverse, they differ because they share a common philosophy: context matters (Gentile, 1995). Crime reductions will be greatest when the analysis and response are highly individualized to a local crime problem.

As specified by Cordner (1999), four elements separate community orientations from other methods of law enforcement. First, the philosophical dimension provides new values for officers. Community policing seeks cooperation from local residents and organizations, and police must embody a personal service orientation while exploring the native culture. Next, the strategic dimension specifies that community policing should include much personal interaction between agents of formal social control and neighborhood residents. Not only does this foster positive relationships between police and the public, but it also allows officers to more fully understand local crime problems. Third, the tactical dimension conveys that officers must investigate, analyze, and address community-specific social disorder. This is achieved by establishing close relationships with neighborhood residents, which also cultivates a collaborative relationship in which community members actively work with law enforcement to reduce crime. Finally, the organizational dimension changes the structure of a police force, giving problem-solving authority to officers regardless of rank. This further implicates the need for officers to systematically seek and understand the local community conditions that may be responsible for a crime problem.
Unfortunately, research on the effectiveness of community-oriented policing is limited (Reisig, 2010). However, much is known regarding the neighborhood characteristics that mediate the relationship between structural disadvantage and crime. Drawing from social disorganization theory, Kornhauser (1978) contends that disorder arises from a lack of effective social controls. A wealth of impressive studies indeed confirm that enhancing community relations (such as through social cohesion, mutual trust, collective efficacy, or willingness to intervene) can reduce community disorder, including offending (Browning, Feinberg, & Dietz, 2004; Carr, 2005; Lowenkamp, Cullen, & Pratt, 2003; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; Warner, 2007; Wilkinson, 2007). The logic follows, then, that if improved informal social control reduces crime, then law enforcement agencies should work to nurture resident relations (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). By encouraging neighborhood residents to take ownership of collective community spaces, social control can be more widely activated (Sampson, 2004).

Investigating the causes of a local crime problem, then designing an intervention to change those causes in order to prevent crime, seems a daunting task. It is of little surprise that the strategies used to reduce crime have differed depending on the crime problem. The SARA process was developed to streamline and synthesize these divergent methods (SARA = Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment; Clarke & Eck, 2005; Eck & Spelman, 1987a). In the first stage, scanning, multiple sources of information are consulted to develop a clear definition of the crime problem of concern. As more data becomes available, the description of the problem may change, though despite its characterization, the event must be something the police can reasonably expected to control. Next, in the analysis stage, the specific problem is evaluated in order to develop an appropriate response. Information about police experiences in addressing a
similar problem is gathered to inform the planned solution. In the third stage, the response, the findings from the analysis are used to design an explicit remedy of the crime problem. Notably, the police problem-solver must explore a broad range of available strategies, and choose the solution that best suits the results of the analysis. Finally, in the assessment stage, the impact of the response on the crime problem is measured. The findings from this evaluation should inform the current solution of the crime problem, and should contribute to the body of knowledge that future problem-solvers consult.

A problem orientation to crime reduction refashions the theories, methods, and practices used to address offending. The SARA model tailors a response to a specific crime problem, measuring and adjusting the intervention as necessary. Traditionally, environmental criminology has focused on the “place” side of the crime triangle (see Figure 2.2). As the following section explores, the other components can be manipulated to prevent crime, as well. Rather than focusing exclusively on physical surroundings, the contributions of crime science can be used to address the opportunity for crime. Moreover, crime science can move beyond offending to look at individual offenders, altering their routine activities to limit the criminal opportunities they are exposed to.

**CRIME SCIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY REDUCTION**

To limit the opportunities for crime that an individual may encounter, a new way of thinking about offending and criminal justice solutions is required. Crime reduction practices must go beyond a blanket approach to physically changing high-crime environments. Problem solvers must understand the perspective of the offender; specifically, uncovering how certain surroundings create the perception that criminal opportunity is available for exploit. To prevent
crime, practitioners must look beyond the physical elements of a place alone, and toward the circumstances that promote crime commission. By determining the stimuli that offenders interpret as conducive to crime, the actual opportunity to commit that crime can be minimized.

Although some features of the physical environment may provide “cues for crime” to any ordinary person (e.g., unguarded cash), other factors require a better understanding of the individual offender. What emotions, actions, or possessions does the offender find rewarding? Where are these rewards located? What emotions or actions does the offender find punishing? Where do these punishments come from? What signals does the offender receive that makes him think he won’t be caught? What signals make him think he will be caught? By answering these questions, the situational precipitators of crime (see Figure 2.1) can be addressed in two ways. First, the daily activities of the offender can be designed to avoid contact with the crime opportunities they identify. Second, the offender’s environment can be manipulated to reduce the rewards, increase the punishments, and improve detection / enforcement of the crime opportunities they will undoubtedly encounter.

These tasks goes beyond the rational choice perspective that offenders will be deterred from committing crime if the benefits are few but the costs are great. Certainly this element cannot be ignored; however, beyond the manipulation of surface-level temptations and dissuasions, there must be a broader effort to minimize the chance to commit a crime in the first place. Using the lessons learned from crime science, the three sides of the outer crime triangle (see Figure 2.2) can be exploited in order to reduce crime opportunities. By recruiting offender handlers, creating target guardians, and training place managers, the two aforementioned tasks can be addressed: offenders will be exposed to fewer opportunities to commit crime, and the perceived crime opportunities that they do encounter will be less favorable for pursuit.
Offender Handlers

Understanding why a person commits a crime is an important pursuit, but discovering how that person commits a crime is of greater importance in reducing offending opportunities (Clarke & Eck, 2005). In thinking about all the possible people that could prevent someone from committing crime, it quickly becomes clear that the robustness of that list will vary from person to person. An offender may report that the only people who prevent them from committing crime are the police (and their effectiveness at actually preventing the offender from committing crime is questionable). Non-offenders might acknowledge that in addition to a number of formal social controls such as criminal justice actors, they are prevented from committing crime by their family (parents, spouse, kids, etc.), friends (classmates, coworkers, etc.), and even more distant associates (boss, neighbors, etc.). It is reasonable, then, to assume that all the people the non-offender comes in contact with contribute to his or her abiding the law. Thus, people who can prevent a particular offender from committing crime should be recruited.

Some offender handlers, such as the police and probation and parole authorities, prevent crime by the definition of their job. Yet agents of informal social control (such as a significant other, a neighborhood watch group, or area business owners) are a crucial element to crime reduction for two reasons. First, these potential offender handlers have a stake in the success of the solution; when that particular offender does not commit crime, they are directly benefited. Second, they may understand (or even be a contributor to) how that individual encounters and pursues crime opportunities; these prospective handlers are in a prime position to develop and institute solutions (National Research Council of the National Academies, 2008).

Community-oriented approaches to crime prevention are based on the context of a crime-specific population or place. By viewing and measuring crime as a native problem in need of a
native solution, it becomes clear that the people local to the crime opportunity should be recruited to eliminate those opportunities (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). By contracting the support and involvement of the community in which the offender is embedded, the strength of formal social control agents such as the police is extended (Taxman, Young, & Byrne, 2004). As officers cannot persistently maintain a watchful and responsive eye on all prospective offenders, additional parties responsible for offender monitoring must be recruited. With these relationships comes less crime opportunity, whether from surveillance, distraction, or persuasion of the offender (Clarke & Eck, 2005).

Third party policing is one such mechanism of this form of crime control, in which offender handlers are solicited (Clarke & Eck, 2005; Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005). By recruiting a class of individuals who can influence offenders’ primary environment, a number of barriers are created between the prospective offender and the offense (Buerger & Mazerolle, 1998; Ekblom, 2005). Even further, when these informal social control agents cooperate with police, compliance with the law is more likely to occur (Pew Center on the States, 2008). The handlers are in a better position than the police to influence the activities of the offender, and may provide the police with useful information about available crime opportunities they should address. By any process, research demonstrates that offenders with strong family and community ties are less likely to recidivate (National Research Council of the National Academies, 2008; Warr, 1998).

**Target Guardians**

According to Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activity theory, a crime will occur when a motivated offender meets an attractive target lacking a capable guardian. As previously discussed, motivation is not of concern; this is because motivation is perhaps always present
despite the available opportunities, or because motivation cannot readily be addressed.

Naturally, what the offender defines as an ‘attractive’ target will be unique that one individual (Smith, 2003). Though some targets can themselves be directly manipulated (e.g., a store keeping a limited amount of cash in the register or an individual not walking to his or her car alone at night), the personalized nature of target preferences makes their number infinite. Moreover, the actors trying to uncover what targets are attractive will likely have a very misrepresentative idea of an actual offender’s perspective. For these reasons, a more malleable crime prevention effort is needed to protect the array of potential victims or targets.

Guardianship can come in many forms, with the central mission of decreasing the vulnerability of a target to a possible crime. Routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson’s 1979 formulation) indicates that guardians may be human actors or security devices. With the development of the outer crime problem triangle which features various “controllers” (see Figure 2.2), guardians generally refer to individuals protecting their own and their acquaintances’ persons and property (Clarke & Eck, 2005). Just as with offender handlers, informal guardians (such as neighbors, coworkers, or family members) augment the capabilities of formal guardians (such as law enforcement actors; National Research Council of the National Academies, 2008). Simply, the greater the guardianship, the less defenseless the potential target.

As listed by Ekblom (2005), there are a variety of methods to reduce the vulnerability of target property, persons, and enclosures. By removing access to a target (e.g., a security fence), concealing the target (e.g., placing shopping bags in the trunk of an empty car), or hardening the target (e.g., installing flood lighting), property is less susceptible to theft and vandalism. People can prevent victimization through target avoidance (e.g., avoiding places where offenders congregate) and reducing any potential offense provocation (e.g., turning the other cheek when
insulted). Finally, enclosures can be safeguarded by controlling the perimeter of a space (e.g., clear space boundaries) or controlling access to that space (e.g., a security card reader at the entrance of a residential area).

Because the possible methods of guardianship are as numerable as the targets they are protecting, it is clear that not all can be accounted for and addressed. Without doubt, general crime prevention measures (such as typical target hardening provisions like surveillance cameras or security tags on merchandise) are effective. It is difficult to say how influential these target guardians are; what is known, however, is that the amount of crime a community experiences is noticeably related to the opportunities that the physical and social arrangements of that community make (un)available (Clarke & Eck, 2005). Nearly a century of social science research has demonstrated that, despite the motivation or propensity of the offender, fruitful crime opportunities will be exploited (Felson & Clarke, 1998).

Accordingly, crime prevention efforts must increase the guardianship of potential targets and victims. Or, preferably, those efforts should create the perception for any actor (with any motivation or propensity) that there are no attractive targets available or that they are being effectively guarded (Taylor & Nee, 1988). In any form, guardians must convey to potential offenders that the pursuit of a target comes with great risk; guards must cue for offenders that they will not successfully obtain the target or complete the victimization, or that they will be apprehended and punished for their attempt.

**Place Managers**

The crime triangle (see Figure 2.2) indicates that an offense will occur when the offender and target converge in space and time, and there is an absence of effective controllers. Crime
science theory and practices have vigorously pursued the circumstances of a place that promote offending. Even more importantly, many factors that prevent crime at a given place have also been discovered (Clarke & Eck, 2005). Typically, place-based crime reduction efforts have included measures that physically alter the environment. These efforts have included ways to increase the costs of crime, decrease the benefits of crime, maximize the effort needed to commit crime, reducing provocations that lead to crime, and removing excuses that are used to justify crime (Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Wortley, 2001). More recently, these programs have begun to solicit the aid of people related to these spaces. Specifically, individuals or groups can be trained as place managers, or people who can control the behavior that occurs within the space for which they are responsible.

From a purely pragmatic standpoint, recruiting place managers reduces the burden on police. Law enforcement cannot address each physical space that is conducive to crime – they do not have the time, resources, or authority. Giving the surveillance and administration tasks of an environment to one of its natural owners (e.g., the residence’s tenant, a store manager, a front office worker) not only relieves police strain, but also extends the power to prevent and detect crimes. In addition, these managers know the place more intimately, allowing them to design and implement more appropriate crime prevention measures.

More conceptually, oftentimes the roots of physical disorder that may promote crime in a given place can be traced to the people who inhabit that space. Indeed, police and their community partners have long noted that developing a description of a specific crime problem is not as easy a task as it might seem. As many problem-solvers discover, the circumstances common to high-crime spaces are often unspecific (such as poverty, racism, or other forms of social-structural disorder); developing a detailed response to the crime problem is therefore quite
difficult. Under the heading of “broken windows,” Wilson and Kelling (1982) have speculated that physical decay (like abandoned buildings, unkempt landscaping, or signs of vandalism) signals to offenders that public order is minimal, and the risk of apprehension is therefore slight. As a space goes unmaintained, area inhabitants such as residents or shoppers perceive high levels of disorder; as a consequence, fear of crime increases, people are reluctant to venture into these areas, willingness to intervene in socially undesirable behavior is minimized, and community controls break down. Thus, the metaphorical broken window gives way to further physical and social disorder (Wagers, Sousa, & Kelling, 2008).

One prescription for this problem is to recruit the owners of these disordered places to better manage their owned space; this can be accomplished by training managers to make changes to the space in ways that will alter the uses of that space. For instance, crime could be prevented if a business owner would eliminate the loitering that takes place in the company’s parking lot; by installing an entrance checkpoint (such as a card reader with a gate or a security kiosk) or making access to the place more difficult (such as speed bumps or fencing), the behavior of the space’s inhabitants will immediately be changed.

Though typically the police are seen as responsible for maintaining order, this can also be achieved when place managers are taught to resolve minor incivilities. By removing the perceptual signs that crime is welcomed in a public space, two important goals are achieved. First, potential offenders perceive an increased risk of being observed, arrested, and sanctioned, thereby decreasing the likelihood that they will engage in the crime. Equally important, addressing structural decay helps resolve social disarray; by sending the message to community residents that crime will no longer be tolerated at that specific place, it increases the probability that they will be concerned, will intervene if necessary, and will take steps to manage their own
spaces (Kelling & Coles, 1996). Indeed, one specific role of place managers is to informally enforce social behavioral norms for that area (Walker, 1984). This is clearly problematic if the norm is deviant; thus, place managers play an important role in negotiating what forms of behavior are acceptable for the space they own (Sousa & Kelling, 2006).

One difficult aspect of this approach is determining which signs of disorder will lead to more serious crime problems, and which environmental cues should be left unaddressed. Ensuring that place owners exercise effective management choices, as opposed to adopting a zero tolerance or fortress style mindset, is crucial to the success of maintenance crime prevention (Sousa, 2010). As such, it is necessary that police and crime prevention scholars teach place managers how to gather intelligence about the causes of a crime problem, and how to prioritize possible responses to that problem (Ratcliffe, 2008). As data analysis has become a more common tool used by crime problem-solvers, crime prevention and place management have become integral parts of everyday law enforcement work, shifting focus from its typical reactive role (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Accordingly, sufficient place management is not a generic response to a generic crime “problem,” but a means of minimizing the real opportunities for crime that offenders perceive and pursue.

**OPPORTUNITY REDUCTION SUPERVISION**

Traditionally, crime science approaches have been reactive problem-solving efforts; probation and parole authorities can capitalize on the successes of these police interventions to create a proactive approach to limiting reoffending. As discussed above, recruiting offender handlers, creating target guardians, and training place managers are all effective crime prevention methods. Tailoring these three strategies to community supervised offenders will
effectively minimize recidivism (specific strategies will be discussed in the following chapter). Although the police are largely reactionary (enforcing law violations), a more preventative approach is required for active offending populations, in which behavioral change is substituted for behavioral control (Taxman, Byrne, & Young, 2003).

One important aspect of this strategy is the combination of formal and informal control mechanisms. Not only do additional crime controllers prevent crime through surveillance and enforcement, but the social capital that these controllers may provide for offenders will additionally encourage desistance (e.g., a steady job provides new routine activities with more handlers, guardians, and managers, but it also creates new prosocial associations; Farrall, 2004; Wright & Cullen, 2004). Further, by involving the community of origin in addressing crime, the problem is better understood, and the resources are better able to tackle the various roots of that problem (Community Policing Consortium, 1994). This framework advocates for the disruption of recidivism patterns through the development of strategic and collaborative solutions (Ratcliffe, 2008).

As the discussion in this chapter has demonstrated, the best solution to recurring crime problems (such as relapsing community supervised offenders) is the reduction of opportunity. Addressing the precipitators of crime is the most effective means to reduce the various forms of opportunity that probationers and parolees encounter. The creation of a community supervision case plan should therefore focus on the three forms of opportunity reduction (see Figure 2.1). The plan must include interactions and programming that address cognitions – it must change the way that offenders interpret criminal opportunity. The plan must create stipulations that will attend to the crime-probable situations that the offender finds himself in – it must reduce the offenders’ exposure to environments where they are likely (based upon their past) to encounter
criminal opportunity. In combining these two strategies, the case plan must address the routines that have developed from that offenders’ cognitions and situations – it must restrict offenders’ access to environments where criminal opportunity abounds.

Chapter 1 documented the reasons that probation and parole practices are ineffective. The balance of treatment and control does not work the way it is being done, in part because the constituent parts are exercised poorly, and in part because potential agents of change have become passive service brokers. Chapter 2 indicates that, as demonstrated by crime science, a revolution requires changes to the theory, methods, and practices of the problem of concern. Thus, changing the focus of community supervision to strategies that reduce criminal opportunity will require that the day-to-day operations of community supervision officers and agencies. As outlined in Chapter 3, there are a number of specific tactics and techniques that will directly reduce the criminal opportunities that probationers and parolees interpret, encounter, and exploit.
CHAPTER 3
HOW TO SUPERVISE OFFENDERS

• Introduction
  ▪ Recap of first two chapters
    - Chapter 1 demonstrates that current offender supervision practices do not work; the balance of treatment and control is not effective, and neither works well alone as currently used
    - Chapter 2 shows, through the insights of crime science, that opportunity reduction can dramatically improve the effectiveness of probation and parole supervision
  ▪ The current chapter discusses how to best supervise offenders according to an environmental corrections model
    - Changing the strategy of community corrections means changing beliefs about probation and parole, the way supervision offices are structured and how processes are administered, and the daily operations of practitioners

• Current offender supervision practices
  ▪ Intake, assessment, and case plan development
  ▪ Treatment
  ▪ Control
  ▪ Discharge

• Environmental corrections supervision
  ▪ Identifying exposure to crime opportunities
    - Figure 4.1: Social Network Analysis
    - Figure 4.2: Crime Precipitators
    - Figure 4.3: Offending Hotspots
  ▪ Creating the offender’s case plan
  ▪ Modifying the offender’s case plan
  ▪ Graduated consequences
  ▪ Earned discharge and aftercare
CHAPTER 4
DEVELOPING OFFENDER SUPERVISION TECHNOLOGY

- **Introduction**
  - Overview of previous chapter
  - Following the offender supervision practices discussed in Chapter 3, new technologies are required to aid in the reduction of probationers’ and parolees’ exposure to criminal opportunity
  - The current chapter includes a presentation of example technologies; these would require tailoring for the context in which they are used (e.g., resources available, population used on, education and training of users)

- **Offender assessment and classification**
  - The importance of assessment
  - Evolution of offender assessments
  - The Level of Service Inventory – Revised
  - The Level of Service / Case Management Inventory

- **Identifying opportunities for crime**
  - Form A: Opportunity Risk Reduction Inventory
    - Risk level of encountering / exploiting crime opportunities
    - Criminogenic needs that contribute to finding / using crime opportunities
    - Responsivity considerations related to crime opportunities

- **Identifying opportunity reduction partners**
  - Form B: Identifying Controllers
    - Offender handlers
    - Target guardians
    - Place managers
CHAPTER 5
GETTING OFFENDERS TO THINK RIGHT

- **Introduction**
  - As it is not possible to provide stipulations that will prevent the offender from ever encountering opportunities for crime, it is necessary to also address the offender’s propensity for offending
    - Many elements of criminal propensity are beyond manipulation, at least within the resource constraints of a typical supervision sentence
    - Must focus on dynamic criminogenic needs, particularly those that contribute to an offender’s interpretation and pursuit of criminal opportunity
  - Addressing propensity is more than one program or a referral to social services; the present chapter discusses effective strategies for creating pro-social cognitions among probationers and parolees
  - In this vein, the approaches explored in the discussion that follows demonstrate how correctional rehabilitation (in particular, the lessons learned from programs that adhere to the principles of effective intervention) can be aligned with the environmental corrections model of offender supervision

- **Targets for change: The central eight**
  - To prevent crime originating from the offender, we have to understand what causes crime
  - Meta-analyses demonstrate that there are eight characteristics repeatedly associated with offending, and program evaluations indicate the best practices in reducing these risks:
    - History of antisocial behavior → create alternative behaviors in high-risk scenarios
    - Antisocial personality pattern → create problem-solving and emotional management skills
    - Antisocial cognition → reduce pro-crime attitudes, create an anti-criminal identity
    - Antisocial associates → reduce association with offenders, enhance interactions with non-criminal associates
    - Family / marital → reduce conflict and build positive relationships
    - School / work → enhance performance and satisfaction
    - Leisure / recreation → enhance pro-social community involvement and satisfaction
- Substance abuse → reduce addiction, reduce supports for substance-oriented behaviors, enhance alternative to substance use

- **Responsivity: Cognitive behavioral techniques**
  - No matter the validity of the goal, if the mechanism is not capable of influencing the roots of criminal propensity, positive outcomes will not be achieved
  - CBT presents the most effective means of altering antisocial personality, cognitions, and associates
  - CBT can be influential in reducing propensity through two routes:
    - Altering offenders’ interpretation of environmental stimuli (whether they observe an opportunity to commit crime)
    - Altering offenders’ appraisal of criminal opportunity (whether they think the rewards are plentiful and/or the sanctions are

- **Changing offender behavior**
  - The decision to change
    - Supervision officers should be trained in motivational interviewing, aiming to get their clients to be enthusiastic about their potential progress
    - As the offender will encounter hurdles in creating a prosocial identity, the choice to “go straight” must be reified and rewarded
    - As not all offenders will have the desire to make a forceful shift in their lifestyle, it is necessary for officers to adjust the level of control the offender is subject to, and ensure that they are participating in prosocial activities; this may bring about “desistance by default”

  - **Modeling change**
    - A sufficient “dosage of treatment” is needed to influence offender behavior, which should be determined after assessing the offender’s level of risk
    - The supervision meetings must be more than a bureaucratic necessity or an impersonation of control; officers must model prosociality, teaching the offender problem-solving and emotional control skills (e.g., EPICS)
    - As offenders are required to embody a lifestyle with which they may not be familiar, they must be exposed to prosocial mentors; it is the role of the officer to develop influential offender handlers with whom the offender can identify
    - Just as practice makes perfect, it can be expected that offenders will make mistakes, even relapsing into minor criminal behavior; this expectation is reasonable, and has two implications:
      - A zero-tolerance approach cannot work, and unstructured deterrence approaches will backfire
      - Undesirable behaviors can be used as teachable moments

- **Facilitating change**
The decision to change and knowing how to behave will not be enough for prosociality to naturally occur; offenders must be placed in environments that are reinforcing of their new identity. It is the role of the officer to design a new routine activity for the offender, in which their daily actions cause them to encounter more offender handlers, better target guardians, and effective place managers. As targeted rehearsal can only go so far, the officer should supervise the offender in the community as they encounter situations that require use of their new skill set (e.g., the first time they fill out a job application, what to do during supervised visitation with his or her child).

- **Solidifying change**
  - In the beginning, overt rewards must be provided for the exercise of prosocial behavior to give offenders additional impetuses to change.
  - As the supervision plan progresses, offenders should be trained to relocate the rewards internally (e.g., job satisfaction, pride in parenting).
  - Because the supervision term will eventually expire, the officer should remind offenders frequently of the beneficial consequences of their new lifestyle (rather than threatening sanctions if they should relapse), and make arrangements for aftercare.

- **Rehabilitation and opportunity reduction**
  - It is not the goal of the officer (or partnering service providers / program administrators) to “fix” the offender; the purpose is to reorient the offender’s interpretation of the criminal opportunities they are bound to encounter.
  - Far from a liberal ideal or a purely humanitarian effort, reducing propensity has visible impacts on crime prevention.
  - By reducing criminal opportunity through crime science, while also reducing criminal propensity according to the principles of effective correctional intervention, the greatest reduction in offending will be observed.
CHAPTER 6
HOW THE POLICE CAN HELP

• Introduction
  ▪ The police as formal social control
    - Police agencies have capabilities that allow them to manage offender behavior perhaps beyond any other entity
    - The fear of arrest that offenders on community supervision generally have can be used as a point of leverage
  ▪ The police as intelligence experts
    - Police officers have access to resources that probation and parole agents do not
    - Police officers receive multiple sources of information about offenders, often observing the roots of crime at their source
  ▪ The police as problem-solvers
    - Because police are agents of social control and have expertise about crime problems, they are in the perfect position to recommend solutions
    - Police are suited to contribute to the efficacy of crime reduction initiatives when they partner with corrections
      - The presentation of a full-force approach to opportunity reduction sends a strong and unambiguous message to offenders
      - Police and probation / parole officers can partner together to balance the minimization of propensity and opportunity

• Problem-oriented policing and the crime triangle
  ▪ Policing offenders
    - Focused deterrence
    - Pulling levers
    - Co-offending
  ▪ Policing targets, guardians, and places
    - Hot spot policing
    - Neighborhood approaches to proactive crime control

• Police partnerships with probation and parole
  ▪ Examples of partnerships
  ▪ Specific points of intervention
    - Police and offender handlers
    - Police and target guardians
    - Police and place managers
CHAPTER 7
MAKING OFFENDER SUPERVISION WORK

• Introduction
  ▪ Restatement of why current offender supervision practices are ineffective
  ▪ Overview of the opportunity reduction model of probation / parole

• The role of research in opportunity reduction supervision
  ▪ Outcome evaluations
  ▪ Process evaluations
  ▪ Supervision tools and technology

• Potential hurdles of opportunity reduction supervision
  ▪ Resource constraints
  ▪ Stakeholder support
  ▪ Probation / parole officer expertise
  ▪ Offender motivation

• Potential advantages of opportunity reduction supervision
  ▪ Reduced offending (and thus reduced victimization, criminal justice costs, etc.)
  ▪ Empowerment of high-crime communities
  ▪ Restoration of faith in the corrections system to actually correct
REFERENCES


